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
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
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
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THE THEÆTETUS

OF PLATO,

WITH


A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

BY THE

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VICAR OF MILFORD, HANTS :

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TO

EDMUND LAW LUSHINGTON, Esq., M.A.,

PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,

THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S THEÆTETUS

IS GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED

BY HIS OLD PUPIL

LEWIS CAMPBELL.

May, 1861.



P R E F A C E.

THE Text of this Edition differs in some respects from that of the Zurich Editors, from which it has in the main been printed.

1. All conjectural emendations have been excluded, except such as appeared to be absolutely required for the correction of mere clerical errors: and these latter have been enclosed within brackets []. The Student is thus at once enabled to distinguish between the (sometimes corrupt) reading that is found in MSS., and that which has been created by the ingenuity of scholars.

The *guesses* even of the highest genius do not pretend to certainty; and the admission of conjectural readings into the text has this disadvantage, that it tends to lull curiosity asleep, and to put an end to conjecture.

Some of the readings which have been thus removed exist in almost all the editions from Stephanus downwards. He appears to have received them on the authority of Cornarius, who, after long study of the ancient medical writers, translated Plato in his old age. In the execution of this work (according to his son, who published it at Basle in 1561) he

used the three printed editions then extant, and *one* MS. from the Library of Baron Hassenstein. This MS. was probably destroyed with the others in the same Library before the end of the 16th century.

Unfortunately, in the *Eclogæ*, or Select Readings, which he appended to each quaternion of dialogues, Cornarius has not distinguished between the readings of this MS. and his own conjectures, of which, as Fischer says (in an Epistle prefixed to his edition of the *Eclogæ*, Lips. 1771), ‘*magnam attulit multitudinem.*’ The formula ‘*legendum est*’ appears to serve equally for both. In his remarks on the *Theætetus* he only once names the MS., and then to differ from it: and in this case (*ἰπνοπλαθῶν* p. 147) the ‘*Codex Hassenstenius*’ is in agreement with the twenty MSS. which have been collated since.

The claim of any single reading of Cornarius to MS. authority, unless supported by other evidence, must be allowed to be very slight indeed. And nothing is known of the value of the MS. in question, beyond what may be gathered from the fact that it was probably bought, towards the middle of the 16th century, for the sum (according to Fischer) of 2000 ducats.

2. Of MS. readings, that of the ‘*Codex Clarkianus*’ in the Bodleian Library has, with rare exceptions, been preferred. The value of this MS., which no editor except C. F. Hermann has yet sufficiently appreciated, is evident from the following facts. ‘It was written,’ (so the last page informs us) ‘by the

hand of John,' (well-named) 'Calligraphus, for Arethas the Deacon, of Patræ,' in the year 896. It was brought from Patmos by Dr. Clarke the traveller, from whom it was bought for the Bodleian Library. Thus it is not only considerably superior in known antiquity to any other MS. containing the Theætetus, but has probably been preserved from adverse influences to which others may have been exposed. The two MSS., Vat. Δ. and Ven. II. (the latter of the 12th century) are very closely related to the Bodleian (though apparently not copied from it), agreeing as they do with it in its peculiar mistakes, and in the lacuna from p. 208, *πάνν μὲν οὖν*, to p. 210, *δοξάζομεν*, inclusive. The errors of the Bodleian MS. (which probably did not originate with John Calligraphus) are of a very simple kind, consisting chiefly either of the repetition of a syllable or initial consonant by a sort of memory of the eye, or the substitution of a word apparently from conjecture, or the introduction of a gloss into the text. Here and there a word is dropped or misplaced (though this is less common than in other MSS.) or the accentuation is at fault, or *ο* and *ω*, *ε* and *η*, *ι* and *ει* are confounded. In one or two instances a marginal reading in the ancient hand seems to indicate that the scribe had several texts amongst which to choose.

The notes contain a few readings of this MS. not mentioned by Gaisford. These are due to a collation made in the year 1856, and have since been verified with the kind assistance of some

friends. Where the readings of all the MSS. appeared corrupt, that of the Bodleian MS. has been printed between obeli, ††.

For a full account of the various readings, the student is referred to the notes of Bekker and Stallbaum, and to Gaisford's *Lectiones Platonicae*.

The present editor is under obligations to Heindorf, Stallbaum, Ast, Deycks, Socher, Zeller, Munk, Lassalle, and other scholars and writers, of whose labours he would have availed himself more largely had circumstances permitted. He has not been contented, however, until the data acquired seemed enough to justify him in forming his own opinion on each point.

For valuable information concerning the MSS. of Plato, he begs to express his acknowledgments to the Rev. H. O. Coxe, Bodley's Librarian, Oxford. His thanks are also due to the Rev. Dr. Badham, for having pointed out several difficulties in the text.

INTRODUCTION.

GREEK philosophy had passed through several phases before Plato wrote. The reflective and creative impulse, which had long striven with forms of the imagination, experiences of history, and impressions of Nature, and to which Socrates had added the energy of moral life, found its crowning form and development in his mind; while different tendencies of thought, which had till then seemed independent of each other, became woven by him into a kind of unity. This is not, however, the unity of a plan, foreseen by the author himself: or of a system, into which earlier ideas are moulded; nor even such perfect unity of treatment as would result if previous conceptions were seen and handled from an unaltering point of view: it is rather the common impress given by a growing mind to the various surrounding aspects of inquiry which it has made its own. The philosophy of Plato is one long dialogue, in which Socrates (its moving centre) becomes the pupil of each school, and teaches where he seems to learn. Protagorean scepticism, Eleatic transcendentalism, the mysticism of the Pythagoreans, the rhetoric of Lysias, are alike penetrated and weighed by the same searching spirit, which enters every labyrinth without losing itself in any.

In the *Theætetus* some earlier and some contemporary theories are made to converge upon the question, What is Knowledge? The method followed in it, and some of the leading thoughts, are akin to the earlier Megarian philosophy; while in itself the dialogue may be considered as a gradual advance from the consciousness of particular and relative impressions towards the contemplation of the universal and absolute Idea. This progress here takes the subjective form of an attempt to define knowledge; and in the course of it sensation and opinion are analysed, and shewn to be wholly indeterminate.

The antithesis between sense and knowledge, opinion and certainty, appearance and truth, the relative and the absolute,

has never ceased to exercise the human mind since the dawn of reflection. To Plato, and still more to those who preceded him, the antithesis and the problem which it involves were new. The mind of an educated Athenian in the time of Socrates was subtle, imaginative, comprehensive, in all practical and artistic matters fully awake, curious and ready for inquiry, but little familiar with the study of abstract ideas. The youth, who in this dialogue is presented to us as an embodiment of the philosophic nature, childishly attempts to define knowledge by an enumeration of the arts and sciences. Yet he proves capable of following the most sustained philosophical argument. So from crude beginnings the Greek mind was led onwards to discover for itself, by the light of its own young but noble intelligence, thoughts which its experience had not anticipated.

The endeavour to trace the origin of these thoughts, which have been so fruitful since, resembles the investigation of the sources of mythology. As the Homeric poems present a cycle of mythological ideas, the analysis of which, by the help of known analogies, reveals the dim features of an earlier and simpler cycle, so in the writings of Plato there are left many traces of earlier philosophies, by comparing which with their genuine extant fragments, and with the testimonies of later writers, some light is thrown, perhaps on those earlier philosophies themselves, certainly on the intellectual atmosphere in which Plato lived. The same inquiry brings out and illustrates his position in regard to contemporary opinion.

In the following Essay it is proposed in the first place to view some of these historical elements in connexion with the *Theætetus*, and to examine what indications this dialogue itself affords of its relation to them.

The answer to this question will be found useful in considering further, (1) the general scope and purpose of the dialogue, (2) its genuineness (if necessary), (3) its position amongst the other dialogues of Plato, (4) its supposed occasion, and the date of its composition; (5) its relation to Aristotle, and (6) to philosophy in general.

§ 1. Contemporary opinions.

Although the chief names mentioned in the *Theætetus* are older than Socrates, and "the problem has come down to us

from ancient times," a careful reader is soon led to suspect that the dialogue contains allusions to living men. The 'disciples' of Protagoras, and the 'friends' of Heraclitus, evidently play an important part in it: whilst there are others, the 'hard, repellent,' 'illiterate' persons, who are expressly forbidden to have any share in the discussion. These and the like touches, which may be paralleled from other dialogues, naturally provoke inquiry.

Before entering upon this, it may be noticed generally, that there is a peculiarity in Plato's manner of alluding to the thinkers of his own time. He speaks not of definite schools, but of 'a certain theory,' or of 'certain men.' We do not read of the friends of Antisthenes, or the disciples of Aristippus, or of Euclides and his band (*οἱ ἀμφὶ Εὐκλείδην*), but 'I have met many such men,' 'there are numbers who keep saying this,' or more familiarly, 'there are certain refined persons, to whom we must shew courtesy.' Allowance must no doubt be made for the natural reticence of Plato, and for the irony of the philosopher, who 'knows nothing of his neighbour.' But it is also reasonable to infer that the schools which claimed affinity with Socrates were only in process of formation, and that their boundaries were not yet well defined. The above remark does not apply to schools already formed, nor to persons contemporary with Socrates himself.—It is from later writers and not from Plato, that we learn which of the other philosophers then living exercised an influence that could survive their age. The chief amongst them in relation to the present subject were three friends or at least companions of Socrates,—Euclides, Aristippus, and Antisthenes.

I. Euclides of Megara, Plato's contemporary and fellow-disciple, seems in his method to have combined the negative dialectic of the Eleatics with the cross-questioning and with the ethical definitions of Socrates. The dialogue, written and spoken, seems to have assumed with him something of a controversial form. His *ἐριστική* must have been more earnest and philosophical than the vulgar *ἀντιλογική* so often ridiculed by Plato; but it was subject in a less degree to the same defects. We are told further, that he used to attack the conclusion and not the premises of an opponent.—One other fragment of his logic remains. He is said to have objected to

definition by comparison, because if things are unlike, they should not be compared; and if like, it is better to deal with the thing itself than its resemblances^a.

The centre of his positive teaching was the Good, which he said was one, called by many names, as Wisdom, God, Intelligence; and to what was opposed to this he denied existence. Here also the teaching of Socrates is engrafted on that of Parmenides and Zeno. The One Being, which is above growth and decay, is to be sought for, not in the universe, but in wisdom, the mind, and virtue. The non-existent is that which is opposite to, or other than the Good.

His theory of knowledge was probably less absolute than that of Parmenides, denying reality to the impressions of sense, but relying upon a sort of dialectic and upon certain ideas or forms, amongst which some diversity was allowed, so far at least as they entered into human language.

It is not easy to determine to what extent the teaching of Euclides contained the germs of the sophisms of Eubulides, or of the paradoxes of Diodorus and Stilpo. If it had such a tendency, he must have approached Antisthenes more nearly than would otherwise appear. It seems not unreasonable, however, to suppose that Eubulides may have introduced a new element into the Megarian school. At all events he gave a new and not altogether wholesome impulse to its paradoxical side.

The following are the chief points in which the *Theætetus* affords indications of its connexion with the school of Megara.

1. Its controversial tone.

Socrates more than once expresses the consciousness of such a tendency. We start indeed with the virtuous determination to conduct the argument, not as professors of word-fencing, but as lovers of knowledge, and yet presently we find ourselves in danger of being on a par with "those skilful men."^b Protagoras is imagined as reiterating this reproach, and confirming it by the reflection, which is dwelt upon also in the *Phædo*, that controversy leads to the hatred of inquiry. We are more-

^a Cf. Plat. Rep. p. 476: τὸ ὄνειρώττειν ἄρα οὐ τὸδε ἐστίν, εἴαν τ' ἐν ὕπνῳ τις εἴαν τε ἐρηγορῶς τὸ ὁμοίον τῷ μὴ ὁμοίον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγήται εἶναι ᾧ ἕοικεν. Ar.

Eth. N. VI. 3 ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν.

^b *Theæt.* p. 164.

over oppressed throughout the discussion with the fear of an imaginary adversary, skilled at the same sophistical weapons. And on reflecting, at each stage of the argument, what it is that has ruled throughout, and that remains triumphant, we are compelled to answer 'a negative dialectic.' The first impression of the youth, the maxims of the old philosophers, even our second thoughts and the strained effort of the imagination to substantiate them, are raised, only to be parted from the sphere of knowledge by this sharp weapon; which in another aspect is the liberating though still dividing instrument of the man-midwife Socrates. In this sense the *Theætetus* may fairly be regarded as an "eristic" or Megarian dialogue; since, although it is no mere sophistical sham-fight, it is characterized by the predominance of that dialectical exercise which consists in refuting theories. This is noticed by Plato himself in the passages just referred to, and is implied in the image of *μαλευτική*.

And the form of refutation used corresponds to that which is described as characteristic of Euclides. In each case the proof is not impugned, but the thing proved is laid hold of and annihilated. Man is not the measure, for if so, then why not every other creature endowed with sense? Motion cannot be the sole principle, for if so, language would be impossible. Protagoras is made to object to this mode of treatment. Socrates imagines him challenging them to disprove his premiss, and complaining that they use only negative proof.

2. Besides this correspondence of method, there are also some coincidences of idea.

a. The turning point of the whole dialogue, the fulcrum, by means of which the mind is finally lifted out of the region of sense, is the mention of the good, expedient, just and honourable, which *Theætetus* had at first unwarily included amongst the things which are not, but become. The knowledge of what is good cannot be resolved into sensation, nor into those motions on which the doctrine of sense was founded, because it regards the future.

This thought is also the occasion of the eloquent digression, in which a just and holy life accompanied with wisdom (*μετὰ φρονήσεως*) is set forth as the way from Earth to Heaven. And the form in which this idea of good occurs, is not transcen-

dent, as in the Republic^c, nor, as in the Philebus, arrived at by a process of reasoning upon the combination of finite and infinite in the world. It is more simple and Socratic than in either of these. And while it is conceived of as one, Socrates is not afraid of varying the name, (*ἀγαθόν, καλόν, ὠφέλιμον, δίκαιον, δσιον, φρόνησις.*)

β. In its general aspect the Theætetus affords only a partial escape from the relative world of sense and opinion towards absolute being, terminating with the conception of *λόγος* as definition by the distinctive difference. Where it may be noticed by the way, that the stress laid upon the perception of individual peculiarities (*πρὶν ἢ σιμότης αὐτῆ τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων — διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον — κατάθῃται*) is parallel to the saying of Euclides, that comparison does not convey knowledge.

This intermediate character of the Theætetus is indicated by Plato's own remark, that we are wavering between two factions, not siding wholly with either. This position is still in harmony with the philosophy of Euclides, who made some attempt to hold unity and diversity in solution together, and who rested ultimately on some form of reasoning (*λόγος*). It may be added, that the two conceptions with which the dialogue closes, of the separation of a whole into its elementary parts, and of the power of distinguishing the thing in question from all others, belong to the tendency combated in the Sophista, but more or less embodied in the Theætetus, to acquiesce in difference, falling short of the highest unity.

γ. It will appear in the sequel, that the difficulty about false opinion, which fills such an important place in the inquiry, and the distinction between the *ἐπιστητά* and *ἄλογα* (p. 201), which occasions the last answer of Theætetus, can be referred with greater probability to the Megarians than to Antisthenes.

3. In one or two points we are reminded of the later Megarian subtleties, and are led to suspect that they may have had their counterpart in the school of Euclides.

The humorous account of the man, from whom there is no escape, who shuts your eye, and asks if you see his cloak with it^d, may be compared with the *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος* of Eubulides. And when we are asked whether any one ever said to himself,

^c p. 509. οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγα- σβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.
θοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρε-
^d p. 165.

τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι^e, we may find a later parallel in the paradox of Stilpo, *ἕτερον ἕτερον μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι*. Such casual hints confirm the suspicion that the tendency already existed at Megara, though in a milder form than afterwards, 'to part everything from everything,' *τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποχωρῶν*. A more pleasing instance of the same analytical bias appears in the three *φάσματα*^f or axioms of the mind, by which it suffers itself to be bound; or in the repeated difficulty, *Ἄρ' οἶόν τε τὸν εἰδότε μὴ εἰδέναι*, which in fact underlies many of the later paradoxes.

The story that Plato and the other philosophers took refuge with Euclides at Megara, although hardly sufficient ground to build upon, is interesting as illustrating the friendship which clearly existed between Plato and Euclides.

If we add to these coincidences the fact that Plato represents this dialogue as having been preserved by Euclides, and asked for by Terpsion, (the Megarians who were present at the death of Socrates,) and that it is read in the house of the former, we have enumerated the chief points at which the dialogue seems to touch upon Megara.

Perhaps there is no more satisfactory account to be given of variations and inconsistencies in Plato, than that in different dialogues he is consciously approaching and examining different contemporary theories, adopting their tone, putting on their dress, as it were proving their armour, not without a latent confidence in the unaided strength of Mind.

This philosophical side of the dramatic genius of Plato is as real and more important than the poetical. The dialogue is not only a convenient artistic form for bringing out the different aspects of a question; Plato is himself continually holding converse with some one: and dramatic propriety is preserved not only in minute points, but in the tone pervading whole dialogues. Those in which an Eleatic stranger is the chief spokesman may still be Plato's, although they seem pervaded by an almost pedantic consciousness of method not found in others: a similar remark applies to the *Parmenides*: and even amongst those in which Socrates holds the first place a marked difference is perceivable; which may be accounted for by saying, (1) that Socrates is not Socrates, but Plato becoming all things

^e p. 190^f p. 155.

to all philosophies : (2) that Socrates is not altogether Plato, but a part-representation, part-creation of Plato's, which he contemplates and converses with, and even criticises : (3) that Socrates himself has different faces, reflected partially in his different followers, the most characteristic of which, the negative 'elenchus,' was reflected in Euclides of Megara.

Aristippus. II. We scarcely need the testimony of later writers to the fact that Euclides and Aristippus were opposed. It is sufficiently obvious from the statements of their doctrine which remain. They were natural enemies on the metaphysical side, as the Cyrenaic and Cynic were on the ethical. Aristippus is mentioned by name only once in Plato. In the *Phædo* it is emphatically remarked that he was not present at the death of Socrates. If we connect this with the strong language in which the position that pleasure is the chief good (which Aristippus held), is met in the *Republic* [p. 509. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ], it is natural to infer that he was regarded by Plato with little sympathy, and that he was probably one of those who left Socrates too early, and gave themselves the credit of their discoveries. The tone of Xenophon's representation conveys a similar impression. Attending like Socrates to the theory of human life, of knowledge and of the chief good, he seems to have been enabled by the impulse of Socratic inquiry to give a philosophical form to the popular doctrine, to which his easy temper and indolent life inclined him, that the Good is nothing else but pleasure. With this he consistently enough combined the sceptical assertion, The impression of the moment is the only Knowledge. He probably supported both these principles with certain physical and logical theories : adding that nothing was by nature just, but by custom and usage, and that the same word used by different men represents a different idea.

Whether his doctrine had fully developed itself into the distinct form which is given in the *Theætetus* to the hypothesis, Sense is Knowledge, it is impossible to say. That he is pointedly alluded to amongst the 'disciples of Protagoras,' if not as their chief, there seems little doubt, from what is recorded of his opinions. A comparison of the following extracts tends to establish this : although it must be remembered that the discussion of these questions by Plato and Aristotle may be

supposed in some degree to modify the statements of later writers :

Diog. L. II. 86. Δυὸ πάθη ὑφίσταντο, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν· τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον τραχεῖαν κίνησιν.

Aristocles. ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. XIV. 18. Τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη καταστάσεις εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν· μίαν μὲν καθ' ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, ἐοικυῖαν τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι, ἑτέραν δέ, καθ' ἣν ἡδόμεθα, τῷ λείῳ κύματι ἀφομοιούμενοι· εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐρίῳ παραβαλλομένην ἀνέμῳ· τὴν δὲ τρίτην μέσην εἶναι κατάστασιν καθ' ἣν οὔτε ἀλγοῦμεν οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαλήνῃ παραπλησίαν οὔσαν.

Sext. Emp. adv. Math. VII. 191. Φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασὶ, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατόν λέγειν ἀδιάψεύστως καὶ ἀνεξελέγκτως· ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκὸν ἐστὶν ἢ γλυκὺ ἐστὶν, οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι.

192. καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς καὶ ἰκτεριῶν ὠχραντικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθθαίνεται, ὁ δὲ παραπίεσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ δυοῖν κινεῖται^β, ὁ δὲ μεμηνῶς

^β This argument is met by Aristotle, when he is discussing the theories

Plat. Theæt. p. 152. ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλα γίγνεται πάντα. p. 153. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σώζει.

See also Phileb. p. 42. μὴ κινουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκάτερα—οὔτ' ἂν ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτ' ἂν οὔτ' ἂν τις λύπη.

Plato Theæt. p. 152. Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀψευδής, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὔσα. 157. τὸ ποιῶν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως.—ἐάν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν. 154. ὁ δὲ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκὸν κ.τ.λ. 156. λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη. 159. Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων κ.τ.λ. 167. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν δοξάσαι οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχη· ταῦτα δὲ αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ. 178. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἶεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα.

p. 157. λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. 158. δοκεῖ—πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα

of Heraclitus and Protagoras, Met. K. 6. 1063 a : οὐθέν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτ'

δισσὰς ὁρᾷ τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισσοῦν φαντάζεται τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὅτι τόδε τι πάσχουσιν, οἷον ὠχραίνονται ἢ ἐρυθραίνονται ἢ δυάζονται, ἀληθείς, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὠχρόν ἐστὶ τὸ κινεῖν αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐνερευθεῖς ἢ διπλοῦν ψεῦδος εἶναι νενομίσται, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. 195. ἔθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὀνόματα δὲ κοινὰ τίθεσθαι τοῖς κρίμασιν. 196. λευκὸν μὲν γάρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δὲ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται.

Diog. L. II. 87. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδοκίαν ἡδονὴν φασιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἤρεσκεν Ἐπικούρῳ, ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα.

Diog. L. II. 88. μηδὲν τε εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει.

μενα ἕκαστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοῦναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι. 156. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ὅτι δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρωπὸν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ζῷον τε καὶ εἶδος. 154. τί δέ; ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρ' ὁμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν;

Theæt. p. 166. αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινὰ σοὶ ξυγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρ-εἶναί τῳ ὧν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὐσαν πάθος, οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.

Theæt. 172. καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια κ.τ.λ.

The apparent force of the above parallel must be slightly qualified by two observations. 1. Very similar language about the senses is ascribed to Democritus. Some of the expressions and illustrations, as well as the argument itself in different aspects, are thus proved to have had a wider currency. 2. In the early part of the Theætetus, motion is said to be good, and rest evil. In the Cyrenaic theory, and in the Philebus, three states are spoken of, smooth motion, which is pleasure, rough motion, which is pain, and the absence of both, which is a state of indifference, "like the sea in a calm."

But while these considerations should be allowed their full weight, it must be remembered that Aristippus and those

ἀξιοῦν ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ὑποβάλλουσι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ποιούσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνδὲ φαίνεσθαι δύο, δύο τ' εἶναι

διὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι τοσαῦτα καὶ πάλιν ἐν τοῖς γὰρ μὴ κινουῦσι τὴν ὄψιν ἐν φαίνεται τὸ ἐν.

who thought with him did resolve knowledge into shifting impressions of a changing world. And here the parallel of the Philebus affords a strong confirmation of the hypothesis we are considering. Nothing was more natural than that the boy Theætetus should attribute certainty to momentary impressions, and that the boy Philebus should petulantly assert that pleasure is the only good. Each in doing so presents a different aspect of a necessary phase of mind. But when they both (or rather Socrates for them) attempt to strengthen their theory by a peculiar doctrine of motion, which, however popular, must have had limits to its reception, it becomes highly probable that the two speakers drew some of their inspiration from a third, who is found to have upheld both pleasure and sensation, and to have supported them with this same doctrine of motion.

There remains therefore some ground for the hypothesis that, in the earlier part of this dialogue, Plato has these Pseudo-Socratics in his eye, together possibly with others. Whether Aristippus was really, or only by implication, a 'disciple of Protagoras,' and whether or not he consciously based his doctrine on the Heraclitean theory of the Universe, are questions which it is perhaps wisest to leave undecided.

III. More features of the personal character of Antisthenes are preserved than of Euclides and Aristippus, but fewer of his philosophy. From the way in which the grave Xenophon treats him, and from the calm epithets of Aristotle, he seems to have been the butt of the Socratic school, a sort of mixture of Ajax and Thersites. He regarded Socrates with a rude half-appreciating fondness, which was reciprocated with good-humoured pleasantry. But he boasted justly enough of a certain strength of character, which was in fact the piece of Socrates that was continued in him. He is praised for his pure and nervous Attic style, of which we have a specimen, probably genuine, in a rhetorical contest between Ajax and Ulysses. His genius, however, seems to have been opposed to abstract speculation. Hence he followed rather the form than the spirit of the Socratic teaching, both on human life and on the significance of terms. His views on the latter subject were probably influenced also by his previous intercourse with Gorgias.

There are, as might have been expected, several points of outward coincidence between his teaching and that of Euclides on the ethical side. They agree that virtue is one, that wisdom (*φρόνησις*) is the chief good, and so on.

But the dialectic of Antisthenes seems to have been at once more rhetorical and more sceptical: approaching much more nearly to the later Megarian subtleties, with which it finally coalesced in the teaching of the Stoics. He has been called a materialist, and no doubt the term applies to him so far as he denied ideas, but his scepticism had nothing to do with physical inquiries, which he abjured. It was a part practical, part logical nominalism. "I see a horse, equine properties I cannot see." — "There is only one term applicable to one thing^h." Hence controversy is impossible, and every assertion equally true. Definition is only a complex termⁱ, and accordingly no single thing can be defined, except in the imperfect way of comparison. You cannot say what a thing is, except by naming it, but only what it is like. Connected in some way with this theory was the saying, in which he agrees with Prodicus, that the first principle of Education is the study of names. He was thus related to Aristippus in philosophy as much as Gorgias had been to Protagoras: denying the absolute, while the other asserted the relative, or rather contending that nothing existed absolutely but facts and individual things.

1. It has been thought that the *Γηγενεῖς* of the Sophista (p. 246 sqq.), who are manifestly identical with the 'hard and repellent' persons shut out from discussion in the *Theætetus*, are meant to include Antisthenes as their chief. More than one critic has even fancied that an allusion to his name lurked in the epithet *ἀντιτύπους*. But (1) the abnegation of physical studies by the Cynics is inconsistent with this. The picture drawn in the *Sophista* especially contains several features (amongst which we may notice the repeated mention of *body* as

^h See Isocrates *Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον* ad init. *καταγεγηράκασιν οἱ μὲν οὐ φάσκοντες οἶόν τ' εἶναι ψευδῆ λέγειν, οὐδὲ ἀντιλέγειν, οὐδὲ δύο λόγῳ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντειπεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταῦτόν ἐστι, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν μία δ' ἐπιστήμη καθ' ἀπάντων ἐστίν.*

Socrates seems to be alluded to in the latter part of this. In the former part Protagoras and Antisthenes seem to be opposed.

ⁱ *μακρὸς λόγος*. In which there is probably the same derisive force as in *Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν*. *Ar. Met. N. 3.*

something to be *touched* and *handled*, and the conception of *δύναμις* to which Plato drives them) which seem to indicate rather a physical than a logical materialism. The question thus raised will be discussed presently. (2) It is a fair inference from the tone of the passage in the *Theætetus*, that the 'disciples of Protagoras' would affect contempt and abhorrence of the 'uninitiated' persons in question. At all events there is a marked opposition drawn between the refined sensationalism of the one and the hard materialism of the other. But frequently (as in the *Euthydemus*) the saying of Antisthenes, *οὐκ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν*, is represented as hardly distinguishable from the theory of Protagoras.

The hypothesis, therefore, at least of an exclusive allusion to Antisthenes here, is not altogether satisfactory^k.

2. When the disciples of Protagoras and the Heracliteans are reduced to absurdity by the negative dialectic of the Megarian Socrates, the position to which they are driven is very much that of Antisthenes, that argument is absurd, and no assertion can be considered false. (pp. 161. 183.)

3. This difficulty emerges afterwards in a more formidable shape in the question, Is false opinion possible? The statement that it is impossible to speak falsely, which Aristotle attributes to Antisthenes, by inference from his saying that controversy was absurd, appears to have been very commonly put forward (*Cratyl.* 429). The deeper inquiry, whether it is possible to think falsely, is seriously raised by Plato as a necessary step towards the true conception of Knowledge. It is shown to be impossible to distinguish truth from falsehood in opinion without the measure afforded by a higher light, viz. Knowledge of true ideas. The difficulty thus raised was certainly felt by others than Antisthenes, and probably by the Megarians, who perhaps disposed of it, as Plato does, to the disadvantage of Opinion in comparison with Knowledge. The arguments and images by which the discussion is conducted are certainly not borrowed from Antisthenes, and are probably Plato's own. The only argument that forcibly recalls what we know of Antisthenes

^k For a different view, see a paper by Professor Thomson of Cambridge on the genuineness of the Sophista

of Plato. — Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, Vol. X. Part I.

is that which proves that right opinion is not knowledge.

Compare

Antisthen. Aj. ad init. : Ἐβουλόμην ἂν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν δικάζειν οἷπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρήσαν· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐμὲ μὲν ἔδει σιωπᾶν, τούτῳ δ' ἂν οὐδὲν ἦν πλεον λέγοντι· νῦν δὲ οἱ μὲν παραγενόμενοι αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις ἀπεισιν, ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάζετε. καίτοι ποία τις ἂν δίκη δικαστῶν μὴ εἰδόντων γένοιτο, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων; τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἐγένετο ἔργῳ.

With

Theset. p. 201 : ἡ σὺ οἶει δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δυνάσθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἰκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;—Οὐκοῦν ὅταν πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἀκοῇ κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν;—

And here, even if the argument was suggested by Antisthenes, (though it may have originated with Socrates), the application is certainly Plato's.

4. It has been commonly supposed of late that the passage which follows the above (p. 201), in which it is said that knowledge is true opinion with definition (*μετὰ λόγου*), and that the elements of things are known only in their combinations, contains a direct allusion to Antisthenes. The passage of Aristotle, which is quoted in support of this, is certainly a very apposite illustration of Plato's meaning.

Metaph. II. 3. 1043. b. "On inquiry then it does not appear that the complex (*ἡ συλλαβή*) consists of the elements (*ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων*) and their combination, nor is a house merely a combination of bricks. And this is right; for combination and mixture do not result from the things combined and mixed. And the like holds in the case of other processes; e. g. if the threshold is so by position, the position does not result from it, but rather it from the position. Accordingly, man does not consist of animal and biped, but, seeing these are the material part, there is required something over and above them; and that neither an element, nor resulting from elements, but the essential part (*ἡ οὐσία*), leaving which out of view, they (Democritus and other physicists, see c. 2.) comprise in their definition the material only. Now seeing that this (the essential part) is that which gives being and substance, this must be

meant by those who speak of absolute substance. Now this must be either eternal, or perishable without perishing, and created without creation. But it has been proved and expounded elsewhere, that the Form is not made nor generated by any, but the concrete thing is made, and that which is generated results from particular elements, (*γίγνεται δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων.*) Now whether the essential part in things perishable has a separate existence, is not clear as yet, except that it cannot be so in some cases, in which there is no universal, as in a house or an implement. Perhaps indeed we should not even give the name of substances to these, nor to any other (of things perishable) that is not constituted by Nature: for in things perishable Nature alone can be conceived of as the essential part. And hence the doubt raised by the followers of Antisthenes and other narrow minds (*ἀπαίδευτοι*) (that the nature of a thing cannot be defined, for definition is a roundabout expression (*μακρὸς λόγος*), but it is possible to indicate by definition what a thing is like, e. g. Silver may be defined not in its own nature, but as being like tin)—is not wholly irrelevant, but may be applied so far as this: That of one kind of substance, viz. that which is composite, (i. e. of matter and form), whether sensible or intelligible, definition is possible: but not of its prime constituent parts: since definition is a species of predication, and this requires the presence both of matter and form.”

The paradox referred to is attributed, not to Antisthenes, but to his followers, who may have extended or modified his opinion. How much is attributed to them? This will be best seen by examining the context. Aristotle is speaking of sensible substance (*αἰσθητὴ οὐσία*), which he has shown to be threefold, viz. matter (*ὑλη*), form (*εἶδος*), and their combination (*σύνθετος οὐσία*). Having determined this, he proceeds in his usual manner to the solution of difficulties. It is clear, for instance, how to settle the question whether the complex whole (*ἡ συλλαβή*) is the same with its elements (*τῶν στοιχείων*) or different from them. The elements are only the material part, and no agglomeration of them can create the form. It is this which makes them one. It is clear also, how much ground there is for the difficulty raised by some narrow minds, that real definition is impossible, because definition is only a rigmale expression for the name. (Aristotle seems to be reminded

of this by the mention of certain things which are not really substances.) As Definition implies prædication, every thing, whether sensible or intelligible, may be defined, in which there is matter and form. But mere matter (e. g. the στοιχεῖα mentioned above) and simple form (e. g. καμπυλότης, cf. Met. Z. 12. 1037 b. 1.)¹ cannot be defined.—Few will doubt that the last sentence, which argues from the nature of predication and from matter and form, contains Aristotle's own opinion. If so, it means that whereas the followers of Antisthenes, improving upon their master's saying, that nothing could be expressed but in one way, said that nothing could be defined, or rather that all definitions were merely nominal, Aristotle thinks that most things can be defined, but some cannot, namely, elements and the most abstract forms. That the Antistheneans are not quoted throughout is evident from the word ἀπαθρευτοί. Aristotle would not have applied this epithet to persons who agreed with him.

To return to the passage of the Theætetus: It may be fairly argued, that several points in it are against a direct or exclusive allusion to Antisthenes. Is the invocation or use of the term ἐπιστητός consistent with his blunt scepticism? And if it were, which according to him would be more known, that which is named, or that which is defined?^m Whatever faults Antisthenes had as a philosopher, mysticism or obscurity was not one of them. Would Plato, then, have spoken of any of his fellow-pupil's tenets as having been heard by Socrates "in a dream?" Then, even supposing that the logical assertions are his, must not a different origin be sought for the physical conception of the elements, of which we and other things are composed? Lastly, Antisthenes' notion of λόγος was probably a very simple one, corresponding to the first of the three meanings proposed to Theætetus, the expression of thought in language. He rather opposed it to reality, (see the passage quoted above, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων, τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἐγίνετο ἔργον,) than identified it with knowledge. All that remains therefore in common between this passage and what we know of Antisthenes is the assertion, that that which is represented by a

¹ This appears to be the meaning of ἐξ ὧν αὐτὴ πρώτων.

^m This argument also excludes De-

mocritus, with whom the ἄτομα were certainly more real (ἐτέρη) than their combinations.

name cannot be defined. Now it is manifest that this might be held by persons who inferred from it that names do not convey knowledge, as well as by one who thought that the only knowledge was of names, and that definitions were superfluous.

The further discussion of this passage may be reserved as for the present irrelevant.

5. One or two places may be referred to, in which a covert allusion to Antisthenes has been, or may be, supposed.

a. The allusion supposed to lie hid in the epithet *ἀντιτύπους* (p. 156) does not seem to be quite in Plato's manner, even if it were consistent with the language held in the Sophist. Contrast the playfulness of Rep. 614. οὐ μέντοι—'Αλκίμου γε ἀπόλογον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός—. It might be said with about equal plausibility that the name 'Αριστειδῆς (p. 150.) contained an allusion to Aristippus.

β. 'Ηρακλῆες, p. 169. Hercules was certainly a favorite hero with Antisthenes, who may be said to have resembled him as one of the physical force logicians—οἱ τὴν βίαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ζητοῦντες (Ar. Met. 1. 1011 a.)—Still he was not singular in his choice (compare Prodicus), and probably the annotation of the Scholiast is not far from the truth of Plato's meaning. 'Ηρακλῆες τε καὶ Θησῆες] οἱ Θρασύμαχοι, Καλλικλείς, Διονυσῶδωροι, Εὐθύδημοι, καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. That some allusion is intended appears probable if we compare the spirit of Euthyd. 297. πολὺ γὰρ πού·εἰμι φαυλότερος τοῦ 'Ηρακλέους, ὅς οὐχ οἶός τε ἦν τῆ τε ὕδρα διαμάχεσθαι, σοφιστρία οὔση—καὶ καρκίνῳ τινὶ ἐτέρῳ σοφιστῆ, ἐκ θαλάσσης ἀφιγμένῳ, νεωστὶ, μοι δοκεῖν, καταπεπλευκότι.

γ. Θράττά τις—ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, p. 174. This has been thought to be pointed at Antisthenes, whose mother is said to have been a Thracian slave. The grounds for this conjecture are slight, and the epithets *ἐμμελής* καὶ *χαρῆσσα* (more appropriate to the rhetorician than the Cynic) must be allowed to detract from its merit.

δ. One other guess may perhaps be allowed to stand on a par with the two last mentioned. Antisthenes wrote a diatribe called 'Αρχέλαος, ἢ περὶ βασιλείας, in which he attacked Gorgias. In the Gorgias of Plato, Archelaus the Macedonian usurper is called happy by Polus. Is it possible that in the passage *Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων* κ. τ. λ. p. 175, Plato ridicules the combatants on both sides of such an argument?

The following slight parallels may also be mentioned:

Antisthenes, like Protagoras, is said to have written an *Ἀλήθεια*. Perhaps this may be alluded to in the *Cratylus*, p. 391: *Εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν τοῦ Πρωταγόρου ὅλως οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπῶν ὡς τοῦ ἄξια.*

As Theodorus calls dialectic *ψῖλοι λόγοι* (p. 164), Antisthenes called the Ideas of Plato *ψῖλαι ἔννοιαι*, 'bare notions.'

The words *ἴππου ὃν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἀπτόμεθα* (p. 195) recall Antisthenes' *ἴππου μὲν ὁρῶ, ἵππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ*, and Plato's retort, 'You see with your eyes but not with your mind.' Lastly, when Theætetus tries to define *σ*, by saying, 'It is *as if* you hissed with your tongue,' we are reminded of the Antisthenean saying quoted by Aristotle, 'You cannot define what silver is: you can only say it is like tin.'

Unless Antisthenes is wronged by Xenophon and Aristotle, the traces of his mind are to be sought rather in the *Euthydemus* than in the *Theætetus*, *Sophista*, or *Philebus*. It deserves to be said however, that some of the names in the list of his works given by Diogenes Laertius are difficult to reconcile with the general account of him. These are *φυσιολογικὸς, περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης* and *ἑρώτημα περὶ φύσεως*. But the name of a work gives little insight into its real import, and Diogenes is far from being always trustworthyⁿ.

Heracliteans.

IV. Beyond the circle of those who had heard Socrates, the most interesting of Plato's contemporaries in connexion with the *Theætetus* are the enthusiasts of Ephesus, with whom the exact soul of Theodorus is vexed, who profess to be deeply read in the wisdom of Heraclitus. They are ridiculed with less than Plato's usual reserve, as a congeries of self-taught heads, who support their master's principle of a flux, only by the absence of fixity in their own thoughts. This picture, the Oriental features of which are noticeable, may be illustrated from the *Cratylus* (part of which is written in facetious imitation of the same school) where Socrates professes himself puzzled to determine what is intended by their symbol fire. By one it is interpreted to mean *the Sun*, by another *the principle of heat*, by another *mind*.

ⁿ An indication of the nature of these works may be sought in Cic. *Tusc.* I. c. 13. § 32. 'Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo libro, qui physicus in-

scribitur, populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens, tollit vim et naturam Deorum.'

Although Heraclitus is mentioned early in the dialogue, these professed followers of his are not adverted to, until the principle of motion is being separately discussed, after the maxim of Protagoras has been dismissed. The arguments by which the same principle is upheld in the opening are almost expressly attributed to the "disciples of Protagoras" and are probably more in keeping with the refined scepticism of Cyrene than with the dark proverbs of Ephesus.

If Plato ever really followed Cratylus, as Aristotle implies (Met. I. 6. *Κρατύλω συγγενόμενος καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλειτεῖαις δόξαις*), these passages acquire something of a personal interest, like those sonnets of Shakspeare that touch on theatrical life.

V. The Theætetus presents few traces of Pythagoreanism. ^{Pythagoreans.} The only place in which this side of Plato's teaching clearly shows itself is the mention of the region pure from evils, which is to receive the wise and righteous soul at its departure (p. 177). But a re-examination of the passage about the elements just now considered, (Theæt. p. 201.) may perhaps justify the conjecture that the person from whom Socrates heard the opinion quoted, 'as in a dream,' may have been some 'Italian or Sikelian man.' This is suggested by the following fragment of Philolaus:

"As concerning Nature and Harmony, the absolute being of things is eternal, and to know nature in its essence belongs to Gods and not to men, except so far as this. Nothing that is and that is known could have been known by us, did not Nature enter into the things, both determining and determined, of which the order of the universe is composed. And seeing that these elements were not similar nor of one kind, they could not even themselves have been reduced to order, had not Harmony arisen between them, howsoever it arose."

That is, The Absolute is not the object of knowledge, but things are known only so far as they partake of it. Without harmony, which is the participation of the absolute, the contrary elements of the universe could not even be combined.

Compare Aristot. Met. A. 5. *Ἐοικᾶσι δ' ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει τὰ στοιχεῖα τάττειν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ὡς ἐνυπαρχόντων συνεστάναι καὶ πεπλάσθαι φασὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. Δ. 7. Ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἷτια μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ*

ὀρθῶς οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτερῶν ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον.

See also Plato Philebus p. 18. Καθορῶν δὲ (ὁ Θεῦθ) ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἄν ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν θεσμόν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα ἓνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἐν πως ποιῶντα μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὔσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγγετο προσειπών. And compare Phæd. 92.

The presumption raised by the comparison of these passages may be strengthened by some further considerations.

In the Theætetus the relation of the elements to the whole is illustrated from number and music^o, as well as from grammar. And in the passage of Aristotle already quoted (Met. H. 3.), immediately after the conclusion that the elementary parts of substance cannot be defined, it is added, "And clearly, if substances are numbers, they are so in this way (as combined of matter and form), and not, as some say, of units."

The words λόγος, ἄλογος, ῥητός, in connection with the relation of parts to a whole, are not inconsistent with Pythagorean usage. The word συλλαβή is used by Philolaus, though in a narrower and technical sense.

The union of these examples and expressions with the cosmical turn of thought, has a Pythagorean air. It may be added, that in two other passages where Socrates speaks from hearsay (Phæd. 62.), or repeats what he has heard long ago, perhaps in a dream (Phil. 20.), the Pythagoreans are probably referred to.

But on the other hand, the logical phraseology, the mention of prædication, the distinction between the name and the proposition, and between αἰσθητά, δοξαστά, and γνωστά, together with the term ἐπιστητός, argue a different origin.

That origin is possibly Megarian^p. The Megarians, like the Eleatics, waged war against sensations and impressions, and relied solely upon reason (λόγος). It is quite conceivable that the term ἐπιστητός may have been coined by them, in common possibly with αἰσθητής, δοξαστής and ποιότης. In the Sophist it is said of the 'friends of ideas,' that they break down the 'bodily

^o Pp. 204, 206.

^p This was Schleiermacher's opinion. (Not. ad. Theæt. p. 520.) The objection of Deycks, that every fol-

lower of Socrates must have drawn a sharp line between opinion and knowledge, proves too much for those who seek here a reference to Antisthenes.

substance' of their opponents into little bits, and refuse to acknowledge it as 'being.' The extreme analytical tendency animadverted on in the same dialogue (*τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποχωρίζειν*) may also be detected in the words *οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκείνο—προσοιστέον—ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα δὲ ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται* (*Theæt.* 202.) The distinction between *ὄνομα* and *λόγος* is not unlike Euclides; and it is worthy of a Socratic philosopher to have made capability of definition the test of the object of knowledge. Nor is it inconsistent with the general spirit of his philosophy, to have reduced 'simple ideas' to nothingness, and yet to have attached reality to 'complex' ones. It agrees with his tendency to hold unity and diversity in solution together: *ἐν, πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον*.

It is true that no doctrine of elements remains amongst the fragments of Euclides, any more than a doctrine of *εἶδη*, which still is probably alluded to in the *Sophist*. Diodorus Cronus, however, a later Megarian (B. C. 300), argues from the conception of indivisible particles or monads.

But there are two points which it is difficult to reconcile with an exclusive reference to Megara; the cosmical expression, *ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα, καὶ τᾶλλα*; and the distant way in which the allusion is made. Would Plato have spoken of hearing anything from his familiar friends 'as in a dream?' Contrast with this *Soph.* 248: *Τάχ' οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως διὰ συνήθειαν*.

These data lead to the conjecture that here, as in the beginning of the dialogue, Plato has fused together two theories, which from different starting-points appeared to him to meet in one. The more prominent is that of Euclides, which gives the key-note to the remaining argument, that knowledge is right opinion with definition (*λόγος*). According to this, nothing is the object of knowledge (*ἐπιστητόν*) but that which is expressed in a proposition. That which corresponds to a name, is the object, not of knowledge, but of sensation. From the position where the simple sensation was regarded as the only knowledge we have gradually come round to this⁹. And as the hypothesis, Sense is knowledge, was supported by the

⁹ See *Theæt.* p. 186: *Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐνι ἐπιστήμη ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ*

theory of change, so this, that definition (*λόγος*) is essential to knowledge, is strengthened by the Pythagorean theory of harmony. The sensible things, which can be named but not represented by a proposition, are regarded as elements, which cannot be known except as they are combined in nature. But this is merely a conjecture. There is still the alternative of falling back upon our ignorance of the time, and saying with truth, that amongst the many shades of opinion on these subjects which existed, a nearer parallel might have been discovered, if more had been preserved. And this impression is rather strengthened by the perusal of the fragments of the old Academy.—Cf. Arist. Met. Δ. 7, quoted above.

VI. Who are the 'impenetrable nay the repellent' men, with whom the 'disciples of Protagoras' will not deign to argue, as ignorant of their Heraclitean mysteries, and utterly illiterate? Who believe only in the existence of what they can clutch between their hands, and refuse to attribute Being to any action or natural process, in short to anything unseen? (p. 155.) They are more fully dealt with in the Sophist, and it has been shewn that the account of them in both dialogues taken as a whole, is unfavourable to the hypothesis that Antisthenes is meant. May they have been in any way related to Democritus? This supposition has been objected to on the ground that the Atomists (according to Aristotle, Met. I. 4.) in upholding their *κενόν*, asserted the existence of the *μη ὄν*. Whereas Plato (Soph. 246.) says of these men, *τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τίς φησι μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν*. (Here the 'bodiless' is evidently equivalent to the 'unseen' of Theæt. I. c.)

Democri-
tus.

The collection of the very numerous allusions to Democritus in Aristotle would be a valuable contribution to the History of the earlier Greek Philosophy. They would be found to present the student with this difficulty, that while occasionally, as in the passage above quoted, the Atomistic doctrine is spoken of as a kind of purely speculative dualism, it is much more frequently referred to in terms which indicate a distinctly physical theory. It is happily unnecessary to argue here at length a point which has been clearly established by Dr. Zeller in his History of Greek Philosophy (2nd edition), that the chief characteristic of the Atomistic philosophy from the first was the firm

grasp with which it held the ideas (which to most contemporary schools were so unreal) of space, extension, solidity and weight.

It does not seem very hard to believe that the abstract foundation of mechanical science should thus have been laid in an age when geometry was rapidly growing to maturity: the real difficulty for us is to conceive in what manner a mechanical theory was united with, if not occasioned by, the dialectical recoil from the Eleatic Undivided Whole. Yet in the earlier stages even of modern science such a confusion of physic and metaphysic was not impossible. The 'Plenum' of Descartes has probably not been without its influence on the Interpretation of Nature.

The Absolute Being of the Eleatics, although the object of Pure Mind and identical with it, was not yet free from the associations of extension. 'Being is full of being, it is continuous, for being touches being.' Against this aspect of their doctrine the polemic of the Atomists was directed, when they asserted the existence of the non-existent. It was the non-existent, as the space in which the existent moves: and their Existence, while uncreated and unchangeable, was also that which has extension, solidity and weight. Parmenides and Democritus both sought for something absolute behind phenomena: the Eleatic found it in the Unity of Being: the Atomist resolved this into Space and body. The relations between these made it possible to conceive of motion and of primordial differences of bulk and form.—The weight of atoms of equal bulk was supposed uniform.—All else was relative and subjective (*νόμῳ*): depending on the impression produced on us by the Atoms in various combinations.

How far is this view of their theory consistent with the conjecture that some friends of Democritus may be alluded to in the passages already mentioned of the Theætetus and Sophist?

1. It does not seem impossible that Plato should accuse such persons of denying the existence of anything 'bodiless' or 'unseen.' For the 'bodiless existence' which they are represented as denying is the 'immaterial essence' of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι*; and the 'unseen process,' which they will not believe in, is the movement of the Heraclitean fire which annihilates all that is stable or tangible. Both these are very different from the 'void space' of the Atomist, which is only asserted as

the necessary condition of matter and motion. And (except polemically) he would rather say that *ἄτομον* and *κενόν* together constitute the reality of sensible existence, than that Being exists and Not-being also exists. Aristotle speaks of the Atomistic principle as *τὸ ὑποκειμένον σῶμα*.

2. A presumption in favour of such an allusion is afforded by the manner in which the sense of touch and of resistance is dwelt upon. It is true that the atoms could not literally be either seen or handled: but they had all the mechanical properties of things visible and tangible, and Plato was at least as likely as Aristotle to represent them as the objects of sense. See *Ar. de Sensu. c. 4*: *Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιούσι· πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἅπτα ποιούσι.*

The sense of touch and resistance (which the Ancients hardly distinguished) is naturally referred to those 'primary' qualities of body which the Atomists upheld. Now these are dwelt upon in the two passages in question more than in the whole discussion of the doctrine of sense in the *Theætetus*, and in language which is much more suggestive of something *hard*. Note especially the words, *Theæt. p. 155*: *Ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι.* *Soph. 246*: *Εἰς γῆν—ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρυὸς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διῖσχυρίζονται τοῦτ' εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα.* *P. 247*: *Πότερον ὄρατόν καὶ ἅπτόν τι αὐτῶν.* *Ib.*: *Πᾶν δὲ μὴ δυνατόν ταῖς χερσὶ συμπίεζεν εἰσὶ.*

3. It may be observed further that in the *Sophist* the men are driven into a corner by being pressed to define (1) whether the Soul is material, which they are not afraid to admit, and (2) whether justice and wisdom are so. Might not this mode of attack be suggested to a Socratic philosopher by the apparent contradiction between the moral sayings of Democritus and his material system?

They are then imagined as retiring upon a more abstract conception of Being. 'Every thing in which there is either an active or a passive power,' i. e. they are supposed to rise from the idea of matter to that of force. The tendency thus recognised surely indicates a different materialism from that of Antisthenes, and the close sequence of the reasoning by which it is developed is not unworthy of the tenacity and penetration which seem to be justly ascribed to Democritus.

See Ar. de An. I. 2. Δημόκριτος περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων γλαφυρωτέ-
ρως εἶρηκεν.

4. It may be urged against the above conjecture (1) that, although Democritus might fairly be called *ἄμουσος*, as the spirit of his inquiry was alien to rhetoric and poetry, and *ἀμύητος*, for he is known to have written against the Protagorean maxim, yet the imputation of *coarseness* which Plato's picture conveys would seem to be unmerited.—This objection may be partly met, however, by supposing his theory to have degenerated in the hands of his followers.—(2) That the elenchus of the *εἰδῶν φίλοι* is described as levelled at the *ἀλήθεια* of these materialists, who would thus seem to be identified with the disciples of Protagoras in the *Theætetus*. To which it may be replied, that the account in the *Sophist* appears to be generalised from more schools than one, not all of whom would deserve the title of 'sprung from the ground' (*σπαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες*). This last therefore alone strictly answers to the title 'hard and repellent' in the *Theætetus*. The difficulty must however be acknowledged, and it remains, whatever hypothesis with regard to the allusion is adopted^r.

If these passages really contain any allusion even to degenerate followers of Democritus (who might be related to him as the Ephesian enthusiasts to Heraclitus), the fact is interesting as confirming the anticipation that no Greek thought of any permanent value failed to obtain some recognition from Plato, though it might be recognized only to be rejected. We are also reminded of Aristotle's saying, that Plato's dialectical bias unfitted him for physical studies; and of Lord Bacon's, that time brings down the lighter goods of antiquity but drowns what is of solid worth, which may be thought no unfitting comment from the physical point of view.

5. Democritus would also rank with those who argued from dreams and madness that nothing which appears is real (*οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι*).

(It is possible that the *δυσχερεῖς* of the *Philebus*, who are said to be very clever in physical science, and have an ac-

^r Another *ἀλήθεια* is spoken of in the *Cratylus*, which may perhaps be that of Antisthenes, but the reference

there is evidently to a logical and not a physical theory.

count to give of pleasure while they deny its reality, may have been also in some way related to the Atomistic school. Compare, for instance, the fragment *Ἐνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι ἡδονται κ.τ.λ.* and the minute way in which the causes of sensation are analysed by Democritus while its reality is denied: also the words *τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα βία διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν*, Phil. p. 46. ad fin.)

Semi-Protagoreans.

VII. One other distinct reference to contemporaries remains to be considered. It occurs at what may be called the turning point of the dialogue: where it is remarked that the stronghold of the doctrine—"What appears to me, is to me"—lies amongst sensible things, but that its weak point is in the answer to such questions as, What is wholesome? What is expedient? And it is added, that those who hold a partial Protagoreanism, (*οἱ τὰ Πρωταγόρου μὴ παντάπασι λέγοντες*), while insisting that honour and justice are merely conventional, admit that, in regard to things expedient and good, mistake is possible, and one councillor and one state is wiser than another. These men seem to be brought forward as witnesses to the existence of something above sensation and convention, just as the "fastidious persons" are made to testify in the Philebus to the existence of mixtures of pleasure and pain. But it seems impossible to identify them with any known school. Euclides denied reality to impressions. Aristippus admitted no good beyond the present pleasure. Plato here alludes to some intermediate teachers, of whom our knowledge is a blank.

This notice of the relation of the Theætetus to contemporary theories may be concluded with a few general remarks.

General remarks.

Such an inquiry must necessarily be scanty in its positive results. Its true value, however, lies rather in the consciousness which it implies, and which it tends to strengthen, that Plato, though in advance of his contemporaries, was not isolated from them, but held living intercourse with the present as well as with the past. In studying any author, it is invigorating even to attempt to breathe the atmosphere in which he moved, and to see with his eyes the men and the ideas surrounding him. Without making this attempt, the modern reader of Plato cannot but lose much. He will be like one reading a letter without knowing to whom it is addressed. Many of the ideas and sentiments may be intelligible to him, but the living tone

and expression which it would otherwise convey are lost. A few cautions however are suggested to us as the inquiry proceeds.

1. In piecing together the fragments of an ancient statue or group, a sanguine and inexperienced eye might naturally imagine some things to fit, which were really independent of each other, and some things to be incongruous which were really not so. Supposing the whole discovered, the mistaken adaptations would be displaced by more perfect symmetry, and the apparent discrepancies harmonised by the intermediate parts. The contemporary remains of Plato's time are such a fragment. The more we study them in the light of his works, the more we feel, that while distinct and opposite tendencies were at work, the various thinkers of that age (especially those who followed Socrates) had much in common; and that many shades of opinion existed besides the opposite extremes. The few names and the few sayings that have been preserved to us by no means exhaust the whole field.

2. Plato's relation to these contemporaries must not be conceived of as closer than it really was. Their theories must not be suffered to crowd in upon him so as to cramp the freedom and originality of his thoughts, of which they are not the substance, but the occasion. He views them in different lights and in different combinations as he moves amongst them, just as natural objects group themselves differently according to the point at which we stand.

For instance, the materialist and sensationalist, who in the *Theætetus* are opposed, in the *Sophist* appear to be combined as the enemies of ideas, differing only in the degree of their unregenerate hardness. And in the *Cratylus*, the Heraclitean and Protagorean doctrines are contrasted. Plato had certain men in his eye, but what interested him far more were the different aspects of philosophy. And these could not be narrowed to this or that individual, nor extended so as to embrace his inconsistencies. A great name in the past might so "orb into the perfect star" as to be wholly identified with one of the great streams of thought, but from the speculative height from which Plato surveyed the present, rival opinions might at one time be generalised into one view, and at another time by a change of position might be seen as wholly distinct.

3. Plato was by no means absorbed in the controversies of the hour. The grand movements of Greek thought, hidden from inferior intellects, were comprehended in one glance by him, not observed as by Aristotle, but consciously realised. Thus in the *Theætetus* he gathers up into a single formula one side of the alternative which philosophy had hitherto presented to the Greek mind. Looking above and beyond Aristippus, and even Protagoras, whose personal influence had hardly yet died away, he fixes his eye upon Heraclitus, who had given the highest expression to the relative side of thought. The struggle, outwardly waged between the Megarian and the Cyrenaic, is in reality a far deeper one, between Parmenides and Heraclitus, or rather between the two opposing streams of Greek Philosophy, which were seeking their unity in the mind of Plato.

§ 2.

Earlier
Philoso-
phies.

As after-ages saw amongst Plato's contemporaries distinctions which were only partially developed in his time, so in a less degree, and with the difference which his genius implies, Plato viewed the past through a generalization and an antithesis. Heraclitus and Empedocles, and from another point of view Protagoras, were the representatives of one tendency, Parmenides and his followers, of the contrary one. The opposition between them is that between rest and motion, unity and diversity, absolute and relative, universal and particular, finite and infinite, positive and negative, between knowledge and opinion, ideas or conceptions and impressions.

In endeavouring to conceive what Parmenides, Heraclitus and Protagoras really were, it would be necessary to divest our minds of this contrasted form under which we are led to think of them in reading Plato. But, although not always brought into prominence, it is of the essence of what they were to him.

This is not the place for a detailed account of the earlier stage of Greek Philosophy. But a brief sketch of it is necessary in order to make Plato's position clear.

It would only be an approximation towards a true estimate, to say that Parmenides represents the idea of unity, being, or rest, Heraclitus that of dualism, of a process, or motion, and Pythagoras that of harmony and order, or definite proportions, as intermediate between the other two.

Philosophy was yet too near its origin for its streams to have diverged very far. As we come nearer to those early thinkers, we find that they had more in common than we supposed. They have a common mythological element, the atmosphere in which their thoughts move, and which they strive to pierce, although it veils their meaning partly from themselves; inhaled by some in the Greek and Sicilian valleys, by some, perhaps in earlier purity, on the Eastern plains, but in all finding its highest sensuous embodiment in the Sun or Fire. The notion of *Δίκη* is common to Heraclitus and Parmenides, the *εἰμαρμένη* of the one is paralleled by the *ἀνάγκη* of the other.

The endeavour to pierce this veil of language^s is accompanied in all of them by a melancholy scepticism and contempt for the common opinions of men. The words of Plato in the *Phædo*, *οἱ πολλοὶ ψηλαφῶντες ὥσπερ ἐν σκοτῶ*, might have been applied by any of the earlier philosophers to the condition of men, who believe the testimony of their senses before that of reason, and cling to their own narrow thoughts instead of being conformed to the law of Nature or Being.

With this scepticism is combined in all of them what may be termed an ideal Pantheism: the speculative and religious intellect filling the void of observation with the intensity of its own early thought. [*τὸ γὰρ πλεόν ἐστὶ νόημα. Parm.*] All that is particular owes its being to Wrong, in the universal alone is harmony and righteousness and peace. The world of opinion is a world of "nought and night;" the fulness of being is absolute, and commensurate with thought. The nature of things, says Philolaus, belongs to Divine, and not to human knowledge.

Such being the ground colours more or less discernible throughout the philosophy of that age, what were the distinguishing features by which they were relieved? It is now proposed to consider this in the case of Heraclitus and (more briefly) of Parmenides; and it may be remarked in passing, that, historically speaking, it does not seem very probable that either of these philosophers pursued his reflections with direct reference to the other. The idea of the History of Philosophy is a little apt to intercept our view of the History itself. As a

^s Cf. *Parm. ὠσάμεναι κροτάφον ἀπο χειρὶ καλύπτραι.*

Platonist sees in the Ionian and Eleatic two opposite poles, so the Hegelian is tempted to trace the progress of thought from Parmenides to Heraclitus, while a Kantian may view the Eleatic transcendentalism as the higher. Such thoughts may supply a valuable theory, but they are not strictly historical. Parmenides and Heraclitus were nearly contemporary, Heraclitus being the earlier of the two: they lived far apart, and were subject to different influences.

Heraclitus. I. Heraclitus of Ephesus (B. C. 500) was an Eastern Greek, and it is not merely fanciful to find an analogy between his thoughts and the more dreamy speculations of the remoter East. But they have a greater interest for the student of philosophy, not only as having contributed primarily to the speculative impulse of the Greek mind, but as permanently valuable in themselves, and anticipating some of the most fruitful of modern ideas. Bacon drew from them some of his happiest expressions; and Hegel professed to have embodied in his own Logic every principle which they contained. "The voice of the Sibyl," says Heraclitus, "although its notes be harsh and rude, yet penetrates to a thousand years." This pregnant saying may be well applied to the obscure utterances of Heraclitus himself. Half understood even by his own followers, imperfectly appreciated by Plato and Aristotle, he exercised a wide-spread influence, second only to that of Parmenides in its intensity. Caught up afresh by the Stoics and Neo-platonists, and by the Fathers of the Christian Church, and read by them in the light of deeper wants, his words received a new interest from their sublime spirit of awe and sadness. And thus many of them have been preserved to us; and reveal in dim and broken outline the proportions of a most noble and far-seeing intellect.

It is the common fate of great thinkers in an early time, that for the most part only the negative side of their teaching 'lives after them.' One reason is, that it is the most distinct and intelligible to themselves and their contemporaries. Deep intuitions, but unsubstantial, though clothed in palpable imagery; anticipations, vague and unsupported by proof, of the human mind, dreaming on thoughts to come, partly become engulfed by time, partly remain dead and fruitless and unknown, until their meaning is revealed by the development of cognate

thoughts in distant ages, and a late sympathy detects what is hidden there in germ. So the doctrine of Heraclitus, which undoubtedly contained an element of order and unity, if not of rest, and had been as ideal as any, was degraded to be the support of the doctrine of sense, although it again enters to restore the balance of philosophy when in danger of being bound fast in the Eleatic One †.

Heraclitus himself had followed in the wake of previous thinkers. As the emigrant Xenophanes had "looked up to the vault of heaven and said that the One was God," so Thales had looked forth on the expanse of the Ægean and said that water was the All, with a vague sense that Nature must be simple and all-pervading. The tendency of his successors had been towards the idea of an homogeneous Infinite. Heraclitus rose to the conception of Nature as a universal ever-acting Law.

He felt deeply the falseness and contradictoriness of sensation and opinion, not because he contrasted their objects with that of knowledge, but because he felt that these are presented as being something in themselves,—'not fluctuating but fixed,'—and not as moments in the Universal Process. This is itself unseen, but is symbolised in several ways. "The Order that embraces all things is an everliving Fire, Eternal, Uncreated, kindling itself by measures and extinguishing itself by measures;" i. e. The Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity and perfect law. This Idea is also represented as "the invisible harmony" which is "better than the visible," as the "Thought which guides all through all," as the "Universal Word" or "Reason," as the "One Wisdom," as "Time," as "Righteousness," as "Fate," as the "Name of Zeus." This Eternal process, which is at the same time a law or harmony, is inseparable in the mind of Heraclitus from the notion of dualism. The process is from This to That and back again, the harmony is between opposites, which do not cease to be opposites, although the one passes into the other. This was not lost upon Plato, "The universe is ever drawn asunder and together at once, says the muse of firmer tone," viz. the Ionian: Plat. Soph. 242. It is implied in the blunt words, "War is the Father of all things:" and in a saying of more doubtful

† Thus the dialectic of Rep. B. VI. is a sort of *ὁδὸς ἀπὸ κέρου μίαν*. See also the Sophist and Parmenides.

meaning, Παλίνοστος ἁρμονία κόσμου, ὡσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρας. Different interpretations of this have been suggested. Perhaps it might be paraphrased, "As the arrow leaves the string, the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cf. Plato Rep. IV. p. 439), and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention; the secret of the Universe is the same^u." Thus Homer is blamed for praying that strife may be no more, since without strife there can be no harmony. "The Deity is Day and Night in one, winter and summer, war and peace, fulness and hunger." Each thing is ever producing or passing into its opposite—evil into good, and good into evil: light into darkness and darkness into light. This Eternal process is the world: "All coming out of one, and one arising out of all." Its nature is to reveal itself in contradictions: Συνάψειας οὐλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὐλα κ. τ. λ. Ἐν τῷ σοφῶν γινώσκεισθαι ἐθέλει τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει, Ζηνὸς ὄνομα.

But it is more particularly described as the way upwards and downwards, which is the same. In every thing there is contrariety, and the action of the all-embracing, all-dividing fire. But there is a more general contrariety between the fire itself and its grosser forms, i. e. between the absolute process itself and the elements which are at once the subjects and the products of its Law. Fire is becoming all things, and all things are becoming fire;—the things are typified as air and water and earth. Here it is more difficult to separate the symbol from the thought. There is an effort made to give greater outward reality to the process, and the language becomes more sensuous accordingly. The way upwards is the way from earth through water and air to fire^x, the way downwards is from fire through air and water to earth. Both processes are ever moving on together; and each element has its own harmony or law. There is then not only contrariety and harmony in the world, but also a lower and a higher. This is more simply expressed by the distinction between the moist and dry exhalations; e. g. the clouds and the sun: the one dark, the other light; the one tending downwards, the other

^u Hor. Epist. I. 12. 'Quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors.'

^x Compare Shakespeare, Antony

and Cleopatra. 'I am fire and air, my other elements I give to baser life.'

upwards. These are, as it were, the body and soul of the world. The death of either is the other's life. The Universal Process is perpetually circling between them. At this point we return to the world of sensible things. They exist only by perpetual strife, life and death work together in them; their birth is a death, their death or absorption into the higher region is the true life; the only harmony amongst them is due to war. But is there war in heaven? Is there no escape from this region of conflicting elements? Is the fire itself, the origin and goal of the struggle of existence, torn asunder by a similar struggle? We may possibly imagine the primordial activity and its law (*πῦρ, μέτρα*) as two coexistent and opposite principles, the balance of which is order (*κοσμός*); but it is probably nearer the truth to say, that the fire is inseparable from the world, and therefore from the conflict of things: as these in their war are ever coming into existence and absorbed again, so the fire is ever parted asunder so as to become all things, and at the same time united out of them ^γ, quenched into the lower forms and kindled into itself again. But then this process is all-embracing; not isolated like the war of particular things: and for each thing to rise from earth to fire, that is, from particular existence to the Universal Process, is to attain to peace. This seems to be implied in the notice of Diog. L. (IX. 8.): *Τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν εἰς γένεσιν ἄγον καλεῖσθαι πόλεμον καὶ ἔριν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰρήνην*^z. On the other hand, that which is wearied with the "Eternal process moving on," is carried downwards by a weak desire of rest and of particular being; and to this is attributed the origin of the individual soul. (See Lassalle, Her. vol. I. pp. 123 sqq.)

What is the bearing of this theory on the mind, on human knowledge, and on human life?

1. The universal law or process may be conceived of as a continued act or utterance of mind (*γνώμη ἢ κυβερνήσει πάντα, τὸ ἐν σοφόν, θεῖος λόγος*). This, though more or less personified (as *Ζεὺς, Δίκη, Θεός*) is nowhere distinctly personal. The act or utterance itself is the soul of the World, not exactly "immanent," but ever moving throughout all, passing into everything and returning into itself again. Yet while thus pervading

^γ Διαφερόμενον ἀεὶ συμφέρεται.

ἐποίησεν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν,—κάματος ἀνά-

^z Cf. too the words *νοῦσος ὑγιείην παυσιν*.

all things, it essentially holds the upper etherial region, and embraces all, being opposed to the things beneath it as universal to particular.

2. Knowledge therefore is the acquaintance and union with this universal and pervading mind or law. That human mind is the best, which most partakes of it; that which lives in its own world of particular impressions and notions, is "nearer earth and less in light." This idea finds a symbolical and also an abstract expression. "A dry soul is the wisest and the best, flashing through the body as lightning through a cloud" (cf. ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις). "The moist soul (e.g. with wine) 'embodies' itself like a gathering cloud" (cf. ὑγρὰ ἀναθυμίασις). "The Law of things is a law of universal Reason, but most men live as if they had a wisdom of their own." "To live in the light of the universal Order is to be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is to go to sleep." "Most men even when they hear are as though they heard not, their speech betrays that though present they are absent mentally." It is an obscure question, and one which Heraclitus probably did not distinctly ask himself, by what path, according to this theory, the mind passes from sense to knowledge, from the darkness of the particular into the light of the universal. The answer would probably be little more than that the eye of the soul is opened. As the faculty of sight is quenched in sleep, so the mind is quenched while it is concerned only with the things surrounding it. But if a man awake, the fire within him finds its kindred fire, and flashes through the clouds of the sensible world. Thus living in the universal order he becomes a partaker of the mind which follows all through all. Sensation is not annihilated, but is absorbed into the grander movement of the mind, and becomes the transparent medium of true vision. (See the expression *κατὰ φύσιν ἐπατεῖν*, where the transition from sensible to mental perception is not marked.) While the mind is thus acquainted with the universal law, it must also follow the swiftness of the universal motion (Plat. Cratyl. p. 412. *διὰ τοῦ λόγτος ἰέναι παντός*) distinguishing all things into their true elements (*κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστα ὅπως ἔχει*), perceiving their transformations, comprehending their unseen harmony (*πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήψεται*). Heraclitus could not be unconscious that this was an ideal state for

man, who "lights a taper for himself in the night," and "is but an ape to compare with God." The subtilty of Nature far exceeds the subtilty of the human intellect, and her energy far exceeds his power to grapple with it. Hence as in his Heaven there is no rest, so even in his philosophy there is occasionally a despairing tone. This however never occurs in speaking of the Eternal process, but of its revelation to and comprehension by man.

3. For in comparison with the grandeur of the Universal Law, human life becomes a very little thing, if it be not more fitly called a death. Indeed, as in all things else, so in man, life and death are ever working together. His body is ever absorbed into his soul, his soul is ever dying into his body; his birth into the world is the entombment of a higher life, the death of what is earthly in him is the awaking of the God. As the Reason is but a small part in any man, so the good amongst men are few, and misunderstood (for dogs also bark at him they know not). Even the philosopher is like the gold-digger, who toils much and finds little, [cf. Plat. Rep. 450 b.], and often his truest wisdom is to know himself, and to feel the nothingness of his individual Being in the presence of the Universal Order. Yet public law is to be zealously maintained, as more general than the private will, the excesses of which are to be quenched as a dangerous fire.

Such is the bare outline of a thought the grandeur of which was far beyond the comprehension of that time. The Λόγος or Law of Heraclitus was not exactly a law of progress, for his elements are ever circling in one round, yet it is as near an approach to that Idea as is to be found in Ancient Philosophy. A still nearer approach is made to the conception of the infinity and simplicity of Nature. And while we feel that the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle owe much of their strength and reality and perfection to the One Being of Parmenides, and in part also to the Pythagoreans, in whose philosophy finite and infinite were already combined, it is impossible not to recognise in Plato a nearer kindred to Heraclitus than to any other of his predecessors. The union of Imagination and Reason, the plasticity of mind, the tendency at once to soar and to roam, may be mentioned as some of the points of communion between them. Many scattered thoughts,

as well as the spirit pervading whole passages, might be quoted in confirmation of this. It is not surprising therefore if Plato grasped the thought of Heraclitus more firmly than his own followers had done^a.

The fate of Heraclitus' teaching at Ephesus^b reminds us of his own picture of the soul that is too weak to follow the Universal motion, and falls away from it to take an individual shape. The very multiplicity of his symbolism seems to have contributed to this result; each disciple interpreting the whole theory by the figure which was most intelligible to himself: one fastening on the Fire, another on the Sun, another on the dry exhalation, another on the more abstract Righteousness, or the ruling Mind, while some appear to have seized upon his habit of teaching by strange outward signs, if there be any truth in what Aristotle gravely asserts, that Cratylus at length only moved his finger. These divided members of Heraclitus continued after him a partial and spasmodic life, and the system ended consistently in a kind of war.

^a Perhaps the two passages in which this appreciation appears most distinctly are, Sophist. 242: διαφερόμενον γὰρ (sc. τὸ ὄν) αἰεὶ ξυμφέρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν, (with which contrast Sympos. 187, where the saying is explained away,) and Cratyl. 412: ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγούνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι τι διεξιόν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίνεσθαι. εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ἰόντος ἰέναι παντός, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἐστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ δ' οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαῖόν κ.τ.λ.

^b This may be illustrated by the continuation of the passage of the Cratylus just quoted, μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. ἐγὼ δέ, ὡς Ἑρμόγενης, ἄτε λιπαρῆς ὦν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον—δι' ὃ γὰρ γίνεται, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἴτιον—καὶ ἰδίᾳ καλεῖν ἔφη τις τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταῦ-

τα· ἐπειδὴν δ' ἡρέμα αὐτοῖς ἐπαυερῶ ἀκούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν ἤττον, τί οὖν ποτ' ἐστίν, ὦγαθε, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐρωτῆν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἄλλεσθαι. ἱκανῶς γὰρ μέ φασι πεπύσθαι καὶ ἀκηκοέναι καὶ ἐπιχειροῦσι, βουλόμενοι ἀποπιμπλάναι με, ἄλλος ἄλλα ἤδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτι συμφασοῦσιν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ τίς φησι τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διαῖόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὴν οὖν τῷ λέγω αὐτὸ ἄσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκόως, καταγελαῖ μου οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ, εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἥλιος δῆλιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὃ τι αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησί· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ βῆδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι· ὃ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησίν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμόν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὃ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελαῖν φησίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο. αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμυγμένον πάντα φησίν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγὼ, ὡς φίλε, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορία εἰμὶ ἢ πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι μανθάνειν περὶ τοῦ δικαίου, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

But its influence on the other side of the Ægean was far greater, and by warring with other ideas it renewed its vitality. As was fitting, however, before finding its true place in the Platonic Philosophy (see especially the Parmenides), it was bound again in the prison of sense, and made to fight the battle of Opinion against the reigning ideal system. Whether or not Protagoras, and after him the Cyrenaics, openly made the Heraclitean dogma the basis of their scepticism, it is certain that Plato, and probable that Euclides also, regarded this as its only real philosophical support^c.

The peculiarity of the traces of Heraclitus in the Theætetus is, that his doctrine is there brought forward in support of a subjective theory; that its influence is partly direct, partly derived through his Ephesian followers, and (possibly) through Aristippus; and that it is carried to its remotest consequences by being subjected to the Socratic or Megarian logic. He thus becomes merely the representative of the principle of the perpetual flux of all things, and their absolute diversity, in opposition to the perfect rest and unity of the Eleatic Being:—the notion that, as it is put in the Phædo, like the tides in the Euripus, all things are ever coming and going, and swaying up and down and to and fro. Nothing *is*, everything is ever *becoming*. That this was a faithful representation of the theory in its later stages, appears from what Aristotle tells of Cratylus, that he found fault with Heraclitus' maxim: *δὲς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης· αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἅπαξ*.

The passage which most distinctly recalls Heraclitus himself, is that in which this doctrine of 'becoming' (*γένεσις*) is first stated and confirmed by proofs, though even this is perhaps coloured by the 'disciples of Protagoras.'

The quotations from the poets (whom the early philosophers despised [*παλαιά τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητικῆ*]) and the subtle illustrations from natural and mental phenomena (contrast Heraclitus' "The drunkard has a wet soul") belong rather to the refined philosophers whom Plato is quoting (or to his own invention) than to the prophet of Ephesus. But the mention of the fire which begets and rules all else, and is itself created by motion, is thoroughly Heraclitean, and the

^c Τὴν λεγομένην αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας προσαγορεύουσι φερομένην τινά. Plat. Soph.

word *περιφορά* (which occurs again p. 181) is perhaps used, together with the symbol of the Sun, not without reference to the circling process of the elements^d, the *ὁδος ἄνω κάτω μία*, which would be reversed if the diurnal motion were interrupted, *καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα*. Cf. *Simpl. in Arist. Categ.* p. 105 b. Bas.: *Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιλείπει, οἴχοιτο ἂν πάντα ἀφανισθέντα. διὸ καὶ μέμφεται Ὀμήρω Ἡράκλειτος, εἰπόντι,*

ὡς ἔρις' ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο,
οἰχήσεσθαι γάρ, φησι πάντα^e.

In the fuller statement of the doctrine of sense, p. 156, the obscure words (rendered more obscure by the interpolation of Cornarius) regarding the comparative swiftness and slowness of the different motions, are probably to be explained in connection with Heraclitus. Sensation is a process between opposites (*ποιούν* and *πάσχον*). If we imagine it under the image of the *ὁδος ἄνω κάτω*, the process is higher, and therefore swifter than the things between which it moves^f; they may be contrasted as fire and earth, as the sun and the cloud, as mind and body. (In this case the process itself has an objective and subjective element). E. g. man and stone are slow motions and of the nature of earth, but vision and whiteness are swifter and more of the nature of fire. In modern language, they have a higher power or law^g. There is probably some intermediate

^d See Lassalle, II. 114 n. 3. 119. is differently applied by Milton, *Par.*

^e The image of the 'golden chain' L. B. II. 1. 1005 (*Chaos loq.*)

Another World

Hung o'er my realm, linked in a golden chain
To that side Heaven from whence your legions fell.

Ib. l. 1051:—

And fast by, hanging in a golden chain,
This pendant world.

^f Cf. Heracl. fr.: *Ἐφαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίγεται.* psychological application of the idea of 'quicker' and 'slower' elements,

^g Shakespeare has made a fanciful in *Sonnets* 44, 45.

But ah! thought kills me that I am not thought
To leap large lengths of miles when thou art gone,
But that, so much of earth and water wrought,
I must attend time's leisure with my moan;
Receiving nought by elements so slow,
But heavy tears, badges of either's woe.

The other two, slight air and purging fire,
Are both with thee, wherever I abide;
The first my thought, the other my desire,

refinement upon Heraclitus which would more completely illustrate the words of Plato. But their interpretation is certainly assisted by a nearer acquaintance with the Heraclitean theory.

In p. 157 the following words forcibly recal Heraclitus: ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα.

And in p. 158 the doubt raised about waking and dreaming reminds us of one of his favourite reflections: τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λαυθάνει ὄκοσα ἐγερθέντες ποιούσιν ὄκωσπερ ὄκοσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλαυθάνονται.

θάνατός ἐστιν ὄκοσα εὐδοντες ὄρέομεν· ὄσα δὲ ἐγερθέντες, ὕπνος.

In one other passage, where there is no direct allusion to him, an expression occurs which is eminently descriptive of his mind: p. 173.

τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πολεὶ κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον, [τᾶς] τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε, καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὄλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς οὐδὲν αὐτῆν συγκαθιεῖσα^h.

When the doctrine of motion is again taken up and criticised in pp. 180 sqq. the more immediate reference is to the Ephesian followers of Heraclitus, the humorous account of whom has been already noticed. They are compelled to state more distinctly what is meant by motion, and to acknowledge that it comprises not only locomotion (which has hitherto been spoken of, though in a vague sense), but also change. This agrees with what Aristotle says, that the Heracliteans had nowhere defined their principle of motionⁱ. The *elenchus* is therefore

These present-absent with swift motion slide.
For when these quicker elements are gone
In tender embassy of love to thee,
My life being made of four, with two alone,
Sinks down to death, oppressed with melancholy:
Until life's composition be recured
By those swift messengers returned from thee,
Who even but now come back again, assured
Of thy fair health, recounting it to me:
This told, I joy; but then no longer glad,
I send them back again, and straight grow sad.

^h Cf. Rep. 496: Ἡ ἐν σμικρῇ πολιτείᾳ ὄταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φωνῇ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδη.

ⁱ Phys. Auscult. VIII. 3 § 3: Πρὸς οὗς, καίπερ οὐ διορίζοντας ποίαν κίνησιν λέγουσιν ἢ πάσας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι.

here applied to them, and their doctrine is exploded by being precisely stated.

Lastly, it should be noticed that the conception of *λόγος*, with which the *Theætetus* closes, has no connexion with the technical and objective use of the word in the Heraclitean system; it is rather employed in a Megarian, i. e. a semi-Eleatic sense, not without a trace of the definitions of Socrates. This appears from the opening of the *Sophista*. With Heraclitus, *δνομα* and *λόγος* were symbolical expressions for the same thing.

Parmenides.

II. The sublime thought of the Eternal movement of an infinite law was not, however, destined to be the final conception of the Greek mind. While life and death and the succession of phenomena were thus idealized on the Eastern shores of the *Ægean*, a different, though parallel impulse was preparing elsewhere, it is said at Elea in *Magna Græcia*: an impulse equally if not more sublime, yet by itself no less incapable of giving rise to such a philosophy as Plato's. Xenophanes had already said—

“There is one God above all in heaven or earth, not like to mortals either in form or mind.” “He is all sight, all thought, all hearing.” “He even abides immoveable in one stay: nor does it become him to waver to and fro.”

Inspired with this thought Parmenides rose at once into an ideal world of mind and being, not seeking there an explanation of the sensible universe, nor endeavouring to grasp its law, or idealize its continual process, but dwelling solely on the all-sufficient object of Absolute and Perfect Being. From the world in which his thought reposed, growth and decay were exiled far, into a region which Pure Being did not enter, a world of nothingness, which yet seemed to satisfy the minds of ordinary men, who trusted in the blindness of opinion and sense, and lived amongst contradictions. For in this lower world of opinion, opposite principles ever strove, light and darkness, heat and cold. But Pure Being is one, a rounded whole, perfect and full, identical with the Absolute Mind. The only symbol of Parmenides is the Perfect Sphere.

The main effort of Plato's dialectic, as is well known, is to bring these opposite poles of thought, the Eleatic and Ionian, into organic and well-balanced harmony. In its most abstract

conception it is the problem of the one and the many (*τῶν λόγων ἀγήρων πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν*), or of motion and rest. In this effort he was assisted by the Pythagoreans, who had already found a sort of middle term in number.

The doctrine of Parmenides does not enter directly into the *Theætetus*, from which the discussion of it is expressly excluded: but his influence is notwithstanding present in the Megarian method, which was in part derived from Zeno (see above), in whose hands the One had acquired a negative power, and was used rather to distinguish than to comprehend, so becoming rather the form than the sole object of thought. This Eleatic influence appears chiefly (1) in the relentless way in which sensation and motion are reduced to nothingness, and because they have no unity are shewn to present no object to the mind: (2) in the crowning point of the dialogue, where it is admitted that there are universal perceptions of pure mind, and that Being is the principal of these: (3) in the paradox about false opinion, which is similar to that of Zeno about motion,—not ‘it is impossible for a thing to be in two places at once,’ but ‘it is impossible to know and not to know at the same time,’—and is solved in the same way by reverting to the conception of degrees: (4) in the form of argument with which this paradox is enforced, *ὁ ἔν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ*: (5) in the question about the whole and its parts, pp. 203, 204.

But it is rather in the objective side of Plato's teaching that the doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno is examined and brought to bear.

III. Protagoras, who gives to the inquiry in the *Theætetus* its subjective turn, and some part of its dramatic interest, had died at the age of seventy, some ten or twelve years before the trial of Socrates, which is the supposed date of the conversation. The real share borne by him in the dialogue is less than appears at first sight. It is to his “disciples” that the doctrine of sense based on that of motion is attributed, and though he is made to bear the brunt of the attack, because the guardians whom he has left will not defend his “orphan” theory, yet when challenged to meet him upon his own ground, Socrates falls back upon the saying quoted at first, “Man is the measure of all things,” and the explanation of it, “Things are to

me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you." The same words occur also in the Cratylus. This, then, is all that we can with any certainty point to in this dialogue as Protagorean, except the name of his treatise *Ἀλήθεια*, the sceptical fragment about the existence of the gods, and perhaps one or two rhetorical words, such as *μεγαλειότερος*, *πολυάρατος*. For it is evident that the doctrine of motion and becoming, which he is said to have entrusted to his disciples "in a mystery," (cf. Cratyl. p. 413, quoted above, p. xliv. n. b), cannot have been extant in his writings. It is therefore surprising to find Sextus Empiricus representing the tenets of Protagoras in language closely resembling that used in the Theætetus. The wonder is abated, however, if we reflect that there was really a very close affinity between Protagoras and the Cyrenaics, and that of this affinity Plato is in this dialogue the interpreter. Aristotle follows Plato in identifying the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus. And there are thus three sources, independent of Protagoras, from which the account of Sextus may have been derived: the Cyrenaics, the Theætetus, and Aristotle. The similarity of the language in which different sensationalist theories are described in later times may possibly indicate the influence of this very dialogue in fixing the terminology of that section of thought.

It is therefore the more interesting to examine the one saying of Protagoras which is here preserved: *πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι*. Might not this seem at first sight to imply something less than the absolute relativity of knowledge? Might it not even be interpreted to mean, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus?" In answer to this it may be remarked, first, that Protagoras appears so far at least to have interpreted his own saying, *ὡς οἷα μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί*. But it may be added, secondly, that the distinction between the race and the individual, between the general term "man," and the singular term "this man," was probably not distinctly present to his mind. When we reflect on the absence of any abiding consciousness of the universal and of the distinction between abstract and concrete, exhibited, for instance, in the first answer of Theætetus, or in the attempt of Meno to define virtue, it

becomes evident that the term *man*, thus barely used by a popular teacher, would naturally call up the idea, not of human nature or of the human mind, nor of the race collectively, but of "a man," "this or that man," an individual, "you or me," not however conceived of as an individual, nor consciously distinguished from any abstract or generic notion of man, but simply present to the imagination. [Cf. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, Thuc. I. 140, which does not correspond to the modern generic use of the word.]

Protagoras saw that men were weary of systems which had no reference to human life, and seemed to make knowledge unattainable. He saw persons teaching astronomy and the nature of Being to those who wanted to learn how to become able and successful citizens. Like other popular teachers, he had a keener eye for the immediate wants of those who came to him than for the truth, of which, however, he is not to be supposed a careless lover. The theory of Parmenides, which had its warm advocates at Athens, was one purely objective; although beginning and ending in the mind, it was wholly independent of any human standard: the highest aim for man was to rise by pure thought into the world of being.

Protagoras felt, like Socrates, that the truth which man requires is relative to man, but, unlike Socrates, he made this the end and not the starting-point of his inquiry, and instead of searching by reflection for that one truth by which man ought to live, he was contented with inferring that truth was variable, according to the common notion, "many men, many minds."

From the pit of scepticism into which Philosophy was thus in danger of being lowered, the impulse given by Socrates to speculative inquiry rescued it, and by vindicating the unity of truth, and the importance of the search for it to human life, gave to the old philosophies their true weight and significance through the Dialectic of Plato.

As embodied in the Theætetus, however, the above doctrine receives some fresh characteristics, first as being made the type of a contemporary theory, and being interwoven with that of Heraclitus; secondly, as holding one side of an antithesis, which gives a sharpness and precision to the term ἀνθρώπος, as equivalent to ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, which it probably had not

when first used; and, thirdly, by being pushed to its minutest results, according to the Megarian method,—not only ‘man’ but ‘each man,’ not only so, but ‘every creature,’ and even the same person at different times.

Gorgias.

The name of Gorgias (of Leontini, who flourished B. C. 480, and is said to have been alive at the death of Socrates) does not appear in the *Theætetus*, and there is no distinct allusion to him. But his denial of absolute Knowledge and Being^t, in which he was followed by Antisthenes, finds a place in the indirect refutation of Protagoras’ assertion of relative truth. The passages in which this appears most distinctly have been already noticed (*Theæt.* pp. 161, 183.) He would also be included amongst the professors of rhetoric who busied themselves about such questions as, Is a King happy?

Other names which might be enlarged upon are those of Euthydemus (who seems to have been a still more worthy predecessor of Antisthenes) and Prodicus.

§ 4.

Socrates.

But the person of Socrates is more interesting than any further scraps of theory. It is this which almost equally with the spirit of the author himself gives life and depth to what might otherwise be a barren conflict of opinion and method. From behind the ironical mask of the *Elenchus*, as preserved by Euclides, there peep forth characteristics of the man Socrates, which awake the reader’s imagination, and rouse in him a kindred spirit of inquiry. The way in which this negative method is represented as a preparatory exercise, ridding the mind of the lumber of its crude notions, the humorous form in which this is expressed, the courteous, but relentless manner in which the method itself is followed, the eager interest shown in the development of a young mind, the kindly sympathy mixed with playful irony with which *Theætetus* is treated throughout: above all, the enthusiastic joy with which the acknowledgment is welcomed in one so young, that there is something which the mind itself perceives without the senses, belong to Socrates alone. The very soul of the representation is a part of him. Beneath the negative and destructive seeming

^t οὐδὲν ἔστιν.—εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπων.—εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ἀνέφοιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας.—*Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.* VII. 65.

there is a sober earnestness of belief, which breaks out in such passages as that about the Divine life, a belief in the existence of truth somewhere, and in the all-importance of the search for it, which we feel to be due above all other men to Socrates. The very form of this inquiry, as consisting in self-questioning, which we associate with Socrates, is adverted to more than once (*οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες—βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.*) The conception of a definition at once simple and exhaustive as the end to be attained by every inquiry, also belongs to him. Cf. Ar. Met. M. 1079 a. *δύο γὰρ ἐστὶν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίζεσθαι καθόλου. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης.*

It deserves to be noticed here that critics have found in the picture of the dwarfed, shrewd, practical spirit, an allusion to Lycon, or to some other of the enemies of Socrates, as they have seen in the contrasted image of the philosophic life, partly a praise of Socrates, partly a trace of Plato's residence at Megara.

The person of Theætetus is also an important element. Theætetus. Whether or not, as seems probable, the dialogue contains a tribute of affection to a friend and pupil who was no more, the reader is certainly intended to dwell with admiring interest upon his character. His dangerous state is the subject of the most anxious solicitude to the persons who meet us on the threshold: they say of him that he has fulfilled the promise of Socrates, who augured most nobly of his future; and presently we are invited to view his portrait as a youth by the hand of his own master Theodorus, who ascribes to him the very combination of qualities described by Plato in his Republic as the ideal of the philosophic nature. We find Socrates in love with his mind at first sight, and still more delighted with him as the argument proceeds.—Theætetus is described by later writers as a great mathematician, who taught at Heraclea, after the times of the Peloponnesian war, and as the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids; and is said to have heard Socrates and to have been the companion of Plato. The latter fact may possibly have been derived from this dialogue, but it is at least natural to identify the persons, especially from the aptness for mathematics shown by the youth at the opening of

the inquiry. If we are right in doing so, a passage in the Republic (p. 528.) acquires a fresh interest from the fact mentioned above, that Theætetus wrote the first treatise on the regular solids. When Plato says that the geometry of solids is yet in its infancy, but that he does not despair of its being discovered, we are tempted to suspect an allusion to the labours of his friend ^u.

What have we then in Theætetus? A youth, whom, as the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist afterwards remarks, no corruption of sophistry could long withhold from the belief in true ideas and the endeavour to grasp them, but full of perplexity and wonder (a proof of this very impulse) at the conflict between common sense, sceptical difficulties, and speculative enquiry, which he heard waged around him, and which found an echo within his mind. Yet until encouraged and helped by Socrates, he is unable to state his opinion on an abstract question, except in a subject which he has systematically studied, viz. geometry, in which he and his fellow-pupil have lately with some labour arrived at a generalised expression. But in this and in the other special studies which he has pursued, his master Theodorus has found in him qualities which are rarely combined, acuteness and gravity, gentleness and courage, a mind unruffled, rapid and unerringly successful in its application to learning and inquiry; and a spirit of generosity unaffected by reverses of fortune.

Theætetus, though a mere boy, is the most desirable of pupils for Philosophy, both as possessing all the requirements of the philosophic nature, and because without being yet irrevocably devoted to any special pursuit, he amply fulfils the condition, *μηδὲὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσὶτω*. (See Rep. B. vii.)

Theodorus. The choice of Theodorus as an interlocutor (not to dwell upon the tradition that Plato had studied under him) connects itself with the same belief in the importance of geometry as an introduction to dialectic, though in Theodorus it had not led to this result. Theodorus is also (as already noticed) of Cyrene, the town of Aristippus, and professes himself a friend of Protagoras.

§ 5.

Such appear to be the external elements of the Theætetus;

^u Although there may be also an allusion to the Conic Sections, which were discovered in Athens about this time.

possessing also a more general interest because they supply us with indications of the influences which had surrounded Plato himself, the phases of thought by which his mind had been attracted or repelled, and with some of which it had been perhaps almost identified; but to each of which he could now assign its due place and value in the progress of the mind towards true ideas, or, to use his own image, in its conversion out of the dark cave and prison of sense to mount upwards towards the world of Being.

It is not enough to have taken a work like this to pieces. That is only a step towards viewing it as a whole.

1. After a preface in which the Megarian tendency of the dialogue is indicated, a youth of philosophic genius is brought into contact with the prophet of Greek thought. The mind of the youth is not "a sheet of blank paper," for besides the ordinary *μουσική* and *γυμναστική*, he has been instructed by Theodorus in geometry and other sciences, and has been stimulated to inquiry by hearing the report of questions raised by Socrates, while he is dizzy with wonder at the contradictions in common language and ideas pointed out by other teachers (compare the state of Glaucon in the Republic). But though anxious he is wholly unable to give a simple and comprehensive (i. e. abstract and general) definition of knowledge.

Socrates, therefore, approaches him in his character of midwife, professing no wisdom of his own, but only the power of bringing to the birth the minds of young men labouring with new thoughts, and of determining afterwards whether the birth be real or imaginary. Under this curious symbol there is expressed not only Plato's theory of education, which recurs in the figure of the cave and elsewhere, but also the consciousness of that which distinguishes this dialogue, and in a less degree other parts of Plato. Although it would be too much to say that he possessed the idea of the History of Philosophy in the modern sense, he approaches more nearly to it than any ancient writer except Aristotle. No one but Plato could have conceived and executed the design of showing the relation of different theories to each other, and the order of their succession, by representing them as gradually developed in an individual mind. Each theory, though negatived, is not annihilated, it has a real importance assigned to it as a stage in the

progress of the human intellect. This power of tracing the evolution of thought Plato preserved from Socrates, while he retained the negative elenchus in common with Euclides. The union of both is expressed in the above metaphor, and characterises all that follows.

2. Theætetus' first real answer, "Knowledge is Sensation," though spontaneous at the moment, is the expression of a current theory, (that of the men called here "disciples of Protagoras," probably including Aristippus.)

Socrates finds in it the doctrine of Protagoras, "A man the measure of what is," which comes to this, Appearing is reality: for what appears to me, is to me.

But this is shown to have been only the popular side of a deeper doctrine, which is appealed to by the current theory, viz. that nothing exists, but all things are ever passing into their opposites, or in other words, Motion is the world. This is supported by all but universal consent, and by the testimony of Nature, (according to Heraclitean interpretation.)

The union of these two principles enables us to conceive of Sensation as a relative process. Each sensation or perception arises relatively both to the individual and to other sensations or perceptions.

Unless we admit that 'more' and 'less,' 'greater' and 'smaller,' are wholly relative, and are therefore subject to continual change, we shall contradict the self-evident axiom, that nothing can become more while it is equal to itself.

Theætetus' curiosity is now fully awakened, and he is prepared to receive a more complete statement of the doctrine, care being first taken not to let any of those 'profane' ones hear who believe only in things bodily, and not in the invisible process.

The motion which is the world is active and passive, and both kinds are infinite. From the perpetual conjunction of these there arise perpetually sensations and sensible things. The active and passive elements are slower, the twin births are swifter, for they flit to and fro between them. Not that the active and passive elements *are* anything, except as producing that which thus arises from them; nay, active may become passive, and *vice versâ*. Being therefore disappears, and all things become, and perish, and change. This applies to sorts

as well as to individual things. "Borne by the gale" of the argument, we even merge the Good and Noble in the universal flux.

Theætetus, however, does not rebel, and some further difficulties, occasioned by the phenomena of dreams, disease and madness, are triumphantly solved. Every such illusion is real to the subject of it at the moment. This appears most evidently in the case of the sick man's palate. At the same time the theory of a process between subject and object is more distinctly worked out. And the birth of Theætetus' first-born is pronounced complete.

3. To the surprise of Theodorus, Socrates now begins to criticise it.

The saying of Protagoras levels all distinctions as to wisdom, and makes argument absurd.

Theodorus is in vain challenged to reply to this, and Theætetus confesses himself staggered.

But Socrates again changes sides, and finds fault with the objection, as begging the question and daring to appeal to common sense.

The theory is, therefore, again examined in the form, Sensation is Knowledge.

After touching on the difficulty of sounds and characters heard and seen but not understood, Socrates dwells on the case of an object of sight remembered but not seen.

(As Theodorus still hangs back, Socrates acts the part of assailant and respondent in one.)

The advocate of sense is driven to admit that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing. He might be reduced many times even to worse extremities (and that on the ground he has himself chosen) by a merciless Eristic adversary.

Still a defence of Protagoras is possible. He is not bound to commit himself to the answers of Theætetus. Memory, he might say, is far inferior in vividness to the present impression. And it is by no means certain that he would have been afraid to admit that the same man may know and be ignorant of the same thing. Or rather he would deny that an individual viewed in different relations, or under different conditions, is the same man. But he would challenge us to prove directly either that sensation is not relative to the individual, or that, if it is relative to him, it does not follow that the object of it is real to him and to him only.

Differences of wisdom there assuredly are both in individuals and states, and in plants also, but they are differences not in the reality, but in the excellence of impressions, customs, or conditions. To alter these from worse to better is the work of the wise teacher or statesman or husbandman. In conclusion Protagoras would demand fair treatment, as the contrary leads only to the hatred of inquiry.

4. That his demand may be complied with, Theodorus is at length 'compelled' to engage, and Protagoras' own words are selected for criticism, no advantage being taken even of the admission, that there are degrees of wisdom, which was made in his name.

'What seems to each is true for him.' It seems to all men that some think truly and some falsely. This was the drift of our appeal to common sense. It follows that whether Protagoras is right or wrong, some think truly and some falsely.

Further, if Protagoras' saying is true for him, it is false for all men besides. But he confirms their judgment who say that he himself thinks falsely and they truly. His saying then is true for nobody.

5. The weight of his authority still makes us pause. But one thing is clear, that the strength of the theory we are considering lies in the region of sense, and, as regards the state, in the sphere of law and custom;—if it gives way at any point, it is in the decision of such questions as, What is wholesome? What is expedient? A partial Protagoreanism, relinquishing the latter ground, but still maintaining the former, seems to have been held by some.

— The magnitude of the question that is thus stirred up reminds us of the blessedness of the life which has leisure for such inquiries. The digression which follows at once affords a rest, and by the elevation of its tone prepares the mind for the higher thoughts which are in reserve. It is of itself a sufficient answer to those who restrict the idea of Truth to particular impressions,—pointing upwards to the pattern in the Heavens and onwards to the life beyond the grave.—We proceed to apply the test indicated above. Even those who assert that what is Lawful is purely conventional dare not seriously assert this of what is Good.

To put the same admission more generally. In every judg-

ment which, like the calculation of expediency, regards the Future, there is the possibility of error. Even if we make the impression of the moment the test of what is true, that impression, when the moment comes, proves one man to have been right in his anticipation and another wrong. This is practically admitted by Protagoras himself, whenever he gives advice to a young speaker.

6. An inroad is thus made into the enemy's territory, but his last stronghold is not yet taken. We have found something independent of sensation, but the "truth" of sensation itself is not yet overthrown. The Heraclitean principle of motion is therefore grappled with. For its Ephesian supporters give us no hold. Theodorus describes the wavering mysticism of these modern Heracliteans, "no friends of his." And Socrates resumes what was said at first of the antiquity of the doctrine, adding that there have been a few who, like Parmenides, have stood out against it, and that our present position is the dangerous middle-ground between two armies. Before closing with the slippery "movement party" we arm ourselves by distinguishing two kinds of motion: locomotion and change. They must admit that all things move in both these ways, or else there would be a way in which they stood still. In the former statement of the theory, sensation and quality were described as fitting between object and subject. But now at the same time that they flit, they must also change. Therefore in the very moment when we are naming them they have become different. Every name is therefore false as well as true: e. g. When I say sensation is Knowledge, it is equally true to say Not-sensation, i. e. according to the theory, Not-Knowledge. Thus the boasted Infinity of Motion becomes the indeterminateness, i. e. the nothingness of Sense. Every thing is nothing in particular.

7. We are now wholly free from Protagoras and from the doctrine of motion. But instead of advancing at once to examine Parmenides, Socrates proceeds with the main argument, and Theodorus is accordingly released. The truth is, there is still some intermediate ground to travel. We have risen above sensation, but the problems connected with Opinion as such (*δόξα*, as independent of *ἀλήθεια*) remain to be solved.

Theætetus must first be made conscious of the existence of pure acts of thought. To this consciousness he rises easily,

when, reverting to sensation for a moment, Socrates proves to him that the eye and ear are only the instruments of the mind. There are some ideas common to the objects of different senses, which are perceived concerning them without any such instrument. These the mind itself, reviewing the impressions of sense, immediately contemplates. 'Being' is the most general of them, and is found in company with all the rest. They include also that perception of what is good, to which reference has been already made.

The enthusiasm with which this acknowledgment is welcomed marks it as the highest point actually gained in the dialogue. It is with this that the more advanced teaching of the Sophista immediately connects itself.

The contrast between the contemplation of these ideas by the mind, and the particular impressions of the senses, throws the latter still further into the shade, and we no longer cast our glances backwards, but advance eagerly as into a new-found world.

We examine opinion, not now as it is bound up with sense, but as the pure act of the mind.

8. But all our efforts to grasp the idea of knowledge here only tend to show that Opinion like sensation is indeterminate.

Protagoras said that all men think rightly. This we interpreted to mean that sense is knowledge, and disposed of it rather summarily by a 'reductio ad absurdum.' But the same difficulty now returns upon us in a more abstract form. How is false opinion possible? Considered quite in the abstract, it seems impossible. For whenever we think, our thought is known to us, and real. Or, if thinking be a silent proposition, it seems impossible that we should join two ideas wrongly when both are clearly present to the mind.

We must descend again from this region of pure thought, and have recourse to the conception of degrees of knowledge and of a process between the mind and sensible things. [For otherwise (as Aristotle says) Thought is like a straight line passing over things, not like a curve embracing them.] False opinion will thus be the failure of the mind in bringing together the impressions of sensation and memory. But it is shown by an example that it is possible to mistake between two things, both of which are laid up in the mind. Therefore we must conceive of a more subtle process between the mind and its own ideas, which it may possess without actually grasping them at any

particular time. But when we look steadily at the image we have called up we find that the same difficulty returns. The mind is ignorant of that which is present to it. For, if I have grasped the wrong idea, how do I not know it for what it is? or if an unreal one, how, when I have grasped it, do I not know it to be unreal? The succession of such images must be continued to infinity.

The lesson drawn from this is, that we cannot define false opinion until we have defined knowledge. I. e. Opinion in its own nature is wholly Indeterminate. This is evident at once, if we examine true opinion. An opinion without any real grounds may yet happen to be true.

9. This leads the way to the last unsuccessful effort to define knowledge from the subjective side. Something more than true opinion is required to constitute knowledge. What is that 'something more?' The answer is ready. Knowledge is true opinion with an account of its object (*μετὰ λόγου*). The mind surveying its impressions (see above) cannot give an account of the individual objects of sense; it can only name them; but the complex ideas of the various relations of these are expressed in propositions. These therefore alone are the objects of knowledge. Or, more physically, the elements of all things cannot be known, but the combination of these in Nature is the object of Knowledge.

This theory is first tested in the case of letters and syllables, from which it seems to have been derived. The elementary sounds certainly cannot be analysed, but are they therefore unknown? If separately unknown how are they known together? Is the complex independent of its elements? Can a whole be thus conceived of without its parts? If, as appears probable, the expressions, for instance, 'all the six,' 'all of the six,' and 'the whole of the six,' (*τὰ πάντα, τὸ πᾶν, τὸ ὅλον,*) are synonymous, and the whole cannot be considered as separable from its parts, then, if the syllable is known, so are its constituent sounds. The simple is equally known with the complex. But if the whole differs from the all, and is separable from its parts, then it is one and uncompounded, that is, a new element. The complex is equally unknown with the simple. Experience points to the former alternative. In learning grammar or music, we did not know the combinations until after we had learned the letters or notes.

[In this conclusion a kind of reality seems to be again awarded to the objects of sense, not as they give rise to ever varying impressions, but as they are perceived by the mind, which imparts to each of them its own stamp of unity. At the same time ideas of relation are shown to have as much and as little reality as simple ideas, and in the *μία ἰδέα ἀμέριστος* a glimpse is afforded of the transcendent ideal world. If we compare the *Sophist*, *Philebus* and *Republic*, Plato's doctrine appears here in a rudimentary form. He wavers between abstract and concrete, the one and the many. The necessity is not yet felt of finding an expression for the relation between the ideal and actual.]

10. But, though this theory is rejected, the above definition of knowledge may still be true. What is the 'account' (*λόγος*) required in it? It cannot be the mere reflexion of thought in language. For this power is possessed by all men. Nor is it the analysis of the complex by the enumeration of its elements. For this may be done rightly in one case and wrongly in another where the elements are the same. But knowledge is infallible. Nor, lastly, is it, what seems plausible at first sight, the comprehension of the distinctive difference. For this is essential to right opinion. And if it is meant that we must have knowledge, and not opinion merely, of the distinctive difference, the term knowledge still remains to be defined.

What then is the result of the inquiry? The answer is simply that given by Socrates, The mind of Theætetus is prepared for better things. Difficulties have been undoubtedly raised, such as Plato really felt, and which were silenced rather than solved by the contemplation of the Idea of Good; (e. g. the difficulty about false opinion.) Hypotheses have been advanced which he knew to be really valuable, and the equivalents of which have frequently satisfied the human mind, (e. g. the hypothesis expressed in the figure of the waxen block.) But Plato does not rest in these uncertainties, and is by no means satisfied. Nor is it by any means his intention to point out the hopelessness of the attempt to define Knowledge. What he does point out is the impossibility of conceiving Knowledge apart from its object. The perception of the existence of Ideas of Being and Goodness, of sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, and of number, which is just touched upon, is the first step towards the construction of that transcendental

world, the contemplation of which, in the light of the Idea of Good, is Knowledge according to Plato's highest conception of it (*ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα*). Whether or not he had attained to this when the *Theætetus* was written, (he had probably advanced some way towards it), the fact is certain that he was not satisfied with any lower or less triumphant view. The meaning and the merits of that final theory do not fall under discussion here.

§ 6.

The genuineness of the *Theætetus* has never been seriously questioned. To put its authenticity in the strongest possible light, it stands or falls with the *Republic*. No difficulty that may arise in assigning to it its chronological position, or in reconciling special points of teaching or method, can countervail the inward harmony, the manifold coincidences of thought and style, the incommunicable grace and beauty, the intensity of inquiry relieved with ever present humour, which bind this and the other greater dialogues to the greatest, making them one living individual whole.

§ 7.

The comparative study of Plato's dialogues is of importance not so much as leading to a chronological arrangement, towards which little progress has been made, but rather as throwing light upon his manner of dealing with a subject and his mode of composition generally. There are fallacies incidental to the study of one dialogue, which the comparison of others will remove: extreme views are thus corrected, assertions modified, the unevenness of the whole surface becomes more evident, as well as the inherent unity, and we become more cautious in speaking of 'Plato's view' of this or that point; and also in taking literally his development of the tenets of this or that school. It becomes apparent too, on a wider survey, that more varieties of thought existed around Plato than we have names for, or than can be easily summed up in one or two formulæ. And at every step we become more convinced that no limit can be assigned to his fertility either of imagination or thought. Such a comparison is the natural and necessary test of every hypothesis regarding any single dialogue.

Schleiermacher linked the *Theætetus* and *Gorgias* as com-

panion treatises: but when read without the bias of his peculiar scheme, they do not present features of very close relationship. The interest of the *Gorgias* is less philosophical and more dramatic, approaching even to comedy. In the *Theætetus* we breathe the serene atmosphere of friendship and peace; in the *Gorgias*, Socrates is engaged in his ironical warfare. The *Gorgias* annihilates rhetoric and the vulgar belief in success which was its food; the *Theætetus* is a criticism of scientific theories, preparing the way for serious philosophical inquiry. The *Gorgias* is written in the strain of the *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras* and *Meno*, and of the first and second books of the *Republic*; the tone of the *Theætetus* is nearer to that of the *Philebus* and *Sophista*, and of the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic*. The points of coincidence, and there are several, between the two dialogues, have as much of contrast as of resemblance. The vulgar notion of the philosopher, which in the *Theætetus* is treated with lofty scorn, in the *Gorgias* is represented with humourous zest. The same may be said of the weakness of rhetoric in philosophy; and the common incentives to action, which in the *Theætetus* are contemptuously dismissed, in the *Gorgias* are stated at length with ironical gravity. Much nearer points of comparison may be found in the *Philebus*, *Cratylus*, and *Meno*.

The *Philebus* presents the other aspect of the controversy between Euclides and Aristippus, the opposition namely between pleasure and wisdom taking the place of that between sensation and knowledge. But the combatants are viewed from an independent height, and the instruments by which decision is made and the question solved, are neither Cyrenaic nor Megarian, but chiefly Platonic, and partly Pythagorean. A detailed parallel and contrast would extend this essay to undue length, but would be useful in illustrating the difference between Plato's earlier and later method, and the growth of his psychology. Some light is also thrown by the *Philebus* on the manner in which Plato treats contemporaries as witnesses to a truth, for which he has himself found a fuller expression.

In the *Cratylus* Socrates is seen moderating between the modern Heraclitean and the Sophistical or conventional view of language: thus a point of opposition is found between the doctrines which are blended in the *Theætetus*.

The Heraclitean or 'natural' theory is ironically set forth at great length; and etymology is tortured so as to bear witness to the flux of all things. The account given in the *Cratylus* of the earlier and later Heraclitean dogmas has been already quoted. The *Cratylus*, after acknowledging that there is a conventional element in language, and that it may possibly have no better foundation than the theory of a flux, ends, like the *Theætetus*, with a sort of 'dream' of the Ideas.

The *Meno* opens with the difficulty which haunts us in the *Theætetus*, How can one inquire about what he does not know? It is there solved by the half-mythical hypothesis of Recollection, to which the slave is made to bear unconscious testimony. This seems to throw some light upon the words of the *Theætetus* (which appear to be partly set aside as the dialogue proceeds), "I leave out of sight the intermediate processes of learning and forgetting, as beside our present purpose." (p. 188.) The image of the waxen block, which seems to take up what is thus reserved, makes it appear doubtful whether these words are meant to hint at any further theory. But a Megarian philosopher would probably know how to distinguish between *μανθάνειν* and *μαθεῖν*, *ἐπιμανθάνεσθαι* and *ἐπιλελῆσθαι*. (p. 191.)

It is of more importance, however, to examine the nature of the connexion hinted by Plato himself between the *Theætetus*, *Sophista* and *Politicus*. There is much substantial correspondence between the *Theætetus* and *Sophista*, which may be regarded as complementary to each other. In the *Theætetus* Knowledge is reduced to its elements; the aim of the *Sophista* is to point out the inadequacy of analysis as a method of Knowledge, and to harmonize opposite ideas, Being and Not-Being, Rest and Motion. The one dialogue is the basis of Plato's subjective, the other of his objective teaching. Heraclitus and Protagoras are examined in the one, Parmenides is brought to the test in the other. The *Theætetus* dwells chiefly on mental processes, the *Sophista* chiefly on ideas. The one is concerned with Knowledge, the other with Being. The possibility of false opinion is the cardinal difficulty of the one: the existence of the non-existent is the corresponding source of perplexity in the other. The highest point touched in the former dialogue is that there are ideas which the mind

itself contemplates unaided by sense, and which, it is hinted afterwards, have each of them an indivisible unity. These ideas or nobler elements are the foundation of the chief speculations in the latter. And the Megarian method of criticism which reigns almost unquestioned in the *Theætetus*, in the *Sophista* becomes criticised in its turn.

There is also an obvious bond of connexion between the *Sophista* and *Politicus*. The one is to the intellectual what the other is to the social and moral world. As the Sophist is to the Philosopher, so is the earthly Statesman to the true King.

But is there a common link, by which the three dialogues are bound in one? There is: and it is one which, though subtle, was probably regarded by Plato as of great importance. This is the gradual development in them of a dialectical method. Indeed, in the *Politicus* this is expressly spoken of as the chief thing, p. 286: *νῦν ἡμῖν ἢ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζήτησις ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ τούτου προβέβληται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικωτέρους γίνεσθαι*; A similar reason is given for the earnestness with which minute distinctions are pursued in the *Sophist*, p. 227: *ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποιίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαίρον. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμῆ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγείται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον.* The same spirit of ironical disregard of the subject-matter in comparison of the method appears in the *Theætetus*, p. 174 (mingled with a deeper irony), where it is said that the philosopher regards a king as a species of herdsman. In the *Theætetus* also the Socratic element of this method is described under the image of *μαιευτική*.

It is easier to perceive the existence of such a dialectical growth in the three dialogues than to trace the exact steps by which it is developed.

The mere outline of it is perhaps the following. First, the consciousness arises that the aim of all inquiry is to find a simple and comprehensive conception of the thing in question, (*ἐν, ἀπλοῦν—ἐνὶ εἴδει περιλαβεῖν—ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν.*) As a

means to this the Socratic questioning is set forth as the art of 'delivering' the mind. Then after the analysis of sensation, the mind is seen reviewing its sensations so as to arrive at general notions concerning them (*ἀναλογίζεσθαι—συλλογισμός.*) Further on, thought is described as a sort of question and answer within the mind (mental dialectic).

Again, the object of Knowledge appears first as a combination of unknown elements, then as a simple unity, then as a combination of which the elements are known, and lastly as a whole parted off from others by a distinguishing mark. With this conception of *λόγος* the *Theætetus* ends. With the same assumption that Definition implies Division, the *Sophista* opens. But presently it appears that these unities which are the objects of Knowledge (elementary ideas) are not fully known, until not only the differences but also the relations between them are perceived. I do not know This, until I acknowledge the existence of all that is Not-this. The existence even of that which is not must be acknowledged, as the condition of all existence. But in the *Politicus* it appears that this is not enough, but that the Other things from which the object of inquiry is distinguished, must not only be acknowledged as 'something different,' but must each be known in themselves, p. 281: *πότερον οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ περὶ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς λόγος—ικανῶς ἔσται διωρισμένος, ἐὰν ἄρ' αὐτὴν τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν, ὅποσαι περὶ τὴν ἐρεῶν ἐσθῆτα εἰσὶ, τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην πασῶν τιθῶμεν;* (cf. *Theæt.* 208: *ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανῶς οἶμαί σοι εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.) ἢ λέγοιμεν μὲν ἂν τι ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν σαφές γε οὐδὲ τέλειον, πρὶν ἂν καὶ ταύτας αὐτῆς πάσας περιέλωμεν;* This seems to be in advance of the method of dichotomy, and may be described as a sort of return to the concrete. Compare *Phileb.* 16: *μέχρι περ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ ὅτι καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδη τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅποσα.*

And while fulness of conception as well as logical exactness is thus shown to be essential to Knowledge, Plato also points out the usefulness of the argument from analogy in proceeding from the more known to the less known, and from the lower to the higher, p. 277: *Χαλεπὸν ᾧ δαιμόνιε, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαί τι τῶν μειζόνων. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἶον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα πάντ' αὐτὸ πάλιν ὥσπερ ὕπαρ*

ἀγνοεῖν. The method of comparison, which was rejected as insufficient in the simpler and lower sphere, is embraced as the means of entrance to the higher: and it is shewn to be the part of inquiry not only to separate between things near together, but also to detect resemblances in what is remote. A more minute investigation of the connexion thus briefly sketched would probably repay the student. A slightly different aspect of it has been seized by Professor Thomson. Camb. Phil. Tr. vol. X. pt. 1.

It remains under the present head to consider the relation of the *Theætetus* to the account of knowledge which Plato gives in the *Republic*.

It has been common to speak of the Ideas of Plato as if they were the beginning and end of his philosophy; not only its consummation, but its foundation. But to see them as they were presented to him, we must learn to place ourselves behind them, and to regard them as a goal aimed at, but hardly reached. In the *Theætetus* he traces some of the steps by which he had arrived so far. He leads us upwards from the dark valley of sense, into which however some light from the upper region is allowed to penetrate, and makes us feel the difficulty of the ascent. We are not lifted at once to an ideal height, from which we can look down upon the world (*Sophist*, p. 216, *καθωρῶντες ὑψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον*): every inch of advance is disputed, and we have the firm ground of experience beneath our feet.

Once, indeed, in the conversation with Theodorus, we are permitted to breathe the more serene air of the higher life, and mention is made of a Divine Pattern of goodness, to which the wise and righteous man becomes conformed. Compare *Rep.* B. IX. ad fin. 'Ἄλλ', ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παραδείγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὄρᾳν καὶ ὄρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίσειν. The passage in which this occurs, in which mention is also made of the region of pure souls, is such as vividly to recal the *Phædo*.

But in the argumentative part, we are led by slow and painful steps out of the limitations of sense, and to the last no attempt is made to extricate us from its conditions.

At first we are only permitted to distinguish each individual sensation from every other: though binding them together in

bundles for the convenience of naming them. Presently perception and memory are shewn to be separable from sensation, but they are still occasioned by it. The "bonds" are further loosened by the observation that in judging of what is expedient for the future, the present impression of sense is worthless in comparison with reflection: but still the future is relative to the present and the past, and the test of past wisdom is the impression of the moment when it arrives. Theætetus now seizes the great truth that the mind does perceive some things, without the instrumentality of the senses; but still it perceives them as attributes of the objects of sense. Further inquiry is made into this process of the mind itself. It can think truly and also falsely. What difference is implied in this? An attempt is made to conceive this by reasoning from an abstract alternative (knowledge or ignorance, being or not being), but we are compelled to fall back upon the conception of a process between sensation and the recollection of former sensations, or between different abstractions of the world of sense laid up in the memory.

Lastly, there is allowed to float before the mind the thought of an abstract whole; first as consisting of the combination of the indefinite elements of sensible things, then as an indivisible elementary unit arising out of them. But we are reminded that if the combination is known, then its elements must be known also. Yet the power of analysis is an inadequate test of knowledge. It is further requisite that the complete whole, which is the object of thought, be distinguished, by its characteristic difference, from every other.

The nearest approach that is made, in this gradual progress, to the doctrine of Ideas, consists in the acknowledgment that the mind in contemplating Being and Goodness is its own instrument, and in the conception raised for a moment and then relinquished, of the abstract whole (*μη τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔν τι γεγονός εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον*). These form the double summit of this ascent, 'rugged and steep,' through experience and reflection towards the ideal world, and upon these the ethereal structure of Plato's transcendental philosophy reposes. In this dialogue the subjective height alone is fully reached. Being and Goodness are still seen as relative, and the mists of doubt soon close over the momentary glimpse of the purely abstract whole as the object of knowledge.

Yet the consciousness, clearly brought to light, of the indeterminateness, the changes and contradictions of sense and opinion (see Rep. pp. 476, 479, 524), the endeavour to find a resting-place from the merely relative view by the Socratic method of definition, the reflection upon different processes of geometry and arithmetic, the Megarian notion suggested by Zeno and Socrates of Being as the Good, the conception of a pure act of the mind, and the questions raised about the elements, are so many distinct movements in the direction of the Ideas.

The approach is only a partial one, however. Socrates, in the *Theætetus*, speaks of Being as the universal attribute, and of goodness and beauty as perceptible by the comparison of the present with the past and future. In the *Republic*, Being is invested with a sort of Divinity, and the Form of Goodness is seen like the Sun in Heaven, giving light and colour and shape and nutriment to the supra-sensual world. The Ideas are no longer seen from beneath, but have lifted us into their own atmosphere. And yet they clothe themselves in imagery derived from the exploded doctrine of sensation. The sun was the favourite symbol of those who made motion their first principle: it is still used in a figure to typify that which is above motion. As the one principle was imagined to be the cause both of perception and life, so the other is conceived of as the Author both of Knowledge and Being. The Heraclitean element appears once again as the fire by whose glimmering light the shadows of borrowed forms are cast upon the wall of the cave or dungeon in which men lie bound. The combination of agent and patient in sensation, according to the earlier theory, resulted in the twin birth, ever recurring, of sensation and sensible thing. The consummation of the Soul's desires in the Ideal World is the Eternal Union of Mind and Being, the twin immortal offspring of which are Reason and Truth.

In the *Republic*, knowledge is shown to be inseparable from the reality of its object. And there are two conditions of this reality. The object of true Knowledge is, (1) above sense, (2) conformable to the Idea of Good. Knowledge is also divided into Absolute (or Transcendental) and Scientific^k.

^k Two slight discrepancies between the *Theætetus* and the *Republic* deserve to be noticed. (1.) In the *Theætetus* the word *δόξα* is applied to

It is unnecessary in this brief sketch to carry our thoughts onward to the latest and most complicated stage of Plato's philosophy. But we may allude in taking leave of this subject to the wide interval which separates the vague and simple notion of the diurnal revolution of the sun and of the sky, from the elaborate astronomy of the *Timæus*, and on the other hand to the close parallel which subsists between the doctrine of sense which is here rejected as a theory of knowledge, and the final theory of sensation as such, in which Pythagorean and other elements are blended with the Heraclitean. (*Tim.* 43. sqq.)

§. 7.

It is manifest that the dialogue in its present form cannot have existed earlier than the date of the battle in which *Theætetus* is said to have been wounded; and the preface, at least, must probably have been written a few years later than this.

The destruction of the Spartan *Mora* by Iphicrates and his peltasts, an event which Mr. Grote, apparently with good reason, has placed as late as 390 B. C., seems on the whole to be most probably the occasion meant. As the Corinthian war continued three years after this, it is possible that some engagement may have taken place as late as the year 387. But if we are driven to suppose a still later date for the scene with which the *Theætetus* opens, the earliest assignable year is 369 B. C., when the combined forces of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians and their allies tried to dispute the passage of the Isthmus with Epaminondas.

So far as any arguments can be raised from the dialogue taken by itself, the hypothesis that it was written a few years later than 390 B. C. is quite satisfactory. It allows sufficient time for Plato's residence at Megara to have become the subject of reflection with him, and for his mind to have advanced considerably towards its final conceptions. If he was 30 at the death of Socrates, he would now be a little over 40. The bitterness caused by that event would not yet be mellowed

mental operations not immediately connected with sensation. In the *Republic* τὸ αἰσθητικὸν and τὸ νοητικὸν are identified. (2.) ὁρθὴ δόξα, which in the *Republic* is applied only

to practical notions, is used in the *Theætetus* indifferently of the juror's verdict and of the conclusions of the arithmetician.

down, or 'rubbed off by travel;' and the unwillingness to descend 'into the cave,' would naturally still give some harshness to the contrast between philosophy and Athenian life.

And even should it be necessary to place the *Sophista* and *Politicus* much later, the conception of a trilogy or tetralogy, though most important (in this case where it is suggested by Plato himself) as indicating connexion of thought, does not necessitate continuity of composition. No one supposes that the *Œdipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles immediately preceded the *Coloneus* in point of date. (οὐδὲ θεατρῆς ὡς περ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων καὶ ἀρξῶν ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.)

On the other hand, even the year 369 B.C. (though some time must surely be allowed for the composition of the dialogue, and we read of no *battle* till the year 368 B.C.) would seem from internal evidence considerably too late. Plato would then be upwards of 60 years old. He is said to have died in 347 B.C. at the age of 81 or 82. It seems hardly probable that at a time when he must have been putting his thoughts into their most perfect shape in the *Republic*, he should make an elaborate return to the 'elements' of a rejected philosophy, or that the perplexities he had encountered in his sojourn with the Megarian philosophers should 'trouble' him as they once had done, or present themselves to him with the same vividness and reality. The slight way in which the two theories 'that wisdom is the good,' and 'that pleasure is the good,' are touched upon in *Rep.* p. 505, 509, contrasts forcibly with the earnestness with which in the *Theætetus* the Cyrenaic theory of knowledge is treated as an open question, and the strong Megarian influence which is throughout perceptible. And while it is most probable that the *Theætetus* is written from a point of view more advanced than any which is allowed to appear in the dialogue itself, it is very difficult to conceive that (e. g.) the passage in which the existence and goodness, sameness and difference of things, are shown to be immediately perceived by the mind, was written nearly at the same period with the account of the Idea of Good in the *Republic*. (See the beginning of B. VII. where the sameness and difference (e. g.) of the fingers is spoken of as one of the first perceptions of the awakening intellect.) The freshness and individuality of the person of Socrates, and the close identification of the

method with his teaching are also features which consist better with the earlier date.

The chief difficulty in the way of the above hypothesis is connected with the person of Theætetus; who in the conversation with Socrates is represented as a boy of about 16 (*μειράκιον*) while Euclides and Terpsion speak of him in the preface in terms which imply that he was already a distinguished and valued citizen and had justified the prophetic words of Socrates. (*Οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι—τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι—ἀληθῆ εἶπεν.*) If the date of the battle in question were earlier than 390 B. C. Theætetus could hardly have had time to fulfil the prophecy of Socrates even in the eyes of his personal friends. But an interval of 9 years does seem sufficient for this. The youth of 16 would have become a man of 25, and might well have earned distinction in light-armed combat, and in other ways. Some touches in the conversation would then acquire additional point. Terpsion has no doubt of the prowess of his friend, yet Euclides mentions with some pride that men had praised him for his conduct in the battle. This praise is also the more natural, if the kind of fighting was one comparatively untried, and the occasion one in which the national honour of Athens and Sparta was nearly concerned. The words, too, *εἶπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι*, have a more touching significance, if they apply to one who seems likely to be cut off in his prime.

The difficulty is greater, however, when the notices of later writers are taken into account. If Theætetus is supposed to recover from his illness and his wounds, the dialogue seems to be robbed of a great ornament. And yet Theætetus (the same Theætetus who had heard Socrates and followed Plato) is spoken of by Suidas as a distinguished mathematician who taught at Heraclea and was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids. That he should be a distinguished mathematician before 25, and even a discoverer in geometry, is not impossible (for, as Aristotle says, *μαθητικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοιτ' ἂν*) but that he should have become a teacher of it in a foreign city is less probable, even if he is supposed to live to the age of 28. And the complaint of Plato in the Republic, that the science of solid geometry was in its infancy, would seem hardly

justifiable, if the treatise on the regular solids had been in existence so long.

But (1.) it is not *impossible* that Theætetus may have so far recovered of his wounds as to be able to be a teacher of mathematics. (2.) The point of the difficulty lies in a late testimony, a cross-examination of which, if it were possible, might place the facts in a different light.

Still it becomes worth while to examine the hypothesis of a later date (368 B. C.), the reasons against which have been already mentioned. It may be said in favour of it; (1.) that it allows ample time for all Theætetus' distinctions; (2.) that a disciple of Plato would fight more willingly with the Lacedæmonians on his side; (3.) that Megara was at this time in alliance with Athens, and hence it would be natural to expect him to put up there. (On the former occasion, however, she seems to have been neutral.)

The preface may be of this date, and yet the chief part of the dialogue may be earlier. It may have been sketched during Plato's residence at Megara (*ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότε εὐθὺς—ὑπομνήματα*) and filled up and retouched at intervals (*ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἔγραφον*); and long afterwards the preface may have been added to indicate the Megarian character of the dialogue.

Some such conjecture (which in any case is not improbable) would seem to be the natural resort, if it became necessary to suppose the preface written after 368 B. C.

§ 9.

The Theætetus and Aristotle.

One chief source of difficulty in the Theætetus to the modern reader is the imperfect development which it presents of the conception of the Proposition¹. In the earlier part, the ever-varying succession of phænomena, bound up with the ever-varying impressions of sense, are only dimly felt to belong to any Subject. Indeed as the argument proceeds the unity of that which is the subject of different impressions or qualities is expressly denied. At a further stage, where the question arises, How is false opinion possible, there appears indeed a

¹ Συλλογισμὸς in the Theæt. (p. 186) is nearly equivalent to "abstraction and generalization."

sort of consciousness that every act of thought implies a subject (p. 188. οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό), and that to think is to say to oneself, "This is that;"—which first shows itself in the example, "I think Theætetus is Socrates," and is afterwards more distinctly expressed where it is said that thought is the mind's silent discourse.^m But that which remains unnoticed is the relation of subject to prædicate in any proposition. Thus it is assumed that when one prædicate is substituted for another, (as when, in the propositions, "Yonder man is Socrates," or Thersites was handsome," the terms "Socrates" and "handsome" have been substituted by mistake for "Theætetus" and "ugly;") this is the same thing as if the terms so confounded were predicated of each other: (thus, "Theætetus is Socrates," "What is ugly is handsome.")

The relation between the terms of a proposition where the subject is something immediately perceived by sense, is brought out afterwards by the image of the waxen block, but the same indistinctness still hangs about abstract propositions. The line is not clearly drawn between saying, "the sum of 7 and 5 is 11," and saying "11 is 12."

Lastly, when it is asserted that the combination of names in speech corresponds to the combination of elements in the object of knowledge, we are still left in the dark as to the exact relation between words or things which is implied in either combination.

This confusion between subject and prædicate is, in other words, to use Aristotelian language, the confusion of matter with form, and of δύναμις with ἐνέργεια. The subject is all its prædicates δυνάμει, and is that which, together with the opposite quality, becomes τόδε τι. Thus Καλλίας ἄμουσος becomes μουσικός: hence Callias is in one sense the material part.

It may be said therefore, that in the earlier philosophy, when the matter changes from one form to its opposite, or from a privative to a positive state, it is lost sight of that the form cannot properly be said to change, and that the matter or

^m A close study of this passage (pp. 189, 190) will afford convincing proof of the indeterminate state of the science of logic at this time, and the

necessity of *getting behind* Aristotle (if the expression may be permitted) in order to understand Plato.

subject, as such, remains unchanged, while assuming different forms.

1. It is this aspect of the questions raised in the *Theætetus* which is taken up by Aristotle, who follows Plato in pointing out that the views of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet in one. Their views are thus identified and criticised at length in two very similar passages of the *Metaphysics* (Γ. 1005 b.—1012 b., K. 1061 b.—1063 b.), in both of which Aristotle is engaged in defending the principle of contradiction.

The theory of Heraclitus is stated in its most abstract and logical form, "Every thing at once is and is not." This is at first put forward with the qualification, "Some (i. e. Plato?) think that Heraclitus means this:" but afterwards it is made to figure as the Heraclitean theory, "adopted by many physical philosophers." The theory of Protagoras is shown to come to the same thing; for if every man's impression is true, then contradictories are true (and not true) together.

Aristotle does not profess to use direct proof in defence of what he assumes to be self-evident and the basis of all reasoning, but he brings forward a number of indirect arguments, which throw considerable light upon the nature of the question. These are intended for such persons as really feel the difficulty: there are others for whom a more summary method is required (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πείθους δέονται, οἱ δὲ βίαςⁿ). Amongst these arguments there are two which deserve especial notice here, as being of a different kind from any which are to be met with in the dialogue. (1.) "We will not say that the act of predication must either *be* or *not be* something, lest they should accuse us of begging the question; but we will say, that every predicate *means* something, and that its meaning is one, and not indefinitely various; otherwise language and even thought is destroyed. And to predicate it in this one meaning of a particular subject is either true or false. Hence, man and not man cannot be truly predicated together of the same subject."

(2.) "The difference between the same man's impressions

ⁿ Cf. Hom. Il. B. II. 188, 198. Ὀντινα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κίχρη, τὸν δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύ-

σασκε παραστάς—Ὀν δ' αὖ δήμου τ' ἄνδρα ἴδοι βοῶντα τ' ἐφεύροι, τὸν σκήπτρῳ ἐλάσασκεν, ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ.

at different times regards not the quality, but the subject of it. Sweet and bitter are the same to the sick as to the healthy man: it is the wine that appears to him at one time sweet and at another bitter. The idea of sweet is the same to him in the past, present, and future."

There are other points in which the discussion is characteristic of Aristotle (as where it is said that the principle of motion rests on a too narrow induction; or that if all creatures having sensation were destroyed, the universe would still exist; or where he points out that the admission of degrees, e. g. "nearer and farther from the truth," necessitates a standard of truth to which the approach is made); but the influence of this dialogue, and of the discussions (Megarian and Platonic) which preceded and followed it, is also very apparent. The following points of coincidence are worth mentioning:

(1.) It is assumed as part of the theory, that everything is thus and not-thus (*οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως*.) But this is nearly the last point to which the principle of motion is reduced in the *Theætetus* (p. 183). Aristotle proceeds to infer that everything must be infinite; and this in two ways: first, as "not-this" means "everything but this," it follows that everything must be everything else^o; and, secondly, (with Plato *Theæt.* loc. cit.) if *οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως* is true, then its contradictory (*οὐθ' οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως*) must also be true; and this, he adds, must go on to infinity. The theory gives an indefinite, that is, a purely negative account of Being (*τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγει*).

(2.) Further, in reference to Protagoras it is shown, that in making all impressions true, he makes them also false, and his own theory amongst the rest.

(3.) The Heraclitean or Protagorean philosopher is seen to avoid tumbling into a ditch. It is evident therefore that he acknowledges the distinction between good and bad. Every thing then is not equally indifferent. And if there are impressions to which the theory does not apply, so much has been conceded. Or, "as Plato puts it," with regard to the future, the physician is a better judge of what will prove wholesome, than a chance person.

^o καὶ γίνεται δὴ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. Aristotle thinks that if this argument had been put to

Heraclitus himself, he would have been compelled to acknowledge its force.

Aristotle further points out the absolute relativity of the doctrine. They cannot say, "What appears, is," but "What appears to me, is to me."

The following scattered touches may be quoted without comment.

"The theory of Protagoras is called *ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια*."

"My eyes may each receive a different impression from the same thing."

"The doubt about the criterion of knowledge is like the question whether the waking or the dreaming life is real."

"Socrates is not a different person for every different attribute."

"When a thing appears bitter, this is in consequence of a manifest defect, viz. disease. The one state then, (i. e. the healthy one) and not the other, is to be held the measure of things."

"Language is made impossible."

"The man thinks thus and not thus : i. e. it is equally true that he is not thinking as that he thinks. He is reduced to the condition of a vegetable."

Lastly, Aristotle, like Theodorus, remarks upon the difficulty of reasoning with the men, because they will not lay down any thing to start with, and allow it to remain firm. Other points of comparison will be mentioned in the notes. In brief, Aristotle meets the indefiniteness of the physical and sophistic theories by asserting the distinction between form and matter and the eternity of form.

2. But he does not deny that a continual process takes place between them, and there is a world in which growth and decay, generation and corruption, are ever going on, viz. the world of sensible things, which in Aristotle reasserts its reality, as being inseparable from the natural forms, and perhaps even from the relations expressed in mathematics.

This is not the place for the discussion of Aristotle's theory of becoming. It is enough to notice (1) that he adopts from the early philosophers, whom he classes together as upholding the material cause, on the one hand the dualism, and on the other the indeterminateness of matter (Phys. Ausc. I.) and points out that therefore it can only be the object of knowledge, "by analogy," with reference to the form. And (2) his conception of sensation as a realization of mental life, is very

similar to that expressed in the *Theætetus*. The *ἐνέργεια αἰσθήσεως*, which is inseparable from the *ἐνέργεια αἰσθητοῦ*, is the meeting point of active and passive elements in motion. (In modern language it is a process between object and subject.) But the *φαντασία* or mental image, which accompanies sensation but is separable from it in thought, in the *Theætetus* is merged in sensation, although the term is simply the noun of *φαίνεσθαι* (*φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἰσθησις ταύτων*), but is clearly distinguished from it by Aristotle. The distinction is made the ground of an argument for the possibility of error ^p.

3. The same distinction between matter and form is also applied to the solution of the doubt, whether the complex whole is one or many, e. g. whether the syllable is all the letters combined, or something above and beyond them. Aristotle shows that neither the parts nor their arrangement can create the form of the whole: much rather it is this mould which determines the arrangement of the parts. It is prior to them, and is eternal and uncreated. They affect the nature of the compound thing only by being capable of receiving a certain form.

At this point Plato (in the *Theætetus*) and Aristotle seem almost to touch one another, except that in Aristotle the conception of the *end* (*τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα*) is bound up with that of the form.

As the tendency in the *Theætetus* is to rise from the ordinary notion of an element to that of elementary Ideas, so Aristotle points out that the universal is in one sense an element: (i. e. logically.) (*Met. Δ. 1014 b.*)

4. Among the germs which the *Theætetus* (like most of

^p (*Met. I. 1010 b: Οὐδ' ἡ αἰσθησις ψευδῆς τοῦ ἰδίου ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἡ φαντασία οὐ ταύτων τῇ αἰσθήσει.*) Again, even where the *φαντασία* is false the *δόξα* may be true. *De Somn.* 3. Cf. *de An.* III. 3.

The difference between Aristotle and Plato (in this dialogue) on this point of psychology, may be illustrated by the following tabular view:

Aristotle thus traces the gradual ascent of the human mind from sense to knowledge:

7. σοφία.
6. ἐπιστήμη.
5. τέχνη.
4. ἐμπειρία.
3. μνήμη.
2. φαντασία.
1. αἰσθησις.

Plato distinguishes

| | | | |
|--|------------------|---|---|
| These two are in some cases inseparable. | } ἐπιστήμη | } | each of which is accompanied by φαντασία. |
| | } μνήμη | | |
| | } δόξα αἰσθησις. | | |

Plato's dialogues) contains of Aristotelian formulæ, the most remarkable is the distinction between possessing and having Knowledge, which obviously corresponds to Aristotle's distinction between Knowing and Contemplating (*ἐπιστάσθαι, θεωρεῖν*),—his favourite illustration of the difference between possession and use, or between a potential and an actual state. No such general application is made of it by Plato. The notion enters into the *Theætetus* only as a last ineffectual attempt to reconcile the existence of Knowledge with the possibility of error, and it is expressed through an imaginary symbol. But the distinction latent in the image between the potential and the actual, is the same by which Aristotle afterwards solved this and other difficulties, if not finally, yet with admirable completeness.

While Aristotle, in adding the corner stone to the fabric of Greek philosophy, could not but draw largely from Plato, either immediately or through the discussions of his followers, yet the presence in him must be admitted of a wholly distinct element, which gives a different value to his speculations, even when in substance they coincide. This may be briefly described as the determination to be at once logical and matter of fact, the conviction that philosophy must be consistent on the one hand with itself, and on the other with experience. This return to common sense, so valuable in restoring the balance of philosophy, and this subordination of all things to logic, may be viewed partly as the natural advance or recoil from the dialectic of Plato, but they are partly the culmination of a separate tendency of the Greek mind.

§ 10.

Modern
aspects.

It has been already noticed, that the completeness with which the doctrine of sense is developed in the *Theætetus*, probably influenced the expression of cognate ideas in the later period of Ancient Philosophy. Passing with this slight remark from the Ancient world, we proceed finally to notice in a few words the bearing of the *Theætetus* upon modern metaphysical inquiry.

And first it is right to observe the importance of the transition. The comparison of Ancient and Modern Philosophy is very different from the study of the relations between two schools or two periods in either. The links by which they are

historically connected are comparatively slender: the external similarity, though sometimes obvious, is generally superficial: but there is also a deeper analogy, like what may be observed between separate kingdoms of nature.

Modern Philosophy starts from a more inward experience of the mind, from a wider and more varied observation of the external world, than was possible in the days of Thales or even of Parmenides. Ancient Philosophy had contributed to this, but indirectly. Descartes did not start from the Platonic Idea, but from the consciousness of his own highly-wrought mind. Bacon rebelled against the authority of Aristotle, and sought for natural and not logical 'forms' in the Interpretation of Nature. And yet it is not merely fanciful to see a kind of parallel between the resting-place from doubt, 'Cogito, ergo sum,' and the resting-place from what is particular and changeable—"The mind contemplating Being and Goodness is its own instrument:" or between Bacon's 'natural form' and the Platonic or Aristotelian εἶδος. Indeed in the latter case, the mode of expression is adapted from the Greek Philosophy.

That which gives the *Theætetus* a peculiarly modern interest is its comparatively subjective character. This is partly inherent in the nature of the question, but is also partly due to the human reference of Protagoras and the self-inquiry of Socrates. An approach only is made to the consideration of abstract Being; the mind is in vain endeavouring to find the determining law of truth within itself. Thus it fails at one time to find any firm standing-ground, at another to conceive the possibility of error. In like manner Descartes, starting from within, is obliged to postulate the existence of God, almost before he can establish his first principle, certainly before he can determine whether the waking or the sleeping life is real, and feels almost as keenly as a Greek Philosopher could have done, the difficulty of conceiving error as possible⁹.

Every metaphysical work, ancient or modern, is sure to

⁹ E. g. *Medit.* III. p. 18: Jam quod ad ideas attinet, si solæ in se spectentur, nec ad aliud quid illas referam, falsæ proprie esse non possunt: nam sive capram sive chimæram imaginer, non minus verum est me unam imaginari quam alteram. Nulla etiam

in ipsa voluntate vel affectibus falsitas est timenda, nam quamvis prava, quamvis etiam ea quæ nusquam sunt possim optare, non tamen ideo non verum est illa me optare, ac proinde sola supersunt judicia in quibus mihi cavendum est ne fallar.

possess some points of affinity and contrast to the *Theætetus*. All that will be attempted here is to indicate very briefly the points in the dialogue itself which seem capable of illustrating more recent phases of reflection. These are, (1) The analysis of sensation or perception. (2) The semi-physical theory of 'motion.' (3) The 'subjective' doctrine of Protagoras and the Cyrenaics. (4) The *Theætetus* as a psychology. (5) Logical difficulties.

1. The *Theætetus* contains a theory of sensation; or rather a doctrine of impressions of sense, in each of which there is shown to be an active and a passive—in modern language, an objective and a subjective—element. No attempt is made, however, at least in the earlier part of the dialogues, to distinguish the physical from the mental in the act of sense, the recipient from the active state of the Subject, sensation from perception. Warmth, whiteness, even comparative size and number, are viewed, so far as the Subject is concerned, (in common with pleasures, desires, hopes, fears,) simply as phenomena, experiences or impressions. And when presently it appears that there is something more in each of us than a bundle of divers faculties of sense, and that the mind, which receives and judges all, is one; the distinction is drawn, not between the mind's sensation and perception, e. g. of a white object, but between its own perceptions and the impressions which it receives through the body: e. g. the eye informs me that this ball is white, that that ball is red; the mind, reviewing these sensations, perceives that each of them *is*, that it is *one*, that it is the same with itself, different from the other, that they are together two: also that the redness and the whiteness *are*, and that they are different, and that this difference *is* a real thing.

But towards the end of the dialogue, where it is said that the simplest elements, for instance, of speech and music, may be the objects of knowledge, this may be regarded as an admission that simultaneous with every impression of sense there is, or may be, a perception of the mind.

This reasoning is not without its bearing on modern theories of sensation and perception: (and it probably implies an observation of inward facts not less complete;) but it is not to be confounded with them.

It stands in a closer and more concrete relation to the mind's experience of itself; it is far simpler, and, though less distinct, is more luminous, expressing a fresh and vivid consciousness, and an intensity of inquiry, which has not yet assumed a set form, or attained to definite results, but is neither overclouded and paralysed by subjective uncertainty, nor lost in the abstractions of logic, nor perplexed by the distracting influences of physical science.

2. For although this theory of sensation is united with a doctrine of motion, and Plato's argument may thus seem to touch upon modern physiological inquiries, or even upon the theories of light and heat and sound, the sense in which the word *motion* is used is vague in the extreme. So far as it is used with a physical meaning, it is not distinguished from force, nor from matter, for this is left out of view. It is moreover the symbol of relation and change. And the term thus metaphorically used is not accurately defined, for while the object and subject are said to suffer change, sensations and qualities are said to be in locomotion (p. 156). It is not easy for us, with our more definite conceptions, to assign any very intelligible meaning to this. But it may be conceded that there is here an anticipation of the fact, that sensation is in every case occasioned by motion. A nearer approach to scientific truth may be found in the notion of the absolute relativity of phenomena. Studying the world of experiences from within the mind, 'ex analogia hominis,' Plato regards the objects of sensation as wholly indeterminate, and can find no true 'measure of things' but in the contemplation of abstract Ideas. I am conscious of my own sensation, but I cannot compare it with that of any other being, still less with any universal standard. Therefore I must not look for truth here, but in the world of Ideas. Modern Experimental Science is equally distrustful of individual impressions of sense, but has found means of measuring the 'motions' by which they are caused, through the effect of the same motions upon other things besides our senses. 'When the same wind is blowing' (Theæt. p. 152) 'one of us feels it warm, another cold,'—but the mercury of the thermometer tells the same tale to all. And though the individual consciousness remains the sole judge of the exact impression momentarily received by each person, yet we are certain that

the sensation of heat and cold, like the expansion and contraction of the mercury, is in every case dependent on a universal law.

3. The philosophy of Protagoras may be described in modern language as a rhetorical scepticism, that of the Cyrenaics as a sensational idealism.

An interesting parallel might be drawn (for instance) between Protagoras and Hume. But it must be kept in mind that scepticism is a relative term, and that while that of Protagoras was directed probably as much against astronomical and mathematical speculation, as against the Eleatic Absolute Being, that of Hume was aimed at the popular belief in supernatural causes, and those a priori notions or Innate ideas, which modern metaphysicians had in part elaborated and in part inherited from Greek philosophy. Both poured contempt upon the popular religion of their day; both pointed to the limited and relative nature of human knowledge; and both were content to rest within the clearly defined boundary of a 'certain uncertainty,' without even an aspiration after Absolute or Ideal Truth. Both (if Plato's representation in the *Protagoras* may be trusted) eminently possessed the faculty of lucid and persuasive exposition, which is sometimes found accompanying a kind of narrowness in speculation. But here the resemblance probably ends. Protagoras may however with justice be regarded as the type of a class,—the utilitarian or common sense sceptics,—of which Hume is in modern times perhaps the most brilliant example.

On the other hand the Cyrenaic dogma may be compared with the destructive or negative side of Berkeley. But their refined contempt for the materialists, who 'believe only in what they can clutch between their hands,' is of a different order from Berkeley's endeavour to resolve concrete existence into ideas of the mind. His denial of material substance as a metaphysical abstraction, was consistent on the one hand with the most searching physical inquiry, and on the other with his belief in the reality of universals, as thoughts of the Eternal mind. But the Cyrenaic could not be said to analyse phenomena: he merely dwelt upon the consciousness of the instant, and limited his view to that. True, he sought a ground of objective reality in a movement from without, corresponding to the impression

within, and embraced both, the active and the passive movement, in the formula of universal change, but universal change is at each instant a mere negation. Hence, to dwell in thought for a moment on this theory was to reduce it to nothingness. And, to speak more generally, modern controversies about the 'reality of the external world' would have little meaning for any of the Ancient Philosophers, who knew so little of the laws of the material universe, although the *spirit* (for instance) of Parmenides and of Democritus may be viewed as typical of all subsequent ideal and material theories.

4. As an inquiry into the nature of Knowledge and Opinion, and the boundary which divides them, the *Theætetus* may be compared with Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Such a comparison would be interesting for many reasons. Besides the sort of kindred which often exists between minds of genuine originality even in distant ages, there is in some respects a similarity of position. Both inquiries commence from within, in both Knowledge is reduced to its elements (simple ideas of sensation), both occupy the middle ground between Material and Ideal systems, both rest upon experience, both rise by gradual steps from sense to reason; in both reflection and imagination are engaged in bodying forth the mind's modes of thinking, (with perfect originality in both, yet with the most curious coincidences in the kind of images employed: compare Locke's sandstone and marble impressions, and his dark room or cabinet, with Plato's waxen block and aviary;) in both the office of the Reason is represented to be the combination (or comparison) of the impressions of sense. Both in short present us with a psychology, clear and simple, based upon experience, and in a certain way complete.

But, not to mention the difference of style, the comparative absence in Locke of the poetical element, and the influence which Natural Philosophy exercised upon his method, there is this radical distinction between the attitude of Plato in the *Theætetus*, and that of the English philosopher, that while Plato's chief endeavour is to rise from the elements of sense to higher things, the first effort of Locke is to recal the human mind from a spurious Platonism to its experience of itself; and while the highest point reached in the *Theætetus* (that the mind reviewing its impressions and determining of their Being,

Unity, or Beauty, is its own instrument) is but the 'topmost round' of 'young ambition's ladder,' Locke rests contentedly within the subjective limits which he believed to be imposed by Providence on the human mind.

5. Lastly, the modified Eleaticism of Euclides, whom Socrates once described as 'capable of arguing with Sophists but not with men,' is not without its counterpart in modern philosophy. It may be described in modern language as the tendency to extreme logical analysis: to rest, that is, in the abstractions of logic, refusing to appreciate the subtlety of Nature and the complexity of the world, and to endeavour to conceive of things as they really are.

(a.) Euclides does not stand alone in his method of following a theory to its logical conclusions, instead of inquiring into the reasonableness of the grounds on which it is based.

(b.) Nor is the 'victim of a mercenary logic,' ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος (caught in a pit-fall), who is compelled to admit that he sees and does not see, in a much worse plight than the student who finds himself bound hand and foot, by victorious subjective analysis, within the limits of his own organism.

(c.) The paradoxical difficulty, 'Is it possible to know and not to know?'—'How can you inquire about that which you do not know,'—has a still nearer resemblance to metaphysical paradoxes among ourselves: e. g. How is it possible that Knowledge (or Inquiry) should transcend the limits of experience? In both cases the idea of a tentative and partial Knowledge, of a sort of faith of the Intellect, is left out of view, and the *result* of both is equally fatal to the spirit of inquiry.


(d.) In the Theætetus the Megarian tendency to divide every thing from every thing (τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποχωρῆειν) is met by the conception of the blending of diverse elements in a higher unity. This thought is further developed in the Sophista, and, as we have seen, is taken up by Aristotle. Though expressed by the Greek philosophers in a dialectical form, this assertion of the presence of a higher unity in every complex whole,—of the inadequacy of analysis as a method of knowledge,—is of permanent value. For it is directed against a confusion to which many others are parallel. Such, for instance, in modern times would be the confusion between facts or phenomena, and their principles or laws, or between

organism and life, or between experience and reason, or between the forms of language or imagination, and the creative mind. We may doubt, with Plato in the *Theætetus*, whether the higher can even be known apart from the lower, but this difficulty ought not to lead to their identification in thought.

(e.) The barren sophistry into which the method degenerated in the hands of the followers of Euclides affords a useful warning to 'intellectualism' in every time.

The mind of Plato in the *Theætetus* is keenly alive to the presence of logical difficulties, but is neither irritated nor deterred by them. He unravels them with the utmost patience, but at the same time treats them with a kind of compassionate irony, as if he refused to be bound within the framework of contemporary thought.

In an age when so much yearns for reconciliation, when, Conclusion.
for instance, the paths of natural and mental science, after swerving far asunder, promise to converge again, when the abstractions of the intellect begin to stand in a new relation to the forms of the imagination, from which they had seemed to be finally severed, it is an interesting and suggestive labour, to turn again the earlier pages of the book of human Inquiry: to find there 'anticipations of Nature' indissolubly woven together with the reflections of the mind upon itself: to see a fast-ripening philosophy labouring with an imperfect logic; and language, and poetical imagination, with mixed modes of sense, casting their many-coloured veil over the irregularities of mental growth, and giving form and life and substance to dialectical and speculative thought. This Attic prime of intellectual manhood is beautiful to contemplate, even if philosophy may not hope from such fountains to renew her youth.



ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

T. I.
ed. Steph.
p. 142.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ἌΡΤΙ, ὦ Τερψίων, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ;

ΤΕΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐζήτουν κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον, ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦ εὐρεῖν.

ΕΥ. Οὐ γὰρ ἦ κατὰ πόλιν.

ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν;

ΕΥ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθήναζε.

ΤΕΡ. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι;

ΕΥ. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις· χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ

5 The
Preface.
Terpsion
and Eucli-
des meet
before
Euclides'
house in
Megara.
10 They con-
verse about
the danger-
ous state of
Theætetus,
of whom
Socrates
had truly
prophesied

3. ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ] Euclides and Terpsion appear also in the Phædo as the Megarians who were present at the death of Socrates, p. 59: Καὶ Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων. Compare with the preservation of this dialogue by Euclides, and the introduction of Theodorus of Cyrene, the preservation of the Pythagorean dialogue by Phædo, and the introduction in it of Simmias and Cebes (Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότες).

6. καὶ σέ γε] With some emphasis. I have been looking for you.

7. καὶ ἐθαύμαζον] It is perhaps intimated that Euclides, like his master Socrates, was to

be found daily in the market-place.

9. μὴν expresses surprise.

11. ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου] For the expression compare Charm. p. 25: Ἐκ Ποτιδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου. The date is either earlier than B. C. 387, or later than B. C. 369. Either supposition presents some difficulty. See Introduction.

13. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι] Spoken not, as Stallbaum says, in jest, but in serious alarm, occasioned by the word φερομένῳ.

14. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις] 'Indeed, hardly alive.' 'Only just alive.'

great things. Euclides has preserved the conversation, which Socrates a little before his death held with Theætetus when a boy.

ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν p.142.
αἰρεῖ τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.

ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἢ δυσεντερία;

ΕΥ. Ναί.

5 ΤΕΡ. Οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.

ΕΥ. Καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὧ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ νῦν ἤκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ τὴν μάχην.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμα-
10 στότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ c
Μεγαροῖ κατέλυεν;

ΕΥ. Ἐπείγετο οἴκαδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ' ἐδεόμην καὶ
συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤθελε. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας
αὐτόν, ἀπιὼν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σω-
15 κράτους, ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τού-
του. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν
αὐτῷ μεираκίῳ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ δια-
λεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καί μοι
ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγους οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ
20 διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἀξίους ἀκοῆς, εἶπέ τε ὅτι πᾶσα d
ἀνάγκη εἶη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς
ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι.

2. αἰρεῖ] 'affects him.' Compare Soph. Ant. 606: Τὰν οὐθ' ὑπνος αἰρεῖ ποθ' ὁ παντογήρως.

5. Οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι] 'What a noble life is then in peril!' 'What a loss such a man would be!' It is natural to conclude from this that Theætetus must have been already distinguished; although, perhaps, not in war.

10. αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ] 'Why did he not stop where he was, and

come and put up at Megara?'

14. ἀπιὼν πάλιν] 'as I returned.'

16. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι] δοκεῖ gives a slight uncertainty to the expression. It here qualifies rather the mark of time ὀλ. π. τ. θ. than the infinitive ἐντυχεῖν. So below, p. 144, δοκοῦσι belongs more in sense to ἀλειψάμενοι than to ἵεναι. 'I think it was a little while before his death that he met with him.'

p.142. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνας ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἂν διηγῆσασθαι;

ΕΥ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ οὐτῶ γε ἀπὸ στόματος· ἀλλ' ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότε εὐθὺς οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνησκόμενος ἔγραψον, καὶ ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνωρθούμην· ὥστε μοι σχεδὸν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται.

b ΤΕΡ. Ἀληθῆ ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μέντοι ἀεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδείξαι διατέτριφα δεῦρο.

1. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε — εἶπε] In the editions before Heindorf these words were given to ΕΥ. But in the Bodleian MS. (in which the initials of the interlocutors are generally omitted) a small capital T has been inserted over καί. [Bekk. — : καὶ Δ. vulgo enim : ἀτὰρ.]

3. οὐκ οὐτῶ — γε] Not, at least, in the way you seem to expect. οὐτῶ] as we are, on the spot. Comp. the use of νῦν οὕτως.

4. ἐγραψάμην — ἔγραψον] I wrote for my own use—I went on writing.

5. ὑπομνήματα] 'notes.' See Phædr. 275, where letters are called ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον.

7. ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην] = εἴ τι μὴ ἐμεμνήμην. μὴ gives indefiniteness to ὃ. Is it possible that we have here an indication of the mode in which the dialogue was really composed?

10. Ἀληθῆ ἤκουσα] The clauses are parallel and not consequent, hence the ἀσύνδετον.

καὶ μέντοι, κ. τ. λ.] 'And, now I think of it, I have always meant to ask you to shew it me, but have let opportunities

slip till now.' That which is really most emphatic is expressed by the participle. It has been objected to this rendering, (a) that δεῦρο is not used as an adverb of time except with μέχρῃς or ἀεὶ, (β) that διατρίβειν, meaning 'to delay,' could not have been used here without an adverb of place. But, (a) such transference of adverbs from place to time is not unusual, and it occurs in the case of δεῦρο in Plat. Tim. 21 : Ἦν ἦδε ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε μὲν, διὰ δὲ χρόνον καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ἐργασαμένων οὐ διήρκεσε δεῦρο ὁ λόγος. In the present passage, the deviation from common use is softened by the neighbourhood of ἀεὶ. Comp. Æsch. Eum. 596 : Καὶ δεῦρό γ' ἀεὶ τὴν τύχην οὐ μέμφομαι. Such a refinement upon a common phrase is in the manner of Plato. And (β) there is no reason why διατρίβειν should not be used here absolutely, with a touch of blame in it, as meaning not simply 'to delay,' but 'to waste time.' See Rep. 472 : Λέγε, καὶ μὴ διάτριβε. Aristoph. Equ. 515 : Φησὶ

ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε p.143.
καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἦκων.

ΕΥ. Ἄλλα μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἐρινου Θεαί-
τητον προὔπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἀναπαυοίμην.
5 ἀλλ' ἴωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅμα ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀνα-
γνώσεται.

ΤΕΡ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

ΕΥ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὃ Τερψίων, τουτί· ἐγρα-
ψάμην δὲ δὴ οὕτως τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη
10 διηγούμενον ὡς διηγείτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη
διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῳ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ
τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν c
πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγῆσαις περὶ αὐ-
τοῦ τε, ὅποτε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης οἷον Κάγῳ ἔφην ἡ

γὰρ ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπ' ἀνοίας τοῦτο πε-
πονθῶς διατρίβειν, where it is
used with a participle as here.
Thuc. VI. 42, 43, 47.

1. πάντως ἔγωγε] This asyn-
deton is very frequent. Infr.
162: Πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ'
ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίμετο ὑπακούειν.
Polit. 269: Πάντως οὐ πολλὰ ἐκ-
φεύγεις παιδιᾶς ἔτη.

2. καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι]
'Besides, as I have walked in
from the country, I should any
how be glad of the rest.'

3. Ἐρινου] A spot on the Ce-
phissus, close to Eleusis, where
it was fabled that Pluto had de-
scended with Proserpine. Paus.
I. 92. There were other places
of the name.

5. ὁ παῖς] Euclides' servant.

9. οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον
κ.τ.λ.] These words are parallel
to οὕτως τὸν λόγον, depending
on ἐγραψάμην. Compare Apol.
19: Ταῦτα—έωρᾶτε—Σωκράτη
—περιφερόμενον.

11. τῷ τε γεωμέτρῳ Θεοδώρῳ]
Theodorus the mathematician
of Cyrene, with whom, accord-
ing to a tradition, Plato once
studied. Two points in him
are of importance as regards
this dialogue: he is a geome-
trician, and stands thus on the
threshold of philosophy; and
he is of Cyrene, the city of
Aristippus, with whom he is
also connected as being one of
the friends of Protagoras. See
infr. 164: Οἱ ἐπίτροποι οὖς Προ-
ταγόρας κατέλιπεν—ὦν Θεόδωρος
εἰς ὅδε.

12. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, κ.τ.λ.]
Imitated by Cicero, de Amic.
c. 1: Quasi enim ipsos induxi
loquentes, ne inquam et inquit
sæpius interponerentur.

13. αἱ μεταξὺ] The bits of
narration in the interstices of
the dialogue.

περὶ αὐτοῦ τε] This is the
reading of the Bodleian MS.
If it is adopted, περὶ αὐτοῦ de-

p. 143. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἡ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι Συνέφη ἢ Οὐχ ὠμολόγει, τούτων ἔνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄπο τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδη.

ΕΥ. Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὦ

pends immediately on διηγήσεις, and ὅποτε λέγοι is eexegetic.

1. ἡ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου] sc. λέγοι. ἡ κ. τ. λ. referring to ὅποτε λέγοι is introduced instead of the regular καὶ κ.τ.λ. answering to περὶ αὐτοῦ τε. The interruptions both concerning Socrates himself, when he told me, (e. g.) 'said I,' or 'I replied;' or again, when he told of the respondent, that 'he assented,' or 'he did not agree.'

4. οὐδέν γε ἄπο τρόπου] Comp. Rep. 470: Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἔφη, ἄπο τρόπου λέγεις—Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε εἰ πρὸς τρόπον λέγω. See also Shakespeare's Julius Cæsar (Act. II. sc. 3.): 'Why bird and beast *from* (i. e. contrary to) quality and kind.' (ἄπο is the Bodleian reading.) It is not necessary to suppose any allusion to the form of the Megarian dialogue, but it adds point to this expression if we suppose that it was cast in this dramatic mould. There is then a touch of nature in the approbation of Terpsion. This is at any rate better, if a reason must be found for everything, than to suppose with Schleiermacher, that Plato is acknowledging an error in his own earlier style. But perhaps it is enough to say that the form is adopted for the sake of clearness, which was of

great importance in this and the two following dialogues. And it is equally natural that Euclides should omit Καγὼ ἔφη, &c. in a written report, and that *viva voce* reporters in other dialogues should insert them. In this Preface we have been introduced to Theætetus as a distinguished citizen. In what follows we are to see the promise of his youth. We are told of Theætetus by later writers (besides the fact that he heard Socrates and followed Plato) that he taught mathematics at Heracleia, and that he was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids. The interval which this seems to require between the trial of Socrates and the death of Theætetus (to which it is difficult not to suppose an allusion here) increases the uncertainty of the date. See Introduction.

6. Εἰ μὲν—] 'If my heart were in Cyrene.' There is an imperfect sequence of clauses, arising out of the interposition of the clause ἦττον γὰρ—ἐπιεικεῖς, the last words of which form a transition to the main thought, to which Socrates gradually returns. The opening is characteristic of Socrates. He starts from an analogous instance, in which the person addressed is interested.

The
Dialogue.
Socrates,
meeting

Theodorus in an Athenian palaestra, asks what youth of promise he has met with, not in Cyrene, but in Athens.

Theodorus speaks warmly in praise of Theætétus, who, though not beautiful, is at once bold and gentle and

Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἄν ἠρώτων, δ
εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλο-
σοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι· νῦν δέ
—ἦττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον
5 ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναί τινες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέ-
σθαι ἐπιεικεῖς· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτός τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον
δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἄν ὀρῶ τοὺς
νέους ἐθέλοντας ξυγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι
πλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως· ἄξιός γάρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ e
10 γεωμετρίας ἕνεκα. εἰ δὴ οὖν τινι ἐνέτυχες ἀξίῳ λόγου,
ἠδέως ἄν πυθοίμην.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ

1. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν—περὶ ἐκείνων ἄν] 'Εκείνων is masc. 'Ανηρώτων, the reading of several MSS., is inappropriate here, and is perhaps due to the parallel passage of the Charmides, p. 153: Αὐθις ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς ἀνηρώτων τὰ τῆδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχει τὰ νῦν, περί τε τῶν νέων εἴτινες ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφέροντες ἢ σοφία ἢ κάλλει ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ἐγγεγονότες εἶεν. The only difficulty of the reading ἄν ἠρώτων is the repetition of ἄν after the pronoun. It may be accounted for by the emphasis which the antithesis gives to τὰ ἐκεῖ and ἐκείνων, and also to ἐκείνων being an afterthought: cf. Rep. 526: Οὐκ ἄν ῥαδίως οὔτε πολλὰ ἄν εὖροις. In both cases we may avoid the reduplication of ἄν, which would be difficult to explain, by supposing a repetition of the verb understood.

2. ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν] 'or other liberal pursuit.' Comp. Tim. 88: Μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσχρώμενοι.

5. τινες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων] ἡμῖν is

not emphatic. The emphasis is anticipated in τούσδε.

5. ἡμῖν τῶν νέων—(7.) 1. ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν] Comp. Thuc. I. 6: Οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων.

γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς] 'to make a good figure.' 'Επιεικής in Plato seems frequently to mean simply 'excellent' (*laudabilis*, Ast. Lex.) cf. Legg. 957: "Ἔστ' ἐν πόλεσιν οὐκ ἀσχήμονα ἐπιεικῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ὀλίγα νομοθετήματα. Symp. 210: "Ὡστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικής ὦν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχη, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ κ. τ. λ. Rep. 398: "Ἀχρηστοὶ γὰρ καὶ γυναιξὶν ἄς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν. (Cf. 387: Γυναιξὶ δὲ ἀποδοῖμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις.)

9. ἀξίος γάρ] The adjective receives greater emphasis by the omission of the substantive verb. Comp. Soph. Œd. Col. 758: Τῆνδε τὴν πόλιν φίλως εἰπὼν, ἐπαξία γάρ. Also Rep. 500: Περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι (sc. ἐσμέν) τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι.

10. εἰ] interrogative; 'whether.' Cf. infra p. 207.

p.143. σοὶ ἀκούσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οἷω ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μειρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι· νῦν δέ, καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθου, οὐκ ἔστι καλός, προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων· ἦττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ' ἔχει. ἀδεῶς δὲ λέγω.

intelligent, a rare combination! Like a stream of oil, flowing smoothly and swiftly without a murmur.

p.144. εὐ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὦν δὴ πῶποτε ἐνέτυχον, καὶ πάνυ

3. μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξω] The expression is softened by the impersonal τῷ. 'Lest it might be thought'—'Lest I should give the impression.' This indirect reference to persons is more common in Plato than appears at first sight. Cf. (in this dialogue) p.175: 'Ὅταν δὲ γέ τινα—ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω, νῖζ. τὸν δικανικὸν ἐκείνον. Phaed. 63: 'Αεὶ ὁ Κέβης λόγους τινας ἀνερευνᾷ, sc. ἐμούς.

4. μοι ἄχθου] καὶ introduces what is suddenly interposed. Comp. Gorg. 486: Καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες—καὶ μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῆς· εὐνοία γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ—οὐχ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι, κ. τ. λ. The outline of the sentence is εἰ μὲν ἦν—, ἐφοβούμην ἂν—· νῦν δέ—οὐκ ἔστι—· ἀδεῶς δὲ λέγω. Δὴ has something of an illative force. Cf. Euthyphr. 11: καὶ εἰ μὲν—σκώμματος.

5. τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων] This passage and the speech of Alcibiades in the Symposium (p. 215: 'Ὅτι μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὁμοῖος εἶ τούτοις (τοῖς Σειληνοῖς—καὶ τῷ Μαρσίᾳ) οὐδ' αὐτὸς δὴ που ἀμφισβητήσεις.) are the chief allusions to Socrates' personal appearance in Plato. See below, p. 209: Τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον. Comp. Xen. Symp. V. 5, where Critobulus, who has been boasting of beauty, is challenged to compete with Socrates. Socrates first shews

that each thing is beautiful in relation to its use, and then asks: 'Ὀφθαλμῶν τίνος ἔνεκα δεόμεθα; Δῆλον ἔφη ὅτι τοῦ ὄραν. Οὕτω μὲν τοίνυν ἦδη οἱ ἐμοὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ καλλίονες ἂν τῶν σῶν εἴησαν. Πῶς δὴ; 'Ὅτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ' εὐθὺ μόνον ὀρώσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ πλαγίου διὰ τὸ ἐπιπόλαιοι εἶναι. Λέγεις σὺ ἔφη καρκίον εὐοφθαλμότατον εἶναι τῶν ζώων. Πάντως δῆπου, ἔφη· ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς ἰσχὺν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἄριστα πεφυκότας ἔχει. Εἶεν, ἔφη· τῶν δὲ ῥινῶν ποτέρα καλλίων, ἡ σὴ ἢ ἡ ἐμή; 'Εγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, οἶμαι τὴν ἐμήν, εἰπέρ γε τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι ἔνεκεν ἐποίησαν ἡμῖν ῥίνας οἱ θεοί. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοὶ μυκτῆρες εἰς γῆν ὀρώσιν· οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ ἀναπέπτανται, ὥστε τὰς πάντοθεν ὀσμὰς προσδέχεσθαι. Τὸ δὲ σιμόν τῆς ῥινὸς πῶς τοῦ ὀρθοῦ καλλίων; 'Ὅτι, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀντιφράττει, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς εἶα τὰς ὀψεις ὄραν ἂν βούλωνται. ἡ δὲ ὑψηλὴ ῥίς ὥσπερ ἐπηρεάζουσα διατετεείχκε τὰ ὄμματα. Τοῦ γε μὴν στόματος, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ὑφίεμαι. Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀποδάκνειν ἔνεκα πεποιήται, πολὺ ἂν σὺ μείζον ἢ ἐγὼ ἀποδάκοις. Διὰ δὲ τὸ παχέα ἔχειν τὰ χεῖλη οὐκ οἶε καὶ μαλακώτερον ἔχειν τὸ φίλημα; 'Εοικα, ἔφη, κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ὄνων αἰσχίον τὸ στόμα ἔχειν. 'Εκείνο δὲ οὐδὲν τεκμήριον λογίζη, ὡς ἐγὼ σοῦ καλλίων εἶμι, ὅτι καὶ Ναῖδες θεαὶ οὖσαι τοὺς Σειληνοὺς ἐμοὶ ὁμοιοτέρους τίκτουσιν ἢ σοί;

πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα, οὐδένα πω ἤσθόμην οὕτω p. 144.
θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα, ὡς
ἄλλῳ χαλεπὸν, πρᾶον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ
τούτοις ἀνδρείον παρ' ὄντινούν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν
5 ὥόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνομένους· ἀλλ' οἱ τε

2. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα—γιγνο-
μένους] The anacoluthon adds
to the expression of surprise.
Comp. Protag. 317: Τὸ οὖν δι-
δράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποδρᾶναι,
ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλή μωρία
καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος. Parm.
128: Τὸ οὖν—οὕτως ἐκάτε-
ρον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν
εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδὸν τι λέ-
γοντας ταῦτα, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς
ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα
εἰρησθαι.

ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπὸν] The simple
and obvious meaning of these
words, 'as it were hard for an-
other to be,' i. e. 'in a degree
hardly to be equalled,' has been
rejected by critics because it
was thought that χαλεπὸν could
not be applied to qualities that
are not acquired. But the
word is not tied down to this
preciseness of meaning. It has
passed out of it even in Homer.
Od. XI. 156: Χαλεπὸν δὲ τάδε
ζωοῖσιν ὁρᾶσθαι. So elsewhere
in Plato it is used where hu-
man agency is not in question
to signify 'next to impossible.'
See Rep. 502: Χαλεπὰ γενέσθαι,
οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε—viz. that
philosophers should be kings,
one of the conditions of which
is the existence of this very
combination of qualities. What
Plato would think of this re-
finement may be inferred from
his caricature of it in the Pro-
tagoras, p. 344: Σὺ δὲ φῆς, ὦ
Πίττακε, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι
τὸ δὲ—ἀδύνατον. The rendering

which it has been proposed
to substitute—'so as to be
ill-tempered with another,' or
(with ἄλλως) 'so as in another
case to be ill-tempered'—is
objectionable, (α) as awkward
in itself, (β) as breaking har-
mony (ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπὸν, δια-
φερόντως, παρ' ὄντινούν), (γ) as
anticipating what is afterwards
stated as a fresh thought (οἱ τε
ὀξεῖς, κ. τ. λ.)

5. γενέσθαι (τοιούτων τινα) 'I
should not have thought there
could have been an instance of
this combination, nor do I find
it usual.'

γιγνομένους] sc. τοιούτους. Cf.
Rep. 492: Οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε
γέγονεν οὐτ' οὖν μὴ γένηται ἄλλοῖον
ἦθος, κ. τ. λ.

οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνομένους, κ. τ. λ.]
The thought is exactly paral-
leled in the Republic, where
the same combination of qua-
lities is described as essential
to the philosophic nature, and
its rarity is dwelt upon in al-
most the same words. Rep.
503: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ
ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέ-
λουσιν ἄμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοὶ τε
καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἷοι
κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιώ-
τητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι
ὑπ' ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπη ἂν τύ-
χωσι, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν
ἐξοίχεται. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἦθη καὶ
οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς τις μᾶλλον ὡς
πιστοῖς χρήσαιο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα,

p. 144. ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ
 πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι εἰσι, καὶ ἄττον-
 b τες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανι-
 κώτεροι ἢ ἀνδριότεροι φύονται, οἳ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστε-
 ροι νωθροὶ πῶς ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λή- 5
 θης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταίστως καὶ
 ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις
 μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ρεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ
 ρέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικούτον ὄντα οὕτω
 ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

10

ΣΩ. Εὖ ἀγγέλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολι-
 τῶν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὐ.
 ο ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.

Theætetus
 (son of Eu-
 phronius of

πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὐ ποιεῖ ταῦτον, δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς, καὶ ὑπνῶν τε καὶ χασμῆς ἐμπίπλονται, ὅταν τι δέη τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν; So the difficulty of combining bravery with gentleness is dwelt upon, *ib.* 375, 6. See also *Polit.* p. 309, 310. The essentials of the philosophic nature enumerated in the 6th Book of the Republic are, love of truth, quickness in learning, good memory, liberality, justice and gentleness, temperance, courage. Theætetus is the embodiment of this nature.

1. ὀξεῖς] This seems the generic word for quickness of intellect. *Rep.* l. c.: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς.

2. πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι] 'Impetuous.' 'Of a quick temper.'

5. λήθης γέμοντες] *Rep.* 486: Εἰ μηθὲν ὄν μάθοι σώζειν δύναίτο, λήθης ὄν πλέως, ἄρ' ἂν οἷός τ' εἶη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι.

7. ἀνυσίμως] 'Successfully'—
 'Making rapid progress.'

9. ὥστε θαυμάσαι] *Soph. El.* 394: Καλὸς γὰρ οὐμὸς βίσιος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι. *Aristoph. Plut.* 810: Τὰ σκευάρια πλήρη ἴσθιν, ὥστε θαυμάσαι. By a refinement of language, the particular cause of wonder is here expressed and made to depend on θαυμάσαι.

13. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὐ] Theodorus takes the interest of a teacher in the youth himself: Socrates that of a fellow-citizen in his father.

14. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἔστι—ἀλλὰ σκόπει] This double ἀλλὰ is frequent in Plato. *Comp. Soph. Phil.* 520: Ἀλλ' αἰσχρὰ μέντοι σοῦ γ' ἔμ' ἐνδεέστερον ξένῳ φανῆναι πρὸς τὸ καίριον πονεῖν· ἀλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ, πλέωμεν. The second ἀλλὰ puts definitely forward the proposition for which the first ἀλλὰ has cleared the way.

Sunium) now enters the gymnasium between two companions. Theodorus adds that, though impoverished, he is most liberal. He is made to sit by Socrates. They converse.

ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἠλείφοντο ἑταῖροί τε τινες p. 144.
οὔτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψάμενοι δεῦρο ἰέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γινώσκεις αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Γινώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιέως Εὐφρονίου ἐστί,
5 καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἶον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διηγεί, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα πολλὴν κατέλιπε. τὸ δ' ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μεираκίου.

ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε ὄνομα· τὴν δ
μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκέ-
10 ναι· ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθεριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καί μοι κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σω-
15 κράτη.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα καγὼ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. φησὶ γὰρ Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῶν ἐχόντων e

'If Theodorus were a draughtsman, he would be an authority on the subject of

1. ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ] The scene then is a gymnasium, perhaps the Lyceum. Compare Euthyphr. 2 : Σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν; taken in connection with Theæt. below, p. 210 : Νῦν—ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν. Theodorus had seen the young men in the portico as he entered. The word δρόμος seems to have been applied to several parts of the gymnasium. Euthyd. 273 : Ἐν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ. (See the whole passage.) Aristias ap. Polluc. IX. 43 : Ἦν μοι παλαίστρα καὶ δρόμος ξυστὸς πέλας.

ἑταῖροί τε τινες] Evidently two from the words ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. One, Νέος Σωκράτης, is named in this dialogue, and is an interlo-

cutor in the Politicus. The other remains mute. Such κῶφα πρόσωπα occur in many dialogues; e. g. Lysias, Charmantides, etc., in the Republic. The scene is natural and not merely dramatic. In Plato's "School of Athens" there are spectators as well as actors

5. καὶ πάνυ] καὶ is intensive.

6. καὶ μέντοι] 'And, now I think of it.'

10. ἐλευθεριότητα] Rep. 485, 6 : Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλῃς ψυχὴν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μὴ. Τὸ ποῖον; Μὴ σε λάβῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας.

12. τὸν ἄνδρα] not μεираκίου. 'He must be a noble fellow.'

16. καγὼ] καὶ is to be taken closely with ἵνα. Cf. Soph. Antig. 280 : Παῦσαι, πρὶν ὀργῆς κάμει μεστῶσαι λέγων.

p. 144. ἑκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὧν λέγει ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὐρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἂν, 5
ἄμουσον δέ, ἠπιστοῦμεν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γ' οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν

p. 145. προσώπων ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὧν λέγει ἢ οὐ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ζῳγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δῆ πού, ὦ Σώκρατες. 15

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικός καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πῆ ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ 20
ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως οὐ.

b ΣΩ. Τί δ', εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς

2. εἰ μουσικὸς ὧν λέγει] The man then is not the measure of the likeness of musical sounds ! Yet afterwards Theætetus is wholly unconscious of contradicting this his first admission.

4. Ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν] Cf. Crit. p. 47 : Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαινῶ καὶ ψόγω καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης ὧν ;

13. Οὐχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι] Bekker has received γ' ἐμέ from a

few MSS., the greatest number (including the Bodl.) reading γέ με. ἐμέ seems more pointed, 'not that I know of,' but με is possibly right. Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 1264 : Οὐκ ὅσον γέ μ' εἰδέναι.

14. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός ;] 'Nor a geometrician, eh ?' There is an archness in the expression, making doubtful what is a matter of notoriety.

16. Ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικός] 'I wonder if he is also an astronomer.'

23. εἰ ποτέρου] 'The mind of

our personal appearance. As he is a cultivated man, we must respect his judgment of our mental endowments.

ἀρετήν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκού- p. 145.
σαντι προθυμείσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα,
τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Therefore, Theaetetus, you must be catechized by me, for he has praised you to me very highly.

5 ΣΩ. Ὦρα τοίνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπι-
δεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι Θεό-
δωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ
ἄστούς οὐδένα πω ἐπήνεσεν ὡς σὲ νῦν δὴ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὄρα μὴ
10 παίζων ἔλεγεν. c

ΣΩ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ
ἀναδύου τὰ ὠμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέ-
γειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῆ μαρτυρεῖν· πάντως
γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκῆψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ
15 ὁμολογίᾳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

one of us.' The indefinite *πότερος* occurs several times in Plato.—E. g. *Soph.* 252: Ἔσται πότερον αὐτῶν, οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινωνούν; Though not common in other writers, it is precisely analogous to the indefinite use of *τις, που, ποθεν*, etc.

9. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι] 'That is good!'—'I am glad to hear it.' Or perhaps more hypothetically, 'It is well, if it is so.' Compare *Menex.* 249: Χάριν ἔχω τῷ εἰπόντι. Σ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι. ἀλλ' ὅπως μου μὴ κατερεῖς. *Polit.* 277: Κινδυνεύει τελέως ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχειν. Σ. Καλῶς ἂν, ὦ Σ., ἡμῖν ἔχοι. δεῖ δὲ μὴ σοὶ μόνῳ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καμοὶ—ξυνδοκεῖν.

11. μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὠμολ.] 'Do not shrink from what you have agreed to.' Comp. *Hom. Il.* XIII. 225: Οὔτε τις ὄκνῳ εἴκων ἀνδύ-

εται πολέμου κακοῦ. *Xen. Symp.* V. 5, where Critobulus says, when his challenge is taken, οὐκ ἀναδύομαι. *Euthyd.* 302: Οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ μοι ἀνάδυσις.

14. ἐπισκῆψει] The verb *ἐπισκῆπτειν*, to accuse of murder or false witness (*φόνου, ψευδομαρτυριῶν*) is more commonly found in the middle voice, because the accuser in such cases is generally an interested party. But comp. *Aesch. c. Timarch.* p. 142: Ἡ(sc. τὴν πόλιν) οὐδὲ ψευδομαρτυριῶν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐπισκῆψαι; and for the passive, *Legg.* 937: Ἐὰν ἐπισκῆφθῆ τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυρῆσαι. *Soph. Ant.* 1313: Ὡς αἰτίαν γε τῶνδε κακείνων ἔχων πρὸς τῆς θανούσης τῆσδ' ἐπεσκήπτου μόρων. The ellipsis of *ψευδομαρτυριῶν* is easily borne with *μαρτυρεῖν* preceding.

p. 145. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι μανθάνεις που παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἅττα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

d ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἀρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμοῦμαί γε δὴ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρὰ γε τούτου καὶ παρ' ἄλλων, οὓς ἂν οἶωμαί τι τούτων ἐπαίειν. ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καί μοι 10 λέγε· ἄρ' οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶ τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ ;

ΣΩ. Σοφία δέ γ' οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

e ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν ;

You learn from Theodorus several things. To learn is to become wiser. To be wise is to know.

5

15

20

1. μανθάνεις] There is a stress upon the word.

4. τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν] 'Astronomy, and what relates to it.'

6. Προθυμοῦμαί γε δὴ] 'I certainly do my endeavour.' He is more modest about these higher subjects.

7. παρὰ γε τούτου] γε (the MS. reading) may be defended: 'from such a master,' referring to προθυμοῦμαι: although τε, which is supported by the version of Ficinus, reads more harmoniously; and the change is slight. The Zurich editors,

in their last edition, omit the particle.

8. ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα—σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ] Comp. Rep. 367: Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, αἰεὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἠγάμην, ἅταρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἤσθην.

18. ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί] For the indefinite plural comp. Gorg. 457: Οὐ ραδίως δύνανται—διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους—οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας. Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. 6, 7: Ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος ταῦτα καὶ σοφός ἐστιν.

What,
then, is
know-
ledge?

ΣΩ. Ταῦτόν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

p. 145.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ οὐ δύ-
ναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἑμαυτῶ, ἐπιστήμη ὃ τί ποτε
5 τυγχάνει ὄν. ἄρ' οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τί p. 146.

φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτῶν,
καὶ ὃς ἂν αἰεὶ ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ
παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος. ὃς δ' ἂν περιγένηται

A pause. 10 βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί σιγᾶτε; οὐ τί που, ὦ
Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυ-
μούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε
καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίνεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Ἦκιστα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν b
15 εἶη ἀγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεираκίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀπο-
κρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης δια-
λέκτου, καὶ οὐδ' αὖ συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω τοῖσδε

4. λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς] 'To grasp thoroughly.' To get a clear conception of.

λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἑμαυτῶ] Phileb. 50: Λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῶ ἀφείναι με, κ.τ.λ.

6. ὁ δὲ ἀμαρτῶν] 'but he who makes a blunder, or whoever is in error from time to time.'

7. καθεδεῖται — ὄνος] Schol. Τῶν οὖν παιζόντων ταῦτα τοὺς μὲν νικῶντας βασιλεῖς ἐκάλουν, καὶ ὃ τι ἂν προσετάττον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπήκουον, τοὺς δὲ ἠττωμένους ὄνους. Comp. Hor. Ep. I. i. 59: At pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, si recte facies.

13. προσηγόρους] The active and passive meanings are combined. 'Mutually conversible.' Compare Republic 546: Πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἀλληλα

ἀπέφηναν. There is possibly an allusion to the mathematical meaning here: 'to make you friends, and bring you into relations with one another.' 'To create a little friendly intercourse.' Compare Rep. 534: Ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμᾶς, and the phrases Σύμφωνα καὶ ποτάγορα, — Ὁμοια καὶ ποτάγορα, in later Pythagorean writings.

15. τῶν μεираκίων τι] Steph. conj. τινὰ, but cf. Euthyd. 277: Γνοὺς βαπτίζομενον τὸ μεираκίον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαῦσαι αὐτό. And see below, p. 169: Τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστί.

16. διαλέκτου] 'conversation,' with a tinge, perhaps, of the more technical meaning. Compare Rep. 454: Ἐριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

p. 146. δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλείον ἐπιδιδοῖεν·
τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἢ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ',
ὥσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀκούεις δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος,
ὡς ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐβελήσεις, οὔτε
θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώ-
τερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἶπέ· τί σοι δο-
κεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρῆ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς
κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἂν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπανορ-
θώσετε.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γε οἰοί τε ὦμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἂν
τις μάθοι ἐπιστήμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἃς νῦν δὴ
σὺ διήλθες, καὶ αὖ σκυτοτομική τε καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων
δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαί τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ
ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἐν αἰτη-
θεῖς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ' ἀπλοῦ.

Theætetus
is at length
encouraged
to attempt
an answer.
'Geometry
and the
like, shoe-
making
and other
useful arts,
all and
each of
these is
know-
ledge.'

But these
are many
and va-
rious;
knowledge

2. ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει] Rep. 536 :
Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον, ὡς γηρά-
σκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μαθάνειν,
ἀλλ' ἤττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες
οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι.

3. μὴ ἀφίεσο τ. Θ. ἀλλ' ἐρώτα]
Compare Lach. 186 : Μὴ ἀφίε-
σθαί σε ἐμοῦ διεκελεύετο, ἀλλ' ἐρω-
τᾶν. Rep. 449.

5. οὔτε θέμις—νεώτερον ἀπει-
θεῖν] Instead of making ἀπιστεῖν
depend on θέμις, a new clause is
introduced expressing the par-
ticular points in this disobedi-
ence which make it unlawful.
The like change occurs often in
Plato, and is part of the fulness
of his style. See above, p. 145 :
Ὅστε θαυμάσαι, κ.τ.λ. and note.

10. πάντως γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Theæ-
tetus is not yet alive to the dif-
ficulty of the subject.

17. ἐπιστήμη] Not 'a science,'
but 'science.' Theætetus does
not make the distinction. The
sentence is, however, humoured
by the introduction of the sin-
gular ἐκάστη.

18. Γενναίως γε] Referring to
εὖ καὶ γενναίως above.

19. ποικίλα] Either 'a rich
variety of things,' or 'many
complex notions for one simple
one.' The analysis of terms
which follows points rather to
the latter meaning; but the
former is more natural, and is
supported by comparing Phile-

is one and simple. This is illustrated.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

p. 146.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράζεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας ;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν τεκτονικήν ; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ ἑκάτερα ἐπιστήμη, 10 τοῦτο ὀρίζεις ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, τίνων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὀπόσαι τινές. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμη-

bus, p. 12 (at the opening of the dialogue): Τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἐστὶ ποικίλον.—ἔστι γὰρ ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἀπλῶς ἐν τι, μορφᾶς δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἴληφε καὶ τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίας ἀλλήλων. The two objections (πολλά, ποικίλα) are discussed in the reverse order. See below: Τίνων—ὀπόσαι, Πρῶτόν γέ που—Ἐπειτά γέ που, κ.τ.λ.

1. Πῶς τί] What (τί), and with what meaning (πῶς). Compare Soph. 262: Πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες ; ὅπερ ῥήθην, κ.τ.λ.

2. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν] sc. λέγω, 'perhaps I am talking nonsense.'

ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι] sc. λέγειν.

3. σκυτικήν] This is said to have differed from σκυτοτόμική (above); and the change of word is an instance of Plato's love of variety. Perhaps the one was a generic, the other a specific term. At least they do not exclude each other in Plato. See Rep. 374: Ἡ οὖν σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πο-

λεμικῆς ; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸν σκυτοτόμον, κ.τ.λ.—Ib. 601: Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς ; —οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας ὁ τε χαλκεύς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς ;

ὅταν—φράζεις] You express by the term 'shoe-making.'

12. Τὸ δ' ἐπ.] 'What I went on to ask you.' v. supr. μὴ ἀφίεσο κ.τ.λ.

13. τίνων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὀπόσαι τινές] The first answer of Meno to the question, 'What is virtue?' is exactly analogous to this of Theætetus about knowledge. Instead of attempting to generalize, he enumerates the several kinds of virtue. Men. 71: Ἄνδρὸς ἀρετὴν—γυναικὸς ἀρετὴν—παιδὸς ἀρετὴ, κ.τ.λ. Socrates replies (Men. 72): Πολλῇ γέ τιμι εὐτυχία ἕοικα κεχρησθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τι ἀνεύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων, κ.τ.λ. The whole passage should be compared with this. See also Lach. 191, 192, where Socrates finds a similar difficulty in lead-

p. 146. *σαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνῶναι ἐπιστή-
μην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω ;*

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς.

p. 147. ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων
τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροιτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐ
ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναίμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρέων
καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἱπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλι-
θουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἶμεν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν γέ που οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς
ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν
πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἴτε ἄλλων
ὠντινωνοῦν, δημιουργῶν. ἢ οἶει, τίς τι συνίησί τινος
ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστίν ;

ing the respondent to the con-
ception of a general notion,—
and Soph. 240, where Theæte-
tus is again entrapped into a
similar mistake in defining the
word εἶδωλον.

1. ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ] Rep. 472 :
Ἐζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷόν
ἐστι.

4. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς—εἰ ἀποκριναί-
μεθα] For the double εἰ comp.
Rep. 331 : Εἴ τις λάβοι παρὰ φί-
λου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος ὄπλα, εἰ
μανεῖς ἀπαιτοῖ, κ.τ.λ.

τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων]
Some trivial and obvious matter.

7. ἱπνοπλαθῶν] For this, the
reading of all the MSS., κοροπλα-
θῶν has been substituted in the
margin of some MSS., for the
sake of the uniformity which
Plato avoided. See below, note
on κοροπλαθῶν, l. 12.

10. οἰόμενοι συνιέναι] Comp.
Rep. 505 : Εἰ ὄνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι
οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν
ὡς εἰδόσι· φρόνησι γὰρ αὐτό φασιν

εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὐ συνιέντων ἡμῶν
ὃ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ
φθέγγονται ὄνομα. Soph. 244 :
Τί ποτε βούλεσθε σημαίνειν ὁπόταν
δὴ φθέγγησθε. We find ourselves
involved in a further stage of
the same absurdity at the end
of the dialogue, p. 210 : Καὶ παν-
τάπασί γε εἴηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν
ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι
μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος
εἴτε ὄτουοῦν.

12. εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσ-
θέντες] It is in Plato's manner
to surprise us with a fresh ex-
ample at each step of the argu-
ment, instead of dwelling upon
one already adduced. Rep.
333 : Ὡσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικός, κ.τ.λ.
—Prot. 312 : Ὡσπερ ὁ κιθαρι-
στής, κ.τ.λ.—and in this dialo-
gue, p. 161 : Βατράχου γυρίνου.—
169 : Σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖον, κ.τ.λ.—
178 : Οὐχ ἢ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ.—
190 : Ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον.

13. ἢ οἶει, τίς τι] οἶει is pa-
renthetical, and therefore does

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

p. 147.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδῶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

5 ΣΩ. Σκυτικήν ἄρα οὐ συνίησιν ὅς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Γελοία ἄρα ἢ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμη τί ἐστίν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. 6
10 τινὸς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται, οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτηθεῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτά γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἶον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλόν που καὶ ἀπλοῦν
15 εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῷ φυραθείσα πηλὸς ἂν εἴη, τὸ δ' ὅτου ἐᾶν χαίρειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνε-

Theætetus
perceives

not affect the position of the enclitic. For the sense, comp. Men. 80: Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σ., τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἴσθα τὸ παράπαν ὃ τι ἔστι.

12. Ἐπειτά γέ που] This ought strictly to refer to the illustration: which however is brought up again immediately. But we had reverted to the main subject meantime.

13. περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν] Ar. Met. 3. 1007 a: Ἀδύνατον ἀπειρά γ' ὄντα τὰ συμβεβηκότα διελθεῖν ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελθέτω ἢ μηθέν.

14. ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει] For the form of reference with ἐν, cf. Thucyd. I, 9: Ἐν τοῦ σκήπτρου τῇ παραδόσει. Phileb. 33: Ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων. The frequency of this idiom perhaps

assists the genitive πηλοῦ, which is descriptive rather than objective. 'In the question of the clay.'

15. πηλὸς ἂν εἴη] Either, 'earth, if moistened, will be (ἂν εἴη) mud,' or 'moistened earth would seem to be (ἂν εἴη) the definition of mud.' The latter is probably right.

17. νῦν γ' οὕτω] 'Now as you put it.' So far Theætetus has appeared wholly unfamiliar with the conception of a universal notion. But Socrates' illustration reminds him of the comprehensive simplicity of geometrical expressions. And thus he finds a clue in what he knows to the new labyrinth of inquiry into which Socrates invites him. Mathematical ideas,

p. 147. ται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἶον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῶν
 ἔναγχος εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σῶ
 ἰ δ ὁμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῶν Θεόδωρος ὅδε 5

that the
 answer re-
 quired is
 analogous
 to a geo-
 metrical
 expression ;
 i. e. simple
 and com-
 prehensive.

being the first pure abstractions which the mind arrives at, are peculiarly fitted to guide it to the contemplation of abstractions generally. So at least thought Plato, Rep. VII. 522–531. We find here the same difficulty which meets us often in Plato. We have to think of that as in process of elaboration, which is already familiar to ourselves. See Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. p. 197 : “A number of Plato’s dialogues are intended merely to produce the consciousness of a general notion, which we possess without the trouble of acquiring it. Hence his discursiveness has often the effect of tediousness to us.”

In reading what follows, it must be borne in mind that, by the ancients, arithmetic was studied through geometry. If a number was regarded as simple, it was a line. If as composite, it was a rectangular figure. To multiply was to construct a rectangle, to divide was to find one of its sides. Traces of this still remain in such terms as square, cube, common measure, but the method itself is obsolete. Hence it requires an effort to conceive of the square root, not as that which multiplied into itself produces a given number, but as the side of a square, which either is the number, or is equal to the rectangle which is the number. The use of the Arabic

notation and of algebra has greatly assisted in expressing and conceiving the properties of numbers without reference to form.

5. Περὶ δυνάμεών τι κ. τ. λ.] See Eucl. B. X. Def. 3–11 : Εὐθείαι δυνάμει σύμμετροί εἰσιν, ὅταν τὰ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τετράγωνα τῷ αὐτῷ χωρίῳ μετρήται. Ἀσύμμετροι δέ, ὅταν τοῖς ἀπ’ αὐτῶν τετραγώνοις μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται χωρίον κοινὸν μέτρον γενέσθαι. Τούτων ὑποκειμένων δείκνυται ὅτι τῇ προτεθείσῃ εὐθείᾳ ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθείαι πλήθει ἄπειροι ἀσύμμετροι αἱ μὲν μήκει μόνον, αἱ δὲ καὶ δυνάμει, (v. l. σύμμετροι καὶ ἀσύμμετροι, αἱ μὲν μήκει καὶ δυνάμει, αἱ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον.) Καλείσθω οὖν ἡ μὲν προτεθείσα εὐθεῖα ῥητή. Καὶ αἱ ταύτη σύμμετροι, εἴτε μήκει καὶ δυνάμει, εἴτε δυνάμει μόνον, ῥηταί. Αἱ δὲ ταύτη ἀσύμμετροι, ἄλογοι καλείσθωσαν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς προτεθείσης εὐθείας τετράγωνον, ῥητόν. Καὶ τὰ τούτῳ σύμμετρα, ῥητά. Τὰ δὲ τούτῳ ἀσύμμετρα, ἄλογα καλείσθω. Καὶ αἱ δυνάμεναι αὐτά, ἄλογοι· εἰ μὲν τετράγωνα εἴη, αὐταὶ αἱ πλευραί, εἰ δὲ ἕτερα τινὰ εὐθύγραμμα, αἱ ἴσα αὐτοῖς τετράγωνα ἀναγράφουσαι. B. VII. 17, 19. Τετράγωνος ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ἰσάκις ἴσος, ἢ ὁ ὑπὸ δυὸ ἴσων ἀριθμῶν περιεχόμενος. Ὅταν δὲ δυὸ ἀριθμοὶ πολλαπλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ποιῶσιν τινὰ, ὁ γενόμενος ἐπίπεδος καλεῖται· πλευραὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλαπλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοί.

5. δυνάμεων] ‘Roots,’ i. e. here, ‘square roots,’ although cube

He relates the discovery of the integral and potential root.

ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος περί καὶ πεντέποδος, ἀπο- p. 147.
φαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ ζύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαία, καὶ οὕτω
κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἑκτακαι-
δεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο· ἡμῖν οὖν εἰσ-
5 ἤλθέ τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνά-
μεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθῆναι ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἓν, ὅτῳ
πάσας ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καὶ εὐρετέ τι τοιοῦτον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.

10 ΣΩ. Λέγε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν. τὸν
μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκῃς γίνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ
τὸ σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον
προσείπομεν.

quantity is afterwards spoken of. Δύναμις is an abbreviated expression for ἡ δυναμένη εὐθεία. So ἡ τρίπους (δύναμις) = εὐθεία ἡ δυνάμει τρίπους, i. e. (a foot being the unit) $\sqrt{3}$. Cf. Polit. 266 : Διάμετρος ἡ δυνάμει δίπους. Similar abbreviations occur below in the terms μήκος and δύναμις. Cf. Eucl. X. Prop. 21 : Τὸ ὑπὸ ῥητῶν δυνάμει μόνον συμμετρῶν εὐθειῶν περιεχομένον ὀρθογώνιον ἀλογόν ἐστι. καὶ ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὸ ἀλογός ἐστι. Καλείσθω δὲ μέση. Ibid. infr. Deff. : Ἐκ δύο ὀνομάτων πρώτης, δευτέρα, &c. ἀποτομή πρώτη, δευτέρα &c.

2. μήκει] In linear measurement. They are δυνάμει σύμμετροι, i. e. their squares are commensurable, viz. by the unit.

3. κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην] Why did he not begin with $\sqrt{2}$? Was it because the δίπους δύναμις is less than the unit, viz. 1 ft.? The ending with ἑπτακαιδεκάποδος is a mere accident, as shown by

the words, ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο.

6. ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἓν, ὅτῳ] ἓν is not the antecedent to ὅτῳ; the construction is, πρὸς τὸ σημαίνον, as if it were εὐρεῖν, ὅτῳ, κ.τ.λ. 'By generalizing, to find an expression that should embrace them all.' Cf. Soph. Philoct. 341 : Τοιγαροῦν τὸ σὸν φράσον αὐθις πάλιν μοι πράγμ', ὅτῳ σ' ἐνύβρισαν. Charm. 166 : Ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἔρευνῶν, ὅτῳ διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη.

11. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα] Comp. Phæd. 104 : Ἡ τριάς καὶ ἡ πεμπτάς καὶ ὁ ἡμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἄπας. Soph. 238 : Ἀριθμὸν δὲ τὸν ζύμπαντα.

12. δυνάμενον] Used here in its ordinary sense, without any reference to δυνάμει above.

ἴσον ἰσάκῃς γίνεσθαι] i. e. to be made as a square number, which, as Euclid says, is ὁ ἰσάκῃς ἴσος, ἢ ὁ ὑπὸ δυῶν ἴσων ἀριθμῶν περιεχόμενος. 'To arise by the

p. 147. ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε.

p. 148. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοίνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὧν καὶ τὰ
 τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὅς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκεις
 γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκεις ἢ ἐλάττων
 πλεονάκεις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων αἰὲ πλευρὰ
 αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὐτὸ σχήματι ἀπεικά-
 σαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ
 ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὠρισάμεθα, 10
 ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ

multiplication of equal num-
 bers.'

7. προμήκη—ἑτερομήκη] These
 terms were distinguished by
 the later Pythagoreans. Nico-
 machus says that ἑτερομήκης
 ἀριθμὸς has one factor greater
 than the other by 1, προμήκης
 by more than 1.

10. τετραγωνίζουσι] Form as
 their squares.

11. ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη] sc.
 τετραγωνίζουσι. See Eucl. II. 14.

ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ ξυμμέτρους
 ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἂ δύναν-
 ται] Translate either, 'not com-
 mensurable with the former in
 linear measurement, but in the
 surfaces (composite numbers,
 see Deff.) of which they are the
 roots,' or 'not commensurable
 with them in linear measure-
 ment, while they are mutually
 commensurable in the surfaces
 of which they are severally
 roots.' I. e. the lines which
 are (or stand for) the irra-
 tional roots are not commen-
 surable with the integral roots
 or with unity (τῇ ποδιαίᾳ),
 but their squares, being inte-
 gers, have a common measure

of unity. They are commen-
 surable not in themselves, but
 in their squares, that is, they
 are potentially commensurable
 (δυνάμει μόνον σύμμετροι). For
 the constr. ἂ δύνανται, comp.
 αἱ δυνάμεναι αὐτά in the Deff.
 above ; also, Eucl. X. 22 : Ἡ
 δυναμένη αὐτό. It remains doubt-
 ful whether the one set of roots
 (δυνάμεις) or both are the no-
 minative to δύνανται, and con-
 sequently, whether τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις
 refers only to oblong number,
 or to both oblong and square
 number. The former alternative
 may be adopted as the simpler ;
 although the latter would be
 the more accurate expression.
 Instead of enumerating all the
 irrational roots, which seemed
 infinite, they conceived the idea
 of finding an expression which
 should embrace them all. They
 first went for assistance from
 arithmetic to the less ab-
 stract forms of geometry (Ar.
 Met. I. 2 : αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων
 ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως
 λεγομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικῆ γεωμε-
 τρίας). Here they at once found
 a generalization. All numbers

ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται· καὶ p. 148.
περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. b

ΣΩ. Ἄριστά γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὧ παῖδες· ὥστε μοι
δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις
5 ἔσεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ὧ Σώκρατες, ὃ γε ἐρωτᾶς περὶ
ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὥσπερ
περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι σύ γέ μοι
δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν· ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται
10 ψευδῆς ὁ Θεόδωρος.

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ c

which can be produced by equal integers they called square numbers. The rest, formed of unequal factors, they called oblong. The roots of the former can be measured by unity, the roots of the latter cannot, though the numbers themselves can. Hence a general distinction, and

a simple nomenclature. The roots of square numbers they called μήκη, i. e. μήκει σύμμετροι, commensurable in whole numbers, the roots of oblong numbers, δυνάμεις, i. e. δυνάμει μόνον συμμέτρους. And similarly, in regard to solid quantity, i. e. the cube roots of numbers.

In other words, $\sqrt{16} = 4$ or $16 = \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 4 \\ \hline \end{array}$;

and $4 = \frac{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4}{3 \cdot 2} =$ the line forming one of its sides.

On the other hand

$\sqrt{12} = 3 \cdot 464$ or $12 = 2 \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 6 \\ \hline \end{array}$ and $2 \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 6 \\ \hline \end{array} = 3 \cdot \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 3 \cdot 464 \\ \hline \end{array}$;

and $3 \cdot 464 = \frac{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot \dots}{3 \cdot 2}$, which is not commensurable with the side of the former square, although its square is commensurable, because it can be measured by unity. The boys ended with the term with which they started; and yet they had gained much: they saw now as one, what they had seen as many; as a whole, what they had seen as infinite; and this by limiting the application of the term, and distinguishing the thing from

that with which they had confused it. So a real advance is made towards a true conception of knowledge, when we have distinguished it from sense and from true opinion, although we fail to define it as it is in itself.

4. οὐκ ἔνοχ. τ. ψ. ἔσεσθαι] 'Will not be found guilty of perjury.' See above, οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψει, and note. The article refers to what has been already mentioned.

ρ. 148. οὕτω δρομικῶ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκένοι, εἶτα δια-
θέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἠττήθης, ἠττόν τι
ἂν οἶει ἀληθῆ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσαι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ 5
ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἶει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη
ἄκρων ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῆ τὸν Δί' ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκρο-
τάτων.

ΣΩ. Θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῶ καὶ τι οἴου Θεό- 10
d δωρον λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε
ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε
τυγχάνει ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκεν, ὧ Σώκρατες, φα-
νεῖται.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω· πειρῶ
μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ

But he
fears that
the ques-
tion about
knowledge
is not so
easy.

Socrates
still urges
him.

He an-
swers that
15 he has
tried inef-
fectually
before ; but
is still
anxious.

1. διαθέων] Running a course.
Comp. Prot. 335 : νῦν δ' ἐστὶν
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῶ
Ἰμεραίῳ δρομῆ ἀκμάζοντι ἔπεσθαι,
ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῶ ἢ τῶν ἡμερο-
δρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεσθαι.
Where Socrates speaks of him-
self as past the δρόμου ἄκμη,
(Rep. 460.) which Theætetus
here has not reached.

5. ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ] See above,
σμικρόν δέ τι ἀπορῶ.

6. τῶν πάντη ἄκρων] The Bodl.
MS. has ἀκριβῶν, with an accent
over the *ā*, and a dot over each
of the letters *ι*, *β*. ἄκρων is re-
quired by the words which
follow. Cf. Lach. 193 : Τῶν
πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ
ἀνδρίαν εἶναι ; Εὐ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι
τῶν καλλίστων. The mistake

perhaps originated in not per-
ceiving that ἄκρων is masc.
"Knowledge is no trifling mat-
ter to find out, but it belongs
to men every way complete ;"
i. e. not, like the runner, in one
way only.

8. τῶν ἀκροτάτων] The superla-
tive might seem unnecessary ;
but cf. Legg. 906 : Τῶν παντά-
πασιν ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν.

12. ἐπιστήμης is governed part-
ly by πέρι, but chiefly by λόγον.

14. προθυμ. — ἔνεκεν — φαν.]
Comp. Phædr. 272 : Πειρῶ λέ-
γειν—Ἐνεκα μὲν—πείρας ἔχομι' ἄν.
Polit. 304 : Πείρας μὲν τοίνυν
ἔνεκα.

16. καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω]
Comp. Gorg. 455 : Αὐτὸς γὰρ κα-
λῶς ὑφηγήσω.

'This is a sign, dear lad, that there is something in you, and that you ought to be made to feel the power of my art. You have heard that I am a strange fellow, but you were not aware that I practised my mother's trade. Consider the midwives; they have once had children, but are now past the age. They have thus experience

ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἐνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ p. 148.
τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν. ⁸

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πείσαι ἑμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω, οὔτ' ἄλλου ἀκούσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει· οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλειν.

ΣΩ. Ὡδίνεις γάρ, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ ¹⁰ κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὃ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα, ὦ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐγὼ p. 149.
εἶμι υἱὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαι-
¹⁵ ναρέτης ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα καί, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας ;

1. ἐνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες—ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν] To classify and to name (as above, συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν—ὅτῳ προσαγορεύσομεν) are considered as different aspects of the same thing.

8. μέλειν] The reading is doubtful. μέλειν has on the whole the best authority; but the reading of the Scholiast, εὔρειν, which is found on the margin of several MSS., supposing it to have been originally a gloss, agrees better with μέλλειν, though it might have been suggested by either. There is an idea of uneasiness in μέλειν which suits well with the context. On the other hand, οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλλειν (sc.

ἱκανῶς τι λέγειν) is a thoroughly Greek expression. For μέλειν used personally, comp. Aesch. Ag. 370: Θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιούσθαι μέλειν. Soph. Electr. 342: Κείνου λαθίσθαι τῆς δὲ τικτούσης μέλειν (where it may be impersonal, as perhaps here). Eur. H. F. 772: Θεοὶ θεοὶ τῶν ἀδίκων μέλουσι.

9. ὠδίνεις γάρ] Rep. 490: Καὶ οὕτω λίγγοι ὠδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὔ.

14. μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς] 'Truly noble and valiant,' or 'commanding,' 'of no common or feeble mould.'

γενναίας] 'Of the right sort.' βλοσυρᾶς, 'burly.' Comp. Rep. 535: Γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἦθη.

p. 149. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν· ἢ καὶ τοῦτο ἀκήκοας ;

b ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἶπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἴτιον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾶον μαθήσει ὃ βούλομαι. οἶσθα γάρ που ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἔτι αὐτὴ κυῖσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἄλλ' αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

· ΣΩ. Αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχεῖαν εἴληχε. στερίφαις μὲν οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὣν ἂν ἢ ἄπειρος· ταῖς δὲ δι' ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

5. ἀτοπώτατος κ.τ.λ.] 'That I am the strangest of mortals, and bring men to their wit's end.' ἀτοπώτατος is the very word to express Socrates' idea of himself,—αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς λόγους. Symp. 215 : Οὐ γάρ τι ῥᾶδιον τὴν σὴν ἀτοπίαν ᾧδ' ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι.

ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν] Comp. Men. 79, 80 : Ἦκουον μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ πρὶν συγγενέσθαι σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν.—καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιότατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τὰλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατεῖα νάρκη τῇ θαλαττία. This whole passage is at

least as much in favour of the MS. reading ἀτοπώτατος, as of Stallbaum's conjecture, ἀπορώτατος, which was suggested by the former part of it.

15. Αἰτίαν] An adj. agreeing as predicate with Ἄρτεμιν. 'Artemis is responsible for this.'

16. ἄλοχος] Used etymologically, as if from ἀ priv., and λέχος or λοχεύω.

17. ἄρα] According to this tale.

ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθ.] 'It is not in human nature to become skilful where it is not experienced.'

19. ἀτόκοις] Bodl. p. m. ἀτόποις. τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα] 'In

of child-birth, and are also such as the virgin Goddess prefers. They perceive the state of those they meet with. They can arouse or allay the travail of a patient : and cause abortion when they think it meet. They are also naturally the best match-makers. They are slow, indeed, to acknowledge the pride they take in this, though they bring people together law-

fully, and
not unlaw-
fully.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς
κυούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεισθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιῶν
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια
καὶ ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδῖνας καὶ
μαλθακωτέρας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε d
δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἔαν νέον ὄν δόξῃ ἀμβλί-
10 σκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσιν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἦσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ
προμνήστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ὡς πάσσοφοι οὔσαι
περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι ποίαν χρῆ ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ὡς
15 ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἴσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μείζον φρονοῦσιν ἢ
ἐπὶ τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννόει γάρ· τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης e
οἶει τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ ξυγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ
20 γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον
φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

honour of their resemblance
to herself,' τιμῶσα, 'prizing.' Cf.
Symp. 208 : Τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀποβλά-
στημα φύσει πᾶν τιμᾶ.

6. φαρμάκια] The Diminutive
is noticeable. 'Gentle reme-
dies.'

8. τίκτειν τε δὴ] Sc. ποιεῖν.

9. νέον ὄν] Sc. τὸ βρέφος, Said
here of the embryo, 'At an early
stage,' i. e. before it is dangerous
to do so. Cf. Hipp. de Morb.
Mul. § 3, 97 : Ἦν μηνιαῖον φθείρη
τὸ παιδίον, where the same thing

is spoken of. For the ellipse,
which is a little difficult, v. infr.
p. 161. τό γε σὸν, sc. κῆμα. Δύ-
νανται is lost sight of as the sen-
tence proceeds. Such a transi-
tion to the indicative mood is
not unfrequent. Cf. Rep. 465 :
Γέρα δέχονται, ζῶντές τε, καὶ τελευ-
τήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν.

14. ποίαν χρῆ] 'What woman
should be married to what man,
to produce the noblest off-
spring.'

p. 149. ΣΩ. Εἰς γυναῖκα δέ, ὧ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἶει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην δὲ ξυγκομιδῆς ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οὐκ εἰκός γε.

p. 150. ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ξυναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἧ δὴ προαγωγεία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἅτε σεμναὶ οὔσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φοβούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν. ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαίαις μόναίς που προσήκει καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

10

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν ἐνίοτε μὲν εἶδωλα τίκτειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆν, μέγιστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαίαις τὸ κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ μὴ. ἧ οὐκ οἶει ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τα μὲν

My art is
greater still

1. τοῦ τοιούτου] Sc. τοῦ ποιὸν σπέρμα καταβλητέον. There is MS. authority for τούτου, but τοῦ τοιούτου is more natural in the connexion. It avoids tautology ; and besides the processes are analogous, rather than similar.

4. ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον] 'unlawful and skill-less : ' contrary to morality and nature.

6. ἅτε σεμναὶ οὔσαι αἱ μαῖαι] Socrates himself however is not so particular. Xen. Symp. III. 10 : Σὺ δὲ δὴ, ἔφη ὁ Καλλίας, ἐπὶ τίνι μέγα φρονεῖς, ὧ Σώκρατες ; καὶ ὁ μάλᾳ σεμνῶς ἀνασπάσας τὸ πρόσωπον, Ἐπὶ μαστροπείᾳ, εἶπεν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγέλασαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, Ἐμεῖς μὲν γελάτε, ἔφη· ἐγὼ δὲ οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ πάνυ ἂν πολλὰ χρήματα λαμ-

βάνοιμι, εἰ βουλοίμην χρῆσθαι τῇ τέχνῃ.

11. ἔλαττον δέ] There is a slight irregularity in the antithesis, occasioned by the stress on τοσοῦτον. The balance of clauses is, however, completed with τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ κ. τ. λ.

18. Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως] For the well-known metaphor, which is nowhere else so completely elaborated, compare Symp. p. 206, sqq. (where Diotima proceeds to explain the mystical expression τόκος ἐν καλῷ) κιοῦσι γάρ, ἔφη, ὧ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἐν τίνι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυμεί ἡμῶν ἢ φύσις. τίκτειν δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχροῦ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ.

than theirs, for it is exercised upon the minds of men, and I can also discern the false birth

ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρας p. 150.
ἄλλὰ μὴ γυναῖκας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐ-
τῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέ-
γιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐνὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασανίζειν
5 δυνατὸν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, πότερον εἶδωλον καὶ c

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θείον τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θνητῷ ὄντι τῷ ζῳῷ ἀθάνατόν ἐστιν, ἡ κύησις καὶ ἡ γέννησις. — ὅθεν δὴ τῷ κυοῦντί τε καὶ ἤδη σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἡ πτοίησις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὠδίνος ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. ib. 209. τούτων αὖ ὅταν τις ἐκ νέου ἐγκῶμων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν θείος ὦν, κ. τ. λ. to the end of the speech. Repub. p. 490 : Οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτας, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἀψασθαι ὃ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου· προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ· ὃ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεῖς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῳῆ καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὔ. So far of the relation of the mind to knowledge. For the relation of the teacher and the taught see Phædr. 276, 278 : Πολὺ δ', οἶμαι, καλλίων σπουδῆ περὶ αὐτὰ γίνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύη τε καὶ σπεύρη μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἱ ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοί, καὶ οὐχὶ ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα — δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον υἱεῖς γνησίους εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, εἰς εὐρεθεῖς ἐνῆ, ἔπειτα εἰς τινες τούτου ἔκγονοί τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἅμα ἐν ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐνέφυσαν. For the theory of teaching and learning thus illustrated see Rep. 518 : Δεῖ δὴ, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσειν περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν, οὐχ οἷαν τινες ἐπαγγελλό-

μενοὶ φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δὲ πού οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέσθαι, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέσθαι, κ. τ. λ. Where it occurs under a different metaphor, that of the cave.

It is always difficult to separate the Platonic from the real Socrates. In the present passage they are indissolubly blended. That men thought Socrates the strangest being, and that he brought them to their wit's end, is matter of fact. The quaint humour, perhaps even the name 'Son of a Midwife,' is Socrates' own. But it is impossible to determine how far the theory based upon his practice, that to teach is not to put something into the mind but to evolve something out of it, or to turn the mind from darkness to light, was consciously held by Socrates himself, and how far it is Plato's theory of the method Socrates pursued. It receives its full development in the VIIth book of the Republic.

3. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν] 'But as its greatest triumph my art comprises this.' δὲ answers to μὲν above, the former δὲ being parenthetical.

5. δυνατὸν] Sc. τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτὴν.

εἶδωλον] Comp. Rep. 520. (From whence Bacon probably took his Idola.) Soph. 240, 264, 266.

p. 150. ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὠνειδίσαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, 5 ἀληθὲς ὠνειδίζουσι. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαί με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τις σοφός, οὐδέ τί μοι d ἔστιν εὖρημα τοιοῦτο γεγονός, τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται 10 ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊούσης τῆς ξυνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρεΐκη, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ 15

from the true. I am childless of discoveries, by the will of the Deity, whom I serve in this. But those we take in hand, however stupid at first, make wondrous progress and do great things. If they leave me too soon, their minds miscarry: unless they return to me, when,

1. ἀποτίκτει] 'Is delivered of.'

2. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε] 'For I have the same previous condition which the midwives have, in being barren of wisdom.'

7. ὁ θεὸς] Who presides over my art as Artemis does over that of the midwives. This must not be identified with τὸ δαιμόνιον, though they are probably connected (see below, and cf. Apol. 40: τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον), but belongs rather to the belief expressed in Apol. 21, 23, where he speaks of his cross-questioning as a Divine service, because occasioned by the oracle at Delphi; and Phæd. 85: Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλος εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, viz. of Apollo the god of the true μουσική (Phæd. 61: Ὡς φιλοσοφίας οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς): but here, as in one or two places of the Apology, the feeling is generalized.

8. τις] Bodl. Vat. Ven. II.

οὐδέ τί μοι] 'Nor have I had such a prize of my invention born to me, the offspring of my own mind.' Perhaps there is a slight play upon the word εὖρημα. Compare Soph. CEd. Tyr. 1107: Εἶθ' ὁ Βακχεῖος θεὸς εὖρημα δέξατ' ἔκ του Νυμφᾶν Ἐλικωνιδᾶν, αἷς πλείστα συμπαίξει; but the primary meaning is 'invention,' cf. Phædr. 278: Υἱεῖς γνησίους — ἑαυτοῦ, εἰάν εὐρεθεῖς ἐνῆ, and εὐρόντες below.

9. ἔστιν—γεγονός] This differs from γέγονεν as ἔχω with aor. or perf. partic. differs from the perf. act.

13. ἐπιδιδόντες] Sc. φαίνονται.

14. καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι] 'And that manifestly.' τοῦτο sc. ποιούσιν. viz. ἐπιδιδόασιν.

ἐναργὲς ὅτι] A strengthened form of δηλον ὅτι. 'As clear as day.' Plato frequently thus extends an idiom.

if I am permitted to receive them, they again improve.

καλὰ εὐρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας p. 150.
 ὁ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὧδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ἤδη ο
 τοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ
 δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες,
 5 ἀπῆλθον πρωϊαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τὰ
 τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν καὶ τὰ
 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν,
 ψευδῆ καὶ εἰδῶλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ
 ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 10 ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὧν εἰς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ p. 151.
 Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί. οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν
 ἔλθωσιν δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς ξυνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ
 δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀπο-
 κωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπι-

4. ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ'] 'They left me, whether it was that they despised me, or were themselves won over by some one else.' The minuteness of the antithesis need not throw suspicion on the reading. πεισθέντες, 'attracted,' 'captivated.' v. Thucyd. VI. 54. (One MS. however has αὐτοὶ ἢ ὑπ'.)

6. ἐξήμβλωσαν] Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 137. φροντίδ' ἐξήμβλωκας ἐξευρημένην.

διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν] Symp. I. c.: Τίττειν δ' ἐν μὲν αἰσχροῦ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ.

10. Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου] We read of the introduction of this youth to Socrates in the Laches, p. 179: Λυσιμ. Ἡμῖν εἰσιν υἱεῖς οὔτοι, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε—ἐμὸς δὲ αὐ ὅδε· παππῶν δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὄνομα ἔχει τοῦμοῦ πατρός, Ἀριστείδην γὰρ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. Lysimachus and Melesias are consulting Nicias and Laches, in the presence of Socrates, about their sons, Aristides and Thucydides.

12. θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες] 'Show-

ing extraordinary solicitude.' 'Going on their knees to me.' Cf. Apol. 35: Ἐώρακά τινος—θαυμάσια ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται.

13. τὸ—δαιμόνιον] Here, as always, not commanding, but forbidding; and, as generally, neuter and impersonal. This is not the place to discuss the subject. It suits well with the intensely self-reflective nature of Socrates (lost sometimes for whole days in thought) that he should pause suddenly on the eve of doing something, without being able (at the time) to explain to himself and others the motives of reason or feeling which checked him.

14. αὐτοὶ] v. l. οὔτοι. αὐτοὶ has the best authority, and is perhaps also preferable as the more difficult reading. It is certainly admissible. 'In some cases I am permitted to do so, and the men themselves improve.' Not unfrequently the

p. 151. διδόασι. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι καὶ
 τοῦτο ταῦτόν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπο-
 ρίας ἐμπίπλονται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον
 ἢ ἐκεῖναι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδίνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀπο-
 β παύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως. 5
 ἐνίοτε δέ, ὧ Θεαίτητε, οἱ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγ-
 κύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάνυ
 εὐμενῶς προμνῶμαι, καὶ ξὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάνυ ἱκανῶς
 τοπάζω οἷς ἂν ξυγγενόμενοι ὄναιντο. ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν
 δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε 10
 καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὧ ἄριστε,
 ἔνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς
 οἶει, ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρὸς
 ο με ὡς πρὸς μαίας υἱὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἂ ἂν
 ἐρωτῶ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τ' εἶ, οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. 15
 καὶ εἰ ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὧν ἂν λέγῃς, ἡγήσωμαι
 εἶδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀπο-
 βάλλω, μὴ ἀγρίαίνε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ
 παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὧ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς με οὕτω
 διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἔτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπει- 20
 δάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶονται

My pa-
 tients also
 are in tra-
 vail, and
 my art can
 rouse or
 allay this
 pain. And
 if some
 come to me
 whom I
 perceive
 not to
 need my
 skill, I give
 them away
 to Prodi-
 cus or to
 some other;
 and in this
 department
 too I sel-
 dom fail.
 Take cou-
 rage then,
 and be not
 angry if I
 put aside
 your first-
 born as not
 worth rear-
 ing. I am
 guided
 in this also
 by the
 Deity, who
 desires
 your good.

more subtle and minute anti-thesis is preferred to the broader and more obvious one. Thus often the reader is puzzled for a moment by finding a negative reply where he expected an affirmative, or vice versa: that which is negatived or affirmed being contained not in the whole of the previous sentence, but in the last word of it. But it must be admitted that the argument is more perfect with οὗτοι.

6. πως] Qualifying μὴ δόξωσι. 'Whom, somehow, I perceive not' etc.

10. ἐξέδωκα] For the word,

cf. Soph. 242: Δυὸ δὲ ἕτερος εἰπὼν (τὰ ὄντα), ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι. For the thing, see Lach. 200: Νικ. τὸν Νικήρατον τούτῳ ἡδιστα ἐπιτρέποιμι, εἰ ἐθέλοι οὗτος· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλους μοι ἐκάστοτε συνίστησιν.

12. ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἶει] Cf. supr. p. 148: 'Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθι—πέπονθα λέγω.

13. προσφέρου] Charm. 165: Σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ εἶδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ προσφέρει πρὸς με.

17. ὑπεξαιρῶμαι] Bekk. corr. The MSS. have ὑπεξαίρωμαι. See below, ἀφαιρῶμαι.

ἀποβάλλω] Bodl. ὑποβάλλω.

εὐνοία τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς p. 151.
 θεὸς δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐγὼ δυσνοία τοιοῦτον δ
 οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλὰ μοι ψευδὸς τε ξυγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀλη-
 θὲς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. Πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς,
 5 ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν·
 ὡς δ' οὐχ οἴός τ' εἶ, μηδέποτ' εἶπης. εἰ γὰρ θεὸς
 ἐθέλη καὶ ἀνδρίξῃ, οἴός τ' ἔσει.

Theætetus
 now ven-
 tures to
 answer,

I. Know-
 ledge is
 Sensation.

I. 'Why,
 Protagoras
 meant this

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω
 παρακελευομένου αἰσχροῦ μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυ-
 10 μείσθαι ὅ τί τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστά- e
 μένος τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὁ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὡς γε
 νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἰ-
 σθησις.

(21.) *τινα λήρον*] Some 'barren stuff.'

οἶονται] Plutarch in quoting this passage reads *οἶονταί με*.

1. *οὐδεὶς θεός*] 'And therefore not the presiding genius of my Art.'

8. *σοῦ γε*] I. e. 'You, whom I respect so highly.'

9. *μὴ οὐ*] See Appendix B.

12. *ἐπιστήμη — αἰσθησις*] The term *αἰσθησις* is more simple and more extensive than any one by which it could be rendered in English. See below, 156: *Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιαύτα ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναὶ γε δὴ καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κ.τ.λ.* Perhaps 'to see and feel is to know,' is the nearest equivalent to what Theætetus means. But 'feeling' has ethical associations which must be excluded here. The German word 'Sinn' presents a nearer parallel.

Before reflection begins, our individual impressions are those

of which we are most conscious and most certain. And subjective certainty is the primitive meaning of τὸ ἐπίστασθαι. Hence *αἰσθησις* seems at first sight identical with *ἐπιστήμη*. Vid. Phæd. 83: "Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγείσθαι, περὶ δ' ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχη, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως δὲν. Aristotle Metaph. III. 1009 b: 'Ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν.—ὁλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἰσθησιν, ταύτην δ' εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναι φασιν. The saying of Theætetus is shown to be the meeting point of two lines of speculation; the one of which may be termed in modern language, subjective, the other objective: the one regarding all knowledge as relative and apparent to man: the other regarding things without reference to man as in a state of transience or

p. 151. ΣΩ. Εὖ γε καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ· χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν, ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῆ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἰσθησις, φῆς, ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

when he said, 'The man the measure of what is.' i. e. What appears to me, is real to me.

p. 152. ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἶρη-
κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὅν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἶρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὐ σοί· ἄνθρωπος δὲ σύ τε καὶ γώ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

15

relation; thus sense cannot be knowledge, unless knowledge is relative, and being is change. This leads to an analysis of Sensation. We are made aware of its real nature, and so taught to distinguish Knowledge from it. See Aristot. de An. III. 3: Δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἶναι· ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ κρίνει τι καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων· καὶ οἱ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταῦτόν εἶναι φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἶρηκε, Πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις—Ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἄλλοῖα παρίσταται. Τὸ δ' αὐτὸ βούλεται τούτοις καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, Τοίος γὰρ νόος ἔστιν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον ἐπ' ἡμαρ ἄγησι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

9. ἄνθρωπον] Not 'Man,'

i. e. collective human nature; nor yet exactly 'Each man.' As we have seen, p. 147, Thætetus is little conscious of the universal. Hence ἄνθρωπος signifies to him not humanity, nor yet the individual, as opposed to it, but this or that man, 'any man you choose.' And whether or not it was so intended by Protagoras, it certainly appears to have been so understood by his 'disciples,' who are here referred to.

6. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι] 'Well, after all, I should not wonder if'—

13. ὡς οἷα μὲν, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. Cratyl. 385, 6: Ὅσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δ' ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' αὐ σοί.

e. g. When it is asked, Is the wind cold? Protagoras would say it is cold to him who feels cold. Appearance in this case is sensation. The wind is to me as I sensibly perceive it. i. e. Sensation discovers that which is.

ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν ἐπα- b
κολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνίστε πνέοντος
ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγοῖ, ὁ δ' οὐ; καὶ ὁ
μὲν ἡρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα
ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ
Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγοῦντι ψυχρὸν, τῷ δὲ
μὴ οὐ;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἑκατέρω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐστι γάρ.

15 ΣΩ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταῦτόν ἐν τε c

1. μέντοι] 'Well, at all events.'
εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ λ.]
Phædr. 260: Οὐκ ἀπόβλητον ἔπος
εἶναι δεῖ—ὁ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ
σκοπεῖν μὴ τι λέγωσι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ
κῆν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον.

6. ἐφ' ἑαυτό] The accusative
may be defended from Thucyd.
I. 141: Τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος
σπενδῆ. IV. 28: Τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς
εἶναι. The prep. is used in a
slightly pregnant sense, = *ipso-*
tenus, 'As far as to itself, and
no further.' v. infr. p. 160:
Οὐδὲ—ἐκείνο—ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γε-
νήσεται. (Perhaps the accus. is
also partly due to the action
of φήσομεν, or to the idea of
motion in πνεῦμα.) For the use
of the reflexive pronoun cf.
Rep. 419: Καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτούς.
Compare with this passage
Locke Hum. Underst. II. 8.
§ 21: "The same water may
produce the sensation of cold
in the one hand and heat in
the other."

13. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνε-
σθαι ἔστιν] 'When you say
"appears," it is that he has a
sensation.' The example is kept
in view throughout. There is
MS. authority for αἰσθάνεται.
(Cf. inf. 164: Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὄρα
οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγει, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ
ὄρα ἐπίσταται.) But the change
of subject makes αἰσθάνεσθαι
preferable. Cf. inf. 187. Τί οὖν
δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, κ. τ. λ.
Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε. Crat. 411:
Τὸ γὰρ γεγάασι γεγενῆσθαι λέγει.
And the repetition of the ter-
mination is a more probable
corruption than the recurrence
of σθ in the same word. Φαί-
νεσθαι appears as a correction
for φαίνεται in two MSS.

15. φαντασία ἄρα] i. e. 'In
regard to heat and cold and
the like your theory and that
of Protagoras agree.' Φαντασία
occurs here simply as the noun
of φαίνεσθαι, = 'appearing,' rather
than 'appearance,' and must be

p. 152. θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀψευδές, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὔσα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν ;

5 This theory of Knowledge, then, depends upon a theory of Being, which Protagoras reserved for his disci-

10

kept clear from the notion of *faculty*, and the associations due to Aristotle, (see de An. III. 3, where he defines it, κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένης.) Appearance (or relative being) becomes a middle term between sensation and being, so that all is merged in sensation. Thus, while the answer of Theætetus is shown to coincide with the saying of Protagoras, the reader is gently led to acquiesce in their common point of view.

1. ἐν τε θερμοῖς] Cf. infr. p. 205 : Ἐν γε τοῖς ὄσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστίν. They are instances of Plato's tentative method.

οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται] Sc. αὐτά, which however is purposely omitted ; viz., τὰ θερμά, κ.τ.λ. Or, while τὰ θερμά, κ.τ.λ. are subj. of κινδ. οἷα may be cogn. acc. "For they would seem to be to each according to his sensation." As we dwell upon the above example in support of the identification of appearance and sense, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγοῦντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὐ, (where, however, ἐστὶ was carefully excluded,) we are led insensibly to substitute "relative being" for appearance, by a

play of words, which may be preserved in English, "What appears to me, is to me." And from relative being (ἑκάστῳ εἶναι) we argue at once to 'being' (Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος). For a similar recapitulation, in which the argument is really carried a step further, (with γὰρ) cf. p. 191 : Οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδῆς ἐν ἡμῖν οὔσα δόξα.

4. Αἴσθησις ἄρα] Sensation then is of being, and, as being knowledge, (in accordance with your theory,) is infallible. Compare with ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὔσα, infr. p. 160 : Κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν.

7. Ἄρ' οὖν—] If sensation is of being, then being is not being but change.

9. τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ] He told the *real truth*, not in his book which is so entitled, but privately to his disciples. Cf. Crat. 413 : Ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Ἐρμόγευες, ἄτε λιπαρῆς ὦν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις. (He had just given a derivation of the word δικαιοσύνη, which he thus ironically attributes to the disciples of Heraclitus as an esoteric doctrine.) By a similar irony, he

ples, to whom he told the real truth 'in a mystery.'

2. If sensation is knowledge, being is change. Things are not, but become. Heraclitus, Empedocles, Homer, Epicharmus, all agree in this.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις ; p. 152.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον· ὡς ἄρα δ
 ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ' ἄν τι προσ-
 εἴποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὅποιουοῦν τι, ἀλλ', εἴαν ὡς μέγα
 5 προσαγορεύῃς, καὶ σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ εἴαν βαρὺ,
 κούφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐνὸς
 μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὅποιουοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φοράς τε καὶ
 κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα,
 ἃ δὴ φάμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἔστι
 10 μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτε οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ ε
 τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμ-

says here that the 'friends of Protagoras' have learnt their doctrine from their master 'in a mystery.' Clearly then the doctrine which Socrates proceeds to develop, was not to be found in the written teaching of Protagoras, but in the interpretations of his followers. The question, how far the Cyrenaics are indicated by the phrase, 'disciples of Protagoras,' has been discussed in the introduction.

(9.) τὴν ἀλήθειαν] There is probably a slight allusion here to the work of Protagoras of this name, which is more distinctly referred to afterwards.

2. καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον] 'I will tell you, and it is indeed a high argument.' He had spoken of a λόγος οὐ φαῦλος above.

3. οὐδ' ἄν τι προσείποις] 'Nor can you call any thing rightly by any name.' Whoever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek thought, of which He-

raclitus was the most prominent exponent.

8. καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα] These words are introduced in order to include Empedocles, whose elements, however, were not subject to growth and decay, and who was probably not independent of an Eleatic influence. His Muse is called in the Sophist χαλαρωτέρα, because his friendship and strife do not possess the world together, but alternately.

11. ξυμφερέσθων] MS. authority preponderates (numerically) in favour of ξυμφέρεσθων, which, however, gives no meaning. Stallbaum fails to defend it, by quoting Ξανθέ τε καὶ σὺ Πόδαργε κ. τ. λ. ; because we can hardly argue from Homer's use of the dual to Plato's, and because philosophers do not run in couples. Stobæus, who quotes this passage, has ξυμφέρονται. In the Bodleian MS. there is an erasure to the left of the omicron, which seems originally to have been ω. An accent on the penultimate has also been

p. 152. φερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας· κωμωδίας μὲν, Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγωδίας δέ, Ὅμηρος, εἰπῶν

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, 5

πάντα εἶρηκεν ἔκγονα ροῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε.

p. 153. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναίτο ἀμφισβητήσας 10 μὴ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι ;

erased. Thus *ξυμφερέσθων* is supported by the Bodleian p. m., besides three other MSS. 'Let it be assumed (since we cannot ask them) that the philosophers of all ages speak with one voice concerning this.' For the imperative, cf. Soph. 244 : *Τόδε τοίνυν ἀποκρινέσθωσαν*. Possibly the word *ξυμφ.* retains here something of its literal meaning, 'are gathered together,' 'move all one way.' The boldness of the language, especially the word *στρατόπεδον*, is in favour of this.

3. Ἐπίχαρμος] Epicharmus ed. Krüsemann fr. 95 : *Συνεκρίθη, καὶ διεκρίθη, καὶ ἀπῆνθεν ὅθεν ἦνθε πάλιν γὰ μὲν εἰς γὰν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω*. Ib. fr. 90 : *Φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἀσκοὶ πεφυσημένοι*. The passage quoted by Diog. Laert. III. 10. (who says that Plato borrowed from Epicharmus) though interesting, if authentic, is too long for quotation here. (V. Mullah. Fragment. Phil. Gr. Epicharm. vv. 177—194.) Epicharmus (circ. 490 B.C.) is called a Pythagorean. One or two of his *γνώμαι* remind us of Heraclitus.

3. *τραγωδίας δέ, Ὅμηρος*] Where the form is in question, *ἔπη* are distinguished from *τραγωδία* : as in Rep. 394. Where this is not the case, they are combined as tragedy, this being another name for *σπουδαία μιμητική* : e. g. Rep. 605 : *Ἀκροώμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν*.

4. *εἰπῶν*] γὰρ add. C. H. et rc B. (Bekk.) Flor. a. b. c. (Stallb.) So in the similar passage, p. 175. (*Διγγιῶν τε κ.τ.λ.*) γὰρ is added in one MS. (Ven. ̄.) The Zurich editors give *δε εἰπῶν*, without MS. authority. But the reading in the text is possibly right. See Appendix A.

5. Ὠκ. θ. γ. κ. μ. T.] Il. ξ, 201, 302.

11. *μὴ καταγ.*] A few MSS. have *μὴ οὐ*, which has been adopted by most editors. See Appendix B. Compare with the whole passage, Cratyl. 401, 402, where, after proposing first *Ἔστια* (fire) and then *ὠσία* (successive motion), as derivations for *οὐσία*, Socrates says : *Ὠ γαθέ, ἐννευόηκά τι σμῆνος σοφίας. Ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο ; Γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τίνα πιθανότητα ἔχειν. Τίνα ταύτην ;*

Motion is the principle of growth, rest of decay. Fire, the presiding element, is

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ ράδιον, ὧ Σώκρατες.

p. 153.

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, ὧ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἤσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμόν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα

Τὸν Ἡράκλειτόν μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν παλαιὰ ἄττα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης κ. τ. λ. Two Orphic lines are quoted besides this of Homer and Hesiod: Ὠκεανὸς πρῶτος καλλιρροὸς ἤρξε γάμοιο, Ὅς ῥα κασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὄπυιεν. S. adds, ταῦτ' οὖν σκόπει ὅτι καὶ ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνει. The last words are a good commentary on *ξυμφερέσθων*.

The theory of knowledge, 'All impressions are true,' is shown to require the theory of being, 'All things come and go.' And thus of the Protagorean and Heraclitean traditions there is woven a doctrine of sense, similar to that which was held by the Cyrenaics and perhaps others at this time. As a doctrine of sense it is received, as a doctrine of knowledge and being it is negatived. And yet some such relative view will return upon us after every effort to bind things in an abstract unity. Compare the way in which δόξα is treated in the Republic, p. 429: Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὀσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον; κ. τ. λ. τί δέ; τὰ

πολλὰ διπλάσια ἤττον τι ἡμίσεια ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται; Οὐδέν. Καὶ μέγαλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μὴ τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἂν φήσωμεν ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τάναντία;

2. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε] Cf. Thuc. I. 2: Καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ελάχιστόν ἐστι, διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι· ἐκ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.

3. δοκοῦν] The expression is a little harsh; and Badham proposes to read *ὄτιοῦν*. But cf. 152: Ἄ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι. 154: Καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρῶμα. Cf. also p. 176: Δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι. 'Being so called.'

5. πῦρ, ὃ δὴ τᾶλλα γεννᾷ] Which is assumed to produce all other things. The symbol of fire as the primal element, is elsewhere associated with the theory of a flux. See Cratyl. l. c. (401.) ib. 413. (speaking of the Heracliteans): Ὁ μὲν γάρ τις φησι τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον· τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διαϊόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὴν οὖν τῷ λέγω αὐτὸ ἄσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκῶς, καταγελαῖ μου οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ, εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπειδὴν ὁ ἥλιος δύη. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὃ τι αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησί· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ράδιόν ἐστιν εἶδέναι. ὃ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησίν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμόν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὃ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελαῖν φησίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο κ. τ. λ.

p. 153. γεννᾶ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· †τούτῳ δὲ κινήσεις. † ἢ οὐχ αὐται γενέσεις πυρός ;

generated by friction, that is, by motion.

b ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐται μὲν οὖν.

Living creatures owe their origin to a similar cause.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν 5 τούτων φύεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; ἢ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ πολὺ σώζεται ;

Exercise is essential to the preservation and improvement of body and mind.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις, οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως

Thus the mythology of the doctrine was rationalized by its adherents. In this dialogue every feature of it is presented, from the most sensuous symbolism (ἡλῖος, χρυσῆ σειρά) to the most abstract principle (τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, p. 156), and its most remote application. See also the famous saying of Heraclitus : (fr. 27. Mullach.) Κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων, οὔτε θεῶν τις οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστω ἦν τε αἰεὶ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰείζων ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ σβεννύμενον μέτρα. But the symbol fire was by no means confined to Heraclitus, (—the Atomists, Pythagoreans, etc.) Cf. Rep. B. VI., where the sun appears as the chief of the sensible world, and the symbol of the idea of good.

2. τούτῳ δὲ κινήσεις] The Bodl. marg. (rather indistinctly) with several MSS. has τούτῳ δὲ κίνησις, which is perhaps right. τούτῳ will then refer to τρίψεως. It seems unnecessary to assert that φορᾶ is κίνησις. The ω of τούτῳ in the Bodleian MS. is partially erased. But the note Δυικῶς in the margin is in the ancient hand.

10. ἐπὶ πολὺ] 'To a great extent ;' or 'for a long time.' So the Bodleian MS. The others vary between ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ, and ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, from which ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ has been conjectured.

12. Ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις] Ἑξις in Plato, like φαντασία, is less technical than in Aristotle. It is simply the noun of ἔχειν, and wavers between the active and neuter meanings of the word. The body is said ἔχειν πως, the mind is rather said ἔχειν τὰ μαθήματα ; hence ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἕξις, the condition of the body ; but ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις, the *having* in the mind. Cf. Rep. 591 : Ἡ ψυχὴ τιμιωτέραν ἕξιν λαμβάνει σωφρ. κ. δικαιοσ. μετὰ φρον. κτωμένη. Ar. Met. Δ. 1022, 6 : Ἑξις δὲ λέγεται ἓνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου—ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον διάθεσις, κ. τ. λ.

For a similar transition from one sense of a word to another, cf. p. 158 : τὰ αἰεὶ δοκούντα τῷ δοκούντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ.

'But with regard to the having the mind, is it not through learning and practice, which are motions, that it gains and pre-

μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶται τε μαθήματα p. 153.
καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας,
ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει
ἄ τε ἂν μάθη ἐπιλανθάνεται;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθόν, κίνησις, κατὰ τε ψυχὴν
καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τούναντίον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας

Motion,
then, is
good, and
rest is evil.

serves what it learns, (or gains what it learns and is preserved,) and becomes better?' The sentence proceeds as if ψυχὴ were the subject, at all events of the latter part. Cf. Rep. 532: 'Ἡ δὲ γε, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν κ. τ. λ., where there is a similar 'nominativus pendens.'

1. κινήσεων ὄντων] Cf. Prot. 329: *ὅτι ἐνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστιν ἃ ἐρωτᾷς.* ὄντων is neuter; 'things which are of the nature of motion,' like τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις above.

2. σώζεται] 'Retains' (middle), or 'is preserved' (passive). Ἔξις, as above interpreted, the preceding κτᾶται τε—καί, and ἐπιλανθάνεται in the corresponding clause, are in favour of the former: for which cf. p. 163: Ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον. Rep. 455: Μηδ' ἃ ἔμαθε σώζοιτο. But when it is rendered as passive, there is a more natural progress in the thought, 'gets knowledge, is preserved, improves,' while ἐπιλανθάνεται may be as justly opposed to improvement as to retention. And we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the word is used differently here, and a few lines above and below: cf. Symp. 208: Μελετῆ—σώζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. See the whole passage. In the

indeterminate state of grammar, may there not be a real, though not unconscious, ambiguity?

6. τὸ μὲν ἄρα] 'The one, then, viz. motion, is good.'

There seems no reason to suspect a gloss. There would be a want of Plato's usual explicitness without κίνησις; and the variety of genders presents no difficulty. Cf. Rep. 434: Ἐνάμιλλον ἄρα—ἡ—δύναμις; inf. p. 156: Τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις.

9. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω—ὅτι] 'Must I go on to mention still weather and calms, and the like, showing how quietness in every case corrupts and destroys, while its opposite preserves: and for my crowning instance, pressing it into the service, shall I insist upon it that by his golden chain Homer means the sun?' For the meaning here given to προσβιβάζων, 'making it yield to my theory,' cf. Phædr. 229: Αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἕκαστον.—'If one is to force each of them (the mythes) to harmonize with probability.' Cratyl. 427: Καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω φαίνεται προσβιβάζειν—ὁ νομοθέτης, viz. 'the sound of words to square with the sense.' Mythology, poetry, nature, body, mind, the elements, had already been 'pressed

p. 153. καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν

Water and air are preserved by motion. The argu-

into the service.' But this final instance requires still greater force. The position of the accusative τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν is possibly due to the attraction of the active προσβιβάζων, and the previous acc. τ. κολοφῶνα. For the transitive clause with ἀναγκάζω. cf. Symp. 202 : Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε, ὃ μὴ καλὸν ἔστιν, αἰσχρὸν εἶναι. Parm. 133 : Ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. Rep. 611 : Ὅτι—ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν (where, however, the word has a different meaning). The construction is assisted by λέγω in what precedes. τὸν κολοφῶνα (to which ἐπὶ τούτοις closely adheres) is accusative in apposition to τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν ὡς κ. τ. λ. Schol. : εἴ ποτε ἴσαι αἱ ψῆφοι ἐγένοντο, οἱ Κολοφῶνιοι περιττὴν ἐτίθεντο τὴν νικῶσαν Συμυρναίους γὰρ ἐλθόντας εἶχον συνοίκους, ὑπὲρ ὧν καὶ τήνδε τὴν ψῆφον ἐτίθεντο.

Three alternatives to the above rendering may be proposed:

(a.) ἀναγκάζω may be used absolutely, and προσβιβάζων may be the governing word.

'Shall I clinch my argument, making this to yield to my theory as its crowning instance, how that, &c. ?'

The obscurity of this construction would be a little softened by the position of τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν.

(b.) ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων might mean, 'convince you, bringing you to terms,' i. e. forcing your assent. In this case σε must be repeated from σοι. (This is

somewhat remote.) Ὡς κ. τ. λ. depends on ἀναγκάζω, πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον, as a sort of cognate accusative, (for it contains the final argument, and not the thing convincingly proved,) and τὸν κολοφῶνα is accusative in apposition to all that follows. Both τὸν κολοφῶνα and ὡς κ. τ. λ. are softened by the influence of λέγω, for which ἀναγκάζω is substituted.

Or (c.), This construction might be a little modified by taking ἀναγκάζω absolutely. 'Shall I clinch or complete my argument, forcing your assent?' But the two latter interpretations are perhaps a little violent.

1. αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι] There is a slight redundancy of expression in order to bring the instance in question under the general theory.

3. τὴν χρ. σειρὰν] II. VIII. 18, sqq. At this point Socrates has entered fully into the Heraclitean vein; as when he says of himself in the Cratylus, 407 : Ὅφρα ἴδῃαι οἰοὶ Εὐθύφρονος ἵπποι, or in the Phædrus, 238 : Οὐκέτι πόρρω Διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι. This is the crowning argument, because it adduces the capital fact of nature witnessed to by the oldest and gravest authority (στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον). The lines chiefly adverted to are 23—26 : Ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ κεν ἐγὼ πρόφρων ἐθέλοιμι ἐρύσσαι, αὐτῇ κεν γαίῃ ἐρύσαιμ' αὐτῇ τε θαλάσῃ· σειρὴν μὲν κεν ἔπειτα περὶ ρίον Οὐλύμποιο δησαίμην, τὰ δέ κ' αὐτε μετήορα πάντα γένοιτο. Cf. Heracl. fr. 36 : (Mullach) Εἰ μὴ ἥλιος ἦν,

ment is clinched with Homer's golden chain. If the revolution of

ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ p. 153. ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, δ πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις· εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ' ἂν

εὐφρόνη ἂν ἦν. Fr. 34 : ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα, εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρίνυες μὲν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσι. As fire was the symbol of motion, so the sun was the still more concrete symbol of fire. See Rep. p. 508, where the sun is allowed to be paramount in the region of sense ; being essential to vision and to life. For the way in which the authority of Homer and the poets is used, ironically by Plato, but seriously by those whom he imitates, cf. Cratyl. 391, where an argument is based upon the line δν Ξάνθου καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον, and infr. p. 194 : Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἦ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής. See also Xen. Symp. III. 6. (Antisth. loq.) : Οἴσθα τι οὖν ἔθνος, ἔφη, ἠλιθιώτερον ῥαψωδῶν ; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη ὁ Νικήρατος, οὐκ οὐν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Δῆλον γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται.

2. ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κιν.—καὶ ὁ ἥλιος] The motion of the whole universe, and the perpetual interchange of the different elements, was symbolized in the Heraclitean theory by the revolution of the sun, who not only rose and descended, traversing the sky, but was also quenched and rekindled daily, Νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρη. See Lassalle II. 119. sqq., who compares Aristot. Meteor. I. 9 : Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὡς κινουσα καὶ κυρία καὶ πρώτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ὁ κύκλος ἐστίν· ἐν ᾧ φανερώς ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου φορὰ διακρίνουσα καὶ συγκρίνουσα τῷ γίνεσθαι

πλησίον ἢ πορρώτερον, αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐστι— Ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὕδατος ἀναθυμίασις, ἀτμίς· ἡ δ' ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ, νέφος.—Γίνεται δὲ κύκλος οὗτος μμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον, ἅμα γὰρ ἐκεῖνος εἰς τὰ πλάγια μεταβάλλει, καὶ οὗτος ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Δεῖ δὲ νοῆσαι τοῦτον ὥσπερ ποταμὸν ῥέοντα κύκλῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κοινὸν ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος.—Ἔστ' εἴπερ ἦνίττοντο τὸν Ὀκεανὸν οἱ πρότερον, τάχ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν ποταμὸν λέγοιεν τὸν κύκλῳ ῥέοντα περὶ τὴν γῆν. Cf. infr. p. 181. τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν.

4. εἰ δὲ σταίη] Cf. Phædr. 245. (where the point of view is nearer Plato's own.) Τὸ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον, τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινουὺν καὶ ὑπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παύλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παύλαν ἔχει ζωῆς— οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινουὺν. τοῦτο δ' οὐτ' ἀπολλυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι καὶ μήποτε αὐθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινήθηντα γενέσθαι. In the text all is made to depend on change ; in the above passage all change depends on that which is self-moving, but in both, motion is essential to being. See Ar. Met. a. 994 A : Τὸν μὲν ἀνθρωπον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος κινήθηναι, τοῦτον δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, καὶ τούτου μηδὲν εἶναι πέρας. Cf. Simpl. in Aristot. Cat. p. 1056. Bas. (quoted by Lassalle) Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιλείπει, οἴχοιτο ἂν πάντα ἀφανισθέντα· διὸ καὶ μέμφεται Ὅμηρῳ Ἡράκλειτος εἰπόντι, Ὡς ἔρις κ.τ.λ. Οἰχήσεσθαι,

P. 153. διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν, ἅπερ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὑπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὕτωςί. κατὰ τὰ 5 ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμμάτων μηδ' ἐν τοῖς ὀμμασι· μηδέ τιν' αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξεως· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε [ὄν] που ἐν τάξει καὶ μένοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Ἐπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν ὄν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκόν καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φοράν φανεῖται 15

the sun and of the heaven . were stopped, the order of the universe would be overthrown.

3. The theory is now applied.

(1) Color is not something without nor in the eye, it arises between, when the eye encounters a particular motion. Hence it is different to

γάρ, φησι, πάντα. Schol. Ven. ad Iliad. XVIII. 107 : (Ὡς ἔρις ἐκ τε θεῶν ἐκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο) Ἡράκλειτος τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν κατ' ἔριν συνεστάναι νομίζων μέμφεται Ὀμήρῳ, σύγχυσις κόσμου δοκῶν αὐτὸν εὐχεσθαι. In the words ἄνω κάτω there is perhaps an allusion to Heraclitus' ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία.

Some of the latest guesses at truth have sometimes had a real or fanciful resemblance to the earlier ones. See Comte in Miss Martineau's abridgment, Vol. I. p. 429. 'Amidst the confusion and obscurity which exist on this subject, I think we may conclude that no organism, even the simplest, could live in a state of complete immobility. The double movement of the earth, and especially its rotation, may probably be as necessary to the development of life as to

the periodical distribution of heat and light.'

5. Ὑπόλαβε] If being then is motion, how are we to conceive of knowledge, i. e. of sensible perception? This is now evolved, a fresh appeal to experience being made at every step. Each sensation is the result of a double movement from within and from without. Hence they are, 1. relative to the individual (ἐκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός); 2. relative to each other. 1. is proved chiefly of the sensations of colour, warmth, &c. : 2. of the perceptions of size and number.

κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα] 'In the sphere of vision.'

9. ὄν] MSS. ἄν.

15. πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φοράν] The theory does not consider the origin of this motion. The instinctive belief in

man and other animals, to different men, and to the same man in different states.

γεγεννημένον, καὶ ὁ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν χρώμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, p. 154.

ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἐκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός· ἢ σὺ διίσχυρίσαιο ἂν ὡς οἶον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρώμα, τοιοῦτον

5 καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὄτρωῦν ζώῳ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ ἂρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτιοῦν ; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτόν δια τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως

10 αὐτόν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὐ ἔφα-

(2) Warmth in like

the reality of external things is already dissolved.

1. ὁ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν] Cf. p. 152 : ἂ δὴ φάμεν εἶναί. τὸ προσβάλλον, sc. ἡ φορά. τὸ προσβαλλόμενον, sc. τὰ ὄμματα. Cf. inf. ἄλλῳ τῷ προσπεσόν—ἄλλου προσελθόντος.

2. οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον] Neither that which gives, nor that which receives, the impulse.

12. ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα] Cornar. (followed by most editors), read ὁ. *Ficin. Id, quod mensuramus. Their difficulty was created by not observing that there is a tacit reference to the example adduced below—ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε ὄντα κ. τ. λ. If this is borne in mind, the text of the MSS. reads smoothly enough, the middle voice is accounted for, and παρα retains its full meaning. 'If that, with which we compare ourselves in size, were large,' &c., (ἦν is emphatic.) We are introduced to a new class of objects, and advance a step in the argument at the same time. All that I

see, hear, feel, &c., is seen, heard, felt, &c. by me alone, and arises solely in relation to me. Again I view the size of other bodies in relation to my own, or I compare different quantities. I cannot think of any magnitude or number as great or small, except in relation to some other magnitude or number. For the use of παραμ. cf. Lucian. I. 198 : Οὔτω γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέγα δειχθείη ἂν μέγα εἰ τῷ μικρῷ παραμετροίτο. For a similar anticipation of an illustration, see Rep. 495 : Ὡσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες—Νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου, where Plato seems to have the allegory of the cave in his mind. Cf. also Thucyd. I. 7 : Αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ—ἀπὸ θαλάσσης μᾶλλον ᾤκίσθησαν, αἱ τε ἐν ταῖς νήσοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἠπείροις (ἔφερον γὰρ ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι ὄντες οὐ θαλάσσιοι κάτω ᾤκουν), where the fact that the islanders were the chief pirates, which is mentioned in the next chapter, is assumed.

p. 154. ^b πτόμεθα, μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλῳ προσπεσὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἂν ⁵ ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὧ φιλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὡς φαίη ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις ;

c ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσει ἂ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκης, πλείους φημὲν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, εἰ δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις· καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ἂν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἢ τις ἄλλος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ' ὅπως τι μείζον ἢ πλεόν γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν ; τί ἀποκρινεῖ ;

d ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν μὲν, ὧ Σώκρατες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν ²⁰ νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἶπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

3. τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον] I. e. 'I, the subject.' Cf. p. 182, τὸ πάσχον. Ar. Eth. N. X. 4 : Αὐτὴν δὲ (τὴν αἴσθησιν) λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ μηδὲν διαφερέτω.

7. εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα] 'We allow ourselves to be driven to use strange and contradictory expressions.' Protagoras would not find fault with us for calling the six dice more than the four, but for using the verb εἶναι to express the relation.

12. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ] The

difficulty has been stated with regard to size, it is now illustrated with regard to number.

20. τὸ δοκοῦν] Cf. p. 157: Δοκοῦντά σοι.

22. φυλάττων] Not exactly 'avoiding' (φυλαττόμενος), but 'being careful :' keeping watch on one point only. Cf. Gorg. 461: Ἐάν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττης. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις ; Τὴν μακρολογίαν — ἢν καθείρης. Infr. p. 180 : Εὐ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον εἶναι. So too, p. 169. πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μὴ κ. τ. λ.

manner is relative to the touch, and size and number are wholly relative.

For want of observing this, we allow ourselves to fall into contradictions.

e. g. We say that six dice are more and fewer ; more than four, fewer than twelve.

Can anything become more unless increased ?

10

15

ΣΩ. Εὖ γε νῆ τὴν Ἑραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, p. 154.
ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ ἀποκρίνη ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειόν τι ξυμ-
βήσεται· ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται,
ἢ δὲ φρήν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

Let us con-
sider this,
not in the
spirit of
contro-
versy, but
of calm
inquiry.]

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ
ἡμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν τὸ
λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, ξυνελ-
θόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς
10 λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἄτε ἰδιῶται
πρῶτον βουλευσόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τί
ποτ' ἔστιν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις
ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ' ἂν βουλοίμην.

What are
these ap-
partitions

15 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε. ὅτε δ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἢ
ἡρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανα-

1. Εὖ γε—καὶ θείως] Theætetus' answer showed great dialectical aptitude. He perceives the contradiction, and yet will not answer *παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν*.

3. ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα] 'Our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.' Eur. Hipp. 612: 'Ἡ γλῶσσις ὁμώμοχ', ἢ δὲ φρήν ἀνώμοτος.

7. πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν] Having ransacked every mental problem.

8. ἐκ περιουσίας] 'Out of our superfluity,' 'for mere pastime.' Dem. de Cor. 226: Οὗτος δ' ἐκ περιουσίας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖ.

9. εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην] Sc. σοφιστικὴν. Cf. Symp. 210: Ὅστε καὶ εἰς ἐπιεικῆς ὄν τὴν ψυχὴν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχη, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίττειν λόγους τοιούτους, νῖζ. ἐπιεικεῖς.

τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρού-

ομεν] Ar. Nub. 321: Καὶ γνωμιδίῳ γνώμην νύξασ', ἐτέρῳ λόγῳ ἀντιλογήσω.

10. ἐκρούομεν] 'Would have knocked our arguments together,' like swords in a sham fight; 'would have bandied arguments.'

11. αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά] Compared with one another. The reading of the old edd., αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ, might be defended; but αὐτά is the Bodleian reading.

15. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε] The abruptness of ἐγὼ without γε might be defended from Rep. 500: Καὶ ἐγὼ, ἀμέλει, ἔφη, συνοίωμα. Eur. Med. 1375: Καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ σὴν. Alcest. 369: Καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ σοι πένθος—συνοίσω. But the correction of the Bodleian MS. is in the ancient hand. In either case καὶ belongs to the pronoun.

p. 155. σκεψόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἅττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν ; ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μείζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῳ, ἕως ἴσον εἶη αὐτὸ 5 ἐαυτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ᾧ μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, αἰεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

b ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε δή.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται

1. οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες] 'With no feeling of irritation.' Cf. Men. 75 : Εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἶη καὶ ἐριστικῶν ὁ ἐρόμενος, εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὅτι Ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν· εἰ δὲ ὡσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πραότερόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

2. φάσματα] These mental phenomena (that have started up before us). Cf. Polit. 268 : Τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἀτρέως τε καὶ Θυέστου λεχθείσαν ἔριν φάσμα. Cf. Meno 85 : Ὡσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὐταὶ κ.τ.λ. For the thought, comp. p. 203 : Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. Prot. 331 : Οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ.

5. ὄγκῳ] Cf. Phæd. 102. 'Simmias is at once taller and shorter, taller than Socrates, shorter than Phædo.' Where the difficulty is met in a different spirit.

12. ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν] This may be construed in two ways. 1. What existed not before, but afterwards, this cannot be, without production and a process of becoming. 2. What was not before, neither can that be afterwards, without production, &c.

The latter is the more subtle, but is probably right. Schol. : Ὁ Πρόκλος τὸ ἀλλὰ παρέλκειν λέγει. Prorsusque ita Latine dixeris quod non prius erat at postea id esse. Heind. 'Nay but, if it was not before, it cannot be afterwards.' Cf. Soph. 265 : Ἡ τις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι.

that have been raised within us ? One voice says, Nothing can become more or fewer, greater or less, while it is equal to itself. Another : That to which nothing is added, and from which nothing is taken, remains equal to itself. A third : Nothing can be, what it was not, without becoming.

These seem to jar, when we say that the dice which were fewer are now more without being increased: or that I, that was taller than you, am now shorter, without becoming so. *Thesetetus* is full of

αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρα ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν p. 155.
 ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε
 ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναντίον παθόντα, ἐν
 ἐνιαυτῷ σου τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ
 5 ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ
 σου αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὕστερον ὁ πρότερον οὐκ
 ἦ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι
 ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἂν ποτε
 ἐγιγνόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις
 10 οὕτως ἔχει, εἶπερ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. [ἔπει] γάρ

1. τηλικόνδε] Of the height you see me.

5. μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρέθέντος] 'My size having been stripped of nothing,' i. e. 'Without anything being taken from my height.' Badham conjectures μηδὲν ἐμοῦ τοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρέθέντος. But this is unnecessary.

7. ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον] This axiom is supplementary to the 3 former. In the first, the aorist was used (γενέσθαι), the present in the second (αὐξάνεσθαι, φθίνειν). Both (γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι) are accordingly combined in the third, by means of which the two former are applied. It is now shown that the aorist implies the present. To us such refinements are difficult, because unnecessary. The subtlety is carried still further in the Parmenides, until it is reduced to the formula, 'That which is, is.' Parm. 156: 'Ἐστὸς τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι καὶ πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἐστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν.—'Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.

9. καὶ, which implies a subtle connexion between ταῦτα and

ἀλλα μυρία, can only be expressed in English by the emphasis on 'these.' Cf. Soph. Œd. Col. 276: ὡς περ με κάνεστήσαθ', ὠδε σῶζετε.

10. παραδεξόμεθα] Sc. παρὰ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου. 'If we are to take this at his hands;' i. e. not only accept, but adopt this as our own difficulty. Cf. Charm. 162: Εἰ οὖν ξυγχωρεῖς τοῦτ' εἶναι σωφρ. ὅπερ οὕτως λέγει, καὶ παραδέχει τὸν λόγον, ἔγωγε πολὺ ἂν ἦδιον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποίμην—. 'Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι.

[ἔπει] γάρ που] 'I assume this (δή), for I suppose I take you with me.' Cf. Euthyph. 12: Ἐπει γάρ που νῦν γε; Euth. πάνυ γε. The MSS. have εἰπέ, but there can be little doubt about the emendation. The six dice are more when compared with four. They were fewer when compared with twelve. They cannot be more without having become more, and they cannot have become more without increase. Protagoras would say; It is true the same thing cannot be more without addition, but the dice in the two cases are not the same thing, for they are in

p. 155. που, ὦ Θεαίτητε· δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἄπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

wonder and bewilderment at this: a sign of his philosophic nature.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφυῶς ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίοτε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιῶ. 5

d ΣΩ. Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἴριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον 10
μανθάνεις ἤδη δι' ὅ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν, ἢ οὔπω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔπω μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. Χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσει, εἰάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον

a different relation. The distinction between relative and absolute quantity is so familiar to us, that this is apt to appear a mere verbal quibble. But the solution of such difficulties was one of the steps by which the Greeks arrived at that distinction.

6. οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν] 'Theodorus is evidently right in his conception of you. For this Wonder is a true symptom of the philosophic nature.'

8. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη] Arist. *Metaph.* I. 2: Διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

9. τὴν Ἴριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον] Hes. *Theog.* 265. Θαύμας δ' Ὀκεανοῖο βαθυρρείταο θυγάτρα ἠγάγετ' Ἡλέκτρην· ἢ δ' ὠκεΐαν τέκεν Ἴρω, cf. v. 780.

10. πότερον μανθάνεις ἤδη] 'Do you begin to perceive what is

the reason of this, according to the theory we attribute to Protagoras?'

Aristotle, *Met.* K. 1063 A, points out that the Protagorean doctrine rests very much on the relativity of quantity. Φαίνονται γὰρ οὐχ ἤκιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιφάσεις ταύτου κατηγορεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ ποσὸν ὑπειληφέναι μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ καὶ εἶναι τετραπηχὺ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ εἶναι. ἢ δ' οὐσία κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ὠρισμένης φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τῆς ἀορίστου.

14. Χάριν, κ. τ. λ.] 'Shall I then earn your gratitude, if in regard to a man, or rather men, of high renown, I help you to elicit the truth of their meaning from its hidingplace in their minds?'

μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν] viz. Heraclitus, Homer, and the rest mentioned above, p. 152.

4. To meet these and other difficulties the "Protagorean" doctrine is further developed. It must be hidden, though, from the uninitiate, those "impenetrable" men, who believe in no unseen operations, but only in what they can clutch with their hands.

δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπο-^{P. 155.}
κεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν ;_e

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλήν ;

ΣΩ. Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων
5 ἐπακούη. εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ
οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις
δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι
ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκληροὺς γε
10 λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' εὖ ἄμουσοι. ἄλλοι δὲ

1. ἀνδρῶν—αὐτῶν] The two genitives are not precisely in the same construction : ἀνδρῶν is governed by διανοίας, αὐτῶν by ἐξ in συνεξερ. The pronoun αὐτός, however, is frequently used to recall a noun, which, for the sake of emphasis, has been placed in the forepart of the sentence, e. g. Rep. 477 : Ἐπιστήμην πότερον δυνάμιν τινα φῆς εἶναι αὐτήν, κ.τ.λ.

ἀποκεκρυμμένην] Is to be taken closely with συνεξερ., as the order shows.

6. ἀπρίξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι] What may be 'grasped thus.' The extreme materialists are here discarded, in the Sophist they are made better for the argument's sake, that we may be able to discourse with them. The description there is very similar. Soph. 246 : Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρύς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων δυσχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταῦτόν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὀριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τις φησι μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονούντες

τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. 247 : τούτων οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἐπαισχυνθείεν οἱ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοὶ τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοντ' ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ ξυμπιέζειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν.

πράξεις] e. g. δικαία καὶ ἄδικος πράξις. v. Soph. 247.

7. γενέσεις] e. g. αἰσθησις, κινήσις, ἡδονή.

9. σκληροὺς—καὶ ἀντιτύπους] 'Hard and repellent,' i. e. stubborn and impenetrable.' For the verbal climax, cf. Tim. 62 : Σκληρόν δέ, ὅσοις ἂν ἡμῶν ἢ σὰρξ ὑπέικη—τὸ δὲ ἐκ τετραγώνων δυνάσεων—ἀντιτυπώτατον εἶδος. There is perhaps a humorous intention in the application of these material epithets to the men in question, similar to the play of words by which the Heracliteans are called ῥέοντες, inf. p. 181. For the inquiry, who are referred to, see Introduction. Cf. Soph. 246 : Ἡ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἀνδρας· ἦδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον.

11. ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι] In comparison with these advocates of gross bodily "matter,"

p. 156. πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἦδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἶδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πᾶ- 5 σχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἕκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις, αἰὲ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις 10 τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι

The men whose mysteries we teach, are more refined. Their first principle, upon which the whole depends, is that All is motion. Motion is active and passive, and each kind is infinite. These meet and produce in-

Protagoras is almost an idealist. His disciples believe not indeed in a world of νοητὰ εἶδη, but in a hidden process underlying appearances, cf. Rep. 477 : δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινα χροῖαν ὄρω οὔτε σχῆμα, κ. τ. λ.

(11.) ἄλλοι δέ] viz. the μαθηταὶ Πρωταγόρου, to whom he communicated his doctrine ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ, p. 152. Schleiermacher conjectured ἀλλ' οἶδε ; but they would then be liable to be confused with the ἄνδρες ὀνομαστοὶ above. The 'disciples of Protagoras,' are evidently contemporaries of Plato. Aristippus is probably included. (Κομψὸς and συρφετός are opposed, Hippias Maj. 288 : Οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός.) The word κομψός is used similarly of certain nameless philosophers (who are clearly the Pythagoreans) Polit. 285 Πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν ὡς ἄρα μετρητικὴ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα. Cf. Phil. 53 : κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινες αὐ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μνησθῆναι ἡμῖν οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν. (Megarians ?)

3. ἦν] 'really is,' according

to the well-known idiom, which becomes more frequent in Aristotle. What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it was before the inquiry began. It is a transference of the reality of history to a general statement. Soph. Œd. Col. 117 : Τίς ἄρ' ἦν ; The doctrine asserted above is now more minutely developed.

8. συνεκπίπτουσα] 'Tumbling forth to light at the same moment.' Compare the lively expression in Rep. 432, when justice is discovered, πάλαι ὦ μακάριε φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι. For the insertion of καὶ γεννωμένη, cf. Soph. Ant. 533 : Καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας. Aesch. Prom. 339. Πάντων μετασχὼν καὶ τετολμηκῶς ἐμοί.

10. τὰ τοιάδε—ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις—κεκλημέναι] The slight redundancy helps to connect the sentence.

12. ἡδοναί γε δὴ] The particles mark the transition to a class of things less familiarly known by the name αἰσθησις.

numerable twin births: sensation and sensible thing coming forth together. Sensations include pleasures, pains, desires and fears, and there are many without a name. Sensible things are colours, sounds, and the like. All the things now spoken of

κεκλημένοι καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνόνομοι, p. 156. παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὀνομασμένοι· τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἐκάσταις ὁμόγονον, ὅψεσι μὲν χρώματα παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί, c
5 καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ γιγνόμενα. . Τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα ; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄθρει εἴαν πως ἀποτελεσθῆ. βούλεται .
10 γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐνὶ τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ d

1. αἱ ἀνόνομοι] See Locke, Hum. Und. B. II. c. 3. I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense, nor indeed is it possible if we would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for.

3. The Bodleian with nine other MSS. has ἐκάστης.

6. οὗτος ὁ μῦθος] Cf. Soph. 242 : Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγείσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ. For the spirit with which all this is done, compare Rep. p. 545 : Φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῆ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν ;

7. πρὸς τὰ πρότερα] 'In reference to what preceded,' viz. from p. 153. Ὑπόλαβε — to p. 155, παραδεξόμεθα.

9. Ἄλλ' ἄθρει εἴαν] 'Well, look attentively, perhaps we shall be able to finish it.' Cf. infr. p.

192 : Ἴδὲ δὴ, εἴαν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπισπῆ. εἴαν = in the hope that.

10. ταῦτα] ποιῶντα, πάσχοντα, αἰσθητά, αἰσθήσεις.

πάντα—κινεῖται] Comp. Locke. 'The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us, and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in.'

12. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ] 'The slower have their motion in one spot, and in relation to what is in contact with them, and are thus the producing elements ; but those which are thus produced are swifter ; for they are carried along, and their motion is from place to place.'

13. τὰ — γεννόμενα οὕτω δὴ] Schol. Εἰς τὸ δὴ ὑποστικτέον. The (probably conjectural) interpolation of Cornarius after οὕτω δὴ [βραδύτερά ἐστιν· ὅσον δὲ αὖ ταχύ, πρὸς τὰ πόρρωθεν τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω γεννᾶ, τὰ δὲ γεννόμενα οὕτω δὴ] is quite un-

p. 156. γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ θάπτω ἐστί· φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἢ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ὄμμα καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεννήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ συναποτίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα, ὃ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὄρα δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο

are in motion. But the motion of some is swift and of others slow. Those which produce are slow, and they move only when in contact. The things produced are swifter,

necessary, and confuses the real sense. The slower motions are the ποιῶντα and πάσχοντα, which, when in contact, produce (without changing place) the αἰσθητὰ and αἰσθήσεις (i. e. qualities and sensations) which are the 'quicker motions,' and pass to and fro between the ποιῶν and πάσχον. Cf. inf. p. 159: 'Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό τε ποιῶν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητα τε καὶ αἴσθησιν, ἃμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα. It is not quite clear what is intended by the qualities and sensations being in locomotion. Perhaps nothing more is distinctly meant than that they flow from subject to object, and from object to subject. But when it is said that they are the swifter motions, the idea is vaguely connected with the Heraclitean doctrine. Sensations and qualities are drops in the ever-flowing river of succession. The man or the tree is like the dull weed that clogs it, itself to be carried down in time. Subject and object are more of the nature of Earth, sensation and quality are sparks of the everliving Fire. This is not, however, brought out consciously here. It is shown afterwards, p. 182, that while sensation and qua-

lity are flowing between subject and object, they have also changed. The above interpretation was first suggested by Voegelinus, quoted by the Zurich editors in the preface to their last edition. He seems however, by a curious error, to make γεννῶν and γεννώμενον equivalent to ποιῶν and πάσχον. That the ποιῶν and πάσχον are both γεννῶντα, appears from p. 159: 'Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ — τό τε ποιῶν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, quoted above.

3. τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων] Men. 76: 'Ἔστι γὰρ χροῖα ἀπορρόσῃ σχήματος ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. This definition is said to be "κατὰ Γοργίαν." In Tim. 67 colour is called, φλόγα τῶν σωμαμάτων ἐκάστων ἀπορρέουσιν, ὄψει ξύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσιν πρὸς αἴσθησιν. Cf. ib. 45, 6.

6. τότε δὴ, κ. τ. λ.] Then it is that while these are issuing in the midst, sight from the eyes, whiteness from that which helps to create the colour, the eye is filled with seeing, and sees now, and becomes not sight indeed, but a seeing eye, and that which helps to give the colour birth is covered with whiteness, and it too becomes not whiteness but white, whether stick or stone, or whatever it is that

for their motion is from place to place. e. g. The eye and its appropriate active motion come in contact. Then sight begins to flit from the eye and

οὐ τι ὄψις ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὄρων, τὸ δὲ ξυγγεννήσαν p. 156.
τὸ χρώμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ
λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε
ὄτουοῦν ξυνέβη † χρώμα † χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ
5 χρώματι. καὶ τὰλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν
καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν
καθ' αὐτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ p. 157.
τῇ πρὸς ἀλληλα ὀμιλία πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα

happens to have been coloured with this hue.

(6.) μεταξὺ φερομένων] It is doubtful whether this means "whilst they are moving," or "as they are moving in the midst." The former is excellent Greek, but the latter seems preferable if we turn to p. 154 : Μεταξύ τι ἐκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός, and infr. p. 182 : Φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιούντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος.

3. εἴτε ὄτουοῦν, κ. τ. λ.] Heind. who receives ὀτιοῦν-χρῆμα, (Cornarius' emendation,) adds, "ne ipso quidem χρῆμα opus fuerit, h. l." It has not been sufficiently remarked that ὀτιοῦν has scarcely more authority than χρῆμα. This is sacrificing too much for a weak reading. One MS. (Par. H.) has σῶμα on the margin, but ὄτουοῦν — σῶμα, though it has thus some slight authority, would introduce a distinction between organic and inorganic matter scarcely known to Plato, and at all events too novel to be so slightly hinted at. The real text is perhaps restored by dropping χρώμα, and reading ὄτουοῦν, (ὄτώοῦν Par. F.) λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὄτουοῦν ξυνέβη χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. 'White, whe-

ther stick or stone, or whatsoever happens to be coloured with that colour.' The repetition of similar consonants is a frequent form of corruption, cf. esp. p. 158: ὄτῳ χρῆ, κ. τ. λ.: where three MSS. (Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.) read ὄτῳ χρόνῳ χρῆ, κ. τ. λ. (Χρόνου, χρόνον, χρόνου, χρόνου, occurring within the next few lines.) Also, p. 149, ἀτόποις for ἀτόκοις Vat. pr. Bodl. pr. Ven. Π. with ἀτοπάτατος a few lines above.

(Yet the reading ὄτουοῦν-χρώμα, in which most MSS. agree, may possibly be right. For our theory has reduced us to narrow limits in the use of language. We have already been within a very little of saying 'motions move.' Cf. also, Rep. 601 : τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματ' ἅττα—ἐπιχρωματίζειν.) For εἴτε ξύλος εἴτε λίθος, cf. infr. ἄνθρωπόν τε καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ εἶδος. Hipp. Maj. 292 : Καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ, κ. τ. λ. The sentence is turned like Phædr. 237 : Εἴτε δι' ᾧδος εἶδος λιγείαι, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικὸν τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἔσχετε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν. Rep. 612 : Εἴτε πολυειδῆς εἴτε μονοειδῆς εἴτε ὅπη ἔχει καὶ ὅπως. The aorists give a sort of picturesqueness to the expression, referring, as in the Homeric similes, to an imaginary case.

ρ. 157. ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ
 πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὡς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι
 παγίως· οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πά-
 σχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιούντι·
 τό τε τι ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλω αὖ προσπεσὸν 5
 πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ
 ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ
 b τι ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον,
 οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνη-
 θείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ 10
 δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε
 του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν
 ὄνομα ὃ τι ἂν ἰσθῆ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι

colour from
 the object
 of sight ;
 the eye be-
 comes a
 seeing eye,
 and the ob-
 ject be-
 comes co-
 loured.
 Neither
 seeing eye
 nor colour-
 ed object
 can be
 thought of
 as existing
 independ-
 ently of
 this mutual
 process.
 We must
 not speak
 of anything
 as existing,

1. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν] 'For it is impossible to have a firm notion (they say) even of the active and passive elements as existing separately in the case of any single thing.' αὐτῶν sc. τῶν κινουμένων, 'To distinguish amongst them the active or passive element as existing in any single case.' Or ἐπὶ ἐνὸς may be taken differently: 'To conceive steadily of agent and patient, as each existing separately in one;' i. e. 'as a single thing.' Cf. Soph. 259: 'Ἐν ἐνὶ ξυνημμένην, and the common expression ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. But the former rendering is more probable. Cf. Arist. Met. V. 20: Μηδὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἐνός. For αὐτῶν Cornarius suggested αὖ τι. If a change were necessary, αὖ τῶν would seem more probable. τῶν ἐπὶ ἐνός, 'of things taken singly,' might then be compared with τῶν ἐν ἐκείνων, Phil. 16.

2. νοῆσαι—παγίως] Rep. 479:

Καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὔτ' εἶναι, οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατόν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτ' ἀμφοτέρα οὔτε οὐδέτερον. The word is used by Aristotle.

9. οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς] The irony of this appears very clearly, if we compare p. 197: Εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός κ.τ.λ.

10. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ] This may be regarded as a sentence of which τὸ is the subject, and all that follows the predicate. The idiom occurs frequently in Plato, Apol. 23. Rep. 340. De Legg. 803. Soph. 244. Its growth may be traced in the following passages, Rep. 357: Τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, προσίμιον. 443: Τὸ δέ γε ἦν ἄρα κ.τ.λ. Τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές κ.τ.λ., 489. τὸ δέ ἀληθές πέφυκεν κ.τ.λ. See also Thuc. II. 44: Τὸ δ' εὐτυχές κ.τ.λ.

11. οὔτε του] The genitive is a point of transition to ἐμοῦ.

13. φθέγγεσθαι—] 'To use the expressions.'

but only as becoming this or that, arising, perishing, or changing. This applies not only to single things, but to those bundles of things, which men call sorts.

γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἄλλοι- p. 157.
 ούμενα· ὡς εἴαν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγκτος ὁ
 τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ
 περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρω-
 5 πόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ ο
 εἶδος. Ταῦτα δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἄρ' ἠδέα δοκεῖ σοι
 εἶναι, καὶ γεύοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ
 οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά
 10 σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρά.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ'
 οἶδα οὔτε ποιῶμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ'
 εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα
 ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο-
 15 γεύσασθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ξυνεξαγάγω· d
 ἐξαχθέντος δέ, τότε ἤδη σκέψομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμαῖον εἴτε
 γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν
 εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἂ ἂν φαίνηταί σοι περὶ ὧν
 ἂν ἐρωτῶ.

Theaetetus is invited to acknowledge the theory so far devel-

2. ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν] For the redundancy, cf. Rep. 506: Δίκαια καὶ καλὰ ἀγνούμενα ὅπη ποτὲ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνούοντα.

4. ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι—τίθενται] Sc. ὄνομα. The subject of τίθενται is indefinite. From our Protagorean point of view, that which answers to a common name is not ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, nor ἐν παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ, but an arbitrary or conventional aggregate of phenomena. Cf. Parm. 165, where the word ὄγκος answers to ἀθροισμα here, but implies something even more vague and formless.

12. ποιῶμαι] 'Tanquam pro-

prium mihi vindico,' velut dicitur ποιείσθαι τινα υἱόν. Heind. Is it not rather, 'give birth to?' Cf. Rep. 372: Ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας. Crit. 45: Ἡ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιείσθαι παῖδας.

14. παρατίθημι] P. 149; Διδούσαι γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια καὶ ἐπάδουσαι. See the description of the education of a Greek youth in the Protagoras, 325: Παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα. The genitive is perhaps partitive, but more probably governed by ἀπογεύσασθαι.

17. καὶ καρτερῶν] 'And with perseverance.' Boldness was all he required at first. p. 148. Θάρρει. 151 εἴαν—ἀνδρίζη.

p. 157. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρώτα δὴ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα ἄ ἄρτι διῆμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω δι- 5
εξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑπο-
ληπτέον ἥπερ διελήλυθας.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλείπον αὐτοῦ.
λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων
καὶ μανίας ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο 10
παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι
τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὄν ἄρτι διῆ-
μεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις

oped. So-
crates dis-
claims
having
any share
in it, ex-
cept that
he has
helped to
bring it
to the
birth. The
Good and
Noble
must be
thought of
with other
things, as
not exist-
ing, but
arising con-
tinually.
5. A for-
midable

2. εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει] 'Whether you are pleased with the idea that nothing is, but is ever becoming, good and noble, as well as what we have just enumerated.'

3. ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν] As, above, αἰσθήσεις is made to include desire, fear, &c., so by the subtle introduction of these words, the doctrine is pushed to its farthest limits, and thus its chief fallacy is hinted at—that of arguing from sense to higher things. So afterwards Protagoras is made to assume that the doctrine applies to states as well as individuals. It is a good example of the irony of dialectic.

8. Μὴ τοίνυν] The doctrine is now so far developed, that we have only to notice an objection, and it will be complete. As false opinion is our stumbling-block afterwards, so now false impressions have to be

accounted for. The solution is a simple one—they are not false to him who is the subject of them. The position, Sense is knowledge, was at first made equivalent to its having a real object (p. 152). But are dreams real? Are the illusions of madness true? Is that really bitter which tastes so to the diseased palate?—If truth is wholly relative, if nothing is but what becomes, it must be so. (In fact, such impressions are not contrary to sense, but to reason.)

9. καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ] And disease, especially madness and its delusions. μανία is the subject of λέγεται, and ὅσα is cogn. accus. Cf. Soph. Trach. 406, λείσσω μάταια. alib.

ὅσα—τί ἄλλο] The double cognate accusative is noticeable. 'The cases in which it is said—to have any other illusory impression.'

class of objections is now disposed of. It is commonly said that in dreams and madness nothing of what appears is real. Protagoras says, All that appears to me is real to me. What account does he then give of these phenomena?

ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα p. 158.
ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

5 ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φαίνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁκνῶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι αὐτό. ἐπεὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβη-
10 τῆσαι ὡς οἱ μαινόμενοι ἢ οἱ ὄνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ βδοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοί τε, καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανο-
ῶνται.

15 ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ ὕπαρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὁ πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτῶντων
τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν
20 οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα
ἀδιανοούμεθα ὄνειρώττομεν, ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν τε καὶ
ὑπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.

1. πολλοῦ δεῖ] These words are adverbial.

2. ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι] E. g. Democritus (who is believed to have written against Protagoras) said of all sensations except hardness and weight: Σημεῖον δ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει τὸ μὴ ταῦτα πᾶσι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ζώοις, ἀλλ' ὃ ἡμῖν γλυκύ, τοῦτ' ἄλλοις πικρὸν καὶ ἑτέροις ὄξύ καὶ ἄλλοις δριμύ, τοῖς δὲ στρυφνόν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως.

12. οἱ μὲν — αὐτῶν] I. e. the madmen.

13. πτηνοί τε] Sc. οἴωνται εἶναι.

18. Ὁ πολλάκις] δ is not exactly governed by ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτῶντων, but it is cognate accusative in apposition with the whole sentence that follows. 'What question do you allude to? This. I dare say you have often heard it asked, &c.' Cf. p. 165: Ἄ ελλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος κ. τ. λ. Rep. 443: Τὸ ἐνύπνιον, δ' ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι, κ. τ. λ.

Arist. Met. Γ, 6, 1011 A: Τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήματα ὁμοιά ἐστι τῷ ἀπορεῖν πότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν.

p. 158. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρή ἐπιδείξαι τεκμηρίῳ. πάντα γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἅ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα, οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι· καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνειράτα δοκῶμεν διηγείσθαι, — ἄτοπος ἢ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοις.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλεπόν, ὅτε καὶ πότερόν ἐστιν ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖται, καὶ δὴ ἴσου ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὃν καθεύδομεν ὧ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἢ ψυχῆ τὰ αἰεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὥστε ἴσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φημὲν ὄντα εἶναι, ἴσον δὲ ἐκείνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέροις διῶσχυριζόμεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

1. ἄπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρή ἐπιδείξαι] Descartes de la Méthode, p. 164 (Cousin.): Et que les meilleurs esprits y étudient tant qu'il leur plaira, je ne crois pas qu'ils puissent donner aucune raison, qu'il soit suffisante pour ôter cette doute, s'ils ne présupposent l'existence de Dieu. Descartes however would not say ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέροις διῶσχυριζόμεθα. As early as the age of Homer, attention had been attracted by the phenomena of dreams. II. XXII. 199: Ὡς δ' ἐν ὀνειρώ οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν. (Bodl. ὅτῳ χρόνῳ χρή.)

2. πάντα γὰρ ὡσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ] 'For everything corresponds in each exactly, as if one was the counterpart of the other.'

4. ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ] This is the reading of the best MSS., though ἐνυπνίῳ is supported by the greater number. But the article with ἐνυπνίῳ is out of place, and

the indefinite τῳ is not used adjectively.

5. καὶ ὅταν δὴ] 'And when in a dream we do seem to be telling thoughts which are dreams, — it is strange, the resemblance of this state to that.'

ὀνειράτα—διηγείσθαι] Not 'to tell dreams,' but 'to give utterance to thoughts which are only dreams.' Cf. supr. πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρώττομεν. Ὀνειράτα is a sort of cognate accusative, or rather, is in apposition to the suppressed object of διηγείσθαι. Ὀναρ is adverbial to δοκῶσι. (Meno 85: Ὡσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὐται.) Τούτων refers to the waking, ἐκείνοις to the sleeping state, like ἐνθάδε, ἐκεῖ of the visible and invisible world. There is probably a slight break in the sentence before ἄτοπος, κ.τ.λ. The collocation ὄναρ ὀνειράτα is like κακοὶ κακοῖς p. 177, and adds intensity to the expression.

Dreams have as much reality to the dreaming mind, as daylight impressions have to the waking mind. And half our life is spent in dreaming. The impressions

of madness, too, though more short-lived, are real at the time to him who experiences them. In both cases it is impossible to demonstrate which is the real world.

Our theory resolves this doubt as follows :

That which is different has a different power, Whether this be

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς p. 158.
λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἴσος ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ
5 ἀληθὲς ὀρισθήσεται ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Γελοῖον μὲντ' ἂν εἴη πολλαχῆ. e

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι,
ὅποια τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

10 ΣΩ. Ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν
οἱ τὰ αἰεὶ δοκοῦντα ὀριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ.
λέγουσι δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες, ὦ Θεαί-
τητε, ὃ ἂν ἕτερον ἢ παντάπασι, μὴ πῆ τινα δύναμιν
τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει τῷ ἐτέρῳ ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ
15 μὲν ταῦτόν εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅπως
ἕτερον.

p. 159.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυ-
νάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄτρωῦν, ὅταν ἢ κομιδῆ ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦ-
20 τον ὀμολογεῖν ;

4. πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι] The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. Γ. 5. 1009 B : Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι.

7. τι ἄλλο—σαφές] 'Any other certain test.'

11. ὀριζόμενοι] 'Who determine.' Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of the word to them.

14. μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτόν] Megarian subtilty is here ironically brought to the help of Protagoras. The language of

logic is applied to the sensible world : the language of ideas to things that admit of degrees. And throughout, the idea dwelt upon is that of difference. The language is humoured accordingly. Socrates ill can hardly be said to be, ὅπως ἕτερον, wholly different, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, ὅλον τοῦτο ὄλω ἐκείνω. For the application of this logic in the mouth of a Sophist see Euthyd. 283. 'Kleinias is not wise. You wish him to be made what he is not : i. e. no longer to be what he is. You wish him to be annihilated.' Cf.

p. 159. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

active or passive.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τι συμβαίνει ὁμοίον τῷ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταῦτον φήσομεν γίνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἶη τὰ ποιῶντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δὲ γε τὰ πάσχοντα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

And the same thing in combination with different things has different products.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύμενον ¹⁰ καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταῦτ' ἄλλ' ἕτερα γεννήσει ;

b ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλ' ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα· πότερον ὁμοιον τοῦτ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ ¹⁵ ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν ;

Socrates ill, is a different man from Socrates well :

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει ;

Democritus ap. Ar. de Gen. et Corr. I. 2 : Καὶ ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἐνὸς μετακινήθentos· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγωδία καὶ κωμῳδία γίγνεται γραμμάτων.

2. Εἰ ἄρα] 'What is the same is like, therefore what is like is the same.' This is one of many examples of the imperfect state of logic, which puts Socrates' respondent at his mercy. He does not always escape unchecked, however, see Prot. 350: Ἐγώ γε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρείοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες.

6. πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν] Soph. 259 : Ὁ καὶ πρόσθεν εἶρηται.

10. ἄλλο ἄλλῳ—καὶ ἄλλῳ] Cf. Rep. p. 369 : Παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρεῖα. The combination of one element with this and another with that, and again with another different from all. Compare with what follows, Ar. Met. E. 2. 1026 B : Εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτον—μουσικὸς Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος, κ. τ. λ.

13. Λέγωμεν δὴ] Phæd. 100 : Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. Σωκράτη is governed partly by λέγωμεν, partly by φήσομεν.

ἤδη] i. e. Having laid down these premises.

of madness, too, though more short-lived, are real at the time to him who experiences them. In both cases it is impossible to demonstrate which is the real world.

Our theory resolves this doubt as follows :

That which is different has a different power, Whether this be

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἴσος ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ ἀληθὲς ὀρισθήσεται ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Γελοῖον μέντ' ἀν' εἴη πολλαχῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλά τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, ὅποια τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. Ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἀν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ αἰεὶ δοκοῦντα ὀριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃ ἀν ἕτερον ἢ παντάπασι, μή πῆ τινα δύναμιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει τῷ ἑτέρῳ ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτόν εἶναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἕτερον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὄφρουν, ὅταν ἢ κομιδῆ ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀμολογεῖν ;

4. πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι] The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. Γ. 5. 1009 B : Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι.

7. τι ἄλλο—σαφές] 'Any other certain test.'

11. ὀριζόμενοι] 'Who determine.' Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of the word to them.

14. μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτόν] Megarian subtilty is here ironically brought to the help of Protagoras. The language of

logic is applied to the sensible world : the language of ideas to things that admit of degrees. And throughout, the idea dwelt upon is that of difference. The language is humoured accordingly. Socrates ill can hardly be said to be, ὅλως ἕτερον, wholly different, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, ὅλον τοῦτο ὄφρ' ἐκείνῳ. For the application of this logic in the mouth of a Sophist see Euthyd. 283. 'Kleinias is not wise. You wish him to be made what he is not : i. e. no longer to be what he is. You wish him to be annihilated.' Cf.

p. 159. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

active or passive.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὁμοῖόν τῳ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἐαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταῦτὸν φήσομεν γίνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἶη τὰ ποιῶντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δὲ γε τὰ πάσχοντα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

And the same thing in combination with different things has different products.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύμενον ¹⁰ καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταῦτὰ ἀλλ' ἕτερα γεννήσει ;

b ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰλλ' ἤδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα· πότερον ὁμοιον τοῦτ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ ¹⁵ ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν ;

Socrates ill, is a different man from Socrates well :

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει ;

Democritus ap. Ar. de Gen. et Corr. I. 2 : Καὶ ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἐνὸς μετακινήθεντος· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγωδία καὶ κωμῳδία γίνεται γραμμάτων.

2. Εἰ ἄρα] 'What is the same is like, therefore what is like is the same.' This is one of many examples of the imperfect state of logic, which puts Socrates' respondent at his mercy. He does not always escape unchecked, however, see Prot. 350: Ἐγώ γε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρείοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες.

6. πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν] Soph. 259 : Ὁ καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται.

10. ἄλλο ἄλλῳ—καὶ ἄλλῳ] Cf. Rep. p. 369 : Παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρεία. The combination of one element with this and another with that, and again with another different from all. Compare with what follows, Ar. Met. E. 2. 1026 B : Εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτὸν—μουσικὸς Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος, κ. τ. λ.

13. Λέγωμεν δὴ] Phaed. 100 : Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. Σωκράτη is governed partly by λέγωμεν, partly by φήσομεν.

ἤδη] i. e. Having laid down these premises.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω.

p. 159.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄνόμοιον δὴ πού.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕτερον ἄρα οὕτως ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἅ νῦν διήλ-
θομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἐκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο
τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἐτέρῳ μοι
10 χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἐτέρῳ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφ' ἑκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ
τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν ;

15 ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαί-
νεται καὶ γλυκύς ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων
τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθη- d
20 σιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφοτέρα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις
πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὔσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσ-
σαν ἀπειργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ
αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγαινούσῃ
γλώττῃ ἐποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

25 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως
ὡμολόγητο.

5. καθεύδοντα] Par. F. marg.
add. καὶ ἐγρηγοροῦντα. Bodl.
καθεύδοντι. Is it possible that
καθεύδοντα δὴ ἐγρηγοροῦντα may be
the true reading ?

6. ὡσαύτως φήσεις] Sc. ἀνό-
μοιον καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἐγρηγορό-
τος, κ. τ. λ.

8. τι ποιεῖν] To act upon some-
thing ; to be agents. So τὸ

ποιοῦν ἐμέ, below. Soph. 247 :
Εἶτε εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὀτιοῦν.

12. ἐφ' ἑκατέρου] In either
case. Cf. Parm. 130 : Λέγοντος
δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους — ἐφ' ἑκάστου
ἄχθεσθαι τὸν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν
Ζήνωνα.

22. ἀπειργάσατο] 'The sensation
arising on the side of the subject
renders the tongue percipient.'

Socrates
sleeping
from So-
crates wak-
ing, and so
on.

Therefore
in combi-
nation with
the same
active mo-
tion they
will pro-
duce dif-
ferent re-
sults.

According-
ly, wine
both seems
and really
is pleasant
to me when
well.

p. 159. ΣΩ. Ὄταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσῆλθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

e ΣΩ. Ἔτερα δὴ αὐτὸ ἐγεννησάτην ὃ τε τοιοῦτος Σω- 5
κράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν
αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην
καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα
ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἄλλ' αἰσθανόμενον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι
οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις,
p. 160. καὶ ἀλλοῖον καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὗτ'
ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλω συνελθὼν ταῦτον
γεννήσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο 15
γεννήσαν ἀλλοῖον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαυτῷ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε
ἐαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

1. ἀσθενοῦντα] The constr. is resumed from ὅταν—λάβη above.

5. ἐγεννησάτην] The use of the 3^d pers. helps to support the notion of 'Socrates being a different man.' Observe, too, the accuracy with which not the wine, but the drinking of the wine is spoken of as the 'active motion.' The dual is expressive. 'They produce when paired.'

11. οὐδὲν ἄλλο—γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος] 'There is nothing else from which I can receive the same sensation.' That ἄλλο is the object of αἰσθανόμενος seems required by what follows. For the accusative, see p. 185: 'Α δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' αἰσθέσθαι, and elsewhere. There is a stress

on οὕτως. For γενήσομαι—αἰσθανόμενος, see a few lines below, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνομαι. The words γίγνεσθαι, αἰσθανόμενος, have become in a manner technical; cf. p. 182. γεν. αἰσθ. answers to ἐγεννησάτην—αἰσθανόμενον above. The point insisted on is not the identity of the subject while in the same combination, but the difference which arises with every new combination. For ἄλλον ποιεῖ, (the Bodleian reading) cf. supr. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλ. (γεννήσομαι Bodl. Vat. Δ.) 'For a different object implies a different sensation, and makes him who perceives it a different man,' i. e. I and my sensation become different, with every change in the object of sense.

But the same wine both seems and really is distasteful to me when ill. For I am then a different man.

10

I should never receive the same impression from anything else. And it would never produce the same impression upon another person. Nor could

15

either subject or object become separately what they become together.

I become percipient of something. It becomes sweet or bitter or the like to some person.

Subject and object are thus mutually dependent and inseparable.

That which sensibly affects me is to me alone and I alone perceive it. My sensation therefore is true, for it is inseparable from my present being: and I am the judge, as Protagoras says, of what is and is not to me.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίνεσθαι, ὅταν p. 160.
αἰσθανόμενος γίνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ
αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνό τε τινὶ γί- b
5 γνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὸν ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γίγνηται·
γλυκὸν γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ' ἐσμέν,
εἶναι, εἴτε γιγνώμεθα, γίνεσθαι, ἐπεὶπερ ἡμῶν ἡ
10 ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν
ἄλλων, οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται
συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι
ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρὸς τι ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίνεσθαι· αὐτὸ
δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὄν ἢ γιγνώμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον c
15 οὔτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ὁ λόγος ὄν διελη-
λύθαμεν σημαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιῶν ἐμοί ἐστι καὶ
οὐκ ἄλλω, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δ' οὔ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐμῇ αἴσθησις· τῆς γὰρ
ἐμῆς οὐσίας αἰεὶ ἐστι. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρω-
ταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἐστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ
ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν.

2. τινὸς] The genitive is caused by αἰσθανόμενος, but cf. Rep. 438 : Τοιαῦτα οἶα εἶναι του. Cf. also ib. 478 : δοξάζειν μὲν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν.

6. ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι] It is impossible a thing should ever be, &c. This is a general statement, the aor. is therefore right. Above, in the words αἰσθανόμενον—γίνεσθαι, the particular case was not lost sight of.

12. εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει] Uses the

term Being in reference to any thing. Inf. p. 201 : Οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζων. Parm. 133 : Ὃν ἡμεῖς μετέχουτες, εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα. Cf. Phaed. 92 : Ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα ἐπωνυμίαν τοῦ ὄντος.

15. ἀποδεκτέον] ἀπολεκτέον Boddl.
21. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας αἰεὶ ἐστι] Seeing it is inseparable from my being at the particular time. Vid. supr. : Ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

ΘΕΑΙ. *Εοικεν.

p. 160. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὖν ἀψευδῆς ὦν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ
d διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν
εἶην ὥνπερ αἰσθητῆς ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὐ.

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ
ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταῦτόν συμπέ-
πτῶκε, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν
τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἶον ρεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα,
κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρη- 10
μάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον
e τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίνεσθαι.
ἢ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε ; φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἶον
νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα ; ἢ πῶς λέγεις ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς εἴκει, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσα-

3. ἢ] 'Or rather.' Cf. Arist. Eth. N. III. 1, § 3 : ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων.

10. Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον] Prot. 309 : Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. Perhaps Plato is ironically preparing the way for what follows, p. 161, 2.

12. αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίνεσθαι] The doctrine 'Sense is knowledge,' is the meeting point of the two theories 'Man is the measure,' and 'All is motion.' The several topics are recapitulated in the reverse order. So Ar. Eth. N. I. 2 : Περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα.

16. Τοῦτο μὲν μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν] Our theory is now complete. (1) First the hypothesis was ventured, Sensation is knowledge. (2) This was at once identified with the axiom of Protagoras. The man the mea-

sure of what is : and their common meaning was brought home to us by the analysis of a familiar example. (3) The mystery was revealed which lay beneath this saying, which had been reserved for certain 'disciples of Protagoras,' the Heraclitean theory of the universe that 'All is motion ;' in which all philosophers save Parmenides concur : which is witnessed to by poetry ; and confirmed by the observation of nature. (4) This theory of being was then applied to the phenomena of sense ; by which means the contradictions of common language were removed ; and (5) in meeting the formidable objection drawn from what are commonly called false impressions, the doctrine was still further developed, and shown to be universally applicable.

At each step it has grown in

Surely what I thus perceive I may be said to know.

5 Theætetus then was right. Sensation is knowledge. And in this principle the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet.

15 I. a. First criticism

the doctrine
of sense.

μεν, ὅ τι δὴ ποτε καὶ τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον p. 160.
τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρε-
κτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπούμενους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ
ἄξιον ὄν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀνεμιαῖόν τε p. 161.
καὶ ψεῦδος. ἢ σὺ οἶεὶ πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν
καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἢ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὄρων,
καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, εἴαν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτό-
κου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὐδαμῶς
γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἶπέ, ἢ αὐτὸ οὐχ οὕτως
ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Φιλολόγος γ' εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ
distinctness, and boldness, and
apparent certainty. At first
only warmth, colour, and the
like were spoken of; gradually
our eyes were opened to the
relativeness of size and number.
By and by it was assumed that
the term *αἰσθησις* includes plea-
sure, pain, hope, fear, &c. Then
we are quietly asked to concede
that things good and beautiful
have only a relative existence.
And, being now fairly at the
mercy of the argument, we can-
not resist the admission that the
illusions of dreams and madness
are as real as our waking and
sane impressions. They are
real to us at the time when we
experience them; which is all
the reality any thing is per-
mitted to claim.

2. τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ] Cogn.
acc. in somewhat vague connec-
tion with what follows: like τὸν
κολοφῶνα, supr. p. 153. Schol.:
'Ἡμέρα πέμπτη τοῖς βρέφεσιν ἐκ
γενέσεως οὕτω κληθεῖσα παρ' ὅσον
ἐν ταύτῃ καθαίρουσι τὰς χεῖρας αἱ
συνεφαψάμενοι τῆς μαιώσεως, καὶ
τὸ βρέφος περὶ τὴν ἐστίαν φέρουσι
τρέχουσαι κύκλῳ, καὶ τοῦνομα τί-

θενται τούτῳ, δῶρά τε πέμπουσι τῷ
παιδίῳ, ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον πολυπόδας
καὶ σηπίας, οἳ τε φίλοι καὶ οἰκεῖοι
καὶ ἀπλῶς οἱ προσήκοντες.

ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον] 'All
round;' i. e. leaving out no
point of view. There is an
allusion to the etymology of
ἀμφιδρ., as the words ὡς ἀληθῶς
indicate.

3. τῷ λόγῳ] In our argument.

4. τὸ γιγνόμενον] In this and
in some other cases where the
reading has been questioned,
the present or imperfect tense
really gives additional vivid-
ness. 'That which is now born,
to us.'

7. τις σοῦ] Bodl. p. m. τίστου?

10. γὰρ δύσκολος] P. 145: Με-
τὰ πάσης πραότητος. p. 155: Οὐ
δυσκολαινοντες κ.τ.λ.

12. Φιλολόγος γ' εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ
χρηστός, ὦ Θ.] Phædr. 235: Φιλ-
τατος εἰ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσούς, ὦ
Φαῖδρε. Ib. 264. χρηστός εἰ, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Φιλολόγος] 'You are truly
a patient inquirer and an in-
genuous person, Theodorus, if
you take me for a sack full of
different theories; and expect
me without any difficulty to

p. 161. Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἶει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ
 ραδίως ἐξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὐ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα· τὸ
 b δὲ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρ-
 χεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀλλ' αἰεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγο-
 μένου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, 5
 ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέ-
 ξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειρά-
 σομαι, οὗ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις· καὶ ποιεῖ
 οὕτως. 10

ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἐταίρου
 σου Πρωταγόρου ;

c ΘΕΟ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἠδέως εἶρηκεν, ὡς τὸ
 δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι· τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ 15
 λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς ἀλη-
 θείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὅς ἢ κυνο-

1. Why did not Protagoras say that a pig or a tadpole was the mea-

pull out the refutation of what has been now stated. But you do not perceive what is really taking place.'

5. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν] 'But I have no advantage in wisdom beyond this simple skill, to receive a theory from some wise person, and admit it on fair conditions.'

7. μετρίως] In a spirit of fairness. P. 179 : Μετρίως ἄρα πρὸς τὸν διδ. εἰρήσεται.

παρὰ τοῦδε] Viz. Theætetus. Or is Protagoras meant ?

11. ὃ θαυμάζω] A courteous way of expressing strong dissent. Prot. 329 : Εἵπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι· ὃ δ' ἐθαύμασα σοῦ λέγοντος—. Gorg. 458 : Ἄκουε δὴ, ὦ Γοργία, ὃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ. No fault is found with

the arguments of Protagoras, only if we follow his doctrine to its results, all creatures that have sense must be equally infallible. Hence there can be no teaching and no discussion.

14. Τὰ — ἄλλα — εἶρηκεν, ὡς] Cf. supr. p. 153 : Ἔτι οὖν σοὶ λέγω—γαλήνας,—ὅτι κ. τ. λ.

16. τῆς ἀληθείας] The title of Protagoras' work. It is often covertly alluded to in this and other dialogues. The most pointed instance is in Cratyl. 391 : Εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀληθείας ῥηθέντα ἀγαπήνῃς ὡς τοῦ ἀξία.

17. ὅς] The type of stupidity. Lach. 196 : Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν οὐκ ἂν πᾶσα ὅς γνοίη.

κυνοκέφαλος] Something more remote even than the Μυσῶν

sure of things? His principle clearly includes all creatures that have sense : and destroys his own pretension to superior wisdom. Not to say that it cuts at the root of dialectic and of all discussion.

κέφαλος ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἴσθη- p. 161.
 σιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς
 ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν
 ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ δ' ἄρα ἐτύγ-
 5 χανεν ὧν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρί- d
 νου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου τοῦ ἀνθρώπων. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν,
 ὦ Θεόδωρε ; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι'
 αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος
 βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερός ἔσται
 10 ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἐτέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ'
 ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος
 δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτε,
 ὦ ἑταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων
 διδάσκαλος ἀξιουῖσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, e
 15 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ'
 ἐκείνου, μέτρῳ ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας ;
 ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωτα-
 γόραν ; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς
 μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν· οἶμαι

ἔσχατος, infr. p. 209. As we might say, Why not the African apes ?

2. πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς] 'Showing a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him.'

3. ἤρξατο] The use of the aor. ind. with ἵνα, ὅπως &c., as with εἰ, though not frequent, is well-known. Euthyd. 304 : Καὶ μὲν, ἔφη, ἀξιὸν γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι. Τί δέ ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. Ἴνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγομένων, οἱ νῦν σοφώτατοί εἰσι. Æsch. Prom. 749 : Ὅπως πέδω σκήψασα τῶν πάντων πόνων ἀπηλλάγην &c.

6. λέγωμεν] λέγωμεν, Bodl. Ven. Π. λέγωμεν, Vat.

13. ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος] The negative form of the same

saying, viz., 'Οὐκ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν,' is in like manner turned against itself, Euthyd. 287 : Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοούμενοι, ὑμεῖς, ὦ πρὸς Διός, εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἦκετε ;

15. ἦν] Viz. In his life-time.

17. ταῦτα] So the Bodleian with the greater number of MSS. C. F. Hermann quotes its authority for καὶ ταῦτα, the reading formerly received ; judging, probably, from the silence of Gaisford.

19. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξυμπᾶσα] Locke, Hum. Und. 13, § 88 : But if it should so happen that two thinking men have different ideas, I do not see how they

δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ
 p. 162. γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας
 τε καὶ δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἐκάστου οὔσας, οὐ μακρὰ μὲν καὶ
 διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθῆς ἢ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου,
 ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βύβλου ἐφθέγ- 5
 ξατο ;

could argue or discourse with one another.

1. ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία] *Ar. Met. Γ, 4, 1006* : Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔν τι σημαίνει οὐθὲν σημαίνει ἐστίν, μὴ σημαινόντων δὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀνήρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἔν. *Euthyd. 286* : Τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκοὼς ἀεὶ θαυμάζω. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφόδρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι παλαιότεροι· ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀεὶ θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν. οἶμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πεύσεσθαι. ἄλλο τι ἢ ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι ; τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος. *Gorg. 481* : Εἰ μὴ τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν ἰδιὸν τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥάδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα.

3. μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος] 'Great, nay enormous.' μὲν points forwards to the alternative implied in ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα κ. τ. λ. 'But then perhaps he was in jest.' *Διωλύγιος*, Sch. : Μεγάλη, ἢ ἐπὶ πολὺ διήκουσα. ἀντὶ τοῦ περιβόητος—σημαίνει δ' ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν καὶ τὸ νυκτερινόν. The meaning, 'loud' (if it really existed, but it is perhaps due to a fanciful derivation from ὀλολύζω) must have

been derived from the meaning 'long.' Cf. *Μακρὸν αὐτεῖν*, φωνὴ οὐρανομήκης. The idea of vast size, or length, may again have arisen from the idea of gloom. If so, the word is possibly related to ἡλυγή, λυγή. Compare ῥάξ, ῥώξ· πτήσσω πτώσσω, &c. 'Vast in extent,' is the only meaning admissible here, and in *de Legg. 890* : Τί δ' οὐ χαλεπά τε ἐστὶ ξυνακολουθεῖν λόγοις οὕτως εἰς πλήθη λεγόμενα, μήκη τε αὐ κέκτηται διωλύγια. This, too, is the meaning in which it is used by the Neoplatonists. For the climax, compare p. 156 : *Σκληροῦς τε—καὶ ἀντιτύπους*. P. 174 : *Σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν*. *Rep. 449* : *Μέγα καὶ ὄλον*.

5. ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βύβλου] 'If the Truth of Protagoras is sincere, and was not laughing when she uttered this from behind her impenetrable screen of written words.' There is an allusion to the etymology of *ἀδύτον*. (*βύβλου*, Bodl. : *κύκλου*, Vat. et pr. Ven. II.)

Cf. the celebrated passage in the *Phædrus*, about written teaching, without dialectic, 275 : *Δεινὸν γὰρ που ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁμοιον ζωγραφία· καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρη τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾶ κ. τ. λ.* For the imagery which is here resumed, see above, p. 152 : Τοῦ-

ΘΕΟ. Ὡς Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνὴρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν p. 162. δὴ εἶπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην δι' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ' αὖ σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ' πάντως
5 καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοὶ ἐφαίνεται ὑπακούειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν, ὧ Θεόδωρε, πρὸς τὰς παλαιστράς ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος b γυμνοῦς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ εἶδος παραποδύμενος ;

10 ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι ; ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς

το ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγε. P. 156 : Τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην.—μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούη.—ὧν μέλλω σοὶ τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν.—οὗτος ὁ μῦθος. At first Protagoras himself spoke in riddles—now his 'Truth' is personified, and speaks obscurely from her hidden shrine. Plato often thus follows up a metaphor. Compare the well-known image of the wave, Rep. 441 : Ταῦτα μὲν μόγις διανενεύκαμεν. 453 : Ἄν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἂν τε εἰς μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γενεῖ οὐδὲν ἦττον. 457 : Ἐν ὥσπερ κύμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν ὥστε μὴ κατακλυσθῆναι. 472 : Τὸ μέγιστον τῆς τρικυμίας. 473 : Ὡσπερ κύμα ἐγγελῶν κατακλύσειν.

1. ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες] P. 161 : Τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου.

3. παρὰ δόξαν] Rep. 346 : Καὶ ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν.

4. πάντως καὶ] See above, p. 143. n.

5. ἐμμελῶς—ὑπακ.] Cf. Soph. 217 : Πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούσονται σοὶ

πράως. Rep. 474 : Glaucon says, Ἄλλὰ τοί σε οὐ προδώσω, ἀλλ' ἀμυνῶ οἷς δύναμαι. δύναμαι δὲ εὐνοία τε καὶ τῷ παρακελεύεσθαι, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἄλλου του ἐμμελέστερόν σοι ἀποκρινοίμην.

6. Ἄρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα] It appears from this, and p. 169, that the Lacedæmonians used to compel bystanders to join in their gymnastic exercises. (Ἐλκεῖν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον.—ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσιν.) This is probably the point of the allusion here. There is no reason to suppose that the human form was less visible in an Athenian than in a Lacedæmonian palaestra. The law of Solon observed in severer times at Athens, which forbade adults to enter a gymnasium where boys were exercising, perhaps throws some light on this Spartan custom. (Æsch. c. Tim. p. 38.)

8. ἐνίους φαύλους] Socrates courteously implies his own inferiority.

9. παραποδύμενος] 'Stripping beside them,' i. e. to compare with them.

p. 162. πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν εἴαν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν 5
 ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον ἰτέουν. Λέγε δὴ, ὦ Θεαί-
 τητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἅ νῦν διήλθομεν, ἄρα οὐ συνθαυ-
 μάξεις εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν χείρων
 εἰς σοφίαν ὄτουοῦν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἡττόν-
 τι οἶκι τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώ- 10
 πους λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾶς, πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἠνίκα γὰρ διήμεν ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ 15
 μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τοῦναντίον τάχα 15
 μεταπέπτωκεν.

ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, ὦ γενναῖοι

2. σκληρὸν] 'Stiff,' opposed to ὑγροτέρῳ, 'more supple.' Symp. 196: Ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος (ὁ ἔρωσ) οὐ γὰρ ἀν οἶός τ' ἦν πάντῃ περιπτύσσεται — εἰ σκληρὸς ἦν. Cf. Rep. 410, where σκλ. is metaphorically applied to character: Ἀγριότητος τε καὶ σκληρότητος καὶ αὐ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότητος. See too Hor. Od. IV. 1: Desine—flectere mollibus jam durum imperiis.

3. προσπαλαίειν] Sc. σε.

6. σοφόν] Qui scientiam aīsthsin esse ponendo repente sapiens evasit. Heind.

7. συνθαυμ.] Cf. supr. ὁ θαυμάζω.

10. εἰς θεοὺς] Contrast with this de Legg. 716: Ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀν εἶη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ

πού τις ὡς φασιν ἄνθρωπος.

15. τοῦναντίον] viz., οὐκ εὖ φαινόμενον λέγεσθαι. This word is not the subject of μεταπέπτωκε, but in apposition with the subject, forming part of the predicate. Nunc autem res subito in contrarium vertit. Ut Me non, p. 70 C. Ἐνθάδε δὲ—τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν. Heind.

τάχα] So the Bodleian MS. with Vat. Ven. II.

17. Νέος γὰρ εἶ] Parm. 130: Νέος γὰρ εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὕτω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήφεται.

τῆς—δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει] 'Your ear is quickly caught, and your mind influenced, by popular arguments.'

According to this theory, Theætetus is as wise as any God. The confidence of the youth is shaken by these objections, but they are dismissed by Socrates, who points out that argument should be met with argument and not with ridicule.

παῖδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ξυγκαθεζόμενοι, p. 162.
 θεούς τε εἰς-τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ ἔκ τε τοῦ
 λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς ο
 οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἐξαιρῶ, καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοντο
 5 ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει
 εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὅτου-
 οῦν· ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἠντινοῦν λέγετε,

1. δημηγορεῖτε] 'You talk
 clap-trap.'

2. ἄγοντες] Hipp. Maj. 298 :
 Μηδὲν τὸ τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον πα-
 ράγοντες. Phædr. 267 : Τὸν δ'
 —Εὔηνον εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν.

The Bodl. MS. with its two
 followers, Vat. and Ven. Π.,
 gives λέγοντες. But the tend-
 ency to the repetition of
 consonants, already noticed,
 weakens its testimony in
 this instance with λέγειν and
 λέγετε following. Compare,
 besides the instances adduced
 in the note on p. 156, p. 160 :
 Οὐτ' αὐτῷ λεκτέον, οὐτ' ἄλλου λέ-
 γοντος ἀποδεκτέον, Bodl. Vat. ἀπο-
 λεκτέον, p. 169. ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ'
 ἄγε, Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ἀντ.
 ἀλλὰ λέγε. As regards the sense
 there would be a slight awk-
 wardness in the repetition of
 the same common word, which
 it is in Plato's manner to avoid,
 though, on the other hand, the
 expression ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ
 τοῦ γράφειν, is made more
 pointed at first sight. But the
 general sense with δημηγορεῖτε
 is enough to occasion this,
 without the introduction of λέ-
 γοντες. And if we look closely
 at the expression εἰς τὸ μέσον
 λέγειν θεούς, it is hardly sup-
 ported by comparing Herod.
 VI. 129 : Ἐριν εἶχον ἀμφὶ μουσικῇ
 καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ εἰς τὸ μέσον ;

de Legg. 817 : (the poets are
 addressed) Μη δὴ δόξετε ἡμᾶς —
 —ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμᾶς δημηγορεῖν—
 πρὶν κρίναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ
 ἐπιτήδεια πεποιήκατε λέγειν εἰς τὸ
 μέσον εἴτε μή. Here λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέ-
 σον is not equivalent to δημηγορεῖν,
 but means rather to 'recite in
 public.' Cf. ib. 664 : Εἰς τὸ μέσον
 ἄσόμενος. The passages already
 quoted show that ἄγειν εἰς τὸ μέ-
 σον, meaning 'to adduce in il-
 lustration or argument,' is quite
 Platonic. See also Phil. 57 : Οὐ
 δ' ἔνεκα ταῦτα προηνεγκάμεθα εἰς
 τὸ μέσον. There is a slight ex-
 pression of violence in θεούς—
 ἄγοντες which suits the context
 well. *

οὓς ἐγὼ] Here, as p. 152,
 Protagoras' opinion is quoted in
 his own words. Diog. Laert.
 IX : Περὶ θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι,
 οὐθ' ὡς εἰσὶν εἰθ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν. πολ-
 λὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, ἢ τε
 ἀδηλότης, καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος ὁ
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

4. ἐξαιρῶ] Rep. 492 : Θεῖον
 μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶ-
 μεν λόγου.

7. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην] In
 dealing with a metaphysical
 theory it is not enough to have
 shown its inconsistency with
 common sense. It must be met
 upon its own ground, and the
 truth which it contains, as well
 as the sources of falsehood,

p. 162. ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε· ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμερεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεό-

p. 163. δωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίαις τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τούτων λεγομένους λόγους. 5

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ᾧ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σύ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλη δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς ὁ τε σὸς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλη. 10

ΣΩ. Τῆδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταῦτόν ἢ ἕτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γάρ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. 15

b ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἂ τῷ ὄραν αἰσθανό-

clearly distinguished. This, and not merely, as the Scholiast says, that he may draw out Theætetus further, is Socrates' motive in relinquishing the ground he has just taken.

3. οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου] Sch. ἐκ τῆς τῶν κυβευόντων συνηθείας ἔλαβε τὸ οὐδενὸς μόνου, ὅταν ἐκεῖ πέση ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἐν τὸ ἐλάχιστον.

'Not worth an ace.' Or, if, as Stallbaum conjectures, the phrase originated in the line of Homer, Π. VIII. 234, Νῦν δ' οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἄξιόι εἶμεν Ἔκτορος, 'No better than a single man,' whereas he is now ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιος. Cf. Polit. 297 : Τὸν ἐτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἰατρόν. See above, p. 144 : Ἄξιος γὰρ — γεωμετρίας ἔνεκα, and below, p. 167 : Ὁ σοφιστῆς—ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν.

4. πιθανολογίαις τε καὶ εἰκόσι]

The Bodleian reading in the ancient hand. Cf. Ar. Eth. N. I. 2 : Παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικῷ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικῷ ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

5. τούτων] Several MSS. have τηλικούτων.

8. ὁ τε σὸς καὶ] Theæt. has answered for both. See above, σύ τε καὶ Θεοδ. †

14. ἐκινήσαμεν] Rep. 450 : Ὅσον λόγον πάλιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας !

16.] The argument is in brief the following: 'If sensation is knowledge, we can know and not know the same thing ; since (1.) we have perfect sensible perception of things we do not know thoroughly; and (2.) we remember (i. e. know) things which we do not sensibly perceive.'

2. The doctrine is therefore examined in the shape in which it first appeared ; viz. Sense is knowledge. If to see and hear is to know, when a person

hears a strange language, or sees characters which he has never learnt, does he know or not know what is said and written?

μεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; p. 163.
οἶον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον
οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν φθέγγονται, ἢ ἀκούειν τε
καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ αὖ γράμματα μὴ
5 ἐπιστάμενοι βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὄραν, ἢ
ἐπίστασθαι, εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν, διίσχυριούμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ
ὁρῶμέν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν· τῶν
μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὄραν τε καὶ ἐπί- 6
10 στασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν
τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ἃ δὲ οἱ τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ
αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἐρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι
τῷ ὄραν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.

Allowing this to pass,

ΣΩ. Ἄριστά γ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι
15 πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ' ὄρα
δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσίόν, καὶ σκόπει πῆ αὐτὸ διω-
σόμεθα.

15. ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ] 'That I may leave you room to grow,' 'That I may not be always stunting and stopping you.' Lys. 206: Οἱ καλοί, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπαινῇ καὶ αὐξῇ. Phædr. 246: Τούτοις δὴ τρέφεται τε καὶ αὐξεται μάλιστα γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα. Rep. p. 497: Ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται. The expression in Aristoph. Vesp. 638, *Ἠξάνομην ἀκούων*, though more humorous, also affords an illustration.

We may naturally ask what objection Socrates would have raised, had he not feared to check Theætetus' growing intelligence. This may perhaps be gathered from below, where he ventures to puzzle him a little further, p. 166: Ἴσως δὲ γ' ὦ θαυμάσιε πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἔπα-

θες κ.τ.λ. Socrates might have asked, Does every one who sees the forms and colours, or who hears the sounds, possess the sciences of them (*ζωγραφική, μουσική*, p. 145)? Could he give an account e. g. of the *ὀξύτης* and *βαρύτης* of what he hears? Cf. Rep. 524: Μέγα μὲν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. Not even the objects of sense are *κνωον* by sense, but by a higher faculty.

16. τόδε ἄλλο προσίόν, κ.τ.λ.] The implied metaphor is probably that of the wave. It is continued below, p. 161: Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς—ἐκ λόγου μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττωνος καταλαμβάνει: and is slightly varied, p. 177: Πλείω αἰεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῖν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον.

p. 163. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ ;

d ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔροιτα, ἄρα δυνατόν, ὅτου
τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό ποτε, ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην αὐτοῦ
τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπί-
στασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται. μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς 5
ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ μαθῶν τίς τι μεμνη-
μένος μὴ οἶδεν.

Can I be ignorant of what I remember?

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες ; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἶη 8
ὃ λέγεις. Surely not.

ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ ; σκόπει δέ. ἄρα τὸ ὄραν 10 And yet,
οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθησιν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ ἰδῶν τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν
e ὃ εἶδε κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 15

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δὴ πού.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ἤσθετο, τοιουτωνί 20
τινων ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν ;

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίστε ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μύσας ; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάθετο ; 25

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε φάναι.

when I shut my eyes and remember what I have seen,

p. 164. ΣΩ. Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον·
εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται.

8. Τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἶη ὃ λέγεις] That is a monstrous supposition. Parm. 129: Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ ὁμοιά τις ἀπέφαιεν ἀνόμοια γυγνούμενα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια ὁμοια, τέρας

ἂν, οἶμαι, ἦν. Phæd. 101. alib. 16. Τί δέ;] So Bodl. p. m. Vat. Ven. Π. It seems more appropriate in argument than τί δαί, the common reading.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν p. 164.
ικανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ' εἶπέ πῆ.

ΣΩ. Τῆδε· ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου
γέγονεν οὐπερ ὁρῶν· ὄψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπι-
5 στήμη ταυτόν ὠμολόγηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐ
ἑώρα, εἰ μύσῃ, μέμνηται μὲν, οὐχ ὁρᾶ δὲ αὐτό· ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

10 ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾶ οὐκ ἐπίσταται ἔστιν, εἴπερ b
καὶ τὸ ὁρᾶ ἐπίσταται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὐ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι
μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾶ· ὁ
15 τέρας ἔφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀδυνάτων δὴ τι συμβαίνει φαίνεται,
εἰ τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταυτόν φῆ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

20 ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα ἐκάτερον φατέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δῆτ' ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη, πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς,
ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον. Καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαί- c
τητε, δρᾶν ;

25 ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος περί ;

ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρύονος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην,

1. οὐ μὴν ικανῶς γε συννοῶ] 'But I do not quite comprehend why it is so.'

4. οὐπερ ὁρῶν] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ὁρῶν sc. ἔστιν or γέγονεν. Compare the technical use of αἰσθανόμενος, noticed above, pp. 159, 160. Also p. 157: Ἐγένετο οὐτι ὄψις ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν. See also p. 160. ἐπιστήμων—ὠπερ αἰ-

σθητής.

10. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾶ] Soph. 264: Φαίνεται δ' ὁ λέγομεν.

22. πάλιν] μὴ πάλιν Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. The Bodleian margin however says, ἐν ἐτέρῳ λείπει τὸ μῆ. If μῆ were right, the subjunctive ἦ would be required to complete the sense.

I remember it and do not see it.

i. e., If to see is to know,

I remember it and do not know it.

But this seemed to us a monstrous supposition ; Therefore, sense is not knowledge.

—We are in too great a hurry.

p. 164. πρὶν νενικηκέναι, ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄδειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ ;

ΣΩ. Ἀντιλογικῶς εἰκάμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγεγόμενοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες 5 ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταῦτὰ δ ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιούντες.

Perhaps the contradiction is only verbal.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μαθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὅ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἠρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος 10 τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον, ὀρῶντα δὲ οὕ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδότα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον· τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος,

1. ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Viz. the theory of Protagoras, which we are trampling upon. v. infr. προπηλακίζομεν.

3. Ἀντιλογικῶς εἰκάμεν] Rep. 453, 4: Ἡ γενναία, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. Τί δὴ; Ὅτι, εἶπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἶεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίξειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας] 'With a view to mere verbal consistency.' Lys. 216: Καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθύς ἄσμενοι ἐπιπηδήσονται οὗτοι οἱ πάνσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, καὶ ἐρήσονται εἰ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατον ἔχθρα φιλία; The tendencies of Ἀντιλογική are, 1st, to argue from contradictions of language, leading in the last resort to scepticism. Phæd. 90: Καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρί-

ψαντες οἴσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι γεγονέναι τε καὶ κατανεσηκέναι ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων. 2nd, to confuse ideas or principles with facts or results. Ib. p. 101: Ἄμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὠρμημένων, εἴπερ βούλοιο τι τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν.

5. οὐ φάσκοντες] Viz. p. 154: Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ κ.τ.λ.

14. μῦθος ἀπώλετο] Schol.: Παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν διήγησιν μὴ ἐπὶ πέρας ἀγόντων. Hence probably the absence of the article. Cf. Rep. 621: Καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο. See also Phil. 14: Ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ μῦθος, ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο.

μῦθος ὁ Πρωταγόρειος] P. 157: Οὗτος ὁ μῦθος. Soph. 242: Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγείσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν. Arist. Met. A 10. 993 A. (cf. Gorg. 485): Ψελλιζομένη γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία.

καὶ ὁ σὸς ἄμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι p. 164.
ταυτόν ἐστιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

Protagoras
would still
have much
to say.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατήρ
5 τοῦ ἐτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ
ὄρφανόν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ'
οἱ ἐπίτροποι οὐς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέ-
λουσιν, ὧν Θεόδωρος εἰς ὄδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυ-
νεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἔνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

10 ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μάλλον
Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος· ἡμεῖς p. 165.
δέ πως θᾶπτον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεω-
μετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι ἔξομεν, εἰ
αὐτῷ βοηθῆς.

4. εἴπερ ὁ πατήρ] See the passage of the Phædrus already quoted, p. 275: Πλημμελούμενος δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λαιδορηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. 241: Μή με οἶον πατραλοῖαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνεσθαι τινα. Τί δὴ; Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν.

8. κινδυνεύσομεν] Not, 'I will undertake the risk,' but = κινδυνεύω βοηθήσειν, 'It seems I shall have to take his part myself.' Cf. Cratyl. 399: Καὶ κινδυνεύσω εἰ μὴ εὐλαβῶμαι, ἔτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέσθαι. Symp. 174: Ἴσως μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὡς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ' Ὁμηρον φαῦλος ὧν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἵεναι θοιρὴν ἄκλῆτος.

11. Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου] With whom Protagoras stayed when he came to Athens. Apol. p. 20: Ἀνδρί, ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ

ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου. Prot. 311, 315: Xen. Symp. I. 5.

12. ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων] 'From the mere abstractions of dialectic.' We are accustomed to speak of Geometry as a purely abstract science, but see Arist. Met. I. 2: Αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας. The expression ψιλοῖς λόγοις is used differently in Symp. 215: Ψιλοῖς λόγοις ἀνευ ὀργάνων, but cf. Phædr. 262: Νῦν γὰρ ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγματα. Antisthenes is said to have called the Ideas of Plato ψιλαὶ ἔννοιαι. For λόγοι = διαλεκτικὴ, cf. Phæd. 99: Ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. See also Arist. de An. I. 1, where a distinction is drawn between φιλόσοφος, μαθηματικός and φυσικός.

13. μέντοι] σοι is added in the MSS. except Bodl. Vat. Ven. II.

p. 165. ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἂν τις ὁμολογήσειε μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὅπη, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ ;

The 'crucial' question is this,

ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ νεώτερος· σφαλεῖς γὰρ ἦττον ἀσχημονήσει.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. ἔστι δὲ οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι· ἄρα οἶόν· τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναί ;

Is it possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing?

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὄραῖν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί γὰρ χρήσει ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνὴρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ ὄραῖς τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμένῳ ;

You are bound to say it is, if sight be knowledge. Nay, you may be driven to it without

(13.) ἔξομεν] Theod. speaks on behalf of the ἐπίτροποι Πρωταγόρου.

3. μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] By freeing ourselves from the habitual oppositions of words, we are sometimes reconciled to what at first appears a pure contradiction. Spinoza (Cog. Met. I.) shows a still loftier indifference to common language : 'At vero si rem accuratius examinare vellemus, possemus forte ostendere Deum non nisi improprie unum et unicum vocari ; sed res non est tanti imò nullius momenti iis qui de rebus non verò de nominibus sunt solliciti.' Many of the difficulties in Greek philosophy arose, as Plato himself points out in the Sophist, from

the too great stress laid upon logical alternatives ; while the complexity and variety of things as they exist was lost sight of.

ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] 'According to our common mode of affirming and denying :' viz. with a view to words.

8. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα] Compare Rep. 473 : 'Ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶμι δ' τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι. Where Socrates assumes the same tragic tone as here.

14. ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος] 'Caught in a pit,' i. e. unable to stir hand or foot.

16. καταλαβὼν—τὸν—ὀφθαλμόν—εἰ ὄραῖς τὸ ἱμάτιον] Perhaps there is here a trace of the spirit which was afterwards de-

reference to memory, within the sphere of sense itself. A relentless adversary will pin you down, covering one eye with his mantle, to confess that you see and do not see, and therefore know and do not know. And thus you will be proved to know both vividly and dimly, near but not far off, softly and violently.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἶμαι, τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι p. 165.
ἐτέρῳ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα ταυτόν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω γέ πως.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὔτ' ἠρόμην, τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ, ὃ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δ' ὃ οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὁρῶν φαίνει. ὠμολο-
γηκῶς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ
ὁρᾶν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι
10 συμβαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τὰναντία οἷς ὑπε- d
θέμην.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως δέ γ', ὃ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ'
ἔπαθες, εἴ τίς σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν
15 ὀξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι,
πόρρωθεν δὲ μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ
ἄλλα μυρία, ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθο-

veloped in the sophisms of Eubulides.

5. οὐδὲν—τούτο, κ. τ. λ.] Τάττω sc. ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Cf. Rep. 473 : Ἐξευρηκέναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γενέσθαι ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις (sc. ἐξευρεῖν). For the sense cf. supr. p. 159 : Μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταυτόν εἶναι, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Euthyd. 295 : Πότερον ἐπίστασαι τῷ ἃ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ οὐ ; Ἐγωγε, ἔφην, τῇ γε ψυχῇ. Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτωμένοις. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ὅτῳ, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ, κ.τ.λ. For the intentional abruptness of the expression, cf. Phil. 28 : Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν. 'None of that ! I never asked you for it.'

τούτο—τὸ ὅπως] This, viz. the manner.

13. ὃ θαυμάσιε] Such addresses interposed give a tone of increased earnestness to the con-

versation. See Appendix D.

15. ὀξύ—ἀμβλύ] These terms are properly applicable to vision.

ἐγγύθεν μὲν — πόρρωθεν δὲ μή] This probably refers to the sense of smell, v. τὸ ὀσφραίνεσθαι below.

16. σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα τὸ αὐτό] To have an intense and slight knowledge of the same thing : e. g. Τὸ ψυχρόν, p. 152, ῥιγοῖ—ἃ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὃ δὲ σφόδρα ; but the reference here is probably to sound, v. τὸ ἀκούειν below. (Cf. Phil. p. 14 : Βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία.) Aristotle does not feel the difficulty. Met. Z. 1029 B : Τὰ δ' ἐκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἠρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα. Plato would not allow that anything is known, except what, in Aristotle's language, are ἀπλῶς γνώριμα.

17. ἃ] An accusative depend-

p. 165. φόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἥνικ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταῦτόν ἔθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς, πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν ξυνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔσε χερωσάμενός τε 5 καὶ ξυνδῆσας ἤδη ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὅσων σοί τε κακείνῳ ἐδόκει. Τίν' οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἂν ἴσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ; ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμόσε, οἶμαι, χωρήσεται, καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ

How would Protagoras defend his own against the attacks of such a light-armed mercenary?

10

ing chiefly on ἐρόμενος, but vaguely also on all that follows.

1. μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις] A logical mercenary.

2. ἐμβαλὼν] 'Making his assault.'

3. ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνιείς] Rep. 411: ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνίη ἀλλὰ κηλῆ. 'Keeping up the attack.'

4. πολυάρατον] Buttmann conjectures πολυκροτον, 'cunning,' which occurs as a v. l. for πολύτροπον in the first line of the Odyssey. Heind. πολυήρατον, but adds, ne hoc quidem satisfacit. In Ven. II. both α's are erased. Πολυάρητος occurs twice in the Odyssey, VI. 280; XIX. 404: Ὀνομ' ὅττι κε θείης παιδὸς παιδὶ φίλῳ πολυάρητος δέ τοί ἐστιν. Protagoras seems to have affected certain rhetorical expressions, and perhaps may have used this word. See Phædr. 268: ὀρθόεπεια, &c. Stallbaum quotes Themist. Orat. XXII. p. 325. 19. ed. Dindorf.: Τὸν πολυάρατον πλοῦτον τί ἂν καὶ λέγοιμεν

ὁποίων ἀγωνοθέτης πολέμων ἔστιν. For the sense cf. Euthyd. 272: Τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς. Ib. 273: εἰ δὲ νῦν ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχεται, ἴλεω εἶητον. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφῶ ὥσπερ θεῶ προσαγορεύω. Ib. 296: Ἀλλὰ βουληθείης, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε. Ib. 301: Ἦδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μμεῖσθαι, ἅτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς.

6. χρημάτων ὅσων] Protag. 328: Καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποίημαι. ἐπειδὴν γὰρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθη, εἴαν μὲν βούληται, ἀποδέδωκεν δ' ἐγὼ πρᾶτομαι ἀργύριον· εἴαν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὁμόσας, ὅσου ἂν φῆ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν.

12. καὶ ὁμόσε ο. χ.] 'He will grapple with us.' There is a change of construction similar to that in p. 149: Καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ—ἀμβλίσκουσι.

3. He would say that he is not refuted, because not fairly represented by you. He would urge that memory is far less vivid than sensation. And, while not fearing to admit that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, he would assert that the man knowing

χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν, εἰ p. 167.
οἶόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνήσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ
εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι
προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε.
5 τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥαθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῆδ' ἔχει. ὅταν τι
τῶν ἐμῶν δι' ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῆς, εἴαν μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς
οἶάπερ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκρινάμενος ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλλη-
ται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοῖα, αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς. b
αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην
10 παρῆναί τῳ ὧν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὔσαν πάθος, οἶον
ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἢ αὖ
ἀποκνήσειν ὁμολογεῖν οἶόν τ' εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰ-
δέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἢ εἰάνπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώ-
σειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιούμενον τῷ πρὶν
15 ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναί τινα, ἀλλ'

4. τὸν ἐμέ] Cf. Soph. 239 : Τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε ἔτι τί τις ἂν λέγοι; Phædr. 258 : Τὸν αὐτόν. Phil. 14 : Τοὺς ἐμέ (see below). Ib. 20 : Τὸν ἐμέ. Ib. 59 : Τοὺς μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμέ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον.

5. ὦ ῥαθυμότατε Σώκρατες] 'Slovenly Socrates!'

9. αὐτίκα] 'To begin with.'

τινά σοι ξυγχ.] i. e. ἐμέ. 'Do you think a man would admit?'

μνήμην] 'That the memory a man has of an impression when it is past, is anything like what he experienced at the time.'

10. τοιοῦτόν τι οὔσαν πάθος] Hume, Inquiry Conc. Human Understanding: 'Every one will readily allow that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when

he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination.'— 'We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind.' — 'When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed.'

15. τὸν εἶναί τινα] τινα is subj. τὸν pred. Cf. Phil. 14 : 'Ἄρ' οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῆ Πρωταρχὸν εἶνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις μέγαν καὶ μικρὸν τιθέμενος, καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία. Compare a strange fancy of Comte's: Catechisme Posit. p. 2 : 'For each man differs from himself successively as much as he differs simultaneously from other men.'

p. 166. οὐχὶ τοὺς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, εἴπερ
 c ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θη-
 ρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ', ὧ μακάριε,
 φήσει, γενναιοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω, εἰ δύνα-
 σαι, ἐξέλεγξον ὡς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν 5
 γίνονται, ἢ ὡς ἰδίων γιγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον
 τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεῖ
 ὀνομάζειν, εἴη, ὥπερ φαίνεται. ὅς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκε-
 φάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑηνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς
 ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματα μου ἀνα- 10
 d πείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ φημὶ μὲν τὴν
 ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον
 ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μή· μυρίον μέντοι δια-
 φέρειν ἕτερον ἐτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα
 ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ 15
 σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ'
 αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὅς ἂν τινα ἡμῶν ᾧ
 φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ
 φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥή-
 e ματί μου δίωκε, ἀλλ' ὧδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί 20
 λέγω. οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνή-
 σθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἂ ἐσθίει,

is different
 from the
 man
 ignorant,
 and that
 every man
 becomes
 as many
 as the
 changes he
 undergoes.
 More se-
 riously, he
 would chal-
 lenge us to
 prove
 either that
 each man's
 sensations
 are not pe-
 culiar to
 him, or
 that it
 does not
 follow from
 this, that
 what ap-
 pears to
 each man,
 is to him.

1. καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπεί-
 ρους] 'Becoming multiplied to
 infinity, if only alteration take
 place.'

2. ἀνομοίως γίγν. the reading
 of Bodl. Vat. admits of a possi-
 ble rendering, 'If only the man
 become in a different way:' i. e.
 when he is the subject of a dif-
 ferent process. But the read-
 ing of the other MSS. is more
 probable.

ὀνομάτων——θηρεύσεις] 'En-
 tanglements of words.' The

genitive is not objective but de-
 scriptive. Cf. Euthyd. 295: Βου-
 λόμενός με θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα πε-
 ριστήσας. 'If we must really be on
 our guard against being entan-
 gled by each other with words.'

20. μου] To be taken with
 λόγον.

22. φαίνεται——καὶ ἔστι——
 ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται] What is to
 the healthy man, also appears to
 him. Protagoras asserts that
 what appears to the sick man
 also is to him.

καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνουντι τὰναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται· p. 167.

σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι·

οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν. οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμ-

νων ἀμαθής, ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφός,

5 ὅτι ἀλλοῖα· μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων γὰρ

ἢ ἕτερα ἔξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἑτέρας

ἔξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἰατρὸς

φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ

οὐ τί γε ψευδῇ δοξάζοντά τις τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ

10 ἐποίησε δοξάζειν. οὕτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν

δοξάσαι, οὕτε ἄλλα παρ' ἅ ἂν πάσχη· ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ

ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι, πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας b

He would tell us that he is far from disparaging the wisdom of the wise: but he would define wisdom as the power of bringing men over, not from false ideas to true ones, but from a

12. πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας συγγενῇ ἐαυτῆς] Πονηρᾶς is the reading of all the MSS. δοξάζοντας of Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ἐαυτῆς is found in all the MSS. but one. (Flor. b. αὐτῆς). Πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει, 'through having a bad or vicious soul.' Ἐξις, like φαντασία, is not with Plato, as with Aristotle, a term of art, it is simply the noun of the verb ἔχειν, and accordingly has two meanings, 'condition,' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν πως, and 'having'; and, like πράξις, it sometimes wavers between both. For instances of the active sense, cf. Rep. 433: Ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἐαυτοῦ ἔξις καὶ πράξις. Soph. 247: Δικαιοσύνης ἔξει καὶ παρουσία, and infr. p. 197: Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξιν φασὶν εἶναι. Also Crat. 414. de Legg. 625. Tim. 73, 74, 87. For an instance where it seems to waver, cf. Rep. 509: Ἐπιμειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξιν. Ib. 591: Ἡ ψυχὴ—τιμιωτέραν ἔξιν λαμβάνει, σωφροσύνην κτωμένη. Gorg. 524: Ἐχει τὴν ἔξιν τὴν αὐτοῦ. And above, p. 153: Ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἔξις—ἢ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις, we seem to pass from one meaning to the other within

a few lines, as here. Comp. also Gorg. 523: Ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες. Ἐαυτῆς presents more difficulty, but it may still be genuine. The transition is easy and not unfrequent from the person thinking to the mind thinking. Cf. Phædr. 82, where the change from the masculine to the feminine, i. e. from the persons to the souls, occurs several times together. Gorg. 526, τοιοῦτόν τινα—ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην. inf. 173: σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ—ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλεία ἀφήρηται—κινδύνους—ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι, κ. τ. λ. Supr. 153: Ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις, and note. See also, for an instance of a like change of subject, Rep. 442: Μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κρᾶσις—προστήσετον. (That such a change of subject does occur here, is evident from the nominative χρηστή.) The reflexive pronoun is also facilitated by συγγενῇ, being a correlative word. Cf. Phædr. 84: Εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀφικομένη. Phædr. 238: Τῶν ἐαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. Compare

p. 167. συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς χρηστῆ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀληθέστερα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς, ὧ φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν 5 σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοὺς. φημὶ

worse to a better state : and would urge that until this is disproved, Socrates must be content to be a "measure of things."

also for the use of the reflexive pronoun, where it cannot be strictly referred to the subject of the sentence, Rep. p. 419 : 'Εάν τις σε φῆ μὴ πάνυ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τούτους τοὺς ἀνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτοὺς. Supr. p. 152 : πότερον — ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν.

(12.) δοξάζοντας is preferable as the reading of the best MS., as the harder reading, and because the change to δοξάζοντα was so easy with the same word occurring a few lines above. For the change from the singular τινὰ, to the indefinite plural, cf. Rep. 344 : 'Επειδὴν δέ τις—αὐτοὺς—δουλώσεται—ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχροῦν ὀνομάτων—μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἀν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὄλην ἀδικίαν ἡδίκηκότα : et passim.

'For it is not to be supposed that any one ever makes one, who thinks falsely, afterwards think truly. For it is impossible either to think what is not, or to think any thing beyond the present impression, which is always real. But, I suppose, whereas men, through having an inferior mind, entertain thoughts of a kindred nature; a good mind causes them to have good thoughts, those, namely, which the inexperienced call true.'

If any change of reading were

required, the most probable would be the transposition of συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς and ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.

1. χρηστῆ] Sc. ψυχῆ.

ἕτερα τοιαῦτα] Sc. χρηστά. 'Whereas inferior minds have opinions kindred to themselves, a superior mind creates in them opinions which resemble it.'

2. φαντάσματα] This word here contains no association of falsehood, seeing that φαίνεσθαι and εἶναι are identified; but neither does it imply truth.

4. ἀληθέστερα δ' οὐδέν] I. e. 'all are equally real.'

6. κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοὺς] The theory is exposed by being gravely carried to the farthest point. Man is reduced to a level not only with brutes but with vegetables. Cf. Ar. Met. 1008 B: Εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ὑπολαμβάνει ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἶται τε καὶ οὐκ οἶται, τί ἀν διαφερόντως ἔχει τῶν φυτῶν; This however is only remotely hinted at. At present we are to receive this as an additional proof of Protagoras' boldness. For a more serious use of the analogy between human nature and the vegetable world, see Rep. 492 : Σπέρματος πέρι ἢ φύτου εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων κ.τ.λ. Heind. quotes Aristot. de Plant. I. 1, where after mentioning the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles on the question, 'Do plants feel?' he adds, 'Ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιθυμεῖν μόνον αὐτὰ

γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, p. 167.
 ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις
 τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γε σοφοὺς τε καὶ
 ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν
 5 πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἷά γ' ἂν
 ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι
 αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν
 ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ
 δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστῆς
 10 τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν
 σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευ- d
 θεῖσι· καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἐτέρων καὶ
 οὐδεὶς ψευδῇ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, εἴαν τε βούλη εἴαν τε μή,

διὰ τὴν σφοδρὰν τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀνάγκην ἔφησεν, ὃ ἐὰν συσταίη, ἠδεσθαι ὄντως αὐτὰ καὶ λυπεῖσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τε σύμφωνον ἔσται. Cf. *Æsch. Eumen.* 911: ΑΘ. στέργω γὰρ, ἀνδρὸς φιτυποῦ μένος δίκην, τὸ τῶν δικαίων τῶνδ' ἀπένθητον γένος.

2. χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις τε] 'Impart to them good and healthy sensations, and real ones too;' i. e. not only real (which they all are), but also good and healthy. The difference of idiom by which in Greek what is most emphatic is put first, though well-known, is often a source of difficulty. E. g. *Soph. Œd. Col.* 308: 'Ἄλλ' εὐτυχῆς ἵκοιτο τῇ θ' αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐμοί τε· τίς γὰρ ἐσθλὸς οὐχ αὐτῷ φίλος; 'May he come, a blessing to his own city, as well as to me. For who by kindness does not befriend himself?' where the second clause refers to τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει as the emphatic words.

Cf. *supr.* p. 150: Αὐτοῖς τε καὶ

τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι.

Schleiermacher's conjecture, ἀληθείας, has been generally received, but ἀληθεῖς is very possibly right. For the difficult position of τε, comp. *Rep.* 466: Καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν. *Ib.* 472: Εἰκότως ἄρα ὄκνουν τε καὶ ἐδεδοίκη οὕτω παράδοξον λέγειν λόγον τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν. The objection drawn from *supr.* d δὴ τινες—ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, is cancelled by the preceding ταῦτα δὲ αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ. The state of plants has as much reality as that of the wise man: and the latter has no advantage in point of truth.

4. ταῖς πόλεσι] A further step is thus made in advance. Having already included the good and noble amongst the things of which each man is judge for himself, it is natural to apply the same theory to the state, and to law and justice.

p. 167. ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρῳ· σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος· ὧ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτει, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξεληθῶν, εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεων. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποίει 5
 ο μέντοι οὕτως· μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν. καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγόμενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίξῃ τε καὶ σφάλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάξῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκεῖνα μόνον αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύμενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ

He would be willing to proceed by question and answer, only he would demand fair treatment. For Dialectic, if fairly used, leads to sincere inquiry: if controversially, to the hatred of inquiry.

p. 168. τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ 15
 οὔτω ποιῆς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σὲ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι, καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἵν' ἄλλοι γενομένοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἦσαν· 20
 εἰ δὲ τὰναντία τούτων δράς ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τὰναν-

3. λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξεληθῶν κ. τ. λ.] Protagoras himself is represented as master of both styles (Prot. 329: Ἰκανὸς μὲν μακροῦς λόγους—εἰπεῖν—ἰκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἐρωτηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχύ), and in the Phædrus Socrates himself adopts both, of course to the implied disadvantage of the rhetorical, which is more openly ridiculed in the Gorgias. Cf. also Soph. 217: Πότερον εἴωθας μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι—ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων;

9. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] Sc. ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐν λόγοις, supr. Probably this

passage contains a covert censure of the eristic method that pervades this dialogue. Cf. Rep. 487, where perhaps Socrates himself is gently criticized: Ἡγούνται—ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἑκάστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι,—ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι.

13. ἐκεῖνα—τὰ σφάλματα] Those slips and deflections which are due to himself and to the company he has previously kept. παρακρούειν is said to have been a wrestler's term.

τία ξυμβήσεται σοι καὶ τοὺς ξυνόντας ἀντὶ φιλο- p. 168.
 σόφων μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀποφανεῖς, ἐπει- b
 δὲν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται. ἐὰν οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ
 πρότερον ἐρρέθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ'
 5 ἴλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψῃ τί ποτε
 λέγομεν, κινεῖσθαί τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα τό τε
 δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι ιδιώτη τε καὶ πόλει.
 καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψῃ εἴτε ταῦτόν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ
 10 συνηθείας ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ὄπη
 ἂν τύχωσιν ἔλκοντες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς
 παρέχουσι. Ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου εἰς
 βοήθειαν †προσηρξάμην† κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ
 ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς ἔζη, μεγαλειότερον ἂν τοῖς
 15 αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

ΘΕΟ. Παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς
 τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.

2. μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα] Viz. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. i. e. μισολόγους γεγονότας. See the remarkable passage in the Phædo on this subject, p. 89, 90; where a parallel is drawn between the growth of misanthropy and scepticism.

3. ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρέθη] Viz. supr. 167: Γενναιοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω. The unusual form ἐρρέθη was perhaps adopted in imitation of Protagoras.

5. ἴλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς] Sc. σεαυτόν. Cf. infr. 174: Αὐτὴν συγκαθειῖσα. 'Meeting us without reserve, in a candid and good-humoured spirit.'

10. ὄπη ἂν τύχωσιν ἔλκοντες] Soph. 259: Τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τότε δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλκων. Phil. 57: Τοὺς δεινοὺς περὶ λόγων ὀλκὴν.

14. προσηρξάμην] Notwithstanding Buttman's ingenious defence of this word, Lexil. I. p. 103, it is difficult not to incline to the conjecture of Coraius, προσήρκεσα μὲν. Cf. Soph. Œd. Col. 72: Ὡς ἂν προσαρκῶν σμικρὰ, κερδάνη μέγα. See however p. 171: Ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες.

15. μεγαλειότερον] A rhetorical word, used probably in ironical imitation of Protagoras' style. See notes on πολυάρατον, ἐρρέθη, supr. Cf. Xen. Mem. III. 1: Οὕτω πῶς διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ὑπ' Ἀρετῆς Ἡρακλέους παιδευσιν, ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειότεροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν.

17. πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας] 'Your defence of our friend has been most vigorous.'

He would invite us to examine the meaning of his own saying, and of the principle of motion, and thus to meet the doctrine of sense on its own ground, avoiding the captiousness of verbal criticism.

p. 168. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ ἐταῖρε. καί μοι εἶπέ' ἐνενόησάς
 που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος
 d ἡμῖν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ
 παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζοίμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαρι-
 εντισμὸν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων 5
 μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ
 λόγον ;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ ;

ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία
 ἐστίν ; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ
 e ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδά-
 σαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μή τοι τοῦτό γ' ἔχη
 ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὖ 15
 τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δ' ; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους
 πώγωνας ἐχόντων ἄμεινον ἂν ἐπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ
 διερευνημένῳ ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ 20
 οὖν οἴου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἐταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν
 p. 169. παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ' ἴθι, ὦ
 ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν
 εἰδῶμεν, εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον

4. χαριεντισμὸν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον] 'Abusing us for a certain quibbling vein, and exalting the respect due to his maxim, he bade us be in earnest when we are dealing with his theory.'

15. αὖ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον] Coisl. p. m. Αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον. The Bodl. p. m. ἠδ' αὐτοῦ τὸν τὸν λόγον. Cf. p. 167 : Τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ

ρήματί μου δίωκε. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, if correct, refers to the fresh arguments which Protagoras had assumed in his defence, and the discussion founded on them.

22. σὲ δὲ μηδενί] The pronoun is simply used to strengthen the negative.

24. διαγραμμάτων—ἀστρονομίαν] Note the variety.

That Protagoras may be treated 10 with due gravity, Theodorus is at last compelled to join in the discussion.

εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς τε p. 169.
ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τᾶλλα ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἔχεις
διαφέρειν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ ράδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον
5 μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων
σε ἐπιτρέψαι μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν
καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν
Σκίρρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ b
ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ' Ἀνταῖον
10 τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δράμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσ-
ελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκάσης ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς
λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.

ΣΩ. Ἄριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπεί-
κασας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυρίοι
15 γὰρ ἤδη μοι μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυγχά-
νοντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν,
ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι· οὕτω τις ἔρωσ

2. αἰτίαν ἔχεις] 'You are re-
puted.' Rep. 435: Οἱ δὴ καὶ
ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν (τοῦ θυ-
μοειδεῖς εἶναι).

8. τείνειν] Cf. Phaed. 65: 'Εγ-
γὺς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάσαι. 'You
come nearer to the analogy of
Sciron.'

9. κατ' Ἀνταῖον] The allusion
to the Lacedæmonian custom
is repeated, but, as usual, with
fresh imagery, and additional
point. The Lacedæmonians tell
one to strip or go away. But
you, like Sciron, strip all you
meet with, and, like Antæus,
force them to wrestle with you.

10. τὸ δράμα δρᾶν] 'To go about
your work.' Supr. 150: Ἐλατ-
τον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος.

11. ἀποδύσας] 'Having stript
him of every excuse.'

14. ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκεί-

νων] 'But I have more of the
athlete in me than they had.'

15. Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες] Schol. Οἱ Θρασύμαχοι, Καλλικλεῖς,
Διωνυσόδωροι, Εὐθύδημοι καὶ οἱ
τοιούτοι. Winkelmann (Fr. An-
tisthenis) suspects an allusion
to Antisthenes here. But the
Scholiast is probably nearer the
mark. See Introduction; and
cf. Euthyd. 297.

16. καρτ. πρ. τ. λ.] 'Men of va-
lour in the art of controversy.'

μάλ' εὖ ξυγκ.] 'Have bruised
me well.'

17. οὕτω τις ἔρωσ δεινὸς ἐνδέ-
δυκε] Sc. με implied in ἐγὼ supr.
It is left doubtful whether οὕτω
is to be joined with δεινὸς or
ἐνδέδυκεν. 'So strong a passion
for this kind of exercise has
taken possession of me.'

p. 169. δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν
 ὃ μὴδὲ σὺ φθονήσης προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν τε
 ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνήσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε ὅπη ἐθέλεις·
 πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμαρμένην, ἣν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώ- 5
 σης, δεῖ ἀνατλήναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω
 γε ὧν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν
 σοι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καί μοι πάνυ
 τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή που παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος 10
 τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καί τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ
 ὀνειδίση.

d ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύ-
 νωμαι.

ΣΩ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβόμεθα 15
 οὔπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς
 ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι αὐτάρκη
 ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν ὁ
 Πρωταγόρας, περί τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος δια-
 φέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί; 20

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

2. προσανατριψάμενος] 'Giving me a grip,' 'trying one fall with me.'

7. ὧν προτίθεσαι] Viz. διαγραμμάτων πέρι, supr.

11. τις] Somebody; i. e. Protagoras.

15. ἀντιλαβόμεθα] 'Let us attack the question from the same point as before.' Cf. Rep. 544: Πάλιν—ὡσπερ παλαιστής τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν παρέχε.

18. καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν] The sentence breaks and reverts to the direct form. Cf. Rep. 489: Οὓς δὴ σὺ φῆς κ. τ. λ. καὶ γὰρ ξυν-

εχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. In conceding for Protagoras that some men are wise, we went beyond his own words. We must try to prove it out of his own mouth. He says, What appears to each man, is to him. Now it certainly appears to every man that some are wiser than himself, and some less wise; that some think truly, others falsely. Therefore, whether he be right or wrong, it is the case that some think truly, and some falsely.

I. β. Protagoras' own maxim is criticized.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὁμολόγει, ἀλλὰ p. 169.
μὴ ἡμεῖς βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐ-
δὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαμβάνοντας βεβαιοῦσθαι· νῦν
δὲ τάχ' ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου
5 ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τού-
του αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παρ-
αλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.

ΘΕΟ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν δι' ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου
10 λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. p. 170.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Οὕτωςί. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί
φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ ;

ΘΕΟ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου,
15 μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ
φαιμέν οὐδένα ὄν τινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν
ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ἔν γε
τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις
20 ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν
τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτήρας σφῶν προσδο-
κῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναί. καὶ
πάντα που μεστὰ τὰνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους
τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν
25 τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὐτῶν ἰκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν,
ἰκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἅπασιν τί ἄλλο

'What appears to each man, is to him.' And does it not, then, appear to every man that some know more than he does and some less : so that in the greatest dangers, they look up to the wise man as to a God, submitting to be taught and ruled by him ? And they account wisdom to be true

5. καλλιόνως ἔχει] 'It would seem the less exceptionable course.'

6. οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει] It is of no small importance to the question at issue.

20. ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν] Cf.

Rep. 489 : Τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, εἴαν τε πλούσιος εἴαν τε πένης κάμνη, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι, καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν δυναμένου.

23. μεστὰ] So Bodl. with Ven. Π. Par. F.

p. 170. φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσι·

thought ;
and folly to
be false
opinion.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν ἡ-
γούνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν ;

5

c ΘΕΟ. Τί μὴν ;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρῆσόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ ;
πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν αἰεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ
ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ, ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ
που συμβαίνει μὴ αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρα αὐτοὺς 10
δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν
ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδεὶς
ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

It follows
that, if all
men think
truly, some
men think
falsely.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλ' ἀπιστον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἦκει ὁ 15
d πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπων λέγων.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ ;

ΣΩ. Ὄταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς με ἀπο-
φαίνῃ περὶ τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν
ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις 20
περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστι κριταῖς γενέ-
σθαι, ἢ αἰεὶ σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν ; ἢ μυρίοι
ἐκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι
ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἶεσθαι ;

As a mat-
ter of fact
men do
become
judges of
each
other's im-
pressions.

ΘΕΟ. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι 25
e δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἳ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων
πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

7. ὁ Π.] Bodl. Vat. pr. Ven. Π.
τῷ Πρωταγόρα.

15. εἰς τοῦτο—ἀνάγκης—ἦκει]
'Is driven to this.'

25. Νῆ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκ.] 'Yes,
truly, Socrates, I have oppo-
nents more than I can tell, as

Homer says, and they give me
worlds of trouble.'

26. φησὶν Ὅμηρος] Od. Π. 121:
Τῷ νῦν δυσμενέες μάλα μυρίοι εἶσ'
ἐνὶ οἴκῳ.

τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα]
'A world of annoyance,' lit.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ p. 170.
μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα ; ἀρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ
5 μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾤετο μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ οἱ
πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην
τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν ; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν p. 171.
ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἴσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον
μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσοῦτῳ
10 μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν
ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον ἐκεῖνος μὲν
περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἰή-
15 σιν, ἢ ἐκεῖνον ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, ξυγχωρεῖ που
ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ ξυγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν b
τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ
20 εἶναι ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

For instance, they condemn Protagoras. His opinion therefore may be true for him, but it is false for all men besides. Its truth is to its falsehood, as one man is to all mankind. But further, in saying that they think truly, he confirms them in saying that he thinks falsely : and upholds them in denying that they are wrong. Thus the

troubles, such as (i. e. the greatest that) can come from all men. Cf. Æschin. c. Timarch. 9 : Τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον δήσαντες πρὸς τὸν κίονα αὐτὸν τὸν Πιττάλακον ἐμαστίγουν τὰς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πληγὰς οὕτω πολὺν χρόνον ὥστε κ.τ.λ. A somewhat similar use of ἀνθρώπων occurs in Soph. Phil. 305 : Πολλὰ γὰρ τάδε ἐν τῷ μακρῷ γένοιτ' ἂν ἀνθρώπων χρόνῳ. Also fr. CV. 110, 5 (Bekk.) : Ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τι πέπονθεν. 'Respondet vulgare illud nostratium, alle menschenmögliche.' Heind.

4. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα ;] Sc. ἀνάγκη ἐστίν ;

5. μηδὲ—μηδὲ] 'If Protagoras himself also did not think so, nor yet the majority, as indeed they do not.'

8. συνοίεται] This is present, because it has been asserted just above.

13. Ἐπειτα—κομψότατον] 'Now follows the most exquisite touch of all.' Cf. Rep. 558 : Τί δέ ; ἢ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή ; ἔχει sc. τὸ πρᾶγμα s. ὁ λόγος.

p. 171. ΣΩ. Οἱ δέ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ ξυγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς ψεύ-
δεσθαι ;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὅ δέ γ' αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν
δόξαν ἐξ ᾧν γέγραφεν.

ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμέ-
νων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμο-
λογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τὰναντία λέγοντι ξυγχωρῆ ἀληθῆ
αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ξυγχω- 10
ο ρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον
μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς οὐδ' ἂν μὴ μάθη. οὐχ
οὕτως ;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, 15
οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθής; οὐ τέ
τινι ἄλλῳ οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἐταῖρόν μου κατα-
θέομεν.

unanimity
of dissent is
not broken
even by
Protago-
ras himself.

5

The saying
of Protago-
ras is true
for nobody.

7. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα] 'So then, what we get from all is this.' Cf. Soph. 245 : Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, ἵν' ἐκ πάντων εἰδῶμεν ὅτι τὸ δν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπωρότερον εἰπεῖν ὃ τί ποτε ἔστιν. Ar. Met. 988 A : Τοσοῦτόν γ' ἔχομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. The preposition is probably suggested by ἐξ ᾧν immediately preceding. 'On all hands, then, including Protagoras, it is disputed, or rather on his part it is admitted.'

9. ὅταν—ξυγχωρήσεται] These words are explanatory of ὑπὸ ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, and what follows, from μήτε onwards, depends immediately on ξυγχωρή-

σεται, but really also on all that precedes. The construction of a sentence is frequently thus disturbed by the introduction of an explanatory or appositional clause. Cf. Rep. p. 529 : Οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιεῖν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκείνο, ὃ δν περὶ τὸ δν τε ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, εἴαν τέ τις ἄνω κεχηνῶς ἢ κάτω συμμεμυκῶς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρῆ μαυθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν, οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχὴν, κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῆ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μαυθάνῃ.

18. Ἄγαν] 'We are urging my friend too vehemently,' 'running him very hard.'

καταθέομεν] De Legg. 806 :

Could he put his head above the ground, no doubt he might convince us of much folly. But we have done our best. No one will deny that one man is wiser, and another less wise, than his neighbour. It is clear, too, that

ΣΩ. Ἄλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν p. 171.
τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκός γε ἄρα ἐκείνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σο-
φώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψει δ
μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα,
ὡς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο
ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν
αὐτοῖς, ὁποῖοί τινές ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα
λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν
ἂν τοῦτό γε ὄντινόν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἕτερον ἐτέ-
ρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον,

τί δράσομεν, ὦ Κλεινία; τὸν ξένον
ἐάσομεν τὴν Σπάρτην ἡμῖν οὕτω κα-
ταδραμεῖν;

1. Ἄλλά—ἄδηλον] 'But it does not appear that we are out-running what is right,' i. e. I do not see that we are transgressing any rule of truth or fairness. τὸ ὀρθόν means simply (as in Rep. 540: τὸ ὀρθόν περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι) 'What is just and true.' There is no necessity therefore for making παραθεῖν (with the accus.) mean 'to swerve from.'

2. εἰκός γε ἄρα] Socrates admits that there is some ground for Theodorus' remonstrance. 'It is reasonable, I grant, to presume that as he is older so he is wiser than we are.' Ἄρα refers partly to what Theodorus has suggested, but chiefly gives emphasis to ἐκείνον and the words that follow, and perhaps marks the illative connexion between them (πρεσβύτερον ὄντα, σοφώτερον ἄρα εἶναι) 'Indeed, when we come to think of it, Protagoras, being older, must be wiser than we are.'

5. καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα] Sc. λη-
ρώδη.

6. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν] Socrates returns to the charge with the second ἀλλά.

7. τὰ δοκοῦντα] P. 154: Ἐὰν μὲν τὸ δοκοῦν, κ.τ.λ. Men. 83: Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Σ. Καλῶς τὸ γὰρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου.

12. ταύτη ἂν μάλιστα ἴστασθαι] 'Will by preference take its stand (or will take its stand most resolutely) in this position, which we sketched out for it in our defence of Protagoras.' Or μάλιστα may be taken closely with ταύτη, 'Hereabouts, as near as we can guess.' Cf. Parm. 130: ὅταν ταύτη στῶ. 'The argument' is more or less personified, as so often in Plato, (cf. Rep. 484: Διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξεληθόντος λόγου. Ib. 503: Τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου,) and is the subject of ἐνχωρήσεται, ἐβελῆσαι, ὁμολογήσει, and τολμήσειε, in what follows. ἴστασθαι depends immediately on φῶμεν. May there also be a slight play upon the word?

p. 171. ἢ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθῶντες Πρωταγόρα, ὡς τὰ
 ὁ μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ ταύτη καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστῳ, θερμά,
 ξηρά, γλυκεία, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ
 που ἔν τισι ξυγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου,
 περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐβελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν
 γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ἰκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι
 αὐτὸ γιγνώσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ
 ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, εἴπερ που ;

the strength of the position lies in the region of sensible things, which we made the basis of our defence of Protagoras.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

p. 172. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰ- 10
 σχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἄδικα καὶ ὅσια καὶ μή, οἷα ἂν
 ἐκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ
 εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν
 σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως
 εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα 15
 τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ που, αὐτὸ ὁμολογήσει ξύμβουλον
 τε ξυμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν
 ἑτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε
 φῆσαι, ἂ ἂν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὐτῇ,
 παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ ξυνοίσειν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὐ 20

(Transition to the conception of the good.)

If the theory would concede any thing, it would be this, that all are not equally judges of what is wholesome: and in the case of states, that although honour and

'This unstable theory will make a stand hereabouts if anywhere.' See also Thuc. VI. 34 : Πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γνώμαι ἴστανται.

1. ἢ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθῶντες Πρωταγόρα] This 'new wave' of discussion rises upon the last, pp. 167, 168 : Κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροῦς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς—ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστά ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἷα γ' ἂν ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίξῃ. The argument is beginning to relax a little under the influence of the ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν thrown carelessly in, p. 157.

6. καὶ θηρίον δέ] 'Nay, even

every inferior animal.'

10. Οὐκοῦν—περὶ πολιτικῶν] The distinction in the case of sensible things between the impressions of sense, and the knowledge of what is good, is evident enough. The analogous distinction in the case of things moral and social is less obvious. See, amongst other passages, Rep. 505 : Τί δέ ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν, καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἔλοιπτο τὰ δοκούντα κἂν μὴ ἢ ὁμῶς ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κηκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκούντα κτῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει ;

justice are matters of convention merely, yet in deciding what is expedient, mistake is possible both to individuals and states.

This is the attitude of some who have partially relinquished the Protagorean doctrine. They offer us a new and important handle for discussion.

λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὀσίοις καὶ ἀνο- p. 172.
σίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει
αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν
τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξη καὶ ὅσον ἂν
5 δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρω-
ταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι.
Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάτ-
τονος, καταλαμβάνει. c

ΘΕΟ. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

10 ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δὴ, ὦ δαι-
μόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὡς εἰκότως
οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς
τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις ;

2. ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι] He drops the figure, and passes from what the 'argument' would naturally say, to what certain persons, who are presently defined, actually do say. For a somewhat similar transition to an indefinite plural, cf. Gorg. 457: Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρακέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας—καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες (cf. καὶ ὅσοι γε in the present passage) κ.τ.λ.

6. τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι] Cf. Men. p. 80: Ὅρᾶς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις ;

Aristotle (Met. 1008 A), uses the expression, τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον. The digression which follows is not merely an ornament. As in the Sophista the philosopher and the sophist

are the counterpart of being and not-being respectively, so here the man of the world and the philosopher represent the contrast between the life of sense and the life of knowledge. There are similar digressions in the Phædrus and Protagoras.

9. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν] Compare the opening of the digression in the Phædrus, σχολὴ μὲν δὴ ὡς ἔοικε—, and Cic. de Am. V: Et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi.

12. ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις] 'In scientific pursuits.' Supr. p. 144: Γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν. Tim. 88: Μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ. He takes common ground with Theodorus. Cf. infr. p. 173: Τά τε γὰρ ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομούσα. Compare with the whole passage the opening words of the Apology.

p. 172. ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.

ΘΕΟ. Πῆ δὴ ;

ΣΩ. ἼΗ τοῖς μὲν, τοῦτο δὲ σὺ εἶπες, αἰὲν πάρεστι σχολὴ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεῖνοι, εἰάν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ· καὶ

2. ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι] 'Who have been jostled about from their youth.' Compare Aristophanes' περίτριμμα δικῶν. (Nub. 447): cf. Dem. de Cor. 269.

κυλινδούμενοι] The word expresses contempt. Cf. Rep. 479: Μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται.

3. πρὸς ἐλευθέρους] Soph. 253 (referring to this): Ἡ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάβομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀνευρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον; Rep. 499: Οὐδέ γε αὐτῶν λόγων, ὧ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἱκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγονάσιν, οἷων ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς κ. τ. λ. 536: Οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρὴ μαθάνειν—and the whole image of the cave with its captives and their liberation. See also Aristot. Met. I. 2: Δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὸ ζητοῦμεν χρεῖαν ἐτέραν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος φάμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὄν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη μόνη ἐλευθέρᾳ οὕσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

8. τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου] 'We are for the third time beginning a fresh argument.' The first fresh λόγος was the criticism of Protagoras and his de-

fence; the second begins where Theodorus is induced to accept Socrates' challenge (see the words, p. 168, αὐτῶν τὸν λόγον); the third arises with the mention of the wholesome and expedient, and the partial supporters of Protagoras.

9. οὕτω κάκεῖνοι] Sc. μεταλαμβάνουσι. This part of the sentence (from ὥσπερ—) is in apposition with what precedes. Cf. supr. 171: Τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωτ., and note; also Rep. 557: Κινδυνεύει ἡν δ' ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι· ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἡθεσι πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο. Also ib. p. 532: Οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὰ ὁ ἔστιν ὄρμηξ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῆ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὁ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ τῷ ὄρατοῦ.

10. καθάπερ ἡμᾶς] Such slight redundancies are natural in conversation.

ἀρέσκειν seems to govern the accusative with the meaning to satisfy. The whole sentence is in construction with ἼΗ.

(Digression.)

Before entering upon this, however, we pause to reflect upon the happiness and freedom of the philosophic life, which has leisure to take up fresh topics or to lay them down at will. Not so the

mind which is exercised in the courts of law. The one is the training of a freeman, the other of a slave—

διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον p. 172.
 τύχῳσι τοῦ ὄντος. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε αἰεὶ λέγουσι·
 κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ρέον, καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ο
 ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκην
 5 ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγι-
 γνωσκομένην, ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ρητέον· (ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν
 καλοῦσιν·) οἱ δὲ λόγοι αἰεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δε-
 σπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ
 ἀγῶνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ·
 10 πολλακίς δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀπάν- p. 173.

1. διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων] See Polit. 286.

4. ἀνάγκην] Hesych.: 'Ἀνάγκη· ἢ δικαστικὴ κλεψύδρα. Pollux VIII. 17: "Ἐμοὶ δ' οἶονται καὶ ἀνάγκην σκεῦος εἶναι δικαστικόν. The latter quotation expresses doubt. May not the notion mentioned by the grammarian have arisen from the present passage? The structure of the sentence (τε—καὶ) forbids our identifying ἀνάγκη here with the clepsydra, which has been already alluded to. It is rather 'the strong arm of the law,' which the adversary could bring to bear, if the speaker wandered from the indictment. 'But the other sort are always pressed for time: for the ebbing water hurries on the speaker: and he has no liberty to follow whither fancy leads him, but the adversary is at hand to wield over him the resistless logic of coercion, holding a written outline of the points to which he must confine himself, which forms a running commentary to his oration.'

6. ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ρ.] ὑπογραφὴν retains its verbal force nearly

as if it were ὑπογεγραμμένα, but is not the antecedent to ὧν. See p. 147, note on δτφ.

ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν] 'What they call their affidavits.' The affected unfamiliarity with legal terms is in good keeping. Compare Rep. 400: Καὶ, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, λαμβον καὶ τιν' ἄλλον τροχαῖον ὠνόμαζε.

7. πρὸς δεσπότην] Not simply the δικαστής, but rather δῆμος or νόμος, which he represents. Compare the passages in the Republic in which Δῆμος is spoken of as the master of the ship (488), as the great sophist (492), and as a mighty beast (493); and cf. Euthyphr. p. 2: "Ἐρχεται κατηγορήσων μου, ὥσπερ πρὸς μητέρα, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. Also Herodotus VII. 104 (of the Spartans): "Ἐπεστι γὰρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῶ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ. Pindar III. 38: Νόμος πάντων βασιλεύς.

8. τινα δίκην] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. 'Some cause or other.'

καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες] 'And the trial is never for an indifferent stake, but always immediately concerns the speaker.'

10. περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος] Π.

p. 173. τῶν τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλεία ἀφήρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγ-

Whose mind becomes inevitably dwarfed and crooked and servile.

XXII. 161 (of Achilles and Hector): Ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἱερήιον, οὐδὲ βοεῖην ἀρνύσθην, ἀ τε ποσσὶν ἀέθλια γίνεταί ἀνδρῶν· ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς θεόν Ἐκτορος ἵπποδάμοιο. In Herodotus the metaphor is already softened down, VII. 57: Περὶ ἑαυτοῦ τρέχων (said of Xerxes). Aristoph. Vesp. 375: Ποιήσω δακεῖν τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμον δραμεῖν. The expression τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ, is suggested by τὴν ἄλλως. (τὴν ἄλλως Bodl. p. m.)

1. ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς] 'Keen and shrewd.'

3. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην—ἐλεύθερον] 'Of all mental growth, and all honest and liberal culture;' 'of self-respect and the spirit of upright independence.' Both meanings are expressed in the Greek.

7. οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι] 'Not being able to undergo these consistently with righteousness and truth, they betake themselves immediately to falsehood, and to avenging themselves on one another by wrong, and so are repeatedly bent and stunted; whence they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness in their mind, but supposing themselves to have become capable and accomplished men.'

Cf. Rep. 519: Ἡ οὐπω ἐννεονήκας τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μὲν σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακία δ' ἠναγκασμένον ὑπηρετεῖν ὥστε ὄσφ' ἂν ὀξύτερον βλέπη τοσοῦτ' πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον—Τοῦτο μέντοι ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενον περιεκώπη τοὺς τῆς γενέσεως συγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὴ ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἠδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι, περὶ τὰ κάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν, κ. τ. λ.

9. πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγκλῶνται] 'Are continually thwarted and cramped in their growth.' Rep. 495: Ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ βαναυσίων ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηται οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποθεθρυμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν. 611: Τεθεάμεθα μέντοι διακειμένον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θάλαττιον Γλαυκὸν ὄρωντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥαδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε παλαιὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετριφθῆναι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων.

κλῶνται, ὡσθ' ὑγιᾶς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς p. 173.
 ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ^b
 γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὧ
 Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει
 5 διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώ-
 μεθα, ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ
 ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα;

Turn we
 now from
 them; and
 let us still
 use our
 liberty to
 describe
 the leaders
 of our own
 band.

ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμῶς, ὧ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.
 πάνυ γὰρ εὖ τοῦτο εἶρηκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ^c
 10 τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι
 οἱ ἡμέτεροι ὡσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν περι-
 μένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικα-
 στης οὔτε θεατῆς, ὡσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ
 ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.

They know
 nothing of
 politics and

15 ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ
 τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἂν τις τοὺς γε φαύλως δια-

4. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ] Phædr. 247: Φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἴσταται. Polit. 291: Ἦμφεγνήσα κατιδὼν τὸν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράγματα χορόν. The metaphor is continued in the words οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύοντες, — οὔτε θεατῆς ὡσπερ ποιηταῖς — περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων—.

5. διελθόντες] The expression is a little confused: for the words πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώμεθα, as understood with διελθόντες, are unemphatic, while in the second part of the clause they are emphatic. Probably but for the attraction of the other participle, διελθόντες would have been διέλθωμεν. (Coisl. τραπώμ.)

ἐάσαντες] Since here, as in the Sophista, we have stumbled prematurely on the philosophic life.

6. τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μετ.] 'Our

freedom, which consists, as we have said, in the power of ranging from one topic to another.' 'Cf. Tim. 26: καὶ τίν' ἂν ὧ Κριτία, μᾶλλον ἀντὶ τούτου μεταλάβοιμεν; Polit. 257: Διαναπαύσωμεν αὐτὸν μεταλαβόντες αὐτοῦ τὸν συγγυμναστήν τόνδε Σωκράτη;—Καθάπερ εἶπες, μεταλάμβανε.

11. οἱ ἡμέτεροι] οἱ is suspicious. If genuine, it still belongs to the predicate,—'our servants,' i. e. those which, as philosophers, we have.

περιμένει] 'Waits our pleasure for its completion.'

13. ἐπιτιμήσων] 'Stands over us to criticise and to compel.'

15. ὡς ἔοικεν] The sentence continues as if λέγωμεν had been λεκτέον.

16. τοὺς φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι] ἐν φ. is empha-

p. 173. τρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; Οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων
 d πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου
 δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πό-
 λεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα
 ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι. σπουδαὶ 5
 δὲ ἐταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν
 αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται
 αὐτοῖς. εὖ δὲ ἢ κακῶς τι γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῷ
 κακὸν ἐστὶν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ

public life,
 still less of
 revels and
 intrigues
 for power.

The philo-
 sopher's

tic, i. e. 'in such a pursuit.' For an account of these gentry, see Rep. 489—496., where they are called *παμπόνηροι*—ὡσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερά ἀποδιδράσκοντες, κ. τ. λ.

1. Οὗτοι δέ που] Compare the less ironical description in the Republic 488: *νόησον γὰρ τοιουτονὸν γενόμενον*, κ. τ. λ. The contradiction between philosophy and common life is here stated in its most paradoxical aspect. Nor do there appear any features of the transcendental philosopher. (V. *infr.* τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὄλου.) We find a trace of him for the first time in the Sophist, as of the ideal king in the Politicus.

5. σπουδαὶ δέ, κ. τ. λ.] 'But the ambitious striving of political clubs for power, and public meetings and banquets and revellings with minstrelsy, are actions which do not occur to them even in dreams.'

For a similar 'nominativus pendens,' cf. Rep. 532: 'Ἡ δέ γε λύσις—ἢ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν—ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. The irregularity is softened in the present instance by the fact that the earlier part of the sentence forms a sort of collective no-

minative to *προσίσταται*. With this list of 'worldly goods,' compare Rep. 491: *πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ ξυγγένεια ἐρρώμενη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεία*.

6. ἐταιρειῶν] 'Clubs' or 'leagues.' See Rep. 365: *ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἐταιρείας συνάξομεν*—. Thucyd. VIII. 54: *Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τὰς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἀπάσας ἐπελθόν*, κ. τ. λ. : and Arnold's note.

8. τι γέγονεν] So the Bodleian and several other MSS. But Clement in quoting the passage reads *τις* with the majority of manuscripts. This, however, may easily have arisen out of what follows. Stallbaum says, 'Si quis alius, certe philosophus scit, quid recte, quid secus in republica fiat.' But if he is ignorant of what is passing, how can he judge of it? See above, *νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα* κ. τ. λ. The fate of Archimedes would be an illustration of what is meant. It is true that we cannot imagine Socrates to have been ignorant (e. g.) of the mutilation of the Hermae.

ignorance of these things, and of his neighbour's pedigree, is not ironical but real.

His body is at home in the city, but his mind is traversing the earth and heaven, compassing the whole of everything.

γυναικῶν, μάλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης p. 173.
 λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, ο
 οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν,
 ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κείται αὐ-
 5 τοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησα-
 μένη σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται
 κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τὰ τε γᾶς ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα
 γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ
 πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνωμένη τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου p. 174.
 10 ὄλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθειῖσα.

1. οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες] Aristid. Or. III. T. I. p. 30. ed. Dind. : τὸ λέγειν περὶ τούτων καὶ ἐγχειρεῖν ὡς περ ἂν εἴ τις ἐξαριθμῆσθαι βούλοιτο τοὺς χόας τῆς θαλάττης. (Stallb.)

3. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν] Cf. Ar. Eth. N. IV. 3, §§ 27, 28. (of the high-minded man)—πρὸς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι—εἴρωνα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς.

6. ἀτιμάσασα] Cf. Rep. 496 : ἡ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῇ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ· βραχὺ δὲ πού τι καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλης τέχνης δικαίως ἀτιμάσασαν εὐφυὲς ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι.

7. κατὰ Πίνδαρον] The fragment is thus quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. Υ. 707 : πέταται κατὰ Πίνδαρον τὰς τε γᾶς ὑπένερθεν οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομῶν, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνάμενος. (v. l. ἐρευνώμενος.) He seems to have had the poet's words, as well as this passage, in his mind. Plato therefore seems to have changed πέταται into the more prosaic φέρεται, (πέτεται occurs as a marginal reading,) and to have introduced the words καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, (perhaps also

ἀστρονομοῦσα,) in compliment to Theodorus, adding τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου κ.τ.λ. Plato almost always thus weaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poet's measures to the rhythm of prose; e. g. Rep. 365 : πότερον δίκαια τεῖχος ὑψίον ἢ σκολίοις ἀπάταις ἀναβὰς καὶ ἐμαντὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ; ib. 364. : τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρουθεν ἔθηκαν καὶ τινα ὁδὸν μακρὰν τε καὶ ἀνάγνη. Protag. 340 : ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἀκρὸν ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δ' ἤπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπὴν περ εἰδύσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι.

τὰ τε γᾶς] Bodl. τᾶτε. Is it possible that Plato wrote τᾶτε, as in the quotation of Clement? This seems probable, when it is considered that τὰ ἐπίπεδα κ.τ.λ. is an afterthought, to which the transition as the words stand in the text is somewhat abrupt; and also that the term γεωμετροῦσα is more naturally applicable to the surface of the Earth.

9. τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὄλου] Ὁ γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ δὲ μή, οὐ. (Rep. 537.) See the humorous illustration of this in

p. 174. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ὡσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομούντα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θραττά τις ἐμμελῆς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέγεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ 5 δ' ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λαυθάνοι αὐτόν. ταῦτόν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διάγουσι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὅ τι πράττει, ἀλλ' ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα· 10 τί δέ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε. ἢ οὐ ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐγωγε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἰδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ

He is laughed at by ordinary people, as Thales was by the Thracian maid-servant. For knowing nothing of his neighbour, while he searches into the nature of man, he appears helpless in public and private life, having no topics for scandal, and despising the common subjects of praise and

the Republic, 474 : ὅτι ὅν ἂν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτόν, εἰάν ὀρθῶς λεγῆται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα, κ. τ. λ. And ib. 486 : ἐναντιώτατον σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὄλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου.—ἢ οὐκ ὑπάρχει διανοία μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἶει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον ; ὄλου, 'In its universal aspect.'

(10.) εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς] 'Not lowering herself to contemplate any of the things surrounding her.'

Θραττά τις] Θρατταν a patria ancillam hanc dicit. ἐμμελῆς autem h. l. ad leporem et venustatem in jocando trahendam docuit Ruhnken. ad Longin. p. 261. Fabellam hinc forte

duxit Laërt. I. 34. (Heind.)

Do not the epithets rather refer to the slave's neatness in her own department? v. τρωῶς καὶ ὀξέως p. 175. 'A trim and dainty Thracian handmaid.'

7. ταῦτόν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα] 'The same piece of raillery does not fail to apply,'—'will serve—.' For the metaphorical use of ἀρκεῖν ἐπὶ, cf. Soph. Ant. 611 : τό τ' ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἐπαρκέσει νόμος ὅδε.

For the application of the σκῶμμα in the mouth of an enemy, see the speech of Calicles in the Gorgias, 484 sqq., which presents many points of similarity to the present passage.

11. τῇ τοιαύτῃ φ.] Sc. ἀνθρωπίνῃ.

boasting :
thinking of
a king
merely as
the shep-
herd of a
trouble-
some flock,
who for
want of lei-
sure must
be a clown :
looking
upon broad
acres as a
narrow
strip of
earth : and
on high pe-
digree as
but a single
reach in an
endless
river.

τοιοῦτος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, p.174.
ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῆ περι^ο
τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι,
γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θράτταις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ
5 ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπί-
πτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινὴ, δόξαν
ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη. ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς λαιδορίαις
ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λαιδορεῖν, ἅτ' οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν
οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι· ἀπορῶν οὖν
10 γελοῖος φαίνεται· ἔν τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν d
ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι
γελῶν ἐνδηλος γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύ-
ραννόν τε γὰρ ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἓνα τῶν
νομέων, οἷον συβώτην, ἢ ποιμένα, ἢ τινα βουκόλου

1. ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον] These words refer only to δημοσίᾳ.

5. εἰς φρέατα] 'Into pitfalls and all manner of perplexity.' Supr. 165. τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος.

6. ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη] 'And the awkwardness of the position is terrible, and makes him seem no better than a fool.'

8. ἴδιον] 'He cannot use personality in invective.'

12. τύραννον—ἐγκωμιαζόμενον] Governed by ἀκούων, implied in ἀκούειν below.

13. ἓνα τῶν νομέων] Comp. the Politicus, p. 266, where this is regarded as the most universal conception of the kingly office. Regarding νομευτική as a whole, the philosopher thinks of βασιλική only as a part of it. ὅτι τῇ τοιαύτῃ μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὔτε σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν ἢ μή, τὸν τε μικρότερον οὐδὲν ἠτίμακε πρὸ τοῦ μείζονος, ἀεὶ δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν περαίνει τᾷληθέστατον. Soph. 227.

τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἦττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρὰ τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ὠφελεί ἡμᾶς καθαίρον. τοῦ γὰρ κτήσασθαι ἕνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἠγεῖται γελούτερα, σεμνότερον δὲ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαννότερον.— The latter passage has also a slight tinge of the irony of the text. The figure probably originated in some saying of Socrates. Compare Xen. Mem. I. 2. § 32 : ὅτι θαυμαστὸν οἱ δοκοῖε εἶναι, εἴ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεύς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὁμολογοῖη κακὸς βουκόλος εἶναι. Ib. § 38 : 'Ο δὲ Κριτίας· Ἄλλὰ τῶνδὲ τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι δεήσει, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ

p. 174. ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα·
 δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον
 ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς· ἄγροικον
 δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἦττον τῶν
 νομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν 5
 ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία
 πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος
 θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν
 εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη
 ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἐπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους 10
 ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν
 p. 175. ὀρώντων ἡγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ
 δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν αἰεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι
 ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστῳ γεγό-
 νασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ 15
 βασιλεῖς καὶ δούλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολ-

τῶν χαλκίων.—Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἔφη ὁ
 Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε· εἰ
 δὲ μή, φυλάττου, ὅπως μὴ καὶ σὺ
 ἐλάττους τὰς βοῦς ποιήσῃς.

1. πολὺ βδάλλοντα] Lit., As
 being rich in milk, i. e. sucking
 out no small advantage. Com-
 pare the speeches of Thrasyma-
 chus in Rep. B. I.

2. ἐκείνων] masculine.

3. ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν]
 'Only he thinks the creature
 whom they tend, and out of
 whom they squeeze their wealth,

to be of a less tractable and
 more insidious nature.'

ἄγροικον δὲ] 'rough and un-
 civilized from stress of work'—

10. ὑμνούντων] 'And when
 they cant of pedigree'—

11. παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ—ὀρών-
 των] 'Betraying a dull and
 contracted vision'—

14. ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων]
 Compare the comic fragment
 ascribed to Epicharmus or Me-
 nander. (Krisemann's Epichar-
 mus, 119.)

'Απολεῖ με τὸ γένος· μὴ λέγ', εἰ φιλεῖς ἐμέ,

Μῆτερ, ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ γένος· οἷς ἂν τῇ φύσει

'Αγαθὸν ὑπάρχη μὴθὲν οἰκείον προσόν,

'Εκείσε καταφεύγουσιν εἰς τὰ μνήματα,

Καὶ τὸ γένος, ἀριθμοῦσιν τε τοὺς πάππους ὄσοι.

Οὐδ' ἓνα δ' ἔχοις ἰδεῖν ἂν, οὐδ' εἰπεῖν, ὅτῳ

Οὐκ εἰσὶ πάπποι· πῶς γὰρ ἐγένοντ' ἂν ποτε; κ. τ. λ.

μυριάδες ἀναρίθμητοι] This ex-
 pression recurs frequently in
 later Greek authors.

16. βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες]
 These words belong to all the
 preceding nouns.

λάκις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὄτρωον, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ p. 175.
 εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφε-
 ρόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ
 καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφι-
 5 τρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαεικοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν, οἷα b
 συνέβαινε αὐτῷ τύχῃ, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ,
 γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαννότητα
 ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασιν δὴ τούτοις ὁ
 τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελάται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερ-
 10 ηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ
 ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀπορῶν.

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασιν τὰ γινόμενα λέγεις, ὦ Σώ-
 κρατες.

1. ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι] The order is ἐπὶ καταλόγῳ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι προγόνων.

2. ἀναφερόντων] Sc. τὸ γένος, The genitives depend upon σμικρολογίας, or rather, more vaguely, upon the sense of the words ἀτ. α. κατ. τ. σμικρ., as δυναμένων upon γέλα below, -κατα in καταφαίνεται being probably used in its condemnatory sense.

3. ἄτοπα—τῆς σμικρολογίας] The genitive is not quite analogous to ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας, Ap. 41., which is rather quantitative: nor is it exactly equivalent to ἄτοπος ἢ σμικρολογία, (like ἄσημα—βοῆς, —φῶτων ἀθλίων ἰκτήρια, in Sophocles), though as in these last cases the adjective is isolated for the sake of emphasis, but the genitive has the additional meaning, 'in respect of,' as after interjections and epithets. Cf. Protagor. 317 : πολλή μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος. Rep. 328. χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου (for its way of

life?) Rep. 532 : πάμπολυ ἔργον λέγεις. τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ; Phæd. 99 : πολλή ἄν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία ἄν εἴη τοῦ λόγου.

The whole sense lies somewhere between σεμνυνομένοι καὶ ἀναφέροντες—ἄτοποι φαίνονται τῆς σμικρ. and σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφερόντων—ἄτοπος φαίνεται ἢ σμικρολογία.

5. οἷα συνέβ.] The Bodl. reads οἷα συνέβαινε αὐτῷ τύχῃ. Perhaps rightly. The meaning in both cases is the same. 'He was,—what Fortune made him.'

6. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ] Sc. τοῦ πεντεκαεικοστοῦ. Compare Rep. 515, 6 : Εἰ δ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν βία διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους, καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειε πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ ὀδυνᾶσθαι τε ἄν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἄν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὄραν οὐδ' ἄν ἐν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν.

ρ. 175. ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὦ φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω,
 ο καὶ ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ Τί ἐγὼ σὲ
 ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ
 ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ
 ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον; ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων 5
 κεκτημένος τ' αὖ πολὺ χρυσίον, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ
 ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέ-
 ψιν, ποίῳ τέ τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου
 φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀπο-
 φυγεῖν,—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ὅταν αὖ δέῃ λόγον 10
 d διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν

But when he takes the other up into his own region, from questions of private wrong, to inquire what justice is, from diatribes on the theme 'Is a king happy?' to contemplate the idea of the royal office and of human happiness,

1. *τινα—τις*] The indefinites are used with an indirect reference to the philosopher and to τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνον καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν below.

5. *Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων*] See the passage of the Gorgias (p. 471.), in which Polus contends that Archelaus is happy. (Diog. mentions a diatribe of Antisthenes, called Ἀρχέλαος, ἢ περὶ βασιλείας, in which Gorgias was assailed.)

Buttmann thus defends *εἰ*, which three MSS. omit:—"Quamvis certum exploratumque haberent vulgares illi oratores, regem propter divitias suas unice beatum putandum esse, tamen rem ita in encomiis tractabant, ut, quasi dubia ea videri posset, multis eam exemplis argumentisque probarent. Quidni igitur v. c. encomii alicujus in Cræsum argumentum his verbis indicari poterit; *εἰ Κροῖσος εὐδαίμων;*" It may be questioned, however, whether ἢ *βασ.* might not give a better meaning.

In the words which follow, *τε* seems to impede the

sense, and *αὖ* is superfluous. If Plato is really quoting from a rhetorician, this is possibly not a fatal objection, though the conjectures *πάνν πολύ, πάμπου,* (Heusd. Hirschig. Badh.) would seem probable. Possibly, however, the words *βασιλεὺς—χρυσίον* are adapted from some poet. (Cf. Theogn. *εὐδαίμων εἶην, καὶ θεοῖς φίλος ἀθανάτοισι, Κύρν', ἀρετῆς δ' ἄλλης οὐδεμῆς ἔραμαι.*) In which case *γὰν πολύχρυσον* is perhaps the true reading. For *κεκτημένος* in such an adaptation, cf. (besides Protag. 340., quoted above), the quotation of Tyrtaeus in the Laws, p. 629: *οὐτ' ἂν μνησαίμην οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείμην, οὐτ' εἰ πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώπων εἶη, φησὶν, οὐτ' εἰ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ κεκτημένος, εἰπὼν σχεδὸν ἅπαντα, κ. τ. λ.*

There is a close parallel between the present passage and page 174. *τοιγάρτοι κ. τ. λ.*

Cf. *τί ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ*, with *ἐν δικαστηρίῳ—ἀναγκασθῆ λέγειν*: ἢ *σὺ ἐμέ*, with *ἐν ταῖς λοιδορίαις*: *εἰ* (or ἢ) *βασιλεὺς*—with *τύραννόν τε γάρ*—.

7. *ἐπὶ σκέψιν*] MSS. *ἐπίσκεψ*.

καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν. p. 175.
 ἰλιγγιῶν τε ἀφ' ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων με-
 τέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας, ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν
 καὶ βαρβαρίζων, γέλωτα Θράτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ'
 5 ἄλλῳ ἀπαιδευτῷ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ'
 ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσιν ἅπασιν. Οὗτος
 δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν
 ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ὃν δὴ φιλόσο- e
 φον καλεῖς, ᾧ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ
 10 εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουρικὰ ἐμπέση διακονήματα, οἷον
 στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένου συσκευάσασθαι
 μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδύναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους· ὁ δ' αὖ τὰ μὲν
 τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως δια-
 κονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια

Then that
 dwarfed
 shrewd le-
 gal mind is
 puzzled in
 its turn,
 and be-
 comes a
 laughing-
 stock not to
 the unedu-
 cated, but
 to the wise
 and free.
 The philo-
 sopher may
 be well con-

2. ἰλιγγιῶν τε] 'He gives the philosopher his revenge; (for) dizzied by the height where he finds himself hanging by a thread, and from which he looks downwards into space, (a strange experience to him), and being dismayed and lost, and broken in his utterance, he is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaids, nor by any other of the uneducated, for they do not perceive his plight; but by all whose nurture has been the reverse of servile.'

The sentence probably divides after ἀηθείας, and ἀδημονῶν τε—answers to ἰλιγγιῶν τε. (ἰλιγγιῶν τε. γὰρ add. Ven. Ξ. This is quite unnecessary.)

9. ᾧ ἀνεμέσητον] 'Who may, without our surprise or censure, appear simple and a mere cipher, when some menial service is required of him, if he has no skill, for instance, in

tying up bed-clothes with the proper knot, nor in flavouring a sauce, or a fawning speech:—the other character is that of the man who is able to do all such service with smartness and dispatch, but has not the skill to throw his cloak over his right shoulder with a gentlemanly grace; no, nor to celebrate aright with the music of discourse, in his turn, that life which is lived in truth by the immortals and by heaven-favoured men.'

11. ἐπισταμένου] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ἐπιστάμενος cett.

13. τορῶς] 'Smartly.' ἄτε δριμύς ὄν.

14. ἀναβάλλεσθαι—ἐπιδέξια] Probably, 'to wear his garment over his right shoulder in a gentlemanly fashion.' Aristoph. Av. 1566: οὗτος, τί δρᾶς; ἐπ' ἀριστερ' οὕτως ἀμπέχει; οὐ μεταβαλεῖς θοίματιον ἔδ' ἐπὶ δεξιάν; Cf. Hor.

p.176. ἐλευθέρως οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.

ΘΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἅ λέγεις ὡσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ' ἀνθρώπους εἶη.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη· οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν

tent to seem unskilled in servile arts, in comparison with those who are dumb in the highest music of the soul.

5

Ep. I. § 96. si toga dissidet impar, Rides. Quid, mea cum pugnat sententia secum? A possible rendering at first sight is, 'to strike up the song in his turn.' Vid. οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντα, and cf. Rep. 420: κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντας. Symp. 177: εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἐρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ. But one person could hardly be said to sing ἐπὶ δεξιὰ, and the antithesis requires the other rendering. The slave can tuck in bed-clothes, the freeman wears his garment with a grace. The slaves' contribution to the banquet is literally ὄψον ἡδύναι, figuratively θῶπας λόγους ἡδ. (Cf. Gorg. 465: τὴν ῥητορικὴν—ἀντίστροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν ψυχῇ ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι.) The 'freeman's' is literally the lyre and song; in a higher sense, discourse of philosophy and virtue. This is his proper ἔρανος. Cf. Symp. 177., where the minstrel is dismissed, and Eryximachus proposes that they should discourse of the praises of love. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι χρῆναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἐρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ὡς ἂν δύνηται κάλλιστον. v. Prot. 347. There is a further 'harmony'

between the discourse and life of the philosopher. Lach. 188: καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμωσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμωσμένος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον ξύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἰαστί, οἶομαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστὶ, ἀλλ' ἤπερ μόνη Ἑλληνικὴ ἐστὶν ἁρμονία.

There is an allusion to the well-known custom of taking the lyre in turn. θῶπας λόγους is perhaps rightly supposed by Ruhnk. ad Tim. p. 146. to be a poetical expression, quoted probably from Euripides or Epicharmus.

2. θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ] There is a rhythmical cadence in the words, cf. Phædr. 261: Πάριτε δὴ, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά τε Φαῖδρον πείθετε. Rep. 617: Λαχέσεως θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος κ. τ. λ. Symp. 197. the end of Agathon's speech.

7. ὑπεναντίον γάρ] Compare the saying of Heraclitus, παλίντονος ἁρμονία κόσμου ὡσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρας. The prep. conveys the idea of 'bearing up against.'

φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. p.176.
διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φεύγειν ὅ τι
τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· b
ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὄσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέ-

Men will
not hear

1. τόνδε τὸν τόπον] viz. τὸν
σωματοειδῆ τε καὶ ὄρατὸν τόπον.
Rep. 532. The imagery of
place in which Plato's philoso-
phy is enfolded appears most
prominently in the Phædo, the
Phædrus, and Rep. B. VI. and
VII.

The notion that evil must
exist in everything but the
Divine Nature reappears in a
curious mythical form in the
Politicus, p. 270. and is implied
Tim. 87: τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν (sc.
νοσήματα) διὰ σώματος ἔξιν κ. τ. λ.
Ib. 69: ξυγκερασάμενοί τ' αὐτὰ
ἀναγκαίως τὸ θνητὸν γένος ξυνέθε-
σαν. In the Phædo evil is al-
most identified with the bodily
principle. Our ignorance on
the subject is, however, con-
fessed in the Lysis, p. 220, 1:
πότερον, ἢν ὃ ἐγώ, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν
ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ
δειψῆν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιού-
των;—ἢ γέλοιον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὃ τί
ποτ' ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ
οἶδεν;

3. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ]
Phædr. 252, 3: ἰχνεύοντες δὲ
παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκω τὴν τοῦ
σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν, εὐποροῦσι
διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἠναγκάσθαι πρὸς
τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι
αὐτοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ, ἐνθουσιῶντες, ἐξ
ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ
ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν
θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν.

Rep. 613: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε
θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὅς ἂν προθυ-
μείσθαι ἐθέλη δίκαιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ
ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατόν

ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. Ibid.
500: Οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε,
σχολῆ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς
οὔσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέ-
πειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας καὶ
μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ
δυσμενείας ἐμπίπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς
τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα αἰεὶ
ἔχοντα ὄρωντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτ'
ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἄλ-
λήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ
λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμῆσθαι τε
καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι.
Phæd. 107: νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνα-
τος φαίνεται οὔσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη
αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ
σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην
τε καὶ φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι.
Tim. 90: τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλομάθειαν
καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθείς φρονήσεις
ἐσπουδακότε καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τῶν
αὐτοῦ γεγυμνασμένῳ φρονεῖν μὲν
ἀθάνατα καὶ θεία, ἄνπερ ἀληθείας
ἐφάπτηται, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, καθ'
ὅσον ὃ αὐτὸν μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ
φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τούτου
μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν—διὰ τὸ
καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἁρ-
μονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, τῷ κατα-
νοομένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιωσά-
κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν.

4. ὁμοίωσις δὲ] 'And to be
made like to Him is to become
righteous and holy, not without
wisdom.'

μετὰ φρονήσεως] Is virtue
possible apart from know-
ledge? This question is dis-
cussed in the Protagoras and
the Meno. The answer given
is, that practically it would ap-
pear so, but that virtue can be

p. 176. σθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον πείσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὦν ἔνεκα οἱ πολλοὶ φασὶ δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὐ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῆ εἶναι. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστὶν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν 5 ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν.
e θεὸς οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἶόν τε δικαιοτάτος, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὅς ἂν

this : for there must be some evil to resist the good, and this cannot be in heaven, but in this lower world. Our wisdom therefore is to escape heaven-

proved to be inseparable from knowledge. And in the Meno the paradox is solved by saying that practical virtue is a Divine gift, *θεία μοίρα προσγινομένη ἀνευ νοῦ*, but that if there should be a virtuous man who could teach virtue, he would be like Tiresias amongst the shades ; *ὡσπερ παρὰ σκιάς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἶη πρὸς ἀρετὴν*. In the more dialectical dialogues one side of the contradiction disappears, and it is assumed that philosophy is essential to real virtue. Phæd. 69 : *ὦ μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι—ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, — φρόνησις, — καὶ ξυλληβδὴν ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως,—χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῆς, κ. τ. λ.* In the Republic it is again acknowledged that it is possible to partake of virtue without philosophy, but in an imperfect way ; e. g. in the case of the soul which laments its choice of another life. P. 619 : *εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιω-*

κότα, ἔθει ἀνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεληφότα. And the education of the φύλακες generally (not of the rulers) is independent of reason, though in harmony with it. Rep. 401, 2. (In the Philebus also the perfect life contains the knowledge of practical things. The philosopher must know his way home.) Thus the contradiction felt at first is reconciled by acknowledging the existence of different parts of our nature, which, though connected, and indispensable to each other's perfection, are not identical. There is a slight emphasis on *μετὰ φρονήσεως* in opposition to what follows.

4. *ἵνα—δοκῆ εἶναι—ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ (ζημίαν ἀδικίας)* The whole of this passage is parallel to the speeches of Glaucon and Adimantus in the 2nd book of the Republic, and the same thought is differently worked out in the Gorgias.

5. *ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος*] 'This is what men commonly repeat, an old wives' fable, it appears to me.' The meaning of *λεγόμενος* here (not = 'as the saying is') seems determined by *λέγωμεν* following.

wards, by becoming just and pure with wisdom, so becoming like to God.

This is a man's true 'cleverness' and proof of virtue. And the real penalty of vice is one which cannot be escaped by clever shifts. For to act wrongly is to be removed from the Divine pattern, and to be brought nearer to the likeness of the Evil.

ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅ τι δικαιοτάτος. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἡ p.176.
ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀνανδρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ
5 δ' ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφαίαι ἐν μὲν πολιτικαῖς δυναστεῖαις γιγνόμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ τέχναις βάνουσαι. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέγοντι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἄριστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχωρεῖν δεινῶ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι. ἀγάλλονται γὰρ
10 τῷ ὀνειδέει, καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λῆροί εἰσι, γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ' ἄνδρες οἴους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς σωθησομένους. λεκτέον οὖν τὰληθές, ὅτι τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον εἰσιν οἴοι οὐκ οἴονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἴονται· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ
15 γάρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικρῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἀδύνατον ἐκφυγεῖν. e

ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστῶτων,

1. περὶ τούτου] 'Moreover a man's real ability, or else his nothingness and want of manhood, is concerned with this.' The genitive is accounted for by the vagueness of the relation expressed. ἀνανδρία is suggested by ἀνδρός.

6. φορτικαί—βάνουσαι] 'vulgar'—'mechanical,' or 'mean.'

7. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι, κ. τ. λ.] This very favourite thought is developed in the Gorgias.

9. ὑπὸ πανουργίας] 'Not to admit that villany constitutes him a clever man.'

10. οὐ λῆροί] 'that they are not mere absurdities, cumbering the ground :—'not sole-

cisms,' as Carlyle might say.

γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη] ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης (Il. XVIII. 104., quoted Apol. p. 28.) Aristoph. Nub. 1203 : πρόβατ' ἄλλως.—Milton, Areopag. : 'Many a man lives a burden to the Earth.'

λῆροί] Charm. 176. ἐμὲ μὲν λῆρον ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὄτιον ζητεῖν. Phæd. 72 : τελευτῶντα πάντα λῆρον τὸν Ἐνδυμῶνα ἀποδείξειε καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἀνφαίνοιτο.

11. τοὺς σωθησομένους] Who deserve to live in it, i. e. for whose interest the laws are to be made. Cf. Soph. Ant. 189 : ἡδ' ἐστὶν ἡ σώζουσα.

19. παραδειγμάτων] Cf. Rep.

p. 176. τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιω-
τάτου, οὐχ ὀρώντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἡλιθιότητός
τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοι-
p. 177. οὔμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι.
οὐ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοι- 5
οῦνται. εἰ δ' εἴπωμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς
δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ
τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν
αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς αἰεὶ ἔξουσι, κακοὶ κα-
κοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ 10
πανοῦργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ, ᾧ Σώκρατες.

b ΣΩ. Οἶδά τοι, ᾧ ἑταῖρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμ-

The soul that does so will not be received at death into the region pure from evils.—They will laugh at this, and call us simplemen. But if they would consent to reason with us, they would ere long become confused and silent, and their fluent rhetoric would fade away, leav-

592 : 'Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παραδείγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὀρᾶν καὶ ὀρώντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίσειν.

1. τοῦ ἀθέου] 'From which the Divine has fled.'

6. τῆς δεινότητος] 'From this cleverness which is their boast.'

8. τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς] Viz. πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων. Phæd. 81.

καθαρός] Phæd. 83. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται, οἶμαι, ὁμότροπος καὶ ὁμότροφος γίνεσθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν ἐς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαρῷ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας.

Ibid. 69 : καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη κ. τ. λ. καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρὸς τις ἦ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς—καταστήσαντες—

πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὅς ἂν ἀμήτος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαυμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.

τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς] 'They will always retain their way of life like to themselves—evil as they are, associating with evil things.' κακοῖς is neut. Compare the well-known passage of the Phædo, p. 81. 'Ἄλλὰ διελημμένην γε, οἶμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς κ. τ. λ. imitated by Milton, Comus, circ. v. 460 :

'The soul grows clotted by contagion,
Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose
The divine property of her first being.'

See especially the words κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητος τῆς μελέτης.

10. καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ] i. e. their feeling of superiority will only be confirmed.

13. Οἶδά τοι, ᾧ ἑταῖρε] 'I am

ing them as helpless as a child. But we must return, and take up the broken thread of discussion.

βέβηκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέη δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξα- p.177.
σθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς
πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάδρως φεύγειν,
τότε ἀτόπως, ὧ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν
5 αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη
πως ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν δια-
φέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα
τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν· εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω αἰεὶ
ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον· ἐπὶ c
10 δὲ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἴωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὧ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἀη-
δέστερα ἀκούειν· ῥᾶω γὰρ τηλικῶδε ὄντι ἐπακολου-
θεῖν· εἰ μὲντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν.

I. γ. Third criticism of the doctrine,

What appears to me, is to me.

We found that even

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθά που ἦμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ᾧ
15 ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ
τὸ αἰεὶ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τούτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ,
ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διῆσχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ
ἦκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἂ ἂν θῆται d

quite aware of it, my friend!'
i. e. 'I know the full extent of the ridicule that they will pour on us.' He refers to the emphatic answer of Theodorus.

3. καὶ μὴ ἀνάδρως φεύγειν] Cf. Rep. 518 : οὐκ ἂν ἀλογίστως γελῶ.

5. ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πως ἀπομαραίνεται] 'That brilliant rhetoric of theirs fades utterly, leaving them to appear no better than children.'

6. παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέρειν] Crit. 49 : ἐλάθομεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς παίδων οὐδὲν διαφέροντες.

8. πλείω αἰεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον] 'They will bury us under the

discussion to be commenced afresh, i. e. the arrears of discussion, which will gather against us with an ever-increasing stream.' He means, that if the main stream of the inquiry is dammed up any longer, it will come in upon us with overwhelming force. Cf. Rep. p. 450 : ὅσον λόγον πάλιν ὡσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς κινεῖτε περὶ πολιτείας. Polit. p. 302 : τοῦ νῦν ἐπικεχυμένου λόγου κατ' ἀρχάς.

11. τὰ τοιαῦτα] Quam spinosiora ista. Cic. Tuscul. I.

18. περὶ τὰ δίκαια ... περὶ τὰ γαθοῦ] 'In regard to what is just—concerning what is good.'

p.177. πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θε-
 μένῃ, ἕωςπερ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τὰγαθοῦ οὐδένα ἀν-
 δρεῖον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι
 καὶ ἂν ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ
 ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν 5
 εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ που σκῶμμ' ἂν εἶη
 πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

⊙ ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα
 ὃ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται.

those who
 make jus-
 tice con-
 ventional,
 hesitate to
 apply their
 principle to
 what is be-
 neficial and
 good.

1. τῇ θεμένῃ] So Bodl. with
 Vat. Ven. Π.

2. περὶ δὲ τὰγαθοῦ] Rep. 505:
 ὃ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπαντα ψυχὴ καὶ
 τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπο-
 μαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δέ—
 What is good cannot be appa-
 rent merely. (Compare the say-
 ing of Des Cartes and Spinoza:
 The idea of God implies His
 existence.) This was not, how-
 ever, universally admitted. Ar.
 Eth. N. I. 2 : τοιαύτην δὲ τινα
 πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τὰγαθὰ, κ. τ. λ.

τὰγαθοῦ—ὠφέλιμα] Rep. 457,
 458 : κάλλιστα γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ λέ-
 γεται καὶ λελέξεται ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέ-
 λιμον καλὸν τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρὸν.
 —γάμους—ποιήσομεν ἱεροῦς εἰς
 δύναμιν ὅτι μάλιστα· εἶεν δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ
 οἱ ὠφελιμώτατοι.

We have not yet risen to the
 conception of the ideal good
 ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας : good is still
 a relative term, though know-
 ledge begins to find a resting-
 place there. In the concrete
 the good and expedient are
 identical. See Spinoza, Cog.
 Met. I. c. 6. § 7. § 11. Res
 sola considerata neque bona
 dicitur, neque mala, sed tan-
 tum respective ad aliam, cui

conducit ad id quod amat ac-
 quirendum, vel contra ; ideoque
 unaquæque res diverso respectu
 eodemque tempore bona et mala
 potest dici—Deus vero dicitur
 summe bonus, quia omnibus
 conducit, nempe uniuscujusque
 esse quo nihil magis amabile,
 suo concursu conservando. Ma-
 lum autem absolutum nullum
 datur, ut per se est manifes-
 tum.

Porro uti bonum et malum
 non dicitur nisi respective, sic
 etiam perfectio, nisi quando
 perfectionem sumimus pro ipsa
 rei essentia, quo sensu antea
 diximus, Deum infinitam per-
 fectionem habere, hoc est infi-
 nitam essentiam, seu infinitum
 esse.

5. πλὴν εἴ τις—λέγομεν] Rep.
 533 : ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ
 ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσοῦ-
 των πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρό-
 κείται.

7. πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν] In respect
 of that which we mean.

9. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα]
 Let him not intend the name
 but the thing which is contem-
 plated under it. (γὰρ add. Bodl.
 Vat. Ven. Π.) Dr. Badham con-

ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γάρ.

p. 177.

A state makes laws for the benefit of its members, but they are not always beneficial.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζη, τούτου δὴ που στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντα τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἶεται τε καὶ δύναται, ὡς ὠφελιμωτάτους 5 ἑαυτῇ τίθεται. ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται ;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

p. 178.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει αἰεὶ, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἐκάστη ;

10 ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ διαμαρτάνειν.

Or, to put it more generally, (for the laws regard the future benefit of the citizens,)

ΣΩ. Ἐπι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειε ταῦτα ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἶδους ἐρωτῶη, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ὄν. ἔστι δέ που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετούμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ [μέλλον] ὀρθῶς 15 ἂν λέγοιμεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

b

The man, you say, is the measure of all things white,

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, οὕτωςι ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἢ 20 ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνω τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων, Πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὡς φατέ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,

jectures τὸ πρ. ὃ ὀνομάζομεν θεωρεῖτω. This does not appear necessary.

(9.) Μὴ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα] Ar. Met. I. 4. 1006. 6 : τὸ δ' ἀπορούμενον οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπων τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα.

1. Μὴ γάρ] These words were put into Socrates' mouth in the edd. before Heindorf. Cf. Soph. 255 : Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κ. τ. λ. Theæt. μὴ γάρ.

2. ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζη] 'Whatever name it gives to this.'

11. ἐνθένδε] From the following point of view.

13. ἐν ᾧ καὶ] For the method cf. Rep. 491 : λαβοῦ τοίνυν ὄλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ——— πάντος περὶ σπέρματος ἢ φυταῦ.

ἔστι δέ] Sc. τὸ ὠφέλιμον. Whatever is expedient, is also referrible to future time.

16. τοῦτο δέ] Viz. τὸ ἐσόμενον εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.

μέλλον] The MSS. vary between μᾶλλον (Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.) μέλλει μᾶλλον (Coisl.) and μέλλον μᾶλλον (cett.)

p. 178. λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τι οἶεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτως ;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὡς
 c Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ οἷα ἂν οἰηθῆ ἔσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίνεταί ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι; οἷον θερμά, ἄρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῆ ιδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ
 10 ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῆ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων γενήσεται, ἐαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα ;

heavy, and the like, for he has the standard of them in himself. Has he also the standard in himself of future things? If he thinks he is going to have a fever, and the physician tells him No, which opinion will prove true for him in the sequel?

1. λευκῶν βαρέων κούφων οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ] Cf. supr. 172 : τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ ταύτη καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκεία, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου.

2. τὸ κριτήριον] The word is formed from κριτής, on the analogy of δικαστήριον. Cf. Legg. 767 : δύο δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔστω κριτήρια. The present is probably one of the earliest instances of its use.

οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος] sc. αὐτά. Or rather the accusatives are cognate. Vid. supr. p. 152. Οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται—.

4. ὄντα] There is a slight stress on the present tense in opposition to μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι.

6. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι φήσομεν] As here knowledge seems to emerge with the mention of future time, so in the Protagoras, p. 357, virtue is shown to be knowledge, because it implies the power of comparing the future with the

present. (Cf. the line of Homer, Οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἄμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω.)

7. ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ] 'The tribunal for deciding these things is within him.' 'The decision rests with him.'

9. οἷον θερμά] The word is placed absolutely. Heind. compares Crat. 393 : οἷον τὸ βῆτα ὁρᾶς ὅτι τοῦ ἦ καὶ τοῦ τ̄ καὶ τοῦ ᾠ προστεθέντων οὐδὲν ἐλύπησεν κ.τ.λ.

ἄρα—κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν] 'Surely we must suppose (must we not?) that the result will be according to the opinion of one of them, or shall we say that it will be in accordance with both?' It is implied in what follows, *which* opinion is probably right.

14. ἐαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα,—ὁ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι—τὸ μέλλον—καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι] These words contain the point of the argument.

ἐαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα) Viz. καὶ

ΘΕΟ. Γελοῖον μὲν τ' ἂν εἶη.

p.178.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', οἶμαι, περὶ οἴνου γλυκύτητος καὶ ἀσθηρότητος μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἢ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, κυρία.

5 ΘΕΟ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὖ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρμόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσειε μουσικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβη δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.

10 ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσεται μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἢ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος ἐκάστῳ ἡδέος ἢ γεγυρό-
15 τος μηδέν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτής, ἢ σύ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν
20 ὅστισοῦν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.

θερμὸς καὶ πυρέττων. The repetition of the word is curious.

Aristotle, Met. I. 5. 1010 b. : Ἔτι δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὡς περ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δήπου ὁμοίως κυρία ἢ τοῦ ἱατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος, οἷον περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ὑγιούς ἢ μὴ μέλλοντος.

15. μηδέν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα] The certainty of present impressions is swept away together with the doctrine of motion, infr. p. 182. The rela-

tion of present to past impressions is further discussed under the guise of a new inquiry, pp. 191, sq. (See espec. the word *μημεῖον*.)

17. τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανόν] A further home-thrust at Protagoras.

18. ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον] 'That which each of us will find persuasive to be spoken in court.'

The musician is a better judge of future harmony than the gymnast, as the latter will himself confess when he hears the sounds.

Surely Protagoras himself professed to be a better prophet than those he taught, of the probable effect of a rheto-

ΣΩ. Νῆ Δία, ὧ μέλε· ἧ οὐδεὶς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διε-
 p. 179. λέγετο διδοῦς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἴ μὴ τῶν τοῦς συνόντας
 ἔπειθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε
 μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς
 αὐτῷ.

rical argu-
 ment.

5

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα.

2. εἰ μὴ] εἴ πη τοῦς συνόντας
 —Profecto in futurarum quo-
 que rerum cognitione omnibus
 præcellere se Protagoras profi-
 tebatur, aut nemo ipsi magnam
 doctrinæ mercedem solvisset, si
 quo modo persuasisset disci-
 pulis, etiam de futuris rebus
 neque vatem neque alium
 quemquam melius posse judi-
 care, quam ipsum sibi unum-
 quemque. V. ad Gorg. § 75,
 p. 47. Platonis autem senten-
 tiam restituimus unius litterulæ
 mutatione. Quippe vulgo scrip-
 tum εἰ μὴ τοῦς συν., unde con-
 trarius prorsus et absurdus sen-
 sus efficitur. Quam scripturam
 nequis tuendam arbitretur ver-
 bo αὐτὸς ad Protagoram tra-
 hendo et αὐτῷ mutando in αὐτῷ
 (sc. τῷ συνόντι), manifesta h. l.
 est superiorum verborum πότε-
 ρον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτῆς re-
 petitio, neque tum ferri posset
 hoc αὐτῷ: adeo id moleste re-
 dundaret. Idem vitium insedit
 Phileb. p. 34 c. Ἴνα μὴ τὴν ψυ-
 χῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅτι μά-
 λιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν.
 Corr. Ἴνα πη, et Protag. p. 331 d.
 Καὶ γὰρ ὀτιοῦν ὀτφοῦν ἀμηγέπη
 προσέοικε. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέ-
 λανι ἔστιν ὁ μὴ (l. ὅπη) προσέοικε
 καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ. Heind.
 This reasoning is probably
 correct. But δή, which is the
 received correction of Phil. l. c.
 seems more forcible here than

πη, which has no particular
 aptness in this passage. 'If he
 had *really* persuaded them of
 that which has been now sug-
 gested.' Cf. p. 166. εἰ δὲ ὀνομάτων
 γε—: alib. The corruption pro-
 bably originated in the slightly
 obscure reference of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ,
 or perhaps simply from the
 neighbourhood of μὴ. (i. e. Νῆ.)
 Schleiermacher solved the
 difficulty by omitting αὐτῷ, and
 referring αὐτὸς to Protagoras.
 But this destroys the force of
 καί, and the question is not be-
 tween one oracle and another,
 but between the opinion of the
 master and of the common in-
 dividual. For αὐτῷ referring
 to an indefinite subject, cf.
 Apol. 39: οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ αὐτῆ ἢ
 ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε
 καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ
 ῥάστη, μὴ τοῦς ἄλλους κολουεῖν,
 ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως
 ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. The change
 from plural to singular has been
 elsewhere illustrated.

The μάντις is introduced as
 being ἐπιστήμων of the future
 generally, just as the physician
 is of future health or sickness,
 the musician of future harmony,
 &c. τις ἄλλος points distantly
 at Protagoras himself, and his
 position as the prophet of his
 school is hinted at. Cf. supr.
 162. ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βύβλου
 ἐφθέγγατο.

And it is acknowledged that a state must often fail in its legislation, which regards the future. Therefore one man is wiser than another, and not every man, but the wise man, is the measure of things.

On this ground, then, the theory cannot stand. And there are other points where it is easily assailable. But it is more diffi-

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον p. 179.
περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετου-
μένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκη εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτά-
του ἀποτυγχάνειν ;

5 ΘΕΟ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου
εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε b
ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι,
ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι μηδὲ ὅπωςτιοῦν ἀνάγκη
10 εἶναι μέτρῳ γίνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἠνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ
ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἶτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα
ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτη, ἧ τὰς
τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὐταὶ δὲ ἐφάνησαν
15 τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἠγούμεναι.

ΣΩ. Πολλαχῆ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλη ἂν τό γε c
τοιοῦτον ἀλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι.
περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις
καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίνονται, χαλεπώτερον
20 ἐλεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτοι
γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσί, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς
τε εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ

2. πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ] Both from experience and from the analogies just adduced. We pass from the individual to the state, as in p. 172.

Arist. Met. K. 1063 a. τούτου δ' ὄντος τοιούτου, τοὺς ἐτέρους μὲν ὑποληπτέον μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἐτέρους οὐχ ὑποληπτέον.

16. Πολλαχῆ ἂν] We revert from the general saying of Protagoras to the particular interpretation of it given above, viz. in its application to the doctrine of sense. This has not

been disproved by the above argument, as it has nothing to do with the future.

18. ἐξ ὧν] 'The momentary effect produced on each man, from which arise the sensations, and the beliefs which are in accordance with them.' Vid. p. 156; and note the incipient distinction between αἰσθησις and δόξα.

22. ὄντα] Ast. conj. τὰ ὄντα, but see above, p. 178. ἀληθῆ τε οἶεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα.

P. 179: Θεαίτητος ὅδε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἶρηκεν αἴσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦτὸν θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, δ ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα, εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ⁵ φαύλη οὐδ' ὀλίγοις γέγονεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπλου. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἑρακλείτου ἑταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρώμένως.

ΣΩ. Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον· καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.

cult to attack the main position, viz. that the present sensible impression is true.

Perhaps this is impregnable, but let us approach, and try whether its foundation in the doctrine of motion is secure.

10

I. δ. Criticism of the

1. οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἶρηκεν] Hom. Odys. A. 343: ὦ φίλοι, οὐ μὰν ὕμιν ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οὐδ' ἀπὸ δόξης Μυθεῖται βασιλεία περίφρων. Xen. Symp. II. 11: καὶ οὗτος δὴ ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ σκοποῦ ἔδοξεν εἶρησθαι.

3. σκεπτέον—διακρούοντα] Soph. 246: Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ ξυνέστηκεν. This combat is somewhat differently described in the present passage.

4. τὴν φερομένην — οὐσίαν] This is the ground on which the 'semi-Protagoreans' take their stand, the last stronghold of the doctrine, as it was the first point it occupied.

διακρούοντα] Schol.: ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν διακωδωνούντων τὰ κέραμα, εἰ ἀκέραιά εἰσιν. Cf. Philob. p. 55: γενναίως δέ, εἴ πη σαθρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν περικρούωμεν. Compare the English expression, 'As sound as a bell.'

8. ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπλου] 'Makes rapid strides,' 'gains in importance,' 'is waged with increasing energy.'

9. χορηγοῦσι] Vid. Demetr. Byz. ap. Athen. p. 295. ed. Schw.: ἐκάλουν δὲ καὶ χορηγούς, ὡς φησιν ὁ Βυζάντιος Δημήτριος, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς μισθουμένους τοὺς χοροῦς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς καθηγουμένους τοῦ χοροῦ, καθάπερ τοῦνομα σημαίνει.

τούτου τοῦ λόγου] λόγος is here almost equivalent to "school of thought." Cf. supr. τοὺς τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ κ. τ. λ. infr. τῶν ἐπείσκωμαζόντων λόγων.

11. Τῷ τοι] 'We are the more bound to consider the question, and that in the light of its first principle, even as they present it to us in the discussion.' Gorg.

principle,
All is mo-
tion.

Final re-
jection of
the doctrine
of sense.

Great has
been the
conflict

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γάρ, ὧ Σώκρατες, p. 179.
περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἧ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις^e
'Ομηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ
τὴν Ἐφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι [εἶναι,]
5 οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἶόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρώσιν.
ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ'

448 : ὥσπερ σοι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπε-
τείνατο Χαιρεφῶν. (καὶ add. Bodl.)

(12.) ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται]
Viz. in referring every thing to
a first principle, whether of fire
or motion.

2. τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων] Sc. δογμά-
των. περὶ τούτων κ. τ. λ. depends
verbally partly on διαλεχθῆναι,
partly on ἔμπειροι, really upon
the notion "there is no discus-
sion possible." Cf. infr. ὅπερ
ἦα ἐρῶν. If the genitives were
masculine, and out of construc-
tion, the use of ἔμπειροι without
an object would be too abrupt.
Compare, however, παρὰ μὲν τού-
των, below.

ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις] p. 152. Cf.
Cratyl. 439 : φαίνονται γὰρ καὶ
ἔμοιγε οὕτω διανοηθῆναι.

3. Ἄομηρείων] Cf. p. 152.
ἔτι παλαιότερων] Orpheum
intelligit : conf. Cratyl. § 41.
(p. 402.) Heind.

4. εἶναι] Om. Bodl. with se-
ven other MSS.

5. τοῖς οἰστρώσιν] 'with men
in frenzy.'

6. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ] "For, in true
accordance with their master's
writings, they are ever in mo-
tion ; but as for dwelling upon
an argument or question, and
quietly asking and answering
in turn, they are absolutely
without the power of doing so ;
or rather they possess in a sur-

passing degree the most perfect
absence of all quietness, even in
the minutest respect."

The weak point in this ren-
dering of the last words is πρὸς
τὸ μηδὲ σμικρόν = 'in respect of
what is less than little.' For
πρὸς, compare Soph. p. 248 :
ὅταν τῷ παρῆ ἢ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν
καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις.
And for μηδὲ σμικρόν, cf. Phileb.
p. 60 c. φρόνησιν — ἡδονῆς μηδὲ
τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσιν. But the
article still presents some diffi-
culty. We can only suppose
that in the accumulation of ne-
gatives μηδὲ σμικρόν has taken
the place of σμικρότατον.

Another possible rendering
is : 'Or rather the utter nega-
tion of it (τὸ οὐδ' οὐδέν) sur-
passes every thing, in regard to
the absence of all quietness in
the men.' But it is difficult to
find a parallel for this use of τὸ
οὐδ' οὐδέν.

In either case ὑπερβάλλει is
probably used absolutely, and
not with reference to μηδέν.
The point is, not that οὐδ' οὐδέν
is a stronger expression than
μηδέν, (it should be compared
with ἡττον—ἢ τὸ μηδέν), but (1)
the negation is put more
strongly by being affirmed ;
(2) ὑπερβάλλει assists the climax,
as being a stronger word than
any in the former clause ; and,

ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἐρωτήματι καὶ ἡσυχίῳς ἐν
 p. 180. μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἦττον αὐτοῖς ἐνὶ ἡ τὸ
 μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδέν πρὸς τὸ
 μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσι ἡσυχίας· ἀλλ' ἄν
 τινά τι ἔρη, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγμα- 5
 τώδη ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, κὰν τούτου ζητῆς
 λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἶρηκεν, ἐτέρῳ πεπλήξει καινῶς
 μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέν πρὸς
 οὐδένα αὐτῶν· οὐδέ γε ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
 ἀλλ' εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδέν βέβαιον εἶναι 10
 ἢ μῆτ' ἐν λόγῳ μῆτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι,
 ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνυ
 πολεμοῦσι, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκ-
 βάλλουσι.

and many
 the com-
 batants on
 either side.
 The friends
 of Heracli-
 tus in Ionia
 defend the
 doctrine of
 motion
 with all
 their might.
 But we
 must take
 their theory
 into our
 own hands
 to test it.
 For the
 men are in
 a flux, and
 offer us no
 hold for ar-
 gument.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἀνδρας μαχομένους 15
 ἐώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας. οὐ γάρ σοι
 ἐταῖροί εἰσιν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς
 ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὓς ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὐ-
 τοῖς ποιῆσαι.

(3) if the former rendering is correct, what was at first spoken of only with reference to argument, is now asserted generally. Cf. *infr.* μῆτ' ἐν λόγῳ μῆτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς. Compare with *ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδέν—ἐνεῖναι*, *Arist. Eth. N. IV. 1. § 39. ὑπερβολῇ τοῦ μηδενὶ ἂν διδόναι.*

5. ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας κ. τ. λ.] Cf. *Protag.* 342. (of the Spartans) τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὐρήσει φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχη τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλε ῥῆμα βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον, ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής.

ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγμ.] 'Plucking up as from a quiver sayings brief and dark, they let them

fly at you.'

6. ἀνασπῶντες] Cf. *Soph. Aj.* 302. λόγους ἀνίσπα.

τούτου] Sc. τοῦ ῥηματισκίου.

7. τί εἶρηκε] Sc. τὸ ῥηματίσκιον. καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ] 'Of words new-fangled ill,' 'of terms strangely twisted to an unheard-of sense.'

10. βέβαιον—στάσιμον] 'Fixed or settled—stationary.'

εἶναι] γενέσθαι is purposely avoided.

16. οὐ γάρ σοι ἐταῖροί εἰσιν] The dislike of a geometrician to the Heraclitean method is not unnatural.

17. τὰ τοιαῦτα] Sc. εἰρηνικά s. τὰ βέβαια ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

ΘΕΟ. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὧ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται p. 180.
τῶν τοιούτων ἕτερος ἑτέρου μαθητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι
ἀναφύονται, ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχη ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθου-
σιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἠγείται εἰδέναί.
5 παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἦα ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε
λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων· αὐτοὺς δὲ
δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

The pro-
blem now
before us has
come down
from an-
cient times.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα
ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ
10 ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις δ
τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὠκεανός τε καὶ Τηθύς ρεύματα

1. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς] Rep. 330.
Ποί' ἐπεκτησάμην, ὧ Σ.; et alib.

2. αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται] 'They
spring up unbidden, wherever
each happens to have caught
the *afflatus*.'

3. ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχη—ἐνθουσιάσας]
Contrast with this Hegel, G. d.
Ph. p. 55. 'It is the very spi-
rit of this whole recital, that
the more developed Philosophy
of a later age, is really the pro-
duct of the previous labours of
the thinking mind: that it is
required and determined by
these earlier views, and has not
sprung of itself independently
from the ground.' (Nicht isolirt
für sich aus dem Boden gewach-
sen ist.) For the expression
αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, cf. Rep.

520: αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται
ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἐκάστη πολιτείας.
As in pp. 172 sqq. we had a
description of the man corre-
sponding to Protagoras' theory,
so here we have the men of
Heraclitus. The wildness and
the enthusiasm, at once specu-
lative and irrational, are Ori-
ental rather than Greek, and

are probably due rather to the
soil than to the germ. Com-
paratively little of this is to be
found in Heraclitus himself, al-
though for their abrupt quaint-
ness his sayings might be called
ῥηματίσκια αἰνεγματοῶδη.

5. οὐκ ἂν ποτε λάβοις λόγον]
Ar. Met. Γ. 4. 1006. a. γελοῖον
τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθενὸς
ἔχοντα λόγον, ἢ μὴ ἔχει· ὁμοιος γὰρ
φυτῶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἢ τοιοῦτος ἦδη.
K. 1063 a: μηθέν γὰρ τιθέντες
ἀναιροῦσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ὄλως
λόγον, ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τοιού-
τους οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.

6. αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας]
'But we must take the doctrine
out of their hands, and con it
over by ourselves like a geo-
metrical theorem.' The object
of παραλαβόντας is vague; nei-
ther λόγον in the sense just
used, nor ἀρχήν; but τὰ Ἡρα-
κλειτεία ταῦτα, ἢ τι τοιοῦτον.

8. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα] 'Well,
the theorem, as you call it.'
Compare with the repetition of
γε the double use of γάρ, ἀλλά,
κ. τ. λ.

11. ρεύματα τυγχάνει] Sc. ὄντα,

p. 180. τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἅτε σοφωτέρων, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἠλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἐστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δ' ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμεν, ὡς Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τὰναντία τούτοις ἀπεφώνησαντο, Οἶον ἀκίνητον τελέθει, τῷ παντί ὄνομ' εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τούτοις διῆσχυρίζονται, ὡς ἔν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ἣ κινεῖται. Τούτοις

But wise men formerly veiled their meaning from the multitude in poetry, not as these now, who make no secret of their views, and seek to win universal suffrage for them, and to convert men from the foolishness of common sense.

which is purposely (or instinctively) omitted. Ὀκεανός τε καὶ Τηθύς are in apposition with ἡ γένεσις, and ρεύματα is predicate. ὡς, &c. expresses not what the poets said, but what they meant, depending partly on παρειλήφ.

3. σκυτοτόμοι] I. e. 'The meanest artificers.' Cf. Prot. 324. : ὡς μὲν—εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται—καὶ χαλκείως καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβουλευόντος τὰ πολιτικά : alib. They do not inquire whether they are understood or not.

7. Οἶον] MSS. οἶον. But the words of Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. f. 7. a. are decisive : ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμνεῖ καὶ μόνον ὡς πάντων ἐξηρήμενον.

8. τελέθει, τῷ παντί] So all the MSS. Buttm. conj. τ' ἔμεναι, τῷ πάντ'. This is gathered from the quotations of Simplicius, and is probably right.

10. ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ] 'All Being is One, and standeth self-contained, not having any space in which it moves.' The nearest approach to this latter assertion in the fragments of Parmenides is in the lines—

(78—85 Mull.) Οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὁμοιον, οὐδέ τι τῇ μᾶλλον τό κεν εἶργοι μιν ξυνέχεσθαι, οὐδέ τι χειρότερον· πᾶν δὲ πλέον ἐστὶν ἕοντος· τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστίν, ἐὸν γὰρ ἕοντι πελάζει. Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν ἐστίν, ἀναρχον, ἀπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὀλεθρός τῆλε μάλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἀπώσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθῆς. ταῦτόν δ' ἐν τούτῳ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κείται.

He asserts, however, that Being is not without boundaries, else it would be imperfect.

Zeno appears to have said, that being was neither with nor without boundaries. Cf. Arist. de Xenoph. Gorg. et Melisso, c. 3 : 'Αἰδίων δὲ ὄντα καὶ ἓνα καὶ σφαιροειδῆ, οὐτ' ἀπειρον, οὔτε πεπεραῖσθαι· Ἄπειρον γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ————τὸ δὲ ἐν οὔτε τῷ οὐκ ὄντι οὔτε τοῖς πολλοῖς ὁμοιοῦσθαι. Ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει πρὸς ὅτι περαεῖ.

The Eleatics did not abstract the idea of Being from that of extension, although its fulness destroyed the idea of space. It was here that the Atomists joined issue with them. To

Their vehemence almost makes us forget the opposite host, who say that the One Being which fills all things doth not move.

We find ourselves on the dan-

οὖν, ὃ ἑταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν p. 180.
 γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον
 πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μή πη ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν,
 δίκην δώσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιστραῖς διὰ p. 181.
 5 γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες
 ἔλκωνται εἰς τὰναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἑτέρους
 πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ' οὔσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, τοὺς
 ῥέοντας. καὶ εἰ μὲν τι φαίνονται λέγοντες, συνέλ-
 ξομεν μετ' αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τοὺς ἑτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν
 10 πειρώμενοι. εἰ δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται ἀληθέ-
 στερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐ-
 τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμφοτέροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι b

Leucippus and Democritus the relations of body were not symbolical but real. They felt that they must account for motion. Hence their assertion of the existence of empty space, τὸ κενόν, or, in other words, τὸ μὴ ὄν in the material sense.

2. εἰς τὸ μέσον] Viz. by having partly discarded and partly retained the principle, ἐπιστήμη αἰσθησις,—τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον μὴ παντάπασι λέγοντες.

4. δίκην δώσομεν] For the humour, cf. Rep. 474: τῷ ὄντι τωθαζόμενος δώσεις δίκην.

διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες] A game, like our French and English, was called διελευστίνα.

6. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι] "I think therefore we ought first to examine the one faction, in the direction of whom we started, these wavering movers of unrest; and if we find any truth in them, we will join our efforts with theirs to pull us to them, endeavouring to shake the

others off. But if those who stand for the unbroken Whole of Being seem to speak more reasonably, we will desert to these again from the revolutionary violence of the movement party."

7. τοὺς ῥέοντας] They are humorously identified with their principle. Vid. supr. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται.

For a similar reference to a set of persons by an epithet, cf. Phileb. 46: οὗς εἶπομεν δυσχερεῖς. Soph. 248: τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς. Rep. p. 488: τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων.

11. ἀπ' αὐτῶν] (ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν παρ' αὐτοὺς Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. Παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐτῶν cett. αὐτῶν Bekk.) We pass from the image of the game to that of a civil war, in which the Heracliteans are the 'movement,' or revolutionary, party. There is probably a slight play on the word στασιῶται.

p. 181. μηδὲν μετρίον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπαλαίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδοδοκιμακότες. ὄρα οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προιέναι κίνδυνον.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον ἂν εἶη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου. Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως περί, c ποῖόν τι ποτε ἄρα λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. 10 βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε· πότερον ἔν τι εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω, ἀλλὰ συμμετέχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα κοινῇ πάσχωμεν, ἂν τι καὶ δέη. καί μοι λέγε· ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ 15 ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφηται.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἔν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ἢ d μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκη δέ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίω- 20

gerous middle ground between these armies. With which side shall we go? Shall we declare for the inviolable constitution of all things, or for the movement party? Let us examine the latter first, as we began with them.

Motion is their principle. Do they admit that motion is of two kinds, locomotion and change?

1. μηδὲν μετρίον] 'Nothing worthy of our reception.'

6. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν] 'No course is to be endured that would prevent us from determining, &c.'

8. σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου] 'You, that were so reluctant to begin the discussion.' Cf. supr. p. 169 : οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω γε ὦν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρασχεῖν ἔμαντόν σοι.

9. ἀρχή] This is the predicate : the subject being contained in what follows. Hence no article is required.

12. ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο] Parm. 138 : κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἂν αὐται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. No argument can be drawn from this about the comparative dates of the two dialogues : although the passage in which the distinction is elaborated, and not assumed, might naturally be supposed the earlier.

Aristot. Phys. Ausc. VIII. 3. § 3 : πρὸς οὓς, καίπερ οὐ διορίζοντας ποίαν κίνησιν λέγουσιν ἢ πάσας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι.

σιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἀρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κί- p. 181.
νήσεως ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὲ λέγω τούτῳ εἶδη
5 κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν.

ΘΕΟ. Ὅρθως γε λέγων.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὔτω διελόμενοι διαλεγόμεθα
ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσι κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν
πότερον πᾶν φατέ ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενόν
10 τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τι ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δ' ἐ
έτέρως ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν οἶμαι
δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

On their granting this, we ask, Do you mean that all things move in both these ways? And they must say, Yes; or else it will be as true to say that things stand still, as that they move.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ ἐταῖρε, κινούμενά τε [αὐτοῖς]
15 καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθως ἔξει
εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἔστηκεν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ
κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὲ πᾶσαν κίνησιν p. 182.
20 αἰεὶ κινεῖται.

5. ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν] Coisl. τὴν μὲν ἀλλ., τὴν δὲ περιφ. —quod glossema sapit. Stallb. It may be asked why circular motion should be chosen to represent *φορά*. The answer probably is, that the revolution of the Heavens is conceived of as embracing all other kinds of motion. Cf. supr. ἕως μὲν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος.

Perhaps also the revolution of the Heavens (or of the Sun) is symbolical of the Heraclitean cycle of elements. (Lassalle.) For *περιφορὰ* interchanged with *φορά*, see Rep. p. 528 : ἐν περι-

φορᾷ ἤδη ὄν στερεὸν λαβόντες—ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους.

7. διαλεγόμεθα ἤδη] Imagining them, for the sake of our argument, to be less impracticable. ὑποτιθέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοῦς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι. (Soph. 246.)

14. κινούμενά τε [αὐτοῖς] καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται] Cf. Rep. 436 : ὡς οἱ γε στρόβιλοι ὅλοι ἐστᾶσι τε ἄμα καὶ κινεῦνται. MSS. ἐαυτοῖς.

19. ἐνεῖναι] Almost all the MSS. have ἐν εἶναι. But the correction of the Bodl. MS. appears to be in an ancient hand.

p. 182. ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν· τῆς θερμότητος ἢ λευκότητος ἢ ὄτουοῦν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιούντος τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν 5 πάσχον †αἰσθητὸν† ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι,

Let us now recal their theory of sensations and qualities, which were said to flit between the

2. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν] Cf. p. 149: Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἦσθησαι;

3. οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν] Supr. pp. 156. 157. 159.

5. τὸ μὲν πάσχον †αἰσθητὸν] αἰσθητὸν is inconsistent with the context, and with the language used elsewhere in the dialogue. Buttman conjectured αἰσθητήν, to which Schleiermacher objected that τὸ πάσχον means the sensorium, and not the sentient subject. But the distinction between them is not clearly marked from the Protagorean point of view. Indeed the conception of a 'sensorium' nowhere appears, at least in this part of the dialogue. It is only in speaking of a particular sense that τὸ πάσχον means, for instance, the eye. (p. 157.)

In p. 159 it appears doubtful whether τὸ πάσχον means the tongue or Socrates, or more indefinitely the 'recipient.' And even if τὸ πάσχον is limited to the organ of sense, there is no reason why αἰσθητής should not be used of this. (Cf. Xen. Mem. I. 5: ἡ γλῶσσα γνώμων τούτων ἐνεργάσθη.)

The noun αἰσθητής appears to be suggested in p. 160, (if it is not coined on the spot,) by the use of ἐπιστήμων just before.

In the present place it might recur naturally, as it is in the manner of Plato to recal a train of thought by repeating some remarkable word. (Rep. 488. οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι. Supr. 180. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα.) To which it may be added, that there is a consciousness of technicality observable in the present passage. (ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα κ. τ. λ.) Apart from these considerations, the rareness of the word, which would be a strong argument in its favour if it had MS. authority, must be allowed to weigh against it as a conjectural reading. And it may also be urged, that the masculine gender of αἰσθητής would impair the effect of the passage, in which every thing seems to be made, as far as possible, neuter and impersonal.

The other conjectural reading, αἰσθανόμενον, agrees perfectly with the context and with all that precedes, and it is quite possible that αἰσθητὸν may have slipped in instead of it by an unconscious logical inversion on the part of the copyist.

6. ἔτι] i. e. when we carry our analysis so far.

subject and
the object.

τὸ δὲ ποιούν ποιόν τι ἄλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ἴσως οὖν ἡ p. 182.
ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ
μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· κατὰ μέρη οὖν ἄκουε.
τὸ γὰρ ποιούν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν b
5 δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω. μέμνησαι
γάρ που ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν
μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιούν ἢ
πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγεγνο-
μένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ
10 μὲν ποιὰ ἅττα γίγνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι· πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐασωμεν, εἴτε c
ἄλλως εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν· οὐδ' ὅ ἕνεκα λέγομεν,
τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτῶντες· Κινεῖται καὶ
15 ρεῖ, ὡς φατέ, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γάρ;

1. ποιόν τι] MSS. ποιούντι.
But the Bodleian margin has
ποιόν τι, with marg. F, corr. E.

ἢ ποιότης] Two difficulties
stand in the way of the recep-
tion of any new 'term of art';
the strangeness of the word,
and the effort required to fol-
low the generalization which it
presupposes.

2. ἀλλόκοτον] 'Strange and
uncouth.'

3. ἀθρόον λεγόμενον] 'The col-
lective (i. e. general) expression.'
This harmonizes with the lan-
guage adopted above, p. 157. δεῖ
δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ
περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ
ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρωπὸν τε τίθενται
καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶον τε καὶ
εἶδος.

The conception of quality is
of later growth than that of
kind or form; this being less

abstract, and still retaining a
tinge of metaphor.

8. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων—αἰ-
σθανόμενα] The construction al-
ters as the sense develops itself;
at first scarcely more is intended
than γίγνεσθαι ὅσα αἰεὶ γίγνεται:
presently the genitive becomes
the subject of the infinitive.
'But out of both as they come
together—they become, while
producing sensations and sen-
sible things, the one of a cer-
tain kind, the other percipient.'

14. φυλάττωμεν—ἵνα μὴ ἀλῶ
ταύτη μένον] Cf. supr. p. 154: φυ-
λάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἶπω. Infr.
p. 183: ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀπόκρισις
ὀρθὴ φανῇ. And, for the argu-
ment, Cratyl. 439: Ἄρ' οὖν οἶόν
τε προσειπεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ αἰεὶ
ὑπεξέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκείνὸ
ἐστίν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη
ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθύς

p. 182.

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ἄς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, φερόμενά τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δ' οὐ; εἴ πέρ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἠλλοιοῦτο δὲ 5 μὴ, εἴχομεν ἂν που εἰπεῖν, οἷα ἅττα ρεῖ τὰ φερόμενα ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

d ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ρεῖν τὸ ρέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου 10 εἶναι ροήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην χροῖαν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλῶ ταύτη μένον· ἀρά ποτε οἷόν τέ τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ αἰεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ἅτε 15 δὴ ρέον;

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐρουῦμεν ὅποιασούν, οἷον τῆς τοῦ ὄραν ἢ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ e ὄραν ἢ ἀκούειν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐκουν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται. 20

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ὄραν προσητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὄραν, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην αἰσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ, πάντων γε πάντως κινουμένων.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν αἰσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἔφαμεν 25 ἐγώ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

ΘΕΟ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

If the qualities moved without changing, we might give them names. But now, while each of them is moving between object and subject, it also changes, so that while you are naming it, it has become something else.

And the same argument applies to the sensations, and to Sensation, which we said was Knowledge. Therefore when we said Sensation was Knowledge, it would have been equally true to say, Not-knowledge.

γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξίεναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν;

12. τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα] To give the name of any color (to an object) — To use the

name of any colour so as to apply it rightly.

17. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως] So far of αἰσθητά, now of αἰσθήσεις.

The principle of motion has proved a fallacious support, since according to it every answer, whether Yes or No, is, or rather becomes, equally true, except that both Yes and No are falsified while we are uttering them. A new dialect should be invented to carry out this theory. The only word for it

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστήμην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη. p. 182.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐοίκατε. p. 183.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα 5 τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσιν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ', ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις, περὶ ὅτου ἂν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίνεσθαι, 10 ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ὅρθως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι οὕτω τε εἶπον καὶ οὐχ οὕτω. δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο τὸ οὕτω λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ 15 αὖ ἐτι κινεῖτο τὸ οὕτω· οὐδ' αὖ μὴ οὕτω· οὐδὲ γὰρ τούτο κίνησις· ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς

4. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν] “Here is a fine result of having corrected (or completed) our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest, and so to make it clear that that first answer was right, whereas it would seem to be made clear that if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right, both ‘it is so’ and ‘it is not so,’ or, if you choose, ‘becomes so,’ that we may say nothing that would bring them to a stand-still.” Heind. compares Rep. X. 602: *χαρίεις ἂν εἶη κ.τ.λ.*

8. οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι] In apposition to ἀπόκρισις. While you are naming a quality, it is altered and slips away; and while you are naming a sensation, it has given place to another. While you say the words Sense is knowledge, your theory

of change compels you to utter in the same breath, Sense is not knowledge. In supporting your answer by the doctrine of motion, you have made this and every other answer alike unstable.

12. Πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε] *μὴ* is changed to *οὐχ*, because the words are taken out of their hypothetical connexion. Compare the language of the Parmenides, e. g. p. 158: *ἐν τε δὲ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἐν μήτε πολλὰ.*

13. οὐδὲ γὰρ] “For when we think of ‘so,’ there is no motion in it: nor yet in ‘not so.’”

15. ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον] Cf. supr. 157. Soph. 252: *τῷ τε εἶναί που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χωρὶς καὶ τῷ ἄλλων καὶ τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μυρίοις ἐτέροις, ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ*

p. 183. τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐ-
τῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐδ'
ὅπως. μάλιστα δ' οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἄπειρον
λεγόμενον.

ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου
ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὐπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ'
c ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ φρόνι-
μός τις ἦ ἐπιστήμην τε αἰσθησιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα
κατά γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μὴ τί 10
πως ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει.

ἄλλων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγχόντων,
κ. τ. λ.

(15.) φωνήν] "Dialect."

Arist. Met. I. 4. 1008. a :
οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτ' οὐχ οὕτως λέ-
γει, ἀλλ' οὕτως τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως.
καὶ πάλιν γε ταῦτα ἀπόφησιν ἄμφω
ὅτι οὐθ' οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως. εἰ
γὰρ μὴ, ἦδη ἂν εἶη τι ὠρισμένον.

Aristotle points out (1), that
it does not follow, because
quantity is wholly relative, that
quality need be so also; (2) that
it is not the quality, but the
subject of it, which changes.

Sensations are wholly shifting
and relative. They could not
be the objects of the mind, un-
less we perceived resemblance
and difference in them. In
every act of sense, therefore,
there is a universal element,
and the mind gives to it its
own stamp of unity.

Arist. Met. T. 1008. a : καὶ
γίγνεται δὴ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ
πάντα χρήματα· ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς
ὑπάρχειν. τὸ ἀόριστον οὖν εἰκόασι
λέγειν, καὶ οἰόμενοι τὸ ἂν λέγειν,
περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λέγουσιν· τὸ γὰρ
δυνάμει ἂν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχείᾳ τὸ

ἀόριστόν ἐστιν.

2. τὸ οὐδ' ὅπως—ἄπειρον λεγό-
μενον] With most of the Greek
philosophers the Infinite was a
purely negative idea.

At this point sensation ap-
pears to be annihilated. And
yet if we view the dialogue as
a whole, the impression we re-
ceive from it is rather this:—
Sensations are purely relative
to the individual, and infinitely
diverse: taken alone, therefore,
they cannot be the objects of
knowledge and thought: but it
is not denied that they are the
occasions of thought and the
conditions of knowledge. (p.
186. ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν
οὐκ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ
ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ.)

3. οὕτως ἂν αὐτ.] Viz. οὐδ'
ὅπως.

6. τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου] This τε
is answered to by ἐπιστήμην τε—
καὶ is expegetic.

Aristotle, Met. Γ. 1009. a, ex-
presses the same sense of relief,
καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴ-
ημεν τοῦ ἀκράτου καὶ κωλύοντές τι
τῇ διανοίᾳ ὀρίσασθαι.

at present
is, In no
way.

Thus we
are rid, not
only of
Protagoras,
but also of
the theory
of sense, so
far as it is
based on
motion.

ΘΕΟ. "Αριστ' εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες" τούτων γὰρ p. 183.
περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινόμενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίη.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ πρὶν γ' ἄν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὐτὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι διέλθητε, δ ὥσπερ ἄρτι προὔθεσθε.

ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὢν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ
10 παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάνπερ γε βούληται. ἤδιστα μέντ' ἂν ἤκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

Theætetus desires now to hear the opposite theory (that of rest) discussed. But Socrates declines doing so. 'Parmenides, whom I once saw in his old age, inspires me, for his glorious depth, with reverence

ΘΕΟ. Ἴππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς
15 λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, περί γε ὧν κελεύει Θεαίτητος, οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ. e

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ ἐν ἐστὸς
20 λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶμεν, ἦττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἓνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρ-

4. σχοίη] The optative depends on συνθηκᾶς. As it was agreed I should, when the discussion of Protagoras' argument should be completed.

14. Ἴππέας εἰς πεδίον] "You challenge cavalry to an encounter in an open plain."

Schol. : Ἴππέας προκαλεῖσθαι εἰς πεδίον, ἐπὶ τῶν τοὺς ἐν τισι βελτίους καὶ ἐπιστημονικωτέρους αὐτῶν εἰς ἔριν προκαλουμένων. Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ καὶ Μένανδρος Καταψευδομένῳ. γράφεται δὲ

καὶ Ἴππον εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ἃ βούλεται τις προκαλούντων. The latter interpretation is alone suitable here.

18. Τί δὴ οὖν] Either 'in what respect?' or 'for what reason?' The former is preferable. Comp. Rep. p. 449 : Τί μάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε; Σέ, ἦ δ' ὅς. Ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα; Ἀπορῥαθυμῆν ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη—

19. ἐστὸς] So Bodl. (though rather doubtfully) with Vat. Ven. Π.

p. 183. μενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἅμα [εἶναι] δεινός τε. συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος

p. 184. τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. φοβούμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυγιώμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλεόν λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὐ ἔνεκα ὁ λόγος ὠρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἄσκεπτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐ-

and awe.
I fear,
therefore,
lest we
should
mistake
his words,
and still
more his
thoughts,
and lest the
crowd of
discussions
which
would

1. τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου] Π. III. 172 : αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἔσσι, φίλε ἔκυρέ, δεινός τε. (Post ἅμα Zitt. Ven. Π. Par. C. εἶναι inserunt. Stallb. This is very possibly right.)

2. συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ—τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτη] In what connection do these words stand with the Parmenides? Do they imply that Plato had already written it, or that he had conceived it; or do they refer to a fact or to a supposition which was the germ from which that dialogue sprang, or which was used to ornament it, by Plato or by some one else? Or did Plato add the present passage after both dialogues had been written? Some light is thrown upon this question by comparing Soph. 217 : οἶον (δι' ἐρωτήσεων) καὶ Παρμενίδην χρωμένον καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὢν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσβύτου. This passage conveys the impression that the written dialogue is referred to. At all events, the repeated reference helps to mark the Parmenides as belonging to this series of dialogues. The same conception of the time at which Parmenides lived, and the same reverence for him, is implied in the words of the Eleatic stranger,

(his professed disciple), Soph. 237 : Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ἃ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὔσιν—ἀπεμαρτύρατο—ἔδε ἐκάστοτε λέγων.

3. βάθος τι] "A magnificent depth of mind." Schol. φαίνεται καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης σεμνύνων τὸν Παρμενίδην.

4. οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα] It is remarkable to find in Plato such a distinct perception of the difference between the grammatical sense and the real drift of an author.

7. ἄσκεπτον γένηται] "Should fail to be considered through the endless intrusion of alien subjects of inquiry."

8. ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων] We pass from the image of a flood (sup. 177.) to that of a disorderly crowd of discussions. Compare Philebus, p. 62 : βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ὠθύμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἠτήθεις ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν καὶ μίγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρᾷ τὴν ἐνδεστέραν; See also Shakespeare, Rape of Lucrece : 'Much like a press of people at a door throng her inventions, which shall go before.' For the use of the verb, see Rep. p. 500 : ἐπεισκεκωμάκοντας—said of the bad philosophers.

enter in
should
cause the
question
about
Knowledge
to be end-
lessly de-
ferred.

Transition
from sense
to opinion.

We there-
fore return
once more
upon our
old track,
and ask,
With what
do we see
and hear
what is
white or
shrill?

Do we see
and hear
with our
eyes and
ears or
through
them?

Not with,
but through.

τοῖς πείσεται ἄλλως τε καί, ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει p. 184.
ἀμήχανον, εἴ τέ τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξι' ἂν
πάθοι, εἴτε ἰκανῶς, μηκυνόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης
ἀφανιεῖ. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὧν κνεῖ b
5 περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ
ἀπολύσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν
εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην
10 ἀπεκρίνω. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ' ἐρωτῶη· τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ
μέλανα ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξεῖα καὶ βαρέα
ἀκούει; εἴποις ἂν, οἶμαι, ὄμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερές τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων ο
καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ
ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθε-
ρον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἶον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπι-
20 λαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνει, ἦ οὐκ ὀρθή.

2. εἴ τε τις κ.τ.λ.] The reasons
given here for avoiding a criticism
of Parmenides and the Eleatic
doctrine are not such as would
prevent its being discussed in
another dialogue. It would
therefore be a mistake to argue
from them against the genui-
ness of the Sophista. Compare
with the expression ὃν νῦν ἐγεί-
ρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον— Rep. p.
450: οὐκ ἴστε ὅσον ἐσμόν λόγων
ἐπεγείρετε.

4. ὧν κνεῖ] Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.
ὄν. Perhaps rightly.

6. ἀπολύσαι] "To deliver."

8. Ἔτι τοίνυν] As usual, the

transition to a new hypothesis
is not made without reference
to the last.

16. Τὸ—εὐχερές] 'Facility about
words and phrases rather than
minute criticism.' Cf. Polit. 261:
ἂν διαφυλάξης τὸ μὴ σπουδάξεν
ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς
τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως.
Cf. Arist. Met. 995 a: τοὺς δὲ
λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβές ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνα-
σθαι συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολο-
γίαν· ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβές τοιοῦ-
τον, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβο-
λαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθε-
ρον εἶναι τισι δοκεῖ.

p. 184. σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθότερα, ᾧ ὀρώμεν, τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὗ ὀρώμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν, ὦτα, ἢ δι' οὗ ἀκούομεν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.

d ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὅ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντέίνει, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείνως.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ δέ τοι ἔνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ τι ἐν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων e ἐτέρων αὖ τινῶν. καὶ ἔξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν ; ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σέ λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καί μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνει, ἄρα οὐ τοῦ σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης ; ἢ ἄλλου τινός ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

5
10
15
20
We are not each of us a sort of Trojan-horse-full of faculties. There is one presiding nature, in which they all meet. It is this *with* which we see *through* our eyes and hear *through* our ears. But we cannot see and hear *through* the same organ.

6. Δεινὸν γάρ που] 'Would it not be strange, if in each of us there were perched, as in a sort of Trojan horse, a number of separate perceptions, and these did not all meet in some one nature, the Mind or what you will, *with* which, *through* these as instruments, we perceive the various objects of sense?'

7. ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις] The plural is caused by ἡμῖν. As if each of us were a sort of wooden machine, like the Trojan horse.—Man cannot be re-

garded as a bundle of separate faculties having no higher unity: that would be too mechanical a conception of his nature. The term 'organ of sense' perhaps originates with this passage.

12. Τοῦ δέ τοι ἔνεκα] It is with a view to this that I am so exact with you, namely, to the inquiry whether, &c. τοῦδε has a double reference to εἰς μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν——αἰσθητά and to εἴ τι κ. τ. λ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἃ δι' ἐτέρας
δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταῦτ' p. 185.
αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως,
δι' ἀκοῆς ;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω ;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν
διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὄργανου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου
περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι ἂν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

10 ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χροῆς πρῶτον μὲν
αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω
ἐστὸν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον,
15 ἐαυτῷ δὲ ταῦτόν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δὲ ἓν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν,
20 δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν δια-
νοεῖ ; οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷόν τε τὸ
κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμή-
25 ριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατὸν εἶη ἀμφοτέρω

There are some things which we perceive about the objects of both senses, e. g. that they are both, that they are different from each other, and each the same with itself. That both are two, and each is one. That they are like or unlike.

Through what do you perceive these things ? If I had asked through

1. ἃ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεως] The object of one sense cannot be perceived by another. Therefore if I perceive anything about the objects of two different senses, it cannot be through either of them.

23. τὸ κοινόν] That which regards them both. You can re-

fer any particular sensation to its proper organ. Can you do so in the case of these common perceptions ?

Cf. Rep. p. 522 : Οἷον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται—ἐπιστήμαι—τὸ ἓν, τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν.

p. 185. σκέψασθαι, ἄρ' ἐστὸν ἀλμυρὸν ἢ οὐ, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἕξεις
 ο εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοή
 φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο.

what do you perceive that they are salt, you would have said the tongue.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, ἢ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης.
 δύναμις ; 5

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἢ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό
 τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ τὸ
 ἔστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ ἠρω-
 τῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν ; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις
 ὄργανα, δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον 10
 ἕκαστα ;

Through what do you perceive being and not-being, sameness and difference, unity and plurality, odd and even ?

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιό-
 τητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον,
 δ ἔτι δὲ ἓν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον
 δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾶς, καὶ τᾶλλα 15
 ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος
 τῆ ψυχῆ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ὑπέρευ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἂ
 ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν 20
 ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλήν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ'
 εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ
 ο ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῆ τὰ κοινὰ μοι
 φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

Theætetus answers, that these are perceived through no special bodily organ, but by the mind itself, surveying

ΣΩ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε 25

6. τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις] Which is common not only to all the senses, but to all things.

ferring to what has just preceded.

8. ἂ νῦν δὴ ἠρωτῶμεν] Viz. as Theætetus understands it, ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἓν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν, re-

9. περὶ αὐτῶν] Concerning the objects of sense.

22. ὄργανον ἴδιον] The Bodl. MS. has ὄργανίδιον.

25. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ] The enthusiasm with which Socrates accepts Theætetus' acknowledg-

what is common to all.

Socrates receives his answer with delight.

There are some things then which the mind itself perceives without the help of the body.

Being is the most universal of these.

Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός τε p. 185.
καγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα
συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι τὰ μὲν
αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ
5 σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι
ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε.

p. 186.

ΣΩ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ
μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὦν αὐτὴ ἢ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτὴν
ἐπορέγεται.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, καὶ τὸ ταύ-
τὸν καὶ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ment of the truth that the mind has its perceptions, independent of sense, belongs to the most interesting aspect of Greek Philosophy. "Gradually it threw off the garment of sense; it revealed a world of ideas. It is impossible for us to conceive the intensity of these ideas in their first freshness: they were not ideas but gods, penetrating into the soul of the disciple, sinking into the mind of the human race; objects not of speculation only, but of faith and love." (Jowett.) Comp., as another instance of this religious feeling, Soph. 265: νῦν μὴν βλέπων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἶσθαί σε κατὰ γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι, ταύτη καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα. Καλῶς γε ὦ Θεαίτητε. καὶ εἰ μὲν γέ σε ἠγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγκαίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολο-

γεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σοῦ καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσσεισιν ἐφ' ἅπερ νῦν ἔλκεσθαι φῆς, εἴσω· χρόνος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοιτ' ἄν.

2. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ] Ad καλῷ ex præcedd. mente repetendum εἶναι, quæ notatu dignum est ellipsis, quum post hæc πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ non inferatur nominativus, verbo εἶ vel addito vel subaudiendo, velut infertur Sympos. p. 195 c. Νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἀπαλός—. Heind. Præter hoc pulchrum, quod in te laudavi. Stallb. The latter is right.

'Not only beautiful, but you have done me a kindness'— Cf. Eurip. Hec. 382. Καλῶς μὲν εἶπας, θύγατερ, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ λύπη πρόσσεισιν.

8. τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται] i. e. ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινόν ἐστὶ. It will serve therefore as a sort of crucial instance.

p. 186. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχροῦν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν ;

The Good and Beautiful are also thus perceived.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἀλληλασκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη
b ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλ- 5
λοντα.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθῆσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως ;

All such ideas the mind immediately contemplates, surveying with a view to the future the present and the past, e. g. The quality of hardness is perceived through the touch.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὅ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἢ ψυχὴ ἐπανιούσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἀλληλακρίνειν πειράται ἡμῖν.

15 But that it is, that it is opposite to

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι
c φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα

3. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] In this and similar phrases the article retains its demonstrative force, as is evident where the words are separated ; e. g. Euthyd. 303 : ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. Soph. Œd. Col. 746 : ἐκ δὲ τῶν μάλιστ' ἐγώ.

4. πρὸς ἀλληλασκοπεῖσθαι] Viz. as opposites.

Theætetus is probably thinking of the recent argument in which ἀγαθόν, ὠφέλιμον, μέλλον, were identified. Throughout this dialogue we can hardly be said to rise to the conception of an existence or a goodness above time, except almost mythically in p. 177. That goodness in its actual working

is always relative, is asserted Rep. 457 : κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερόν αἰσχροῦν.

ἀναλογιζομένη] 'Thinking over the past and present with a view to the future.'

11. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν] Sc. τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. In this and similar passages Plato may be said to be appealing to the consciousness of his reader.

13. ἐπανιούσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα] Returning upon (reviewing) the sensations, it perceives the Being of their objects, and comparing these together, perceives their opposition, and the Being of this again.

softness, and that this opposition is, the mind itself seeks to decide, returning over its sensations, and comparing them.

The one power belongs to all live creatures from their birth: the other is slowly attained, and only by some men. Sensation does not reach being, there-

διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· p. 186.
τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγισ καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγνηται.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μὴδὲ οὐσίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐνὶ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς ἔοικε, δυνατόν ἄψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

1. ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει] 'Extend to the mind.' Cf. Tim. 64: τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν εὐκίνητον—καὶ βραχὺ πάθος—διαδίδωσιν—ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνιμον—τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ἐδραῖον δν—ἀναίσθητον παρέσχε τὸ παθόν.

Phileb. 33: θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβευνύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελεῖν, ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα, καὶ τινα ὥσπερ σεισμόν ἐντιθέντα ἰδίον τε καὶ κοινὸν ἐκατέρῳ.

2. ἀναλογίσματα] 'But what the mind discovers by reflecting upon these.' The idea of proportion (τὸ ἀνάλογον) does not seem to enter into the verb ἀναλογίζομαι and its derivative noun.

6. ᾧ μὴδὲ οὐσίας] Ad dat. hunc ᾧ repetendum est οἷόν τε (potestne illud verum assequi quod ne οὐσίαν quidem assequi

potest?), ut declarant illa mox: Ἐύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἰσθησιν; Ἀνάγκη. Ωἴτε, φάμεν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἄψασθαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας. Heindorf.

But in the present connexion ᾧ is probably masculine. 'Is it possible for him to reach truth who misses being?' There is a transition in the next question from the subject to the object, from αἰσθανόμενος to αἰσθητόν. 'But can one have knowledge of that, the truth of which he misses?'

12. ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ] Something very different from syllogism is meant, and more nearly analogous to generalization. Cf. Phædr. 249: Δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον.

p. 186. ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ταῦτόν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οὖν δὴ δίκαιόν γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὄρῳ, ἀκούειν, ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι;

e ΘΕΑΙ. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Ξύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἰσθησιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ὦμι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἄψασθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἰσθησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταυτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὄν αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη.

fore it fails of truth : therefore it is not knowledge. This lies not in our impressions, but in that, which the mind collects from them.

Sensation, therefore, has no share in knowledge. They are wholly distinct.

15

We have found what knowledge

12. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης] The gen. is governed by μέτεστιν alone. ἀληθείας and οὐσίας are governed partly by μέτεστιν, partly by ἄψασθαι.

16. μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανέστατον] For the double superl., cf. Rep. 331 : ἀλλά γε ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνός οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι.

17. καταφανέστατον γέγονεν] The criticism of sensation is now complete. We see it clearly, as relative, shifting, momentary, inseparable from physical conditions : we have placed ourselves above it, and proceed to explore the region next beyond, that of opinion.

To recapitulate the criticism of ἐπιστήμη αἰσθησις. 1. Certain presumptions are raised against the saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρον, as that it makes all beings equally wise, and that it implies that we can at once know and not know the same thing. 2. Protagoras is convicted out of his own mouth, for in confirming the opinion of other men he confutes himself. 3. There is at least one sphere of knowledge which is above sense, the foresight of consequences, the perception of what is good. 4. And within the sphere of sense, if sensation depend on motion, and motion include change, no quality can have a

is not. We set out to find what it is. Yet we have gained something. We shall not seek for it any more in sensation, but in whatever that is called, when the mind is by itself engaged with being. Opinion is the name for this.

II. Knowledge is true opinion.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἔνεκα ἤρχόμεθα p. 187. διαλεγόμενοι, ἵνα εὕρωμεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' 5 ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἢ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, δοξάζειν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶει, ὃ φίλε. καὶ ὄρα δὴ νῦν 10 πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι β μᾶλλον καθορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγε αὐθις τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστὶ δόξα· κινδυνεύει δὲ 15 ἢ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. εἰ γὰρ μὴ φανῆ προἰούσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω μέντοι χρή, ὃ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὄκνεῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

name of its own. 5. The mind receives impressions from without through certain bodily organs; but knowledge implies the comparison of the impressions received through different organs, and this must be the immediate function of the mind.

We have made sensation objective, and have risen to the consciousness of that which contemplates and pronounces upon sensations.

5. ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι] 'But in that other term, whatever it is, which is applied to the mind when engaged alone with being.'

The form of expression is partly influenced by the words Τί οὖν ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα κ. τ. λ.

10. πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας] As if in a mathematical demonstration.

13. Δόξαν] δόξα follows naturally upon αἰσθησις. Charm. p. 158, 9: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἴ σοι πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνούσαν αὐτὴν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, αἰσθησίν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἂν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη ὃ τί ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἢ σωφροσύνη.

17. ἄλλο τι] Not adverbial here.

p. 187. εἰ γὰρ οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὐρήσομεν ἐφ'
 c ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἦττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῆ
 ἴσμεν· καὶ τοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος.
 καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῆς; δυοῖν ὄντων [εἰδέοις] δόξης,
 τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου, τὴν ἀληθῆ 5
 δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτ' ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν
 πάλιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

10

d ΣΩ. Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολ-
 λάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς
 ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο
 τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον.

But, still
 to return
 upon a for-
 mer track,

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

15

ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν
 ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον εἰσώμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα
 ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.

Is false
 opinion
 possible?

4. [εἰδέοις] MSS. ιδέαυ.

8. ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν] 'To take up a thread of the previous argument.'

Though we have dismissed the saying of Protagoras, so far as it is bound up with sense, τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι, (φαντασία being συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως), yet the same question returns upon us in regard to opinion considered by itself. This forms a link of connexion between the present inquiry and the foregoing. Cf. Cratyl. 429: Ἄρ' ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι.

See also Euthyd. 284, 286,

where the ἀπορία (ὅτι ψεύδεσθαι, ἀντιλέγειν, οὐκ ἔστιν) is ascribed to the followers of Protagoras amongst others.

13. τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῖν] 'This experience of the human mind.'

16. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι] Though the past discussion has been "wiped out," this still remains "to trouble the mind's eye."

18. ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον] i. e. Not with reference to sensation and motion, but in a more abstract way. The 'manner' has something in it of the Eleatic spirit. For the expression, compare Soph. 245. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ πέρ γε καὶ ὅπη- p. 187.
 γούν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ
 Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς περί, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοι-
 οῖσδε κατεπείγει.

5 ΣΩ. Ὅρθως ὑπέμνησας. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ και- e
 ροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἶχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γάρ που
 σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῆ φαμέν
 10 ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καὶ τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ,
 τὸν δ' αὖ ἀληθῆ, ὡς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γὰρ δῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τότε γ' ἔσθ' ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ p. 188.
 καθ' ἕκαστον, ἤτοι εἰδέναί ἢ μὴ εἰδέναί; μαυθάνειν
 15 γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαί-
 ρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον
 ἐστὶν οὐδέν.

1. In re-
 gard to
 every thing
 one of two
 alternatives
 is true of
 us. Either
 we know it,
 or do not
 know it.

6. πάλιν ὥσπερ ἶχνος μετελθεῖν]
 We seemed to ourselves to be
 launching into a wholly new
 inquiry, but we have fallen into
 the same track by a different
 route. Cf. Aristot. Eth. I. :
 μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν
 ἀφίκεται. Aesch. Prom. 864. ταῦτόν
 μετελθὼν τῶν πάλαι λόγων ἶχνος.

4. ἤτοι εἰδέναί ἢ μὴ εἰδέναί]
 This takes up the thread of
 reflection introduced above, p.
 165 : ἄρ' οἶόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα
 τι τοῦτο ὁ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναί; It was
 one weakness of the 'sensational'
 doctrine that it led to this con-
 tradiction. The same opposition
 considered in the abstract is now
 used to prove the impossibility
 of falsehood in opinion.

The discussion which follows
 probably bears some relation
 to the notions of Gorgias, and

perhaps of Antisthenes. At all
 events it would seem to be a
 fragment of Eleaticism; being
 exactly parallel to the difficul-
 ties raised by Zeno against the
 possibility of motion. It runs
 parallel also to the subtleties of
 the later Megarians.

6. νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν
 οὐδέν] Because we choose to
 dwell on the absolute alterna-
 tive, knowledge or ignorance.
 Cf. supr. p. 158. μὴ ὑπολάβω-
 μεν—.

Plato thus hints at the true
 solution of the difficulty, viz.
 the conception of a gradual
 process, which is afterwards
 presented under the image of
 the impressions on wax, &c.

The doctrine of recollection,
 developed in the Meno and
 Phædo, is also held in reserve.

p. 188. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλα μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν
λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν
ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ
b εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὗ;

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα
οἶεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ
ἀμφοτέρωθεν εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφοτέρωθεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἠγείται αὐτὰ εἶναι
ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαί-
τητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν
ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

c ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἄν;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ μὴν, ἃ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἶεται πού ἃ μὴ
οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις ἔτι ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς
γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν που δοξάζειν, ἐπεὶ περ πάντ' ἢ
ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται
δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ ταύτη σκεπτέον ὃ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ
τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι
d καὶ μὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

19. αὐτὰ] Cf. Phæd. 99: ὁ δὴ
μοι φαίνονται — ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ
προσαγορεύειν: and see p. 155 n.

20. Τέρας] Supr. p. 163: τέρας

γὰρ ἀνεῖη δὲ λέγεις. Phæd. 101. alib.

23. ἐν δὲ τούτοις] 'And under
this alternative.'

27. εἶναι] So the Coislinian MS.

(The inter-
mediate
processes
of learning
and forget-
ting may
be left out
of sight as
beside our
present ar-
gument.)
In thinking,
therefore, I
must think
of some-
thing which
I know, or
which I do
not know.

But I can-
not know
and be ig-
norant of
the same
thing.

Therefore
I cannot
think
falsely, for
I cannot
think one
thing which
I know to
be another
which I
know, else
I should
know it
and not
know it.
Nor what
I do not
know to be
something
else which
I do not
know, for
what I
know not
cannot be
present to

my mind.
Nor what
I do not
know to be
what I
know, nor
what I
know to be
what I do
not know.
And what
other case
(under the
above al-
ternative)
is conceiv-
able?

2. The path
of know-
ledge being
thus hem-
med in, we
try the path
of being.
To think
that which
is not, is
to think
falsely.
But can I
think of

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὅτου οὖν p. 188.
δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὡς οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάσει, κὰν ὅπως οὖν
ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

5 ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰάν τις
ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνη; Δυνατὸν δὲ ὅπως οὖν ὁ λέγεται, καί τις
ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του
εἴτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς
ταῦτα φήσομεν ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἰόμενος. e

10 ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως,

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ὁρᾷ μὲν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔν γε τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ.
ἢ σὺ οἶει ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὔσιν εἶναι;

1. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ] "May it not
possibly be simply thus:" μὴ
expresses *suspicion* = "I should
not wonder if." Cf. Phaed. 67.
μὴ οὐ θεμιτόν ἢ. Ibid. 69. : μὴ
γὰρ οὐχ αὐτῆ ἢ ἢ ὀρθῆ ἀλλαγῆ
κ. τ. λ. μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἢ
τοιαύτη ἀρετή. Crit. 48 : μὴ—
ταῦτα—σκέμματα ἢ : and see Ast.
Lex. sub v. For ἀπλοῦν in this
sense, v. supr. 147 : ἀπλοῦν εἰ-
πεῖν. Symp. 184. Polit. 306 :
πότερον οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ τοῦτο,
ἢ—ἔχει διαφορὰν—. Aristot.
Eth. N. V. 9. 9 : ἢ οὐδὲ τοῦτο
ἀπλοῦν.

6. ὁ λέγεται] Which is assert-
ed. Buttman and Bekker conj.
λέγετε, which seems probable,
but not necessary. Cf. Phaed.
77, where there is a similar
doubt.

14. Εἴ] Interrogative.

16. εἰ ἔν γε τι ὁρᾷ] The con-
verse argument is used Rep.
478, where it is asked, 'What
is opinion concerned with?'
ἢ οἶόν τε αὐ δοξάζει μὲν δοξάζει
δὲ μηδέν; Ἀδύνατον. Ἀλλ' ἐν γε
τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων; Ναί. Ἀλλὰ
μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἔν τι, ἀλλὰ μηδέν
ὀρθότατ' ἂν προσαγορεύοιτο. Πάνυ
γε. This close relation between
the ideas of unity and being,
derived from Parmenides, ap-
pears frequently. See esp.
Soph. 238 : ἀνάγκη τὸν τι λέγοντα
ἐν γε τι λέγειν. The mind can-
not recognise being except
where it finds its own impress
of unity.

Ar. Met. 1006. b. : οὐθέν γὰρ
ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἐν.

p. 188. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἔν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

p. 189. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἔν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὄν ἀκούει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ του, ἐνός γέ του ἀπτεται καὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἐνός ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἔν τι δοξάζει ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δ' ἔν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ξυγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὄν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν.

b ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἶόν τε τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλο ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὗ [τε] γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον²⁵ ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδῆς ἐστὶ δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα ὧδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν ;

what is not, either absolutely or with reference to any thing?

I cannot see, and yet see nothing.

And that which I see, being one thing, must have existence.

For unity and being are inseparable. The same is true of hearing and touch.

And of thought also.

To think what is not is to think nothing, and to think nothing is not to think.

False opinion, if it exists, must be something different from this.

19. περὶ τῶν ὄντων] Arist. Met. Γ. 2. 1004 : ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ στέρησιν μᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι διὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἔν, οὐ ἢ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἢ στέρησις (ἢ

γὰρ ἀπλῶς λέγομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο ἢ τινι γένει κ. τ. λ.)

25. MSS. οὐ γάρ. τε seems required, but γὰρ is right. Cf. p. 190.

28. Ἄλλ' ἄρα ὧδε γινν.] 'But

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς ;

3. Can it then be a transference of thought : i. e. When I think one existing thing to be another ?

Theaetetus believes this must be the true falsehood.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμέν εἶναι δόξαν, ὅταν τις τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν ὄντων, ο ἀνταλλαζόμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φῆ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὄν μὲν αἰεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἑτέρου, καὶ ἀμαρτάνων οὐ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῆ δοξάζων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γάρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν 10 δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῆ.

ΣΩ. Δῆλος εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα ;

Socrates claims moderation for not pressing this contradiction in terms, and passes on.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους 15 ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἶόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίνεσθαι, ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρρήσης, ἀφήμι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φῆς, τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ 20 δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε.

may it be supposed, then, that the following occurrence is what we express by this name ? 'What ?' 'That what we call false opinion is really a sort of transference of opinion.'

2. Ἀλλοδοξίαν] This seems to have been a prevalent conception. Vid. Arist. Met. Γ. 5. 1010. a. : φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἑκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς, κείσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς φρονούντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονούντας, ἀλλ' οὐ ταυτά. He ascribes this application of

Homer to Democritus, de An. I. 2. Cf. Herod. I. 85 : ἀλλογνώσας τὸν Κροῖσον.

φαμέν] In apposition with the preceding verb; introduced by ὡδε.

14. τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους] Rep. 382 : τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεύδος, εἰ οἶόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν. Phil. 23 : Ἄρα ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἠδονήν.

18. ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρρήσης] Supr. 163 : ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. He refers to the boldness with which Theaetetus now answers, See p. 187.

p. 189. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὡς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἢ διάνοιά του δρᾶ, οὐ καὶ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἦτοι ἀμφοτέρα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανο- 5 εἶσθαι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κάλλιστα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὃ περ ἐγὼ καλεῖς ; 10

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν ;

ΣΩ. Λόγον οὖν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχὴ διεξέρ-
χεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὡς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀπο-
φαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη, οὐκ
p. 190. ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ 15
ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν
δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον, εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαί-
ξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη φῆ καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην
τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἐγῶγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ

When I take one thing for another, I must have either one or both things in my mind, either at once or in turn.

Now thought is the mind's self-dialogue, in question and answer. When it has agreed with itself upon a final answer, we call this its opinion.

2. ὡς ἐκεῖνο] Referring to the first ἕτερον.

8. Ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει ;] The bearing of these words is not quite clear. Perhaps they are meant to introduce the analysis of thinking, in which things are present to the mind at first successively, afterwards in one view.

Compare with this account of thinking Phileb. pp. 38, 39, where the mind not only talks with itself, but has a writer and a painter within it. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμᾶς ——— κ. τ. λ. Soph. 263 : Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταῦτόν· πλὴν ὃ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἀνευ

φωνῆς γιγνόμενος κ. τ. λ.

14. τοῦτο γάρ μοι] Plato was probably thinking of Odyssee 19. 224 : ἐρέω, ὡς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἦτορ. Compare the φάσματα in the beginning of the dialogue. 'The semblance it presents to me, when it thinks, is simply that of conversing, and of being engaged in question and answer with itself.'

16. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα] 'But when it has come to a determination, whether slowly, or having flown rapidly to its conclusion, and so is now at one and not divided in judgment, we call this its opinion.'

καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον p.190.
οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν. σὺ δὲ τί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ γώ.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ
5 φησὶν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἄναμιμνήσκου δὴ εἰ πώποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σε-
αυτόν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχροὺν ἐστίν
ἢ τὸ ἀδίκον δίκαιον, ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον,
10 σκόπει εἴ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτόν πείθειν ὡς παν-
τὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον
οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτόν

Opinion is
a silent
proposi-
tion.

To think
this to be
that, is to
say, This
is that.

Now who
ever said
to himself,
'Surely fair
is foul,' or
'wrong is
right,' or
'odd is
even'?

8. παντὸς μᾶλλον—παντάπασιν
ἄρα—ἀνάγκη] The dramatic force
of such particles is noticeable: cf.
Phil. 38: αὐτόν—ἀνέροιτ' ἦν ὧδε—
τίποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρά τὴν πέτραν—

The Greek language from
Homer downwards was pecu-
liarly apt to suggest the above
reflections on the nature of
thought. Διαλεκτικὴ was its
proper development. The fol-
lowing remarks of Col. Mure
(Lit. of Greece, B. II. c. xiv.
§ 1.) on the self-dialogue of
Homer, apply in some degree
to all Greek literature. "Ex-
clusively proper to Homer is
his power of dramatizing, not
merely action, but thought;
not merely the intercourse be-
tween man and man, but be-
tween man and himself, be-
tween his passions and his
judgment. The mechanism of
which the poet here chiefly
avails himself is to exhibit the
person under the influence of
excited feelings as communing

with, or, as Homer defines it,
addressing his own mind; dis-
cussing the subject of his soli-
citude under its various aspects
as a question at issue between
his judgment and himself. The
conflicting feelings are thus, as
it were, personified; while the
current of the language, often
the very sound of the words, is
so nicely adapted to the turns
of the self-dialogue, that the
breast of the man seems to be
laid open before us, and in the
literal sense of the term, we
read his thoughts as they flit
through his bosom."

12. ἐν ὕπνῳ—ὑγαιίνοντα ἢ
μαινόμενον] Note the liveliness
with which fresh touches are
thrown in. It must be remem-
bered here that sensible per-
ception is excluded from con-
sideration for the present, as
well as learning and forgetting.
Everything is either known or
unknown: present to the mind,
or not present.

p. 190. ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἄρτιά ἐστὶν ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλον δέ τινα οἶει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον 5
τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀναπείθοντα
αὐτόν, ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἓν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν 10
ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφοτέρᾳ γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ
ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν
ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν. ἑατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα

Or, 'the cow must be a horse,' or 'two is one.'

Therefore when I mistake this for that, I cannot have both in my mind.

11. ἑατέον δὲ καὶ] Several of the MSS., including Bodl. and Coisl., have ἑατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταῦτόν ἐστι περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, where ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει evidently refers to p. 190 : ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει. This cannot be adopted without rejecting περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου as confusing the sentence. The drift would then be, 'You must not dwell upon the words as regards things alternately presented to the mind, seeing that the word ἕτερον, as far as the word goes, is the same as applied to both.' This would be an imperfect way of developing the distinction thrown out above, and unlike Socrates, who, especially in this dialogue, always waits for Theætetus to follow him. And it is equally necessary to 'let the word alone,' whether the objects are conceived alternately or both at once. And it may be asked, What difference is there in this respect between saying ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν, and ὡς τὸ

αἰσχρόν καλόν? The words ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει must therefore be rejected as a mistaken gloss.

If the words ἐπειδὴ—ταῦτόν ἐστι are genuine, περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου must either be omitted or transposed. But it is possible that this explanation has also crept in from the margin, and this suspicion is strengthened by the fact that the Bodl. p. m. wrote ἐστὶν. We should thus revert to the reading of several MSS. ἑατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. περὶ is often used rather vaguely, e. g. Rep. p. 538. καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. καὶ is a little difficult. It seems to belong to the whole sentence rather than to any particular word. Cf. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 44. ὡς τοῖσιν ἐμπείροισι καὶ τὰς ξυμφορὰς ζώσας ὀρῶ μάλιστα τῶν βουλευμάτων. Ant. 280. παῦσαι πρὶν ὀργῆς κάμει μεστῶσαι λέγων. Œd. Col. 1582. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἤδη κάποθανμάσαι πρέπον. See Ellendt's Lex. Soph. sub voce καί, C. 4.

"Now as regards the word 'this or that,' you must *e'en* let it alone." Or more dis-

περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου· [ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ p. 190. κατὰ ῥῆμα ταυτόν ἐστι.] λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῆδε, μηδένα δὲ δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὼ τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄμφω μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

But if I think only of the one, I cannot think the one to be the other, for I cannot have in my mind that of which I am not thinking.

10 ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μὲν τὸ ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῆ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὐ μὴ δοξάζει.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐτ' ἄρ' ἀμφοτέρα οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δοξάζοντι ἐγχωρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὥστ' εἴ τις ὀριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδῆ τὸ ἕτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι· οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδῆς ἐν ἡμῖν οὔσα δόξα.

This transference, therefore, is also inconceivable.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὄν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ ;

tinctly, 'But, I must add, you will have to let the word alone.' The version of Ficinus led some critics to conjecture εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ. But this, as Buttman observes, would not harmonize with Theætetus' reply. Cf. Euthyd. 301, where the word is dwelt upon. τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ παραγενομένου τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἂν εἴη; Ἄρα τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς;—ἀλλ' ἔγωγε οὐδ' ἂν

παῖδα ᾧμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν.

17. οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη] The clauses, though connected outwardly by γάρ, are rather parallel than consequent, as in p. 152.

22. πολλὰ—καὶ ἄτοπα] e. g. that it is impossible to distinguish the sophist from the true philosopher; and the other difficulties mentioned at large in the Sophista.

p.190. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἐρώ σοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῆ πειραθῶ σκο-
 πῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἀποροῦ-
 μεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐὰν
 p.191. εὖρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότε ἤδη περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων, αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γε- 5
 λοίου ἐστῶτες· ἐὰν δὲ πάντα ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινω-
 θέντες, οἶμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες
 πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὅ τι ἂν βούληται. ἢ οὖν ἔτι
 πόρον τινὰ εὕρισκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἡμῖν, ἄκουε.

We are
 in great
 straits.
 But we
 dare not
 face the
 conse-
 quences of
 failure un-
 til we have
 turned
 every
 stone.

5. αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἐστῶ-
 τες] 'When we are ourselves
 free from the absurdity,' 'ex-
 empt from the ridicule.'

7. παρέξομεν—πατεῖν] Gorg.
 476: γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὡσπερ
 λατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου. alib.
 There is probably an allusion
 to Soph. Aj. 1142 seqq.: 'Ἡδὴ
 ποτ' εἶδον ἄνδρ' ἐγὼ γλώσση θρα-
 σὺν ναυτὰς ἐφορμήσαντα χειμῶνος
 τὸ πλεῖν· ᾧ φθέγμ' ἂν οὐκ ἂν εὔρες
 ἦνικ' ἐν κακῷ χειμῶνος εἶχετ', ἀλλ'
 ὑφ' εἵματος κρυβείς πατεῖν παρείχε
 τῷ θέλοντι ναυτίλων.

The argument from p. 187 to
 p. 191 may be thus condensed.

We no longer search for
 knowledge in sensation, which
 is neither true nor false, but in
 opinion, where the mind is en-
 gaged with its own objects by
 itself. But here an old difficulty
 meets us in another form. It
 seemed that sensation could
 not be false, because it was re-
 lative to the subject. It now
 seems as though opinion can-
 not be false, because we cannot
 separate a thinking subject
 from knowledge and being. What
 I do not know cannot be
 present in thought. Neither
 can I lay hold in thought on

that which is not. But can I
 take one thing which is for an-
 other which also is? Thought
 being silent speech, if I lay
 hold of both, (i. e. if both are
 present to the mind,) I cannot
 mistake them; e. g. No one
 ever said to himself, Good is
 evil. And if only one is pre-
 sent to me, I cannot discourse
 about them, e. g. if I am think-
 ing only of the good, I cannot
 say, Good is evil. We are in
 great straits. For the result
 at which we seem in danger of
 arriving is contradictory to
 most important facts.

We must not appeal to these,
 however, until we have extri-
 cated our minds, if possible,
 from this metaphysical tangle.
 For logical and metaphysical
 difficulties are not to be solved
 "ambulando," but by a higher
 criticism of the forms of
 thought which have occasioned
 them.

In what follows, we are
 brought gradually back from
 the simple to the complex,
 from the more abstract to the
 more concrete. We are com-
 pelled to image to ourselves,
 what was discarded at a former

We said it was impossible that I should think what I do not know to be what I know, else I should be ignorant of what I know.

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὁμολογήσαι, ἡνίκα ὠμολογήσαμεν, ἃ τις οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ ψευσθῆναι· ἀλλὰ πῃ δυνατόν. b

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα ἡνίκ' αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίῳτ' ἐγὼ γιγνώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὀρών ἄλλον ὃν οὐ γιγνώσκω, ᾗθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὃν οἶδα; γίνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ οἶον λέγεις.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἃ ἴσμεν, ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὧδε· ἴσως πῃ ἡμῖν συγχωρήσεται, ἴσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν

But perhaps it is possible in a certain way; e. g. Theætetus knows Socrates, and yet may

stage of the inquiry, a process between the relativity of sense and the absoluteness of knowledge, which, like every process, admits of degrees. Thus, it may be said, the idea of motion returns upon us in a higher form.

The mind is a storehouse of old impressions, in which we are continually looking for the types of new ones. But the old impressions fade and get confused, and we fail to bring them with precision and clearness into contact with the new. This is to think falsely.

6. τοιοῦτον εἶναι] Sc. αὐτό.

13. ἀλλ' ὧδε.] This is the punctuation of the Bodleian MS., which seems better than that usually followed. καὶ ἴσως, the reading of the later MSS., is unnecessary. A qualifying clause is sometimes thus in-

troduced before ἀλλά—without any particle of connexion with what precedes. Compare Soph. El. 430: σμικρὰ μὲν τὰδ', ἀλλ' ὁμῶς ἄχω, δὸς αὐτῷ.

Æd. Col. 1615:

σκληρὰν μὲν, οἶδα, παῖδες· ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ μόνον

τὰ πάντα λύει ταῦτ' ἔπος μοχθήματα.

Eur. Alc. 353:

ψυχρὰν μὲν, οἶμαι, τέρψιν· ἀλλ' ὁμῶς βάρος

ψυχῆς ἀπαντλοίην ἄν.

Supr. p. 171: εἰκός γε ἄρα—ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀναγκή— — Compare also the frequent asyndeton with πάντως. For ἴσως—ἴσως δέ cf. Apol. p. 18: ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη—.

14. συγχωρήσεται—ἀντιτενεῖ] Cf. Soph. 254: εἰάν ἄρα ἡμῖν πῃ παρεικάθη τὸ μὴ ὃν λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ ὃν ἀθώοις ἀπαλλάττειν.

p. 191. τοιούτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα
 ὁ λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν εἴ τι λέγω. ἄρα ἔστι
 μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐθις ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Θές δὴ μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν
 ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ' ἔλαττον,
 καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου,
 καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δ' οἷς με-
 τρίως ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΩ. Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν

mistake
 another
 whom he
 sees but
 does not
 know, for
 Socrates
 whom he
 knows.

II. a. *Hypothesis of the waxen block.*

We return therefore in part to the conception of a process, which may be described by

(14.) ἀλλὰ γάρ] 'But we must risk the chance of failure, for,' &c.

3. μαθεῖν] The tense is noticeable. Whatever difficulty may attend the conception of the process of learning and forgetting, (μανθάνειν, ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι), it is certain that things are learnt and forgotten (μαθεῖν, ἐπιλελησθαι.) In what follows the process itself is imagined rather than analysed.

7. Θές] Cf. Phileb. 34 : θές τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν—παθημάτων τὰ μὲν. alib—. The image is not unlike Locke's illustration of the different kinds of memory. Hum. Und. B. II. 10. §§ 4, 5 : 'The brain in some retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone, and in others little better than sand.' Ib. 29. § 3. 'If the organs or faculties of perception, like wax over-hardened with cold, will not

receive the impression of the seal from the usual impress wont to imprint it, or like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it when well imprinted ; or else, supposing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with sufficient force to make a clear impression—in any of these cases the print left by the seal will be obscure.'

8. κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον] Plato's image is not the common one of a waxen tablet, but of a 'block of wax,' such as was used for sealing. ἐκμαγεῖον is used first of the whole mass, afterwards of those parts of it which have received the particular impressions.

13. τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρός] Aesch. Prom. 461 : μνήμην θ' ἀπάντων μουσομήτορ' ἐργάτιν.— Plat. Euthyd. 275 : καθάπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ δέομαι ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως Μούσας τε καὶ Μνημοσύνην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι.

means of the following image.

Each of us has in his mind a block of wax, on which he receives the stamp of those sensations and perceptions which he wishes to remember. That which he succeeds in stamping is remembered and known so long as the impression lasts, but that of which the impression is rubbed out, or is imperfectly made, is

Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, ὃ τι ἂν p. 191.
βουληθῶμεν μνημονεύσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν
ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι
καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα
5 ἐνσημαινομένους. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῆ, μνημονεύειν
τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἕως ἂν ἐνῆ τὸ εἶδωλον αὐτοῦ· ὅταν
δ' ἐξαιρεθῆ ἢ μὴ οἶόν τε γένηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλε-
λῆσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω οὕτως.

10 ΣΩ. Ὅ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δέ
τι ὧν ὁρᾷ ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοιῶδε τρόπῳ ψευδῆ
ἂν δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίῳ δή τινι ;

15 ΣΩ. Ἄ οἶδεν, οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ἂ οἶδε, τοτὲ δέ
ἂ μή. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὠμολο-
γήσαμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀδύνατα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διο- p. 192.

1. ἐς τοῦτο — ἀποτυποῦσθαι] 'To stamp them upon this, as if we were taking on it the impressions of seal-rings.'

3. ὑπέχοντας αὐτό] Holding it (the wax) to receive our perceptions and thoughts, we stamp them there, as if taking the impression of a seal. The infinitives are med., because the impressions are taken from our own sensations for our own use.

4. ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους] For the image of the seal, cf. Phaed. p. 76, where it is used of the mind impressing its idea of Being upon things.

6. ὅταν δ' ἐξαιρεθῆ] Ven. Π. corr. δ δ' ἂν. Bodl. et Vat. δέ

omittunt. The Bodl. however, has δ' in the margin by a later hand. The common reading is sufficiently probable: the regularity of the sentence is broken by the introduction of ἕως ἂν, so that instead of δ δ' ἂν we have ὅταν δέ. Cf. supr. p. 159. δ ἂν — ὅταν.

10. αὐτά] Viz. ἂ ἂν ἴδῃ καὶ ἀκούσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἐννοήσῃ. (supr.)

Although I know what is present to me in sensation, i. e. though I may have in me a previous impression of the same thing, yet I may mistake it, i. e. fail to identify it as the original of that previous impression.

18. ἐξ ἀρχῆς] *A priori*.

p. 192. ριζομένους, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις οἶδε σχὼν αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μὴ, τοῦτο οἰηθῆναι ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθάνομενον δὲ μὴ, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὁ γε οἶδεν αὐ, οἰηθῆναι εἶναι ὁ μὴ οἶδε μὴδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα· καὶ ὁ μὴ 5 οἶδεν, ὁ μὴ οἶδεν αὐ· καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεταιί γε, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἶναι· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ 10 αἰσθάνεται, ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν αἰσθάνεται. καὶ ἔτι γε αὐ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται 10 καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὐ ἕτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐ καὶ ἐκείνου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων, εἰ οἶόν τε. καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὁ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὁ 15

forgotten and not known.

For what I know in this way I may mistake, sometimes what I know, sometimes what I do not know.

Mistake is impossible between things both of which are thus known but not present to sense, nor indeed is it possible in any case without sensation.

4. ὁ γε οἶδεν] i. e. not supposing him to have a sensible perception of it.

6. καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεταιί γε] i. e. not supposing him to know it. Both the above cases are distinguished from that in which a thing is both known and perceived.

11. καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν] He holds the stamp left by the former sensation in a line with the present sensation, so that the two impressions coincide. Vid. inf. 194. καταπτικρὸν μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθύ.

14. ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς] Cf. the common expressions ὀρθοῖς ὀμμασι, ἐξ ὀρθῆς φρενός.

The above statement may be put shortly thus: Mistake is impossible—1. Between things not perceived by sense, when we know both or one or neither of them. 2. Between things

not known, when we have a sensible impression of one or both or neither of them. 3. Still more impossible, if that may be, between things, (a.) both of which are known, both perceived by sense, and the knowledge of each of which is identified with its proper sensation: (b.) One of which we know and also perceive sensibly, and identify the knowledge of it with the sensation: (c.) Both or either of which we neither know nor perceive sensibly.

The only cases left in which mistake is possible are (1.) when one thing is known and another perceived sensibly; or (2.) when two things are known and also present to sense, but we fail to connect knowledge and sensation rightly.

Still less when two things are known and present to sense, and when the sensation and the old impression coincide : or when neither is present to the mind at all. But when something, either known or unknown, is present to sense, and the mind brings the sensation over-against the old impression of a different thing—then the mind mistakes.

οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων κατὰ ταῦτά, ὃ αἰσθάνεται· p. 192.

καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται.

5 πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῆ τινὰ δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴ πέρ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιούτον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν τίσι δὴ ; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἔπομαι.

10 ΣΩ. Ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερον ἄττα εἶναι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται δέ· ἢ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν πολὺ πλείον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε.

15 ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεόδωρον καὶ ἐν ἑμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἷός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαίτητον κατὰ ταῦτά, ἄλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὀρώ αὐτούς, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἄπτομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν, ποτὲ δ' οὐ, καὶ ἀκούω ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, ποτὲ δ' αἴσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ 20 ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἥττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἑμαυτῷ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

2. καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε] In order to exhaust every conceivable case, the converse or negative of each of the foregoing cases, in which knowledge and sense were combined, must be fully stated.

5. ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία] Cf. supr. ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων εἰ οἷόν τε. The gen. is governed by ἀδυναμία. ὑπερβάλλει is abs. 'All these cases are beyond every thing in regard to the impossibility of any man's

thinking wrongly in any of them.'

8. ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω] 'For perhaps if you state them, I may perceive your meaning better.'

12. ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται] Subaud. ἄττα.

14. ἀπελείφθην] For this use of the aorist when a person reflects on his own state, cf. Soph. Aj. 678 : ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι περιχαρῆς δ' ἀνεπτόμαν. alib.

p. 192. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὦν βούλομαι δη-
λῶσαι, ὡς ἔστι μὲν ἅ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ
αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἅ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι
μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο.

p. 193. ΣΩ. Ἴδὲ δὴ, εἴαν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίσπη. Σωκράτης
ἐπιγιγνώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὁρᾷ δὲ μηδέ-
τερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἰσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν 10
οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἔστι
Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἢ οὐδέν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὦν
ἔλεγον. 15

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γινώσκων
ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γινώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέ-
τερον, οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐ οἰηθείην, ὃν οἶδα, εἶναι ὃν μὴ
οἶδα. 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

b ΣΩ. Τρίτον δέ, μηδέτερον γινώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθα-
νόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἕτερόν τιν' εἶναι
ὦν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἐξῆς νόμιζε
πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτε ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ 25
Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γινώσκων οὔτε
ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δ' οὐ γινώσκων.
καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταῦτά, εἰ ἄρα ἔπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπομαι.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷδε, 30
ὅταν γινώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἐκείνῳ
τῷ κηρίνῳ ὡσπερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἀμφοῖν τὰ σημεῖα,

False opinion is the wrong union of thought and sensation.

διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἰκανῶς ὁρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ p. 193.
οἰκείον ἑκατέρου σημείον ἀποδοῦς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμ-
βιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ ἑαυτῆς ἴχνος, ἵνα γένη-
ται ἀναγνώρισις, εἶτα τούτων ἀποτυχῶν καὶ ὥσπερ
5 οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν
ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημείον, ἢ καὶ οἷα
τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀρι-
στερὰ μεταρρέουσης, ταῦτὸν παθὼν διαμάρτω· τότε d
δὴ συμβαίνει ἢ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.
10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες· θαυμασίως ὡς
λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

ΣΩ. Ἐπι τοῖνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γιγνώσκων

1. προθυμηθῶ] ‘I endeavour to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to make this stand in its own foot-print, so as to fit, that recognition may take place; and then failing to do so, and bringing the ideas crosswise like men who put their sandals on the wrong feet,’—

2. ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι] Sc. τὴν ὄψιν. These words and the following (ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις) suggest an allusion to Choeph. 203—210. καὶ μὴν στίβοι γε κ. τ. λ.

5. παραλλάξας] Cf. for the metaphorical use of this word (which here retains something of its literal sense) Tim. 72. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔννοους ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς, ἀλλ’ ἢ καθ’ ὑπνον—πεδηθεῖς—ἢ διὰ νόσον ἢ διὰ τινα ἐνθουσιασμόν παραλλάξας.

6. ἢ καὶ οἷα] ‘Or my mind errs being affected in the same way as the sight is affected in looking at a mirror, shifting as

it does, so that right becomes left.’ Vision is conceived of as flowing from the eye to its object. Cf. Tim. p. 43.

7. δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρέουσης] ‘Shifting, right-side to left.’ The words have given some trouble. Buttmann conjectured μεταφερούσης, Heindorf says “medelam a libris expecto.” Stallb. conj. δεξιὰς εἰς ἀριστεράν. But may not δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερά be an adverbial expression, originating in apposition? Thus: ἢ ὄψις μεταρρεῖ δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερά (i. e. τὰ δεξιὰ αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ ἀριστερά)—when the case of ὄψις changes δεξιὰ remains unchanged. Compare ἄνω κάτω στρέφων, Phædr. 278; and esp. Soph. Ant. 340. Ἰλομένων ἀρότρων ἔτος εἰς ἔτος, where some MSS. have ἔτους εἰς ἔτος metro repugnante, showing that a similar difficulty had been experienced there.

10. ὡς] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. et ꝥ. cett. φ. ‘Your description tallies wonderfully with one’s experience of what Opinion is.’

p. 193. τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γινώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μή, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καὶ μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

5

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γινώσκων τὸν ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε οἰήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἕτερόν τινα ὃν γινώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἦν γὰρ 10 τοῦτο ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ φαμέν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γίνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γινώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν 15 ἔχοντα ἄμφοῖν, τὸ σημεῖον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον ἰέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεῦδος ἄρα ὠνόμασται.

2. τοῦ ἑτέρου] Viz. of the former.

6. Heind. would insert δ before γινώσκων: but for the transition from the 1st to the 3rd person, when the nom. is indefinite, cf. inf. 196. οἰηθείημεν—οἰηθείη.

9. ὃν γινώσκει] This is the Bodleian reading, which seems preferable. The reference of ἐκείνου is thus made more distinct.

10. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο;] 'We agreed to this?'

16. τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν] Translate, adopting Stallbaum's conjecture, ἐκατέρου, 'Or having some other sensible perception

of both, to fail in holding your previous impression of each person over against your present sensation of him.'

Or, retaining the common reading, τὸ σημεῖον—ἐκάτερον, 'Or having some other sensible perception of them, to fail in holding the previous impressions of both, each over against the sensation which belongs to it.' But it must be confessed that this is not so good.

17. ἀλλ' οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον] We are beginning to have a livelier conception of the *movement* of the mind and of the *remoteness* of sensible things from our notions of them.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκότως γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῆ αἴσθησις τῶν σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῆ παρούσης προσαρμόση, πάντα ταύτη ψεύδεται ἢ διά-
 5 νοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἶδέ τις μηδὲ ἐπή-
 σθετο πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι b
 οὔτε ψευδῆς δόξα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιᾶς λέγομεν. περὶ
 δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις
 στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίπτεται ἢ δόξα ψευδῆς καὶ ἀληθῆς
 10 γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεία
 συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς
 πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεται ;

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ c
 15 ἐρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τὰληθῆς δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ
 ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ ;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίνεσθαι. ὅταν
 μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ
 20 λείος καὶ μετρίως * ὠργασμένος ἦ, τὰ ἴοντα διὰ τῶν

The cause
of this lies
in the na-
ture of the
waxen

3. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθ.]
Sc. σημείον.

4. προσαρμόση] Sc. ἢ διάνοια.

5. ἐπήσθετο] The corr. of the
Bodl. is in the ancient hand.

8. ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις] Here,
and here alone, opinion turns
and twirls about, becoming true
and false alternately.

ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται
καὶ ἐλίπτεται ἢ δόξα] Cf. Rep.
479 : ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ
νόμιμα — μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται
κ. τ. λ.

11. ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους]
τύπος is here the present sen-
sation, which we endeavour to

fit into the former impression,
(ἀποτύπωμα.) τύπος can scarcely
be 'the form of the object.'
This would be inconsistent
with the previous use of the
word, p. 192.

18. φασίν] This need not
imply a reference to any con-
temporary doctrine. It rather
indicates the half mythical tone
which Socrates has assumed.

20. ὠργασμένος] 'Tempered.'
This word has been restored
from Timæus and Suidas, the
latter of whom quotes this pas-
sage. MSS. εἰργασμένος.

τὰ ἴοντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων—

ρ. 194. αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
 κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὀμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ
 δ ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα
 ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά
 τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, 5
 ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθή-
 σεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ
 καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν
 ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεῖα, ἀ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ
 οὔτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

ε ΣΩ. Ὄταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἦ, ὃ δὴ
 ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες
 καὶ μὴ καθαρῶ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκλη-
 ρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρὸν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γί- 15

block, which may be either too shallow, or too hard or too soft, or too narrow, or impure, whence the impressions are either imperfect or faint, or short-lived, or crowded, or coarse and dim, so that it is difficult for the mind to make each sensation correspond to its proper footprint.

ἐνσημαινόμενα—καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα] The thread of the sentence is resumed in an altered form. Cf. Polit. 295. πάν τὸ τοιοῦτον—ξύμβαλλον—γέλως ἀν—γίγνοιτο τῶν τοιούτων—. Phaed. 69. χωριζόμενα δέ.

2. κέαρ] The Homeric form is κῆρ. But Plato avoids bringing poetical words too abruptly into his prose. See above, p. 173, and n.

6. τῶν αἰσθήσεων] The gen. depends on παραλλάττουσι, like τοῦ σκοποῦ above.

7. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα—καλεῖται] There is here a similar irregularity to that just noticed. The sentence begins as though it were to be σαφῆ γὰρ—ὄντα (sc. τὰ σημεῖα) ταχὺ εὐρίσκεται, or something of the kind: but the thought groys as we proceed: and σαφῆ—ὄντα

is left as a sort of accusativus pendens. What follows is to be construed thus: ταχὺ διανέμουσιν (οἱ τοιοῦτοι ταῦτα) ἀ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκμαγεῖα. 'Such persons quickly distribute things (as we term them) each to the place of its own former impress upon the block.'

9. ἀ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται] The later part of the dialogue does not forget the earlier part.

12. λάσιον—κέαρ] Il. B. 851: Πυλαιμένεος λάσιον κῆρ. Il. 554: Πατροκλῆος λάσιον κῆρ.

13. ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής] To appreciate the irony here, it is necessary to compare Soph. p. 234, where the parallel is drawn between the man who 'creates' every thing and the man who knows every thing; as well as Rep. B. X. p. 596, sqq.

γνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, τάναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον p. 194.
καὶ τραχύ, λιθῶδές τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης
ἔμπλεων, ἔχοντες, ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἴσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ
δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά· βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἔνι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ
5 καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχεῖσθαι ταχὺ γίγνε- p. 195.
ται ἀμυδρά. εἰ δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ' ἀλλήλων
συμπεπτωκότα ἢ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, εἰ του μικρὸν
ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἔτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν
οὔτοι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὅταν γάρ τι
10 ὀρώσιν ἢ ἀκούωσιν ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, ἕκαστα ἀπονέμειν

1. λάσιον] 'Shaggy.' Here, as in the case of βλοσυρός, we experience what is a frequent difficulty in Plato, that of determining the precise ethical meaning with which he adapts an Epic word.

2. λιθῶδές τι] The difficulty of the MS. reading is, that it presents as one case what were spoken of above as two, (λάσιον — ἢ — κοπρῶδες), 'Those in whom it is shaggy and rugged, a gritty substance filled with an admixture either of earth or dung.' This is not an insuperable difficulty in a writer like Plato. But the correction λιθῶδές τι (Ficin. Heusd.) is extremely probable; 'In whom it is shaggy and rugged and stony, or full of the admixture of earth or dung.'

8. ψυχάριον] Cf. Rep. 519: ὡς δριμύ βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον.

10. ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν] Cf. supr. 191. ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν. It may be asked, whether these expressions do not provide for the difficulty that is raised afterwards about 11 and 12? The answer probably is, that the difficulty, which is brought into

full light afterwards, is here silently anticipated. (Compare the introduction of ἀγαθόν and καλόν in p. 157.) ἐπινοῶσιν however does not necessarily imply an abstract object of thought. As we dwell upon the image we have raised, we find that it is too simple to express more than the relations of sense and memory, and instead of multiplying κήρινα πλάσματα, a fresh image is introduced in Plato's usual manner. The touches of humour have led some critics to suppose that Plato is alluding to contemporary opinions. But may he not be laughing at himself?

The description of the act of recollecting in the Philebus, p. 34, is worth comparing with the present passage. Ὅταν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχε πάθη ἢ ψυχῆ, ταῦτ' ἀνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνη, τότε ἀναμνήσκεσθαι πού λέγομεν. ἢ γάρ; Π. μ. οὖν. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτε αἰσθήσεως εἴτ' αὐ μαθήματος αὐθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμπαντα ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας

p. 195. ταχὺ ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι. καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλείιστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

b ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. 5

ΣΩ. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

ΣΩ. Ἴδῃ οὖν οἴομεθα ἱκανῶς ὠμολογήσθαι ὅτι 10
παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρω τούτῳ τὸ δόξα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Δεινόν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δέ; πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες; 15

c ΣΩ. Τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἔλκη τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἢ δυσπαλάλακτος ἀφ' ἐκάστου λόγου; 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;

που λέγομεν. The former and simpler process corresponds to the search for the impression upon the wax; the latter to the hunt in the aviary for a missing bird.

(10.) ἐκαστα] Sc. τὰ ὄντα.

1. ἐκάστοις] Sc. τοῖς ἐκμαγείοις. ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες] 'Misappropriating,' i. e. 'Assigning wrongly.'

3. καλοῦνται αὐτοὶ] αὐτὸς refers to supr. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἀμαθεῖς is the opposite of σοφοί: ἐψ. τ. ὄντων, being in-

serted epexegetically.

13. Δεινόν τε] The old editions had γε. The abruptness of the reading in the text is better than such a meaningless connexion. Socrates breaks out, after a pause, with an expression, the relevancy of which does not at once appear.

18. ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἔλκη τις] Compare with this expression, which frequently occurs, the still livelier image supr. p. 191. ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν.

But, when we consider it, the hypothesis is not adequate to the phenomena.

e. g. The numbers eleven and twelve are not objects of sensation, but of thought, i. e. they are impressions on the waxen block, and yet in adding 7 and 5 people sometimes take eleven instead of twelve.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅ τι p. 195.
ἀποκρινούμαι, ἂν τις ἔρηταί με· ὦ Σώκρατες, εὐρηκας
δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐστὶ
πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συν- d
5 ἀψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οἶμαι,
καλλωπιζόμενος ὡς τι εὐρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν
εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον
10 ὄν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ' οὔ, ἵππον οὐκ ἂν
ποτε οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὄν αὐτὸν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἀπτό-
μεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανό-
μεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, φήσει, τὰ ἕνδεκα, ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ e
15 διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν
ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μόνον αὐτὸν διανοεῖται; ἴθι
οὖν δὴ, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἀποκρινούμαι, ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἢ
20 ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἕνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι
ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα
δοξάσειεν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἶει τινὰ πρόποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ
πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ p. 196.
25 πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ'

9. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὐτὸν
‘Is it not then part of your hypothesis, he will say, that on the other hand.’ If mistake arises upon the wrong union of sensation and thought, thought cannot be mistaken when unaccompanied by sensation. The opposition between these two

cases is expressed by αὐτὸν. Socrates proceeds to what Bacon would call a negative instance. MSS. φησί.

11. ὄν αὐτὸν] ‘Which again,’ i. e. ‘as well as the man.’

15. Bodl. φησι with Vat. Ven. II. cett. φησί.

23. οἶει τινὰ] If the sentence

ρ. 196. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ, ἃ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἕνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἧ 5 πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἕνδεκα· ἐὰν δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπῆται, ὁ μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γὰρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν. 10

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶει. καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τί τιποτε γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἕνδεκα οἰηθῆναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λό- 15 γους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθών, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἶεται εἶναι ὧν αὐτὸ οἶδεν. ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ

had proceeded regularly, it would be followed by σκεψάμενον—εἰπεῖν.

1. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ] The insertion of the article does not seem necessary, though it may possibly be right.

ἐκεῖ] Sc. ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ. μνημεῖα] 'Records.'

3. εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων] The question is resumed with εἴ, depending on λέγω, which has broken the regularity of the sentence. 'I mean to ask if ——.' The Bodleian MS. has ἧ, with Heindorf and Bekker.

4. λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν] Socrates refers to his own description of the process of thinking, supr. p. 189, 190.

8. ἐὰν δέ γε] Theætetus is permitted to enlarge a little

upon his own subject. We seek to identify the sum of 7 and 5, of which we have thought (ἐπενοήσαμεν) with the corresponding number in our minds: and by mistake we identify it with 11 instead of 12.

The statement of this case shews the inadequacy of the figure we have adopted. For where are the 7 and 5 and the sum of them of which we think? They are not in sensation: must they not then be in the waxen block? The former difficulty returns—we have taken one thing which we know for another thing which we know.

11. ποτε] Heind. conj. τότε.

15. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους] 'The discussion has returned to its first stage.'

ἠναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ ρ. 196:
αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδῶς μὴ εἰδέναί ἅμα. c

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ
5 ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἰσθησιν παραλλα-
γὴν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δια-
νοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆς
δόξα, ἢ ἅ τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναί. καὶ τούτων
πότερα αἰρεῖ;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀπορον αἴρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος d
οὐκ εἶναι. ὅμως δέ, πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπι-
χειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

15 ΣΩ. Ἐβελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποῖόν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ
ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

ΣΩ. Ἐοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ
λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὡς οὐκ εἰδόσι τί
20 ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτ' οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστή-

To meet
this diffi-
culty, we
venture to
say what it
is to know,
—(a daring
step, as we
are still
seeking the
definition
of Know-
ledge.)

1. ἠναγκάζομεν — ἀναγκάζοιτο] 'It was by this very argument we tried to make the non-existence of false opinion inevitable, because otherwise it would be inevitable that the same person should know and be ignorant at once.'

4. ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν] 'Any thing but this.' Most MSS. give ἄλλό τι οὖν.

11. ἀμφότερα] Viz. τὸ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν κ. ἅ τις οἶδεν οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι μὴ εἰδέναί. The

distinction here indicated is analogous to that noticed by Aristotle between ἐπίστασθαι and θεωρεῖν; which is his favourite example of the difference between ἐξίς and ἐνέργεια. Vid. Eth. N. I. 8. διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ ἐν χρήσει τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν. The tendency to this distinction appears in Sophocles Ant. 1278. ὦ δεσπότη, ὡς, ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος, κ. τ. λ.

p. 197. μην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὡς Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμὲν ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γινώσκωμεν καὶ οὐ γινώσκωμεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεχρήμεθ' αὐτῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρήσθαι, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὡς Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος;

2. ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι] 'Infected with logical imperfection.'

τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι] In other words, we have felt our way hitherto, not by abstract definition and inference, but (as it is expressed Rep. 533) τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. We first ventured the hypothesis αἰσθησις ἐπιστήμη. This was rejected, but the difficulties we met with pointed to a further hypothesis, ὅτι ἡ ἀληθῆς δόξα ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν. Here again we are met by fresh difficulties, but the discussion of them leads to a fresh hypothesis, that we may know, without having knowledge in hand.

3. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν] We are haunted throughout by a difficulty respecting the search for knowledge akin to that respecting its first definition. Can we know it, and yet not know it? To inquire about it implies ignorance of its nature, and yet how can we use the name even in inquiry without knowing the meaning of the name? p. 147.

ἢ οἶει τίς τι συνίησιν τινος ὄνομα, ἢ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστίν; 210. καὶ παντάπασί γε εἴηθες ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης.

10. Ἄλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὡς Σ.] Compare what was said of being, p. 156. τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημωσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.

That there is such a thing as absolute knowledge and absolute being is the postulate of Plato's mind. That he himself or any man had wholly grasped either, is more than he dares to say. The sacredness of this belief, which it would be impious to relinquish, appears also in Theætetus' answer: τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ ἔσται σοι πολλὴ συγγνώμη. For a similar feeling in regard to the practice of virtue, cf. Rep. 407. ὁ δὲ δὴ πλούσιος, ὡς φάμεν, οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκείμενον, οὐ ἀναγκαζομένῳ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀβίωτον. Apol. 38. ὁ δ' ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδένα ὦν γε ὅς εἰμί· εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλο- p. 197.
γικός, οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη
ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ' ἂν ἂ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπλητ-
τευ. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν
5 οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου
τι ἂν γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τοίνυν νῆ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπε-
χομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.

ΣΩ. Ἀκήκοας οὖν ὁ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;

To know is
not to have,
but to pos-
sess, know-
ledge.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνη-
μονεύω.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι. b

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴ-
15 πωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτήσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν;

ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας
συνδοκίμαζε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν πέρ γε οἷός τ' ᾧ.

This dis-
tinction is
illustrated
by a new
image.

20 ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτόν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτῆσθαι
τὸ ἔχειν. οἷον ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατῆς ὦν
μὴ †φοροῖ† ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαι
δέ γε φαῖμεν.

1. ὦν γε ὅς εἰμί] Cf. Phædr.
243. ἕωσπερ ἂν ἦς ὅς εἶ.

εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός] The
apodosis is omitted, and the
construction changed, because
from supposing himself ἀντιλο-
γικός, Socrates proceeds to ima-
gine the effect of the presence
of such a man upon the dis-
cussion.

2. τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι]
Not exactly with Heind. Stallb.
'abstinere nos jubeatur,' but
(sub. δεῖν) 'would have dwelt on
the necessity of abstaining,' or,

possibly, (throwing an emphasis
on ἡμῖν) 'Would have professed
to abstain.'

12. ἐπιστήμης—ἔξιν] Euthyd.
277. τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι—ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔχειν
ἐπιστήμην ἤδη ἐστίν; Phæd. 76.

21. ἱμάτιον] Stallb. attempts
to defend the optative without
εἰ (which has only slight au-
thority), from Rep. 549. ἄγριος
εἶη, which is not quite parallel,
(and there is MS. authority for
ἂν.) The comparison of p. 193.
Σωκράτης γινώσκει κ. τ. λ. sug-
gests the conjecture φορεῖ.

p. 197. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως γε.

c ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κε-
κτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας,
περιστερὰς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασά-
μενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν πού 5
τινα φαίμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς αἰεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτηται.
ἢ γάρ;

II. β. Hypothesis of the cage full of birds.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τρόπον δέ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ
δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ 10
ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίουσ ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν
d καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὰν βούληται, θηρευσαμένῳ ἦν ἂν αἰεὶ
ἐθέλη, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν,
ὅποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.

The mind is like a cage, empty at birth, which we fill by degrees with what we learn. Whatever knowledge then is caught by us, is known so long as it remains in this cage. And yet before we have it in hand, there is a further chase required.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι
ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι πλάσμα,
νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκάστη ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα
παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὔσας
χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας 20
διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχῃσι πετομένας.

3. μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ'] This opposition between minute parts of a sentence is very characteristic of the Greek idiom.

ὥσπερ] The apodosis is to be sought in Πάλιν δὴ κ. τ. λ.

16. κήρινόν τι] 'We established in the mind a sort of moulded form of wax.'

19. τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας] The distinction indicated is probably that between, 1. individuals in the aggregate (πολλὰ ἀθροισθέντα, p. 157.); 2. intermediate abstractions, as the virtues,

numbers, &c.; 3. the highest abstractions, as Being, Goodness, resemblance, difference, &c. Little is thought, however, of any process of abstraction, as appears from the interchange of the terms μνημείον and διανόημα in what precedes.

20. κατ' ὀλίγας] e. g. The virtues, arts, &c.

ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν] e. g. τὴν οὐσίαν—τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται, p. 186.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποιήσθω δὴ. ἀλλὰ τί τούντεῦθεν ; p. 197.

ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν ὄντων, φάναι χρή, εἶναι τοῦτο^θ
τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας
νοῆσαι· ἦν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ² εἰς
5 τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ εὕρηκέναι
τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι
τοῦτ' εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἦν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστη- p. 198.
10 μῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὖθις ἀφιέναι,
σκόπει τίνων δείτῃ ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ
πρῶτον, ὅτε ἐκτᾶτο, εἴτε ἐτέρων. μαθήσει δ' ἐντεῦθεν
σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις
τέχνην ;

To apply
this to the
case of
number :

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου
τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπολαμβάνω.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχει-
20 ρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλῳ πα-
ραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν,
παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μαθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κε-
25 κτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περισσότερῳ ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

2. φάναι χρή, εἶναι] Although φάναι χρή is introduced parenthetically, the sentence receives an indirect turn from it.

3. ἀγγεῖον] 'Receptacle.'

12. ἐντεῦθεν] From this point

of view, viz. where I am already standing.

19. ὑποχειρίους] 'Under (in the power of) his hand.' But not necessarily προχείρους, 'in hand.'

p. 198. ΣΩ. Τῷ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδη πρόσσχεσ τὸν νοῦν. ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὧν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντα ἀριθμοὺς ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμαι.

The arithmetician has knowledge of every number in his mind.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἂν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει ἀριθμὸν;

Yet in calculating he searches for what he knows, as it were putting his hand into the cage.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὗ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὧν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὠμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναί. ἀκούεις γὰρ πού τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.

15

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστέρων κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐρούμεν, ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα,

1. τῷ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν] δὲ δὴ, the reading of the Bodl. and its two companions, has probably slipped in from ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ above.

6. ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ] This is the reading of the MSS. with the exception of Vat. Δ., which omits αὐτά: the reading ἐντὸς is a conjecture of Cornarius. The common reading is defensible. If αὐτὰ is omitted, the antithesis is imperfect; and if grammatical symmetry were desired, it could be restored by substituting αὐτό for αὐτά. But there is no real flaw, for τι is cogn. accusative, and ἀριθμοῖ τι = cast up a sum. The second accusative in the plural of the things which constitute the sum

is therefore perfectly admissible; and it is also pointed, referring to αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ above. Might he not cast up a sum, either of abstract numbers in his head, or of the things about him?

As in the Parmenides, where unity is negatived, so here, where it has not been fully reached, the objects of Knowledge (or rather Knowledges themselves) appear in loose bundles which fly as we approach them.

11. πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὧν] 'What such-and-such a sum amounts to.'

18. ἦν] The past tense implies 'We found it to be—'

ἢ μὲν πρὶν κεκτήσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσθαι ἕνεκα· ἢ δὲ κε- p. 198.
κτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἅ πάσαι
ἐκέκτητο. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὧν πάσαι ἐπιστήμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ
μαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν
ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου
καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάσαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ
εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ ἄρτι ἠρώτων, ὅπως χρῆ τοῖς ὀνό- e
μασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων
ἢ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικὸς,
ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μα-
θησόμενος παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἅ ἐπίσταται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

15 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἅ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώ-
σεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν
γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;

p. 199.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄλογον.

We shall say
then that
it is impos-
sible for
him not to
know what
he knows,
i. e. not to
possess
what he
possesses,

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων
οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπη τις χαίρει ἔλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι
καὶ μαθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠρισάμεθα ἕτερον μὲν τι τὸ
κεκτήσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν
τις κέκτηται μὴ κεκτήσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι,
ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὃ τις οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ

6. πρόχειρον δ'] The way in which the language is humour-
ed to meet each image is very
noticeable. As we say, 'at his
fingers' ends.'

9. τοῦτο] A sort of cogn. ac-
cusative, as ταῦτα is very fre-
quently used. 'This was my
drift in asking,' &c.

19. ὥστε οὐδέποτε] 'So that it
results in no case that a man is

ignorant of what he knows, but
still that he may get hold of a
wrong notion in regard to it;
for he may not have in hand
the knowledge of the particular
thing in question, but another
instead, when in hunting up
some particular knowledge
from his stock (τοῦ ὃ κέκτηται)
he gets hold of the wrong
one by mistake as they flit

p. 199. μέντοι δόξαν οἷόν τ' εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ
 b ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἷόν τε, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν ἀντ'
 ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην δια-
 πετομένων ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, ὅτε ἄρα
 τὰ ἕνδεκα δώδεκα φήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἕνδεκα ἐπιστή- δ
 μην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβῶν, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον
 φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.

but yet he
 may mis-
 take one
 thing that
 he knows
 for another
 that he
 knows,
 when, fail-
 ing in this
 after-
 search, he
 takes the

across him : that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the knowledge of eleven instead of that of twelve,—in other words, the rock-pigeon that was caged within him instead of the dove.'

1. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν] These words are put emphatically forward in antithesis to μὴ κεκτῆσθαι. When hunting for some particular knowledge amongst what he possesses and knows, he catches one for another as they fly about : e. g. the arithmetician makes a mistake in regard to number when he seeks in the tribe of numbers for that which = 7 + 5, and takes hold of 11 instead of 12.

The germ of the present metaphor appears in the Euthydemus, pp. 290, 291. θηρευτικοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ καὶ οὗτοι (οἱ λογιστικοί) κ.τ.λ. αὐτοὶ γὰρ (οἱ στρατηγοί) οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἀ ἐθήρευσαν, ὥσπερ, οἶμαι, οἱ ὀρτυγοθήραι τοῖς ὀρτυγοτρόφοις παραιδάσιν — ἀλλ' ἡμεν πάνυ γελοῖοι, ὥσπερ τὰ παῖδια τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα, ἀεὶ φόμεθα ἐκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήψεσθαι· αἱ δ' αἰεὶ ὑπεξέφυγον. Compare also Arist. Met. I. 5. 1009 b. τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἀν εἶη τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

3. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ] The difficulty of

the sentence lies in these words. They probably refer to δ κέκτῃται—ὁ οἶδε above. For it is difficult to imagine that ἀπ' αὐτοῦ and περὶ αὐτοῦ above do not refer to the same thing. If this be so, the meaning is, that he makes a mistake concerning some general subject, e. g. concerning number in general, when he takes one particular thing contained in it for another. τούτου therefore means, 'of this particular thing,' viz. which he is in search of. For a similar use of τούτου, without anything to which it immediately refers, cf. supr. 180. κἀν τούτου ζητῆς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκε. Infr. p. 202. τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον — ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου.

4. ὅτε ἄρα — φήθη εἶναι, — λαβῶν] We pass from ὅταν to ὅτε ἄρα, because reference is now made to the actual case supposed. The participle λαβῶν is epexegetic to the verb understood in what precedes. He has hold of something else : that is, in the above case, taking the knowledge of eleven for that of twelve. As if ἔχειν — οἷόν τε were τάχ' ἂν ἔχοι. Or the nominative is due to a kind of attraction from the intervening clauses.

wrong
knowledge
in-hand.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.

p. 199.

ΣΩ. Ὄταν δέ γε ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβη, ἀψευ-
δεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι
ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν
ἔδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδῶν γίνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν
μοι συμφήσεις. ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἅ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι
ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἅ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτήσθαι οὐ-
δαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή.
δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι
δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἢ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδῆς γε-
νήσεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο δ
αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπι-
στήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ' ἕτερον
τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενο-

But, if it is
Knowledge
that he has
in hand,
how can he
mistake it?
How can
Knowledge
be the oc-

8. ἐπίστανται] So the Bodleian with all the other MSS. except pr. Ven. II. This is hardly sufficient authority for the change to ἐπίσταται. The transition from sing. to plur. is not more remarkable than that from the 3rd pers. to the 1st. It may be accounted for by the fact that Socrates is speaking generally, and no longer with reference to the case supposed above.

11. παραφαίνεσθαι] As it were, 'looking in at the window.'

17. τό τινος] These words depend immediately on δεινότερον, in common with εἰ ἢ τῶν—δόξα:

but πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία has also reference to them.

18. ἀγνωμοσύνη] Used here in its most literal sense, 'from being unacquainted.'

τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ] Viz. which he possesses, ὃ τι δὴ ἔχει τε καὶ κέκτηται, referring to ἔχοντα.

20. πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία κ. τ. λ.] The clause which follows is a more particular statement or explanation of that which precedes. Compare the structure of Rep. p. 445. τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου φ' ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται, εἴαν πέρ τις ποιῇ ὃ ἂν βουλευθῆ ἄλλο

p. 199. μένης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν καὶ ἄγνοιαν παραγενομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλότητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ποιήσει.

casion of error?

5

e ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς ὄρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ περί 10 ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ.

Perhaps there were ignorances flying about amongst the knowledges, and he has taken one of them.

ΣΩ. Οὐ ράδιόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε. ὁ μέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς p. 200. λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῆ 15 μὲν, φῆς, δοξάσει. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ που καὶ ἠγήσεται γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται περὶ 20 ὧν ἔψευσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἰήσεται τεθηρευκῶς ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον.

25

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος b γελάσας φήσει· Πότερον, ὦ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας

But if he has the ignorance in hand, how can he mis-

πλὴν τοῦτο ὀπόθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγῆσεται κ. τ. λ.

τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρωταρχε.

26. ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν] Cf. Phil. 13. πάλιν εἰς

27. δ—ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος] Supr. pp. 166. 197.

take it for knowledge? After taking a long circuit, we are again at fault.

Unless we have recourse to the image of another cage or waxen block, containing the Knowledges of the knowledges and ignorances, and go on thus to infinity, "in wandering mazes lost."

The truth is, we have no right to be searching for false opinion until we have

τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν p. 200. οἶδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἶεται τινα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν; ἢ οὐδετέραν αὐτοῖν εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δ' οὐ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἠγείται; ἢ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστήμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἕως περ ἂν κεκτηῖται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ εἰ μὴ προ-
 5 οἶδεν; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἠγείται; ἢ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστήμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἑτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἕως περ ἂν κεκτηῖται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ εἰ μὴ προ-
 10 χείρους ἔχη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταῦτον περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιῶντες; Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινόμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ
 15 ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῆ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην
 20 ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἶσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω.

8. γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν] It would be rash to infer from this that the image is not Plato's own. Is Socrates never made to accuse himself of absurdity? Rep. 354. οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίημι δι' ἑμαυτὸν ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ σέ. Prot. 340. εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός.

The value of such inferences must depend on the tone of the

particular passages from which they are drawn.

16. ὁ λόγος] Either this particular argument, or rather the discussion in the form of an imaginary disputant.

18. τὸ δὲ] Sc. ψευδῆς δόξα τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

24. γάρ που is said to be the reading of Ven. Π., and is probably right. (Cett. πω.)

p. 200. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦκιστα, εἴνπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύσης.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἦκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν ;

e ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίνεταί.

ΣΩ. Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἴο ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν,

p. 201. τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνειε τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἴωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.

1. ἀπαγορεύσης] Vat. Coisl. Zitt. The Bodl. has ἀπαγορεύης with an erasure.

8. καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα] True opinion guides to right action, but it is a blind guide.

10. ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν] The man who had to show where the river was fordable is reported to have said, Go on, and you will find. For the expressions αὐτὸ δείξει, τάχ' ἂν αὐτὸ φήνειε, cf. Phileb. 20. προῖον δ' ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει. Protag. 324. αὐτὸ σε διδάξει. Cratyl. 403. τοῦτό γε ὀλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι πηγῆς ὄνομα ἐπικεκρυμμένον ἐστί. Hipp. Maj. 288. εἰ δ' ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται καταγέλαστος, αὐτὸ δείξει. The Scholiast says: Δείξειν αὐτό· ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ πείρας γινωσκομένων. κατιόν-

των γὰρ τινων εἰς ποταμὸν πρὸς τὸ διαπερᾶσαι ἤρετό τις τὸν προηγούμενον εἰ βάθος ἔχει τὸ ὕδωρ. ὁ δὲ ἔφη, αὐτὸ δείξει.

The explanation is probable, though the authority is uncertain.

See above, πλείω αἰεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα—τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον; and compare Rep. 454. εἴαν τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ εἴαν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεῖ οὐδέν ἦττον.

12. ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον] Those fording the river were feeling the bottom with their feet. Compare the way in which Justice 'turns up' in the Republic, 433. Πάλαι, ὦ μακάριε, φαίνεται· πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν κυλινδούμενον.

found Knowledge. And, though we can attempt nothing better than our last answer, perhaps if we return and examine it, the object of our search may show itself.

15

A brief examination is sufficient here.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ; καὶ τίς αὕτη;

ΣΩ. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσι
 ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἐαυτῶν
 τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποι-
 5 οῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἶει δεινούς τινὰς οὕτω
 διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἢ
 ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις,
 τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς
 τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

2. ἢ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν] The irony is almost as transparent as in Polit. 266. γένοι τῶν ὄντων γενναιοτάτῳ καὶ ἄμα εὐχερεστάτῳ. Cf. Phædr. 260 sqq. Gorg. 462. alib. μεγίστων is masc. antec. to οὓς. (ἢ om. Bodl. Vat. Δ. Ven. Π.)

8. πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν] κατεπειγεί γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον. Supr. p. 172.

Failing to conceive of false opinion, we return to examine the theory of Knowledge that it is true opinion. We have not to search far; for in the familiar case of judicial evidence, a true opinion may be formed by the judges without the possibility of Knowledge; since in questions of fact nothing short of personal observation ensures certainty. The definition 'Knowledge is true opinion,' is therefore inadequate.

The question returns, Are the above conceptions and images Plato's own, or is he repeating in them some contemporary theory? The comparison of other dialogues and the close examination of the passage itself tend to the conclusion that

although they may have been suggested to him from without, they may be fairly regarded as his own creation. See especially the passage of the Philebus, in which, after certain men have been brought forward as 'soothsayers' or 'allies,' there follows the analysis of the pleasure derived from Comedy, which is one of the most original and 'modern' passages in Plato. The image of the 'impressions' on the wax has not only been revived in speculation, but perpetuated in common language. And to that of the aviary has probably been less fortunate only from its greater boldness and subtilty.

In what follows the Bodleian MS. gives τούτοις with Vat. Δ. Ven. Π. This is better than τούτους, which can be defended only by supposing the plaintiff to plead his own cause. Trans. 'Or do you suppose there are such clever teachers in the world, as to be able to convey to others the reality of what happened to men, of whose being robbed or otherwise assaulted the hearers were not eyewitnesses?'

The rhetoric of the law-courts proves that true opinion is not knowledge.

For in cases where the evidence of the senses is alone sufficient,

ρ. 201. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πείσαι μέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ πείσαι δ' οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, 5 ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἶπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;

c ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταῦτόν ἦν δόξα τε 10 ἀληθῆς †καὶ δικαστήρια† καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτ' ἂν

the court may be brought to give a true verdict. The judges, then, in such a case have true opinion without knowledge.

3. πείσαι μέν] The implied antithesis is διδάξαι δ' οὐ. Cf. Rep. 475. Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις. Τοὺς δ' ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνες λέγεις; Soph. 240. Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' εἰκόσ μέν.

13. καὶ δικαστήρια] Several MSS. read δικαστήριον. These words have been rejected by the critics, except Buttmann, who conjectured καὶ δικαστική, very aptly for the sense, if the word can be made to signify 'worthy of a good judge.' See the words εἶπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν—ὀρθά ποτ' ἂν δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν. It is in Plato's manner thus ostensibly to restrict himself to the case in point. Cf. p. 152. ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. p. 204. ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἔστιν.

Possibly καὶ δικαστοῦ ἀξία may be the true reading. Cf. Apol. 18. δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή. And see Phileb. 13., where the Bodl. has πειρόμεθα for πειρασόμεθα. Ib. 36, where παραφροσύνας in the same MS. is a correction for πᾶσαις ἀφροσύ-

νας, which the first hand wrote. But it is after all conceivable that δικαστήρια may be the feminine of an adj. not found elsewhere, except in the neuter substantive δικαστήριον.

To resume the argument from p. 195.

Viewing the mind as a receptacle of impressions (or ideas), we said that to think falsely was to fail in identifying present impressions with the ideas already existing in the mind. And thus it seemed impossible to be mistaken about these ideas themselves apart from impressions from without. But in fact we do mistake in things independent of sensation. E. g. an arithmetician who possesses the knowledge both of 11 and 12, will sometimes say that the sum of 7 and 5 is 11. We resort therefore to a less simple conception of knowing, and to a more complex image. To know is to possess knowledge. We may possess it without

III. Theæ-
tetus now
remembers
to have
heard that
true opin-
ion, unless
accompa-
nied with
an account
of its ob-
ject, is not
knowledge.

Socrates
identifies

δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν p. 201.
ἄλλο τι ἐκάτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του
ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν
5 μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ δ
ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος,
οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτωςι καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει,
ἐπιστητά.

ΣΩ. Ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα

having it in hand. We there-
fore image to ourselves false
opinion thus. We have caught,
as it were, (in learning) various
species of knowledge, some gre-
garious, some noble and soli-
tary, (i. e. abstract), and have
caged them in the mind, like
birds. We try to take in hand
one of these birds which we
possess, and as they flutter
about, we take hold of another
instead of it. But then, if we
have this one in hand, how can
we mistake it for the other?
How can Knowledge be the
means of error? Perhaps (The-
ætetus suggests) there were ig-
norances flying about amongst
the knowledges, and we have
taken one of them. But if
I have an Ignorance in hand,
how can I take it for a
Knowledge? Must we imagine
another cage or waxen block
to contain the Knowledge of
the knowledges and ignor-
ances? This would be endless.

4. τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δό-
ξαν] Cf. Meno, p. 97, 98. καὶ γὰρ
αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν χρό-
νον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα,
καὶ πάντα τάγαθὰ ἐργάζεται. πολὺν

δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν,
ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ
ἄξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἂν τις αὐτὰς δήση
αἰτίας λογισμῶ.—ἐπειδὴν δὲ δε-
θῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμαι γί-
γνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι· καὶ διὰ
ταῦτα δὴ τιμώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρ-
θῆς δόξης ἐστὶ, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῶ
ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης. See the
whole passage. Polit. p. 309.
τὴν — ὄντως οὔσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν
μετὰ βεβαιώσεως. Symp. 202.
ἢ οὐκ ἦσθησαι ὅτι ἐστὶ τι μεταξὺ
σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; τί τοῦτο; τὸ
ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν
λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι
οὐτ' ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν· ἀλογον γὰρ
πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἶη ἐπιστήμη; οὔτε
ἀμαθία· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον
πῶς ἂν εἶη ἀμαθία; ἔστι δὲ δὴ που
τοιούτον ἢ ὀρθῆ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρο-
νήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Rep. 506. οὐκ
ἦσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας,
ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ἔναι αἱ βέλτισται
τυφλαί· ἢ δοκοῦσί σοί τι τυφλῶν
διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων
οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθεῖς τι δοξάζοντες;

7. οὕτωςι καὶ ὀνομάζων] i. e.
using this strange term ἐπιστητά.
infr. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα.
ἐπιστητός, like αἰσθητής and ποιό-
της, was a novel word, formed
on the analogy of αἰσθητός.

p. 201. καὶ μὴ πῆ διήρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτὰ σύ τε
κἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μὲν-
τῶν ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμι.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνειράτος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ⁵
εἰ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἶονπερεὶ
στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τᾶλλα,
λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνο-
μάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν
οὔθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἦ¹⁰

p. 202. μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖ[ν] δὲ οὐδὲν προσ-
φέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ
αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον
οὐδὲ τοῦτο προσοιστέον, οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα.

the saying
thus quoted
with what
he himself
has heard
from cer-
tain "as in
a dream;"
viz. that
the ele-
ments of all
things can-
not be ex-
pressed in
a proposi-
tion, but
can only
be named.
You can-
not give
them any
attribute,
since
even such
common
prædicables

1. εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταῦτὰ σύ τε κἀγὼ
ἀκηκόαμεν] Had they both heard
from the same source? Or is
Plato here, as in the beginning
of the dialogue, weaving toge-
ther two distinct theories? See
Introduction.

5. ὄναρ] Cf. Phileb. 20. Λόγων
ποτέ τινῶν πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ ἦ
καὶ ἐγρηγορῶς νῦν ἐννοῶ—. Phæd.
61. Ἄλλὰ μὴν κἀγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ
αὐτῶν λέγω.

6. ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν] 'I heard
in my dream.'

οἶονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα] The meta-
phor is not lost sight of. Infr. 203.
τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ
συλλαβάς. ἠοῖει ἄλλο σέ ποι βλέποντα
ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἃ λέγομεν.

9. προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυ-
νατόν] 'But it is impossible to
go on to predicate any thing of
it (the element), either affirma-
tively or negatively. For in so
doing there is added the idea
of existence or non-existence:
but nothing must be added,

seeing that you can only speak
of the element by itself.'

14. οὐδὲ τοῦτο] This has given
needless trouble. Heindorf
thought the article was re-
quired as with the other words,
and inserted it. Buttman ob-
jected to τοῦτο being so far se-
parated from ἐκεῖνο, and ingeni-
ously conjectured οὐδὲ τὸ τό.
Both objections are obviated
by observing that αὐτὸ, ἐκεῖνο,
ἕκαστον, μόνον, occur in the pre-
ceding lines. For this reason
they are put first, and with the
article, and οὐδὲ τοῦτο—οὐδ' ἄλλα
πολλὰ τοιαῦτα is added after-
wards. Cf. supr. p. 157. τὸ δ'
εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον—
οὐ δεῖ—οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε
του οὔτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ' ἐκεῖνο.
οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ἢ τι ἂν ἰσθῆ.
Accordingly in the reference to
this passage, p. 205, (which
Buttmann must have over-
looked) the article is intro-
duced,—οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο.

as "this" and "that" are separable from the things to which they are applied.

As the elements are combined in Nature, so definition is a combination of names.

That which is named is the object of Sensation; the combination of these elements is

ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, p. 202.
 ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν
 δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον,
 ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον
 εἶναι ὅτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι b
 αὐτῷ ἄλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον
 ἔχειν· τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ
 πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλεκέντα
 λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι
 λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ
 ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνω-
 στάς τε καὶ ῥητάς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν
 μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινὸς τις λάβῃ,
 ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γινώ- c

1. περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι] Cf. supr. 198. ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχῃσι πετομένας. Rep. 402. τὰ στοιχεῖα—ἐν ἅπασιν—περιφερόμενα.

2. εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι] αὐτὸ is not emphatic. 'If it could be spoken of,' λέγεσθαι is the emphatic word.

7. ἤδη] i. e. 'When we come to them.'

9. ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν] Cf. Sophist. 262, where it is described more accurately as συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. See the whole passage.

A passage of Aristot. Metaph. H. 3. is closely parallel to this. He has just shown that sensible reality (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία) consists of matter or potentiality (ύλη, δύναμις), and form or actuality, (μορφή, ἐνέργεια). ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαιδευτοὶ ἠπόρουσαν, ἔχει τινὰ και-

ρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστὶν ὀρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὄρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν) ἀλλὰ ποῖον μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον τί μὲν ἔστιν, οὐ, ὅτι δ' οἶον καττίτερος. ὥστ' οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἡς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὄρον καὶ λόγον, οἶον τῆς συνθέτου, εἴν τε αἰσθητὴ εἴν τε νοητὴ ἢ· ἐξ ὧν δ' αὕτη πρώτων οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ τι κατὰ τινος σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀριστικός, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὑλὴν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν. See Introduction.

Locke's 'simple ideas' are not very different from the meaning of στοιχεῖον here.

12. καὶ ῥητάς] There is possibly an allusion to the mathematical use of the word. Cf. Rep. 546. πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἀλληλα ἀπέφηναν. But the immediate reference is to ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ, 'Capable of expression.'

14. ἀληθεύειν—περὶ αὐτό] 'Is exercised truly with regard to it.'

p. 202. σκειν δ' οὐ τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Οὕτως σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτη, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

d ΣΩ. Ἄρ', ὧ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῆδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ 10 εἰλήφραμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες πρὶν εὐρεῖν κατεγήρασαν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὧ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ 15 ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης ; ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

alone the object of Knowledge. For that impression deserves not to be called knowledge, which cannot be expressed in a proposition. Knowledge then is true opinion giving an account of itself. This is our third answer.

Can we prove it true ?

1. The answer may be a true one, and yet the

2. περὶ τούτου] Sc. οὐδ' ἂν μὴ δύνηται δοῦναι λόγον.

3. δυνατόν—ταῦτα πάντα] Sc. δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. It is a curious form to use in referring to such a simple thing. Possibly γινώσκειν and ἀληθεύειν are included.

Contrast with this Arist. Phys. Ausc. I. 1. (who points out that the elements, or simple ideas, are known not by sensation, but by analysis ; and that definition distinguishes, while the name signifies an undivided whole.)

Ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δὲ ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνῶρισμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, διαρροῦσι ταῦτα.—Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, γνωριμώτερον. Τὸ δὲ

καθόλου, ὅλον τί ἐστι. Πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. Πέπονθε δὲ ταῦτο τοῦτο τρόπον τινα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον. Ὅλον γὰρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος· ὁ δὲ ὀρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

10. νῦν οὕτω] i. e. 'In a casual conversation.'

11. καὶ] Is to be taken with the whole clause as if it were δ καὶ—. For instances of this hyperbaton, see Ellendt. Lex. sub voce καὶ, C. 4.

15. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] The definition itself, whatever may be said of the theory that has been put forward. Heindorf's conjecture, εἰκός γ' αὐ τοῦτο, would give a different turn to the sense. 'It is natural to suppose that we have said well.'

theory on which we have based it may be unsound. This therefore is examined first.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ ;

p. 202.

ΣΩ. Ὅ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα· ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστόν.

e

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ;

ΣΩ. Ἰστέον δὴ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα δὴ.

10 ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἢ οἷε ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἢ λέγομεν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.

It soon appears that we were right in saying the element cannot be defined.

ΣΩ. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἂρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα ;

p. 203.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὕτωςί, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι σῶ, τί ἀποκρινεῖ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς ;

2. λέγεσθαι κομψότατα] 'To be the cream of the whole theory.'

6. ὥσπερ—ὁμήρους] So that if we put them to the torture, we shall bring him (τὸν λόγον) to terms.

7. τὰ παραδείγματα] Cf. Polit. 277, 278, where the same example, that of letters, is introduced to illustrate the nature of Example—'Ὅτι τῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ ῥᾶσ-

ταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἰκανῶς διαισθάνονται—μετατιθέμενα δ' εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ ῥαδίας συλλαβάς ταῦτα ταῦτα πάλιν ἀγνοεῖ.

εἶπε] Sc. the person from whom Socrates and Theætetus heard the theory 'in a dream.' Cf. supr. Θεαι. εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας.

14. μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς] This is done presently, p. 206.

p. 203. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

b ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, οὕτως εἶπε καὶ τὸν τοῦ σίγμα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα ; καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὧ Σώκρατες, τό τε σίγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριπτούσης τῆς γλώτ- 5 τῆς· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἑπτὰ φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ' ὄντινοῦν.

ΣΩ. Τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὧ ἐταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ 10 ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα.

c ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν, ἂρ' ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα ;

2. But is it therefore unknown ?

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γε.

15

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφοτέρα στοιχεῖα, καὶ εἴαν πλείω ἢ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν ;

First, How is the complex related to it ?

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.

5. οἷον συριπτούσης τῆς γλώτ- τῆς] This mode of definition reminds us of the Antisthenean saying quoted by Aristotle— ποιὸν μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι κ. τ. λ. ; and also of Euclides' objection to definition by comparison.

8. ἐναργέστατα] Bodl. ἐνεργέστατα sed exem.

14. ἀποδεδείγμεθα] Heindorf conjectured ἀποδεδέγμεθα, for which MS. authority (Coisl. et Par. E. ex corr.) has since been found ; and it has been received by Bekker. But Stallbaum rightly defends ἀποδεδείγμεθα in the sense 'we have declared

our opinion ;' in which sense the pf. pass. is used by Xenophon and Lysias. Vid. supr. 180. ἀποδεικνυμένων. Compare, however, infr. p. 205. ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἠγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι. But this refers to a part of the theory which is deliberately received in the words τοῦτο μὲν—κατωρθώκαμεν.

16. τὴν συλλαβὴν] Arist. Met. H. 3. οὐ φαίνεται δὴ ζητοῦσιν ἢ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὐσα καὶ συνθέσεως.

The word συλλαβὴ is used probably not without the consciousness of its etymology.

e. g. Is the syllable the same with the letters of which it is composed? If so, they must be equally known with it.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σίγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφότερά p. 203.
ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι
ὃ γινώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γινώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

5 ΣΩ. Τὸ σίγμα καὶ τὸ ὦ ἄρα γινώσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐκάτερον ἄρ' ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον
εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γινώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γινώ-
σκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γινώσεται, προγινώσκειν
τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπαντα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γινώ-
σεσθαι συλλαβὴν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος
ἀποδεδρακῶς οἰχῆσεται.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης.

Or is it something by itself resulting from them?

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ
ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ
ἐκείνων ἓν τι γεγονός εἶδος, ιδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ
ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γ' ἂν μᾶλλον
οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον, καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως
μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

13. ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακῶς οἰχῆσεται] Compare with the humorous pathos with which this is spoken Phæd. 89. Τήμερον, ἔφη, καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, εἴανπερ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἂν εἰ σὺ εἶην καὶ με διαφύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιησαίμην ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν πρὶν ἂν νικήσω

ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον.

18. εἶδος, ιδέαν] εἶδος is here rather more concrete, ιδέα more abstract; but ιδέα is used for εἶδος a few lines below. Generally, εἶδος is more logical, implying distinction; ιδέα more metaphysical, implying unity. See Appendix C.

ρ. 204. ΣΩ. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἢ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐδ' ἂν ἦ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. ἦ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γεγονὸς ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταῦτον
b καλεῖς ἢ ἕτερον ἐκάτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι
15 ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὧ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ δέ γε δὴ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς
20 ὁ νῦν λόγος;

1. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν μία ἰδέα] There is no occasion to suspect the reading, or to conjecture *μίαν ἰδέαν*: *ἐχέτω ὡς* = *ἔστω δ*— Cf. Rep. 547. τὰ δ' ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι.

'Let it be then as we have now put it, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of each combination of harmonious elements.' The words *Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς* take up the thread of *τάχ' ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχοι*. In the conjectural reading the words *ἐχέτω*—*μίαν ἰδέαν*

would of course refer to *ιδέαν* *μίαν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον*.

For *μία ἰδέα* = *εἶδος ἰδέαν μίαν ἔχον*, cf. Euthyphr. 6. τὸ εἶδος φ' πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν; ἔφησθα γάρ που μᾶ ἰδέα τά τε ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια. Infr. 205. *μία τις ἰδέα*—*συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη*.

19. Δεῖ δέ γε δὴ,] Sc. καὶ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὀρθὴν εἶναι.

20. τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός—τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν] Cf. Ar. Met. Δ. 26. 1024. a. ὕδωρ γὰρ καὶ ὄσα ὑγρά καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὄλος δ' ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὄλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἂν μὴ μεταφορᾶ. πάντα δὲ λέγεται, ἐφ' οἷς τὸ πᾶν ὡς

In that case it cannot have parts: unless we regard everywhole in the same way as something different from all its parts, resulting from them.

With a view to this we venture to assert that the Whole is different from the All.

But can we go so far as to distinguish All, in the singular, from All, in the plural?

It is evident that "all of six" is the same as "all six."

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ' ὃ τι διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὴν λέγωμεν ἓν, δύο, τρία, τέταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἐὰν δὲς τρία ἢ τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά ο
5 τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν, πότερου ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταυτόν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. †Πάλιν† δ' οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

15 ΣΩ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ἐφ' ἐνί, ἐπὶ τούτοις πάντα ὡς διηρημένοις· πᾶς οὗτος ἀριθμός, πᾶσαι αὐται αἱ μονάδες.

5. ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν] The words ἢ πέντε καὶ ἓν, which were introduced by Comarius, are anticipated in the simple enumeration ἓν, δύο, &c. They do not occur in the Bodleian or any other MS.

10. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;] So far the MSS. give a meaning perfectly clear and natural. The words which follow are not so clear. The only way in which it seems possible to construe them as they stand, is by laying an unnatural stress on ἓν. "Again, while we speak of all (in the plural), is there no *one* thing of which we speak?" This is brought out more distinctly by C. F. Hermann's conjecture, οὐχ ἓν.

But this sense of πάλιν as a mere particle of transition, = τί δέ; is hardly admissible in Plato (contrast p. 197. πάλιν δὴ, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρυκόν τι κ. τ. λ. — νῦν αὖ—περιστερέωνα κ. τ. λ. infr. p. 205. πάλιν δὴ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν— Cf., however, Phil. 14. πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν.) And this objection is not obviated by substituting the awkward expression πᾶν τὰ ἕξ for πάντα τὰ ἕξ in the previous line. For 'Do we not repeat something when we say τὰ πάντα' would not be a satisfactory rendering. The present passage is one in which a reader of Plato will expect extreme clearness and minuteness of logical sequence. To put πᾶν τὰ ἕξ in the beginning of the argument would be to assume bluntly that which it is intended to prove, viz. that an aggre-

p. 204. ΣΩ. Ταῦτόν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί,
^d τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλέθρου
 ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταῦτόν· ἦ γάρ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ
 στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως ; ὁ γὰρ
 ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὄν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστίν.

5

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But all (plural) implies number, and number implies parts.

gate may be regarded as one thing. With this object it is necessary to reason from the plural to the singular, and to do so by gentle steps. The above argument might lead to the substitution of τὸ πᾶν for τὰ πάντα. But the objection against πάλιν would still remain : and there would be needless obscurity in the logical inversion by which, after reasoning *from* the number, we should then reason *to* it. 'In counting six, we said 'all six' (in the plural.) Again, in speaking of *all*, in the singular, is there nothing which we express? 'There must be.' 'And is not this six?' 'Yes.' The desirable sequence is restored if for πάλιν (which is itself a source of difficulty), we read πᾶν, (which in the MS. character could be changed into something very like πάλιν by the repetition of ν.) The passage may then be rendered, 'Have we not, then, in each expression, spoken of all the six?' 'Yes.' 'But while speaking of them all, is there no one thing *all* of which we

express?' 'There must be.' 'And is that any thing but the six?' 'Nothing.' Compare with the resumption of the last admission in τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, Soph. 328. οὐκοῦν τό γε εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον ; Φαίνει. Τί δέ ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἐνὶ διελεγόμεν ; After ἀνάγκη, we must understand πᾶν τι λέγειν. Compare Symp. 192. οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐξαρνηθείη — ἀλλ' οἷοιτ' ἂν (sc. πᾶς τις) κ. τ. λ. alib. For what has been said of minute sequence, compare, amongst other passages, supr. 164. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ κ. τ. λ. 188. Ἥ οὖν καὶ ἀλλοθί που κ. τ. λ.

1. Ταῦτόν—προσαγ.] We give the names πᾶν and πάντα to the same thing.

4. λέγωμεν] Several MSS. have λέγομεν. If λέγωμεν is right, it refers, not to the present sentence, but to the argument which it introduces about the relation of parts to a whole.

10. ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς] i. e. ὁ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς ἕκαστον ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν πᾶν ἕκαστον. 'The number of each taken altogether is each real thing

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

p. 204.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἐκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ μέρη
ἐστίν ;

e

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

Therefore
all (sing-
ular) also im-
plies parts.

5 ΣΩ. Ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἶη ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖ-
ται, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

Therefore, 20
if all (sin-
gular) and
the whole
are differ-
ent, the
whole is
without
parts.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ὅλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν
εἶη, τὰ πάντα ὄν μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Μέρος δ' ἔσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ
τοῦ ὅλου ;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ παντός γε.

But this
is absurd.

ΣΩ. Ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ p. 205.
οὐχ ὅταν μηδὲν ἀπῆ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστίν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταῦτόν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὐ ἂν μη-
20 δαμῆ μηδὲν ἀποστατῆ ; οὐ δ' ἂν ἀποστατῆ, οὔτε ὅλον
οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό ;

taken altogether,' or 'each taken altogether so far as it exists.' ἐκάστων would be more convenient, but we cannot venture to say that ἐκάστων is wrong. τὸ ὄν—ἐκάστων=ἐκάστων, δ' ἔστιν. Cf. Rep. 490. αὐτοῦ δ' ἔστιν ἐκάστων τῆς φύσεως. But it must be admitted that the text becomes more uncertain in the last few pages of the dialogue.

2. ὁ δὲ ἐκάστων ἀριθμὸς] The word ἀριθμὸς implies plurality. Hence ἐκάστων, unless it is corrupt. We are now reasoning

from singular to plural, as before from plural to singular.

16. ἀνδρικῶς μάχει] Viz. for the θέσις he has chivalrously taken up, p. 204. παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον.

17. αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστὶ] Is this very thing *all*, just as above, ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστίν. πᾶν, being predicate, does not need the article.

21. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] Viz. ὅλον = οὐδ' ἂν μηδὲν ἀποστατῆ = πᾶν.

τὸ αὐτό] Viz. οὐχ ὅλον = οὐ πᾶν.

μ. 205. ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὐ ἂν μέρη ἦ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖά ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταῦτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἐστίν, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἄττα εἰπεῖν, ἃ μέρη μὲν ἐστὶ συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖά γ' ἐκείνης ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύτης συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἰέναι.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη.

3. ἐλέγομεν] The argument is resumed from p. 204. Ὅτι οὐ ἂν ἦ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι.

6. Πάλιν δὴ—ἀνάγκη] This was said before, pp. 203, 204. προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβὴν,—οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

8. ἢ ταῦτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι] ταῦτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς was proved (p. 203.) to follow from their being parts. For the turn of the sentence, compare Rep. 490. ἠγείτο δ' αὐτῷ εἰ νῦν ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάν-

τως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ ἀλάζονι ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινης. ib. 503. ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μνημονεύεις, δεῖν—τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μήτ' ἐν πόνοις μήτ' ἐν φόβοις—φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον. ib. 525. διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτεῖον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῶ γενέσθαι.

21. συλλαβή] The absence of the article marks our familiarity with the word, and also gives it a certain indefiniteness: as in the expression πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. Cf. Rep. 369. Γίγνεται τοίνυν—πόλις—ἐπειδὴ κ. τ. λ.

We cannot therefore view the whole as different from the all. But, if the whole is all the parts, the complex, if distinct from its elements, is not the whole of which they are the parts.

5

10

And it can have no other parts.

Therefore it can have no parts.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

But that which has no parts is uncompounded, i. e. an element, and therefore unknown.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀποδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἶη λόγος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, 5 διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον εἶη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ἑρβῶς ἔχει προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο, ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιῶι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνημαι.

10 ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἢ αἰτία τοῦ² μονο- d ειδές τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι ; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὁρῶ ἄλλην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταῦτόν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ 15 εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἵπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

If then the complex is an aggregate of simple parts, they and it are equally known and describable. If it is one and without parts, it and the element are equally indeterminate and unknown.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἢ συλλαβῆ² ἐστι καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἵ² τε συλλαβαὶ γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπεὶπερ τὰ 20 πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταῦτόν ἐφάνη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε ἓν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλλαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχείον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον² 25 ἢ γὰρ αὕτη αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὅς ἂν λέγη

10. Ἡ οὖν ἄλλη τις] 'And is not this same thing (viz. that it is uncompounded) the cause of its having a simple form without parts?'

15. εἶδος] Used here without

reference to the sense in which it occurs above. Cf. p. 148. ἐπὶ εἶδει περιλαβεῖν.

27. μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὅς ἂν λέγη] For ὅς ἂν without antecedent, (which is not unfrequent), cf.

ρ. 206. συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχείου δὲ τού-
ναντίον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ; τούναντίον λέγοντος ἄρ' οὐ μάλ-
λον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύννοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ 5
τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μαθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ
στοιχεῖα ἐν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ
ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις 10
σε τάρᾳτοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν
b ἄλλο τι ἦν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἕκαστῷ δύνασθαι ἐπακο-
λουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη· ἃ δὲ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμο- 15
λογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Ὡν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροὶ ἐσμεν στοιχείων
καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ
εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργε- 20
στέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν
τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μά-
θημα, καὶ εἰάν τις φῆ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὴν, ἄγνω-
στον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχείου, ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν
ἠγησόμεθ' αὐτόν.

Soph. Ant. 35. ἀλλ' ὅς ἂν τούτων
τι δρῶ, φόνον προκείσθαι δημόλευ-
στον ἐν πόλει.

1. γνωστὸν] ἄγνωστον Bodl.
sed ā erasum.

8. ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο] 'That in
learning you continued doing
nothing else but endeavouring
to distinguish, &c.' Cf. Men. 80.
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς τε ἀπορεῖς.

24. ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν]
'That he is either playing with
us, or talking nonsense.'

The tendency of the present
passage is to rise from the con-
ception of elementary objects
of sense (simple ideas of sensa-
tion) to that of abstract ideas,
(universals, predicables), as the
true elements of Knowledge.

Therefore
it is untrue
to say that
the com-
plex is
known, but
the simple
unknown.

And we
have expe-
rience to
the con-
trary: for
we learnt
our letters
before we
could read,
and our
notes be-
fore we
could play
the lyre.

From this
it appears
that the
element is
more
known
than the
syllable,
the simple
than the
25 complex.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

p. 206.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ἔτι κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν c

Cf. Ar. Met. B. I. 995 b. πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἔστω ἢ εἰς ἃ διαμερίζεται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἕκαστον.

This may be illustrated from the frequent use by Plato of the example of letters, elementary sounds, etc. to represent the Ideas and the mode of becoming acquainted with them.

The following passage of Rep. p. 402. is an instance of this:—

Ὅσπερ ἄρα — γραμμάτων περί τότε ἱκανῶς εἶχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀλίγα ὄντα ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἔστι περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὐτ' ἐν μικρῷ οὐτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἠτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δεοί αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προύθυμούμεθα διαγιγνώσκου, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν οὕτως ἔχομεν. Ἀληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἴ που ἢ ἐν ὕδασι ἢ ἐν κατοπτροῖς ἐμφαίνοντο, οὐ πρότερον γινώσκου, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὰ γνῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης; παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα, οὔτε αὐτοὶ, οὔτε οὐδὲ φαμέν ἡμῖν παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρὶν ἂν τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόητα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν μικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις ἀτιμάζωμεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελέτης;

At the same time it is hinted that the sensible elements, so far as each of them can be regarded

as one individual thing, are also the objects of Knowledge.

Cf. Ar. Met. a. 994. b. ἔτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναφοῦσιν οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες (viz. τὸ ἄπειρον λ.) οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε εἰδέναι πρὶν ἢ εἰς τὰ ἄτομα εἰλθεῖν.

To resume the argument from p. 201. Theætetus has heard it said that true opinion with a reason was knowledge: and that nothing which had not a reason could be known. This reminds Socrates of a theory which said that of the elements (or alphabet) of things no account could be given—they could only be named. But of their combinations an account could be given, and these could be known. Knowledge according to this consists in being able to give an account of any thing. This, however, may be true, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. Testing this by the example of letters, we find that of the syllable $\sigma\omega$ an account can be given (it can be analysed), but not of its constituents σ and ω . But is the syllable known, the letter unknown? If so, in what way are we to conceive of the syllable? As all the letters? How then can I know them all, and yet none singly? Or is it a simple unity formed out of them? It cannot then be related to them as a whole to its parts, unless we can establish a distinction between whole and all. But all (singular) cannot be distin-

ρ. 206. ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπι-
καθώμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅ τι δὴ ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ
μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελε-
ωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν
σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἐν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνων δὴ;

d ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἶη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν
ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνο- 10
μάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν
ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὐ
δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;

gushed from all (plural); and this, containing all the parts, can scarcely be distinguished from the whole. Hence whole and all are indistinguishable. Therefore either the syllable has parts, and, consisting of things unknown, must be itself unknown; or, not having parts, it is uncompounded, and therefore itself, according to the theory, unknown. But our own memory ought to teach us that we first learnt to know the letters, and then the syllables and combinations of them.

Though the theory is rejected, we gain from it the notion of a simple idea and of a complex whole.

(2.) *κὰν ἄλλαι φανείεν ἀποδείξεις*] The train of thought, here broken off, is resumed in the Sophist, where the *ἀσώματα εἶδη* are treated as elements, and combinations of them are shown to be possible.

6. *τί ποτε βούλεται*] The sub-

ject is either *ὁ ταῦτα λέγων*, (cf. *infr.* τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὁ νῦν σκοπούμεν), or *ὁ λόγος*, viz. τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

τὸν λόγον σημαίνειν] *id. qu. τ. λ. εἰπὼν. σ.* 'What are we to understand by this λόγος?' Three meanings are put forward as possible: 1. Expression in words. 2. Analysis. 3. Definition.

11. *ὡσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον*] Cf. *Phileb.* 38. *Κὰν τίς γ' αὐτῷ παρῆ, τὰ τε πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἂν πάλιν φθέγγαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ὁ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;*

12. *ἐκτυπούμενον*] 'Imaging.' Compare also the saying of Democritus, *λόγος ἔργου σκίη*.

For τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν, cf. *Tim.* 75. *τὸ δὲ λόγων νᾶμα ἔξω ῥέον καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν φρονήσει κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον πάντων νημάτων.* *Soph.* 263.

D d

5 This need not, however, affect the truth of our third answer. What is meant in it by 'giving an account?' One of three things. Either, III. a. The reflexion of thought in speech.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν p. 206.
φαιμέν.

But this is
not peculiar
to those
who know.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶπτον
ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου
5 αὐτῶ, ὃ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι
τι ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανούν-
ται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπι-
στήμης γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

10 ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ραδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μη-
δὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ νῦν
σκοποῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ ὃ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ
τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρι-
σιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ.

p. 207.

Or, III. B. 15
The enu-
meration of
the elemen-
tary parts
of the com-
plex whole.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ
ἐκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης. ἂ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν
δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλ' ἀγαπῶμεν
ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἄμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν
20 τροχοί, ἄξων, * ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ἴσως οἶοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ
σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ
συλλαβήν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ b

3. Οὐκοῦν] Ven. Π. and an-
other MS. give οὐκοῦν αὐ.

10. καταγιγνώσκωμεν] 'Accuse
in our minds.'

τὸ μηδέν] 'Utter nonsense.'

16. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσίοδος] Or. et.
D. 454. Νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ οἶδ', ἕκα-
τον δέ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης.

Cf. Arist. Met. B. 3. 998. b.
ἕτερος δ' ἔσται ὃ διὰ τῶν γενῶν
ὀρισμὸς καὶ ὃ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν

ἐνυπαρχόντων.

20. ὑπερτερία] The Bodleian
with the other MSS. has ὑπερ-
τηρία.

22. Ὁ δέ γ' ἴσως οἶοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς]
The apodosis is deferred, as is
so often the case when an illus-
tration is introduced with ὥσ-
περ. It is finally resumed with
οὕτω τοίνυν— Cf. Rep. 402.
Ὡσπερ ἄρα—γραμμάτων πέρι—

p. 207. λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικούς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ὀνόματος λόγον. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνει τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 5 πρόσθε που ἐρρήθη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνάμενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, 10 λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δόξη καὶ ἀντιδοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περάναντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοί, ὦ ἐταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ 15 στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἐκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό μοι λέγε, ἵν' αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.

d ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὄντιν οὖν 20 ὄτου οὖν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μα- 25

But I may perform this rightly

— Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ κ. τ. λ.

3. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι] 'Whereas it is impossible.' Cf. p. 157. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, and note.

5. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε] p. 206. ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας κ. τ. λ. is most probably referred to.

15. Εἰ σοί] εἰ is interrogative, depending on τοῦτό μοι λέγε.

21. τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν—] e. g. thinking τ to be the first letter both of τε and θε.

22. τοῦ αὐτοῦ τότε μὲν] e. g. thinking the first letter of θε at one time θ, at another τ.

in the case of Theætetus' name, and yet mistake in the first syllable of Theodorus', which is the same in both.

θήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρώντας p. 207.
αὐτά ;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἼΑρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον ἠγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ θ
5 αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην
τιθέντας συλλαβὴν ;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ πω ἠγούμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας.

This is not to know the syllable.

10 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἴ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, καὶ αὖ Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ p. 208.
εἴ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἄρ' ἐπίστασθαι
φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων
15 συλλαβὴν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἄρτι ὠμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν ;

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γε.

ΣΩ. ἼΑρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἐξῆς γράφῃ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δῆ.

25 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὦν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων, ὡς φαμέν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ

2. αὐτὰ] 'What I have described.'

20. Οὐδέν γε] 'Certainly not.'

γε assents to the meaning of the question. Cf. Phil. 38. Οὐδέν γε. ἀλλ' ἄπερ ἀκούω λέγω.

p. 208. διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὠμολογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἣν οὐπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν. 5

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὅναρ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἢ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν; ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις αὐτὸν ὀριεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἓν γέ τι ἔφαμεν 10 λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὀριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἶδωλον, τὸ δ' ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ 15 τρίτον τί λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν ᾧ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἷον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν;

d ΣΩ. Οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου περί ικανὸν οἶμαι σοι 20 εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

7. ὄναρ—ἐπλουτήσαμεν] Cf. Polit. 277. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἷον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα, πάντ' αὖ πάλιν ὥσπερ ὑπαρ ἀγνοεῖν. 278. ἵνα ὑπαρ ἀντ' ὀνειράτος ἡμῖν γίγνηται.

8. ἐπιστήμης λόγον] λόγος is used here in a double sense. 1. Definition of Knowledge.' Cf. p. 149. ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν. 2. That 'account' of a thing which (with right opinion) constitutes Knowledge. The play

of words may be preserved, "when we thought we had found the most indubitable 'account' concerning Knowledge."

9. τις] Viz. the nameless author of our theory.

17. ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν] The two former were inferences from different meanings of λέγειν;—to express and to enumerate. See p. 206. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν.

Or, lastly, III. γ. The power of adding a mark which distinguishes it from all other things. I. e. Definition by the characteristic difference, or by the sum of the distinctive elements.

ΣΩ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὐ χάριν εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι p. 208. ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἂν λαμβάνης ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὡς φασί τινες, λήψει· ἕως δ' ἂν κοινοῦ τινὸς ἐφάπτη, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται
5 ὁ λόγος ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ἦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω· καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον ε
τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ὃς δ' ἂν μετ' ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὅτου οὖν τῶν
ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ αὐτοῦ,
10 ἐπιστήμων γεγωνὸς ἔσται οὐ πρότερον ἢν δοξαστής.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτως.

Even this
disappoints
us on a
nearer
view.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε
ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ
λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη
15 πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνεταιό τί μοι λέγεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο ;

ΣΩ. Φράσω, εἰ οἶός τε γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε p. 209.
ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, εἰ μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σὸν
λόγον, γινώσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος
ἐρμηνεία.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἐνὶ τῷ οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ὧ τῶν

3. τινες] Probably the Megarians. See Introduction.

9. αὐτοῦ,] This punctuation appears preferable when it is observed that there has been a tendency in the last few pages to accumulate genitives.

10. δοξαστής] Cf. p. 160. ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην, ὧνπερ αἰσθητής.

13. σκιαγραφήματος] The image is a familiar one. Cf. Phæd. 69. μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη

ἀρετή. Rep. 365. 602.

16. Πῶς τί τοῦτο] 'What do you mean? and why is it so?'

19. δὴ] According to the hypothesis.

21. ἦν] Is, according to the hypothesis.

24. ὧ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τούτων οὐδενός] It occurs to Socrates while speaking that the 'Difference' of one person from another is not one but many.

p. 209. ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἠπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διανοούμεν, ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.

b ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· πῶς ποτὲ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὄντινούν ; θὲς γάρ με διανοούμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ἢ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχη ρίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐν ἕκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ρίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἔξ- ὀφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμαυτὸν ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη κατάθῃται, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως

5

For unless I can distinguish Theætetus from Socrates and every one else, how can I be said to have a right opinion of him ? If then by the comprehension of a true account is meant "right opinion of the distinctive difference," this is a necessary part of right opinion.

10

15

20

5. ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει] The verb is attracted by τις ἄλλος.

13. τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν] The phrase Μυσῶν ἔσχατος is strengthened by the insertion of the article. The editors (under protest from Buttman) read τὸ λεγόμενον. There seems no reason for this. Cf. supr. οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. Arist. Eth. N. VIII. 3. δεῖ γὰρ τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας συναλωσαι. In the examples quoted by the

Scholiast the proverb is used to express contempt. Here it means only remoteness.

22. μνημεῖον — ἐνσημηναμένη] Cf. pp. 191, 196. This is an instance of the way in which a theory which is rejected is still permitted and intended by Plato to leave an impression on the mind.

23. κατάθῃται] So Bodl. with Vat. Ven. II.

ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ, [καὶ ἐμέ,] εἰς αὐριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀνα- p. 209.
μνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα δ
5 ἂν εἴη ἐκάστου πέρι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί
ἂν ἔτι εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἢ διαφέρει
τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ὡς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων δια-
φέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ
ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν
15 ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν
καλοῖτο δικαιότερον· τὸ γάρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσ-
λαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γεν-
ναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκότῳ μένῳ.

But if it means, "Knowledge of the distinctive difference," the term Knowledge remains still unanalysed.

1. καὶ ἐμέ,] Bodl. εἰ σὺ ἐμέ καὶ: Vat. Δ. εἰ σὺ ἐμέ καὶ: Ven. Ξ. et pr. Π. εἰ σὺ ἢ ἐμέ καὶ (Bekk. Stallb.): cett. εἴση ἐμέ καὶ: Ven. Ξ. γρ. οἴση ἐμέ. ἢ is awkwardly remote from its antecedent, and sets aside τὰλλα ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ, which answers to ἐξόφθαλμον in the previous sentence. And the ἢ may have originated in the similarity of sound between ἢ and ὕ, as in p. 200. many MSS. read αὐτὴν for αὐτοῖν. Heindorf's conjecture, ὁ, referring to μνημείον, is unsatisfactory, because it is rather the object of sense, which, by fitting the μνημείον, would be said to remind. Hence ἃ ἐμέ καὶ would seem a fair emendation. But the above is chosen as the simpler, and as accounting

more naturally for the corruption. If it is right, the sentence must be supposed to revert by a conversational licence to the indicative mood. See p. 149, ποιεῖν καὶ — ἀμβλίσκουσιν, and note. Schleiermacher's conjecture, ἢ, leaves the subject of ἀναμνήσει doubtful. That of the Zurich editors, εἴσει σὺ ἐμέ καὶ ἐμέ, introduces an abrupt and awkward inversion. And the use of οἶδα in this sense is very questionable.

14. ὑπέρου—περιτροπή] ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ποιοῦντων πολλάκις καὶ μηδὲν ἀνυόντων, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ταχέως τι πραττόντων. μέμνηται δὲ αὐτῆς Φιλήμων ἐν Ἡρωσι καὶ ἐνταῦθα Πλάτων. (Schol.) οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, i. e. λῆρος ἂν εἴη.

p. 209. ΘΕΑΙ. †† εἴ γε δὴ τι νῦν δὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἡδὺ χρῆμ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ

p. 210. γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἐστίν. ἦ γάρ ; 5

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη κατ' ἐκείνον.

10

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασί γε εὔηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὄτουοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα αἰσθησις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθῆς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς 15
b δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

1. εἴ γε δὴ] So the MSS., except Vat. Δ., which has εἰ δέ. The Bodleian continues without punctuation from ἐσκοτωμένῳ, and accents as above. But the accents appear to have been added by a later hand. Is it possible some words may have slipped out? such as τί οὖν δὴ ; εἴ γε δὴ τι— 'Well, what then? For I presume your question just now implied that you had something to say.' The reading of Vat. Δ. admits of being rendered, however, 'Well, but if,— what were you just now going to say, when you asked the question?' Most of the editors give Εἰπέ. The question referred to is τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν— τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη; This is a little

difficult; and Badham, retaining Εἰ δέ, most ingeniously conjectures τί νῦν δὴ ὡς ἕτερον ὑπέθου, i. e. 'what was the suppressed alternative implied by the use of μέν?' But this is hardly required. Theætetus very properly recalls Socrates from his unwonted discursiveness.

3. ἡδὺ χρῆμ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ] The genitive is due to a sort of attractive ethical force in ἡδύ, cf. ἀτοπα τῆς σμικρολογίας above. Soph. Phil. 81. ἀλλ' ἡδὺ γὰρ τοι κτήμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν.

'An amusing sort of creature must be our fairest of the accounts of knowledge!'

8. ἀποκρινεῖται] Sc. ὁ λόγος.

13. φάναι] ἐκείνον sc.

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυυόμεν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὧ φίλε, p. 21c.
περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἢ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον
ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σέ εἴρηκα.

5 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἢ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν
τέχνη ἀνεμιαία φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τρο-
φῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπι- c
10 χειρῆς γίνεσθαι, ὧ Θεαίτητε, εἴαν τε γίγνη, βελτιώ-
νων ἔσει πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, εἴαν τε κενὸς
ῆς, ἦττον ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος,
σωφρόνως οὐκ οἴομενος εἰδέναί ἃ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον
γὰρ μόνον ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλεον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ
15 τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄν-
δρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην
ἐγὼ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἢ μὲν τῶν
γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι d
καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ
20 βασιλέως στοᾶν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἣν με
γέγραπται· ἔωθεν δέ, ὧ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαν-
τῶμεν.

3. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε πλείω] καὶ πλείω, 'even more,' ναὶ μὰ Δί' ἔγωγε is interposed.

9. Ἐὰν τοίνυν] I. e. 'The power of rejection is one of the greatest powers in thinking.'

19. τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοᾶν] Indictments for impiety were

laid before the ἀρχων βασιλεύς, who was the representative of the ancient kings in their capacity of High-Priest, as the Rex Sacrificulus was at Rome. (Smith's Dict. of Ant.) It is at this point that the Euthyphro is supposed to open.

Though Theætetus has brought forth more than he knew was in him, the art of Socrates has hitherto rejected all. But he is cured of thinking that he knows what he does not know.

APPENDIX A.

On some peculiarities of style and idiom in Plato.

Ἄλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη κατάθῃται. Theæt. p. 209 c.

The words of Socrates, it is said in the Euthyphro (pp. 11, 15), are like the works of Dædalus; they are endued with motion. This image expresses the most characteristic peculiarity of Plato's style, the source of much both of its beauty and of its difficulty. His thoughts are not fixed and dead, like specimens in a museum or cabinet, but flying as he pursues them, doubling, hiding, reappearing, soaring aloft, and changing colour with every change of light and aspect.

The reader of the Theætetus, for example, is disappointed, if he looks for perfect consistency with the Republic, or if he expects to find the logical statement of a definite theory. The ground is shifted several times. One line of inquiry is abandoned, and yet the argument presently returns from a new starting-point upon the former track. A position is assumed and then relinquished;—the figures are erased,—and yet further discussion is made, not without reference to the hypothesis which has been demolished. The doctrine of sense, for instance, is wholly negatived, and yet it cannot be said that we are not intended to gather something from it.

Plato's metaphors are 'living creatures' rather than figures of speech; he regards them not as airy nothings, but as realities; he recurs to them with fondness, as Lord Bacon does. But no expression is ever merely repeated in Plato. If an image is recalled, it is with some additional or altered feature: if a conception is resumed, it is not merely copied, but a fresh picture is drawn from the life. Even in recapitulating, some modification is often made, or the argument is carried further. Thus the photograph, as it has been called, of the connexion is apt to be blurred, from the thought moving as we read. Even in the same passage, where an ordinary writer would

be contented with referring to an example or illustration just adduced, Plato surprises the reader with a different one, which perhaps gives a new direction to the current of thought. A fair instance of this occurs in *Theæt.* p. 168, where Theodorus says: 'It was mere nonsense in me to hope that you would excuse me and not compel me to strip for the contest, as the *Lacedæmonians* do. You are rather to be compared to *Sciron*: for *they* tell one either to strip or go away; but you are rather like *Antæus* in your way of doing business, for you will let no man go till you have *stripped him* (like *Sciron*) and *compelled him to wrestle with you* (like *Antæus*).'

The argument itself (δ λόγος) is continually personified and is spoken of under a Protean variety of figures.

It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away 'like a tale.' More frequently it has power over us, like a general commanding us, like a sea in which we must swim for our lives, while it rolls its successive waves over us, or like a wind which carries us we know not whither. Sometimes 'its name is legion,' and it is multiplied into a swarm or an impetuous throng. Or it takes a milder form, as the raft, or dolphin, on which we seek to escape from a sea of doubt, or the wall behind which we screen ourselves from the driving shower. The Argument talks with us, it goes through a subject, takes up a position, hides its face from some threatening objection and passes on. It rebukes us for unfair treatment of itself, it can be insulted, it stands in need of help, it has a father, and guardians of its orphanhood.

This movement or plasticity of ideas, which penetrates the whole of Plato's writings, is closely connected with their conversational form, and manifests itself in what may be called his poetical use of language.

The observation of both these elements of Plato's style is of importance to the student, because it saves him from the necessity of resorting to some forced construction, or flying to conjecture, upon each occasion of grammatical perplexity.

I. Conversationalisms. In Plato we often meet with irregularities of construction, which in an oration or set treatise would be referred to looseness or inelegance of diction, but which only make the dialogue more easy and lively and natural.

a. Changes of construction. The following are a few out of several instances in the *Theætetus* :

(1.) p. 144. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα—πρῶτον αὖ εἶναι—ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν

ἄμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὀρώ γιγνομένους. Theodorus begins by simply expressing his surprise, but proceeds to dwell upon his previous anticipations and experience to account for it.

- (2.) p. 153. ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις—κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα κ. τ. λ. cf. p. 173. σπουδαὶ δ' ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχάς—οὐδ' ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

The emphasis on the first words causes the sentence to begin vaguely, and the construction is determined as it proceeds.

- (3.) p. 167. πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς.

Here, unless something is corrupt, a transition is made to the reflexive pronoun, as if ψυχῆ were the subject of δοξάζοντας : a transition from the persons who think to the mind which thinks.

- (4.) p. 172. οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειε φῆσαι (ὁ λόγος) ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. He passes from what the argument would say, to what certain persons do say. So elsewhere there is often a transition from the indefinite singular to the indefinite plural.

To this may be added the occasionally difficult use of the cases of nouns : e. g. Theæt. p. 147 ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει, without περί : just as we might say in conversation, ' the mud-question,' for ' the question about the mud.'

β. Resumption. A thought is frequently resumed in the same sentence, for the sake of modifying it, or of particularizing the aspect in which it is considered, or merely for the sake of clearness. The introduction of the pronoun αὐτός, to recall a noun which has been thrown back for the sake of emphasis, is a familiar instance of this.

- e. g. p. 155. εἰάν σοι ἀνδρῶν—τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν—συνέξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν.

Perhaps the most marked instance of resumption in the Theætetus occurs p. 171, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπό γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, δταν τῆ τάναντία λέγοντι ξυγχωρῆ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται.

γ. Redundancy. There are other ways in which regularity of construction is sacrificed to fulness of expression.

- e. g. p. 153. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε. καὶ γαλήνας καὶ ὄσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σώζει.

- p. 172. τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεῖνοι, εἰάν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ.

p. 199. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἶόν τε, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν ἀντὶ
 ἐκείνης, ὅταν—ἀνθ' ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, ὅτε ἄρα τὰ ἔν-
 δεκα δώδεκα φήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἔνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν
 δώδεκα λαθῶν, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἶον φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς.

An occasional consequence of this fulness of expression is the de-
 ferred apodosis, which sometimes occurs, especially after ὥσπερ :
 e. g. Rep. 402 Ὅσπερ ἄρα ———. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐ-
 πως κ. τ. λ. Theæt. p. 207. ὥσπερ ἂν—οὕτω τοίνυν κ. τ. λ.

δ. Also connected with the conversational form of Plato's writ-
 ings, and the plastic, growing condition of his thoughts, is the im-
 perfect kind of argument which he sometimes employs. It is a
 saying of Aristotle's that Dialectic deals tentatively with those sub-
 jects on which Philosophy dogmatizes, (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ
 ἃν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστικὴ); and Bacon speaks of a Socratic induc-
 tion. To this, and to a certain economy used towards the respond-
 ent, is to be attributed the frequency of the argument from example
 (the example often covering more ground than seems quite fair,) and of the inference, by means of simple conversion, from particular
 to universal.

The immaturity of the science of logic no doubt renders this mode
 of reasoning more easy and natural than it could be in a later age,
 but it is not explained without allowing for the fact that the inquiry
 is conducted, at least on the part of the respondent, in a tentative
 and inductive spirit.

An instance occurs in the Theætetus p. 159, when it is argued
 that if what is different is dissimilar, then whatever is dissimilar is
 wholly different, and what is similar is the same. That Plato was
 fully aware of the inconclusiveness of the form of argument thus
 ironically adopted, appears from Protag. p. 350, where Socrates is
 checked for it by Protagoras, who says, Ἐγωγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ
 οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρράλαιοι εἰσίν, ὁμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρράλαιοι ἀνδρεῖοι,
 οὐκ ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες.

And sometimes, even where an instance is really meant to
 cover a large conclusion, its power is ostensibly limited with per-
 suasive modesty : as in Theæt. p. 152. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταύ-
 τὸν ἔν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. — Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος
 δεῖ ἐστι.

Ib. p. 204. Ταῦτόν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί, τό τε πᾶν
 προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα.

ε. It is difficult to separate between the conversational and the
 poetical element in Plato. Their combination gives him the power
 of 'saying any thing.' Just as there is a freedom of expression

possible in conversation, which we feel to be impossible in writing, or as the poet can express with grace and dignity what by other lips were better left unsaid.

II. This leads us to the *Poetical use of language*. Plato's words have frequently a different value from any that could be given them by a mere prose writer. The language as well as the thought is instinct with a creative power, which gives it a dramatic vividness and refinement; at times even a dithyrambic cadence, or a lyrical intensity. The poet whom Plato most resembles in this is Sophocles; but his style may be regarded as the mirror of all Greek literature.

a. Poetical use of single words.

(1) Choice of a more sensuous expression (*πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖν*).

p. 150. *ἐναργὲς ὅτι* for *δῆλον ὅτι* ('as clear as day').

p. 154. *ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα*.

p. 156. *συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη*.

p. 160. *μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ*.

p. 162. *διωλύγιος φλυαρία*.

p. 165. *σφαλὲς γὰρ ἦττον ἀσχημονήσει*.

p. 169. *μαλ' εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν*.

p. 171. *ταύτη ἀν—ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον*.

p. 172. *ἀνάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντιδίκος* (wielding coercion).

p. 202. *ταῦτα—περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι*.

To which may be added the 'hypocoristic' use of diminutives.

p. 149. *φαρμάκια*.

p. 195. *ἐάν του σμικρὸν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον*.

(2) Use of Epic words, the meaning of which is sometimes *spiritualized*.

p. 149. *μαίας γενναίας καὶ βλοσυρᾶς*.

p. 162. *ἄξιος οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου*.

p. 174. *πολὺ βδάλλοντα*.

p. 189. *τοῦτο γὰρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη*.

p. 194. *Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἦ*.

(3) Playing upon a word.

p. 150. *εὕρημα*. Cf. Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1108.

p. 152. *τὴν ἀλήθειαν*.

p. 181. *τοὺς ῥέοντας*.

p. 194. *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ*.

p. 208. *ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον*.

Closely related to this is (4) the etymological use of words: i. e. when, by dwelling upon its etymology, a word is made to express something different from, or more than, its ordinary meaning.

p. 149. *ὅτι ἄλοχος οὔσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχεν.*

p. 152. (perhaps) *ξυμφερέσθων* (let them march one way).

p. 161. *τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον.*

p. 193. *ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλι ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας.*

p. 198. *πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ.*

(5) Poetical use of particles: e. g. the frequent use of *ἄρα*, helping to keep up the idea that Socrates is repeating what he has heard, the occasionally difficult reference with *γάρ* (p. 152. *οἶα γάρ*—and note), the hyperbaton of *καί* (p. 154. *καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε*. p. 195. *ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοι τὸ ῥῆμα*—), and generally the dramatic liveliness, with which successive clauses are contrasted, as if each were put into the mouth of a different person. Speech thus becomes literally a 'self-dialogue.' See especially p. 155, *ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι*: and p. 190, *ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον—ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον—ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα—ὡς ἀνάγκη*—, with which the supposed answers of the mind to itself are introduced.

Compare Phil. 38. *τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ' ἐστάναι φανταζόμενον ὑπὸ τινι δένδρῳ.*

β. The same poetical energy shows itself in the expansion of some of the ordinary forms of grammar. In this also Plato reflects the general tendency of the Greek language.

(1) Apposition. The use of the apposition of clauses (as a form of exegesis) deserves to be reckoned among the more salient peculiarities of Plato's style. One example from the *Theætetus* will suffice to indicate what is meant.

p. 175. *πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν—ἰλιγγίων τε ἀφ' ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεῖς—ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων—γέλωτα—παρέχει κ.τ.λ.*—where another writer would probably have inserted *γάρ*.

Sometimes a sentence is thus placed in apposition with a pronoun such as *τοῦτο* (p. 189 ad fin.) or *ὃ* (p. 158.) Compare the use of *τὸ δέ*, e. g. p. 157. A slightly different use is that of the accusative in apposition to the sentence, which may be viewed as an extension of the 'cognate accusative.' Instances of this are p. 153, *ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα κ.τ.λ.*; p. 161, *τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.* (Many of the examples of resumption and redundancy above referred to would fall grammatically under this head.)

(2) Attraction. E. g. where a main verb was to be expected, we find a participle. It can be accounted for; but there is reason to believe that it is partly due to the neighbourhood of another participle, or of some word that is usually construed with a participle.

p. 173. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πρότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώμεθα; where we should have expected διέλθωμεν.

p. 150. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προιοῦσης τῆς συνουσίας θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσιν: where, but for the proximity of ὡς—, ἐπιιδόντες would probably have been ἐπιιδόασιν. See also λαβών, p. 199. which but for δταν—λάβη would be λαβόντα.

γ. To the same self-consciousness of language which betrays itself in the foregoing instances may be attributed the minuteness of antithesis, which, though common everywhere in Greek, is strikingly so in Plato.

p. 150. ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες.

p. 151. ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπιιδόασιν; where the subjects of the two verbs are opposed.

p. 197. εἰ δυνατόν οὔτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ κ. τ. λ.

δ. This power of refining upon language is turned to account in adapting the mode of expression to the exigencies of the argument.

E. g. p. 152, where we are gradually led from the example of the wind, which one man feels cold, and another not, to the position that sensation is the correlative of reality. See also pp. 158, 159, where, as the argument proceeds, (ἕτερον) ὄλον τοῦτο ὄλω ἐκείνω is substituted for ὄλωσ ἕτερον.

ε. The care which is taken of the rhythm is a further peculiarity of Plato's style, and may be treated as a poetical element. This is especially noticeable (1) in the manner in which quotations from poetry are shaded off so as to harmonize with the surrounding prose, and, (2) in the occasional elaboration of prose writing to something like a metrical cadence.

(1.) p. 173. In the quotation from Pindar, φέρεται is probably substituted for πέτεται (see note on the passage), the words τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα are inserted, and τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὄλου is added at the close. Thus the poetical language is interwoven with the sentence, so as to embellish it without interrupting its harmony.

p. 194. The substitution of the Attic κίαρ for the Homeric κῆρ is probably due to a similar motive.

(2.) Dithyrambic and lyric cadences are more frequent in some other dialogues than in the Theætetus. See especially Sympos. pp. 196, 197, the close of Agathon's speech, especially the last few

lines, in which the rhetorical antitheses have more the effect of rhythm than of argument: Phædr. 238, 241, alibi: Rep. 546, 7; 617, 8; and several places of the Timæus, e. g. p. 47, ὧν ὁ μὴ φιλόσοφος τυφλωθεὶς ὀδυρόμενος ἂν θρηνοῖ μάτην. With such passages may be compared Theæt. 175, 6, οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.

The same power shows itself more slightly in an occasional inversion of the order of words for the sake of emphasis,

p. 158. οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι.

p. 160. κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπων μέτρον εἶναι.

ζ. A few words may be added in conclusion on the artificial structure of Plato's dialogues, of which the Theætetus is acknowledged to be a prominent example.

There is a unity in each of them, approaching to that of a living organism:—the spirit of the whole breathing in every part:—a continuity independent of the links of question and answer, by which it appears to be sustained; which may be viewed apart from the scenery and the changes of persons, and the passages of humour and pleasantry by which it seems to be interrupted.

And while it is comparatively easy to distinguish the principal stages of the argument, yet there is such a dovetailing and interpenetration of the parts, that it is difficult to adopt an exact division without doing violence to the real harmony, or even to mark the exact point of transition from one hypothesis to another.

An instance of this is the way in which the reader is prepared for the argument from the idea of expediency, which may be said to be anticipated as early as p. 157, ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν. (Compare the anticipation, at the very beginning of the dialogue, p. 144, ἐπεσκεψάμεθ' ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὧν λέγει, of the conclusion arrived at p. 179, σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, κ. τ. λ.) The difficulty of reconciling the ideas of goodness and wisdom with the doctrine of sense appears more distinctly in the defence of Protagoras, p. 167, and presses for solution as an element of the common opinion of men, p. 170, καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις——παρὰ σφίσιν.

These two passages have prepared the way for the statement in pp. 171, 2, of the 'semi-Protagoreanism' of those who will not venture to say that every creature knows what is for its own health, nor that every individual and every state knows equally what is expedient in legislation. When a breach has thus been made in the

enemy's lines of defence, a rest is afforded to the reader by the vision of the Divine Life which follows, in which, however, the ideas of wisdom and holiness and righteousness have a direct bearing upon the conclusion towards which we are being carried step by step, and its effect upon the tone of the discussion is apparent in the words p. 177, *πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμ' ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν οὐχί; κ. τ. λ.* At this point the argument from Expediency is fully entered into. But it is difficult to say exactly where it began.

A similar gradation may be observed in the development of the difficulty about false opinion.

Note also the artfulness of the transition from sensation to thought, pp. 184–187, and from 'true opinion' to 'true opinion giving an account of itself,' p. 201.

And while the earlier part is written with a view to what is in reserve, the previous discussion is not forgotten as the inquiry proceeds. See p. 194, *ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται*, compared with p. 152, *ἃ δὴ φάμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς*: and p. 209, *μνημείον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη κατὰθῆται*,—an application of the (relinquished) conception of the waxen block.

Plato's philosophy has been compared to a building, of which the Republic is the superstructure, while the other dialogues are the pillars and fretted vaults upon which it rests.

The image fails to give an adequate idea of the perfection of Art,—or rather of Nature conscious of itself,—which gives harmony, but not regularity, a growing, not a fixed, consistency, both to the parts and to the whole.

His writings are the creations of a great master, whose sketches are worked up into the larger monuments of his genius, a cycle surrounding an eternal Epic poem, bound together by the unity not merely of a particular age and country, but of an individual mind.

APPENDIX B.

μη̄ οὐ.

§ 1. THE most familiar use of μη̄ οὐ is after verbs of fearing and the like, with the subjunctive^a: where a fear is expressed that something is *not*, or will *not* be; e. g. Plat. Men. p. 89. πρὸς τί βλέπων δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστεῖς, μη̄ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἡ ἀρετή;

But there are other cases of a different kind, in which μη̄ οὐ has only the force of a single negative.

These are, (1) With a conditional participial clause depending on a negative sentence, e. g.

Hdtus. II. 110. οὐ οἱ πεποιῆσθαι ἔργα οἰά περ Σεσώστρι τῷ Αἴγυπτίῳ.
 - - - - οὐκ ὄντων δίκαιον εἶναι ἰστάναι ἔμπροσθε τῶν ἐκείνου ἀναθημάτων, μη̄ οὐκ ὑπερβαλλόμενον τοῖσι ἔργοισι.

Hdtus. VI. 106. εἰνάτη δὲ οὐκ ἐξελεύσεσθαι ἔφασαν, μη̄ οὐ πλήρους ἔόντος τοῦ κύκλου.

Soph. Œd. Rex, 220. οὐ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν ἵχνηνον αὐτός, μη̄ οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον.

(2.) With an infinitive or participle dependent on a negative sentence, when the clause so introduced explains or supplements that which is denied. What is so explained has of course something in it of a privative meaning. The commonest instances are those of verbs of refraining, being able (to avoid), admitting (a negative), and denying; e. g.

Soph. Œd. Col. 361. ἦκεις γὰρ οὐ κενή γε, τοῦτ' ἐγὼ σαφῶς ἔξοιδα, μη̄ οὐχὶ δεῖμ' ἐμοὶ φέρουσά τι.

Soph. Œd. Rex, 1088. οὐ τὸν Ὀλυμπον ἀπείρων, δὲ Κιβαιρῶν, οὐκ ἔσει * * * μη̄ οὐ σέ γε κ. τ. λ.

^a To the same head should probably be referred the use after *αἰσχύνομαι* with the infinitive, mentioned by Rost (Grammatik, p. 764.); of which I

have been unable to find an example. But for the converse, see Plat. Gorg. p. 461. ἡσχύνθη μη̄ προσομολογήσαι.

- Soph. Antig. 540. μή—μ' ἀτιμάσης τὸ μὴ οὐ θανεῖν τε σὺν σοι—
 Œd. Col. 572. ξένον γ' ἂν οὐδέν' ὄνθ', ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν ὑπεκτραποίμην
 μὴ οὐ συνεκσώζειν.
 Plat. Phæd. 72. τίς μηχανή μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα ἀναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τε-
 θάναι ;
 Ib. 88. οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρρόντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνόητως θαρρέειν.
 Ib. ἐκεῖνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ πονεῖν αὐτήν—.
 Symp. 197. τίς ἐναντιωθήσεται μὴ οὐχὶ Ἔρωτος εἶναι σοφίαν ;
 Gorg. 461. (l. c.) μὴ προσομολογήσαι—μὴ οὐχί. Ibid. τίνα οἶει
 ἀπαρνήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχί— ;

(3.) With the infinitive or participle after *αἰσχρόν ἐστι*, and some other expressions of reproach.

- Plat. Theæt. p. 151. αἰσχρόν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμείσθαι ὃ τί
 τις ἔχει λέγειν.
 Plat. Soph. p. 219. τὴν θηρευτικὴν ἄλογον μὴ οὐ τέμνειν διχῆ.
 Plat. Symp. πολλή ἄνοια μὴ οὐχ ἔν τε καὶ ταύτων ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ κάλλος.
 Plat. Phæd. 85. μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχειν—πάνυ μαλθακοῦ
 ἀνδρός.
 Soph. Œd. Rex, δυσάλητος γὰρ ἂν εἶην, τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτεῖρων
 εἶδραν.

§ 2.

1. There is a simple and obvious explanation of the two passages of Herodotus, which may perhaps be found with some modification to apply to the other cases above mentioned.

Both in II. 110. and VI. 106. the clause introduced with *μὴ οὐ* expresses not a merely hypothetical condition, but a condition which was also a fact. It is not merely said that Dareius should not stand before the image if his deeds were inferior, it is also asserted that they were inferior. The Spartans did not say that they would not come unless it was full moon, but that they would not come on the ninth day, because the moon was not then full.

The same explanation applies to Soph. Œd. Rex, 220. Œdipus says, not 'that he could not have made the investigation, unless he had had some clue:' but that '*not having* any thing to guide him, it was impossible for him to conduct the investigation by himself.'

In all these instances therefore *οὐ* is clearly significant: not destroying the negative force of *μή*, but strengthening into a subordinate assertion what might otherwise be understood as an hypothesis. It gives a degree of objective reality to the clause, and brings it into prominence as an integral part of the predication.

But why is this only done when the whole sentence is negative? For instance, why could not the priest have said, 'δειν αὐτὸν προσκυνέειν τὰ ἐκείνου ἀναθήματα, μὴ οὐκ ὑπερβαλλόμενον τοῖσι ἔργοισι'?

The answer is probably to be sought (1) in the tendency of negative particles in Greek to multiply themselves,—which acts here in two ways, the negative turn of the sentence leading the mind onwards to a further negative, and the negation in the principal clause making it necessary to strengthen the subordinate but independent negative expression:—(2) in the indefiniteness of the negative sentence, which makes the necessity of avoiding ambiguity to be more distinctly felt.

2. These last remarks apply equally to the second case, that of negative sentences, (or interrogative with negative meaning,) to which a negative clause is appended, explanatory of that which in the chief clause is denied. But it is less easy here to determine the exact significance of οὐ. The subordinate clause in this case does not run parallel to the whole sentence, but to a part of it, i. e. it corresponds, not to what is negatively asserted, but to what is denied. Still it is a fair hypothesis that it is not merely subordinate, but that it enters into the predication. It is co-ordinate with the predicate, if we do not include in that term the negative particle. It is a fact consistent with this hypothesis, that what is thus introduced with μὴ οὐ is generally dwelt upon with some emphasis, and is often more important to the sense than the preceding verb, which has something of an auxiliary character. Thus Plato Phæd. 72, τίς μηχανή μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα ἀναλωθῆναι, might be more briefly expressed thus,

πῶς οὐ πάντα ἀναλωθήσεται;

and ib. 88. οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρρόυντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρέειν, is nearly equivalent to οὐδεὶς ἂν θάνατον θαρρόων οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρόιη.

It is not necessary for the validity of an hypothesis of this kind to show that where οὐ is omitted, (as in Soph. Œd. Rex, 1388. οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμεν τὸ μὴ ἴποκλείσαι τοῦμόν ἄθλιον δέμας. Philoct. 348. οὐ πολὺν χρόνον μ' ἔπεσχον μὴ με ναυστολεῖν ταχύ,) the clause is purely subordinate, though the case would be considerably strengthened if this could be proved. And though an account could be given of both the above instances, (in the first the remoteness from fact of an imaginary act in past time, in the second the emphasis being on ἔπεσχον, and his 'not sailing' being in this case so purely imaginary), still it is better, especially when dealing with poetical instances, not to seem to strain them to our theory. It is noticeable that οὐδὲν κωλύει is generally followed by the infinitive without either μὴ or μὴ οὐ. It is in effect an affirmative expression.

3. The last case is in form nearly analogous to the first, with this difference, that the clause introduced with *μη ου*, instead of being co-ordinate with the predicate, is itself the subject of the sentence. Here *μη* indicates that the expression is hypothetical, while *ου* shows that what is thus supposed is conceived of objectively, and as taking place in the region of fact. The supposition generally refers to the case which is immediately before the speaker, and it is usually a supposition of something not *done* in that case. Here a 'negative instance' comes to our aid. Soph. Œd. Rex, 12. *δυσάλητος γάρ αν ειην τοιάνδε μη ου κατοικτείρων εδραν*. But ib. 76. *τηνικαυτ' εγω κακος μη δρων αν ειην πανθ' οσ' αν δηλοι θεος*. Again, Plat. Soph. l. c. *αλογον μη ου τεμνειν*. But, where it is a mere abstract supposition, *πως ου πολλη αλογια—γνωσαι την ψυχην μηθεν*. (Theæt. 199.) *ουκ αλογον μη—δειν*, (Phæd. 62.)

What has been already said of the tendency of negatives in Greek to suggest negatives must be applied to this case also. Thus: *καλον εστι, μη—*. *αισχρον εστι μη ου—*.^b

§ 3.

Although the MS. authority for *ου* in Theæt. 153. a. is weak, (Par. C. E. Flor. a. c. Palat. Coisl. ex em. Ven. Π. ex em. Par. B. ex em.), yet the comparison of similar passages, especially Phæd. 88. *ουδενι προσηκει θανατον θαρρουντι μη ουκ ανοητως θαρρειν*, tends strongly to confirm the reading which has been retained in the text. According to Hermann, the omission of *ου* in such cases is a frequent error: and, after what has been said above, it may perhaps be added, that the use of *μη ου* is in harmony with the general vividness and reality with which the whole passage is conceived.

^b It is possible that the use of *μη ου* after such expressions as *ουκ αν δυναίμην, ουδεμία μηχανη, τίς μηχανη,* should have been placed under this rather than the foregoing head.

APPENDIX C.

εἶδος, ἰδέα.

§ 1. The words *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are throughout nearly synonymous in Greek, but there is a tendency observable to a difference in their use, perhaps in some way connected with the difference of gender.

εἶδος seems earlier to have shaken itself clear of metaphor, and to have settled into an abstract meaning. Thus in Thucyd. II. 20 τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου means simply the nature of the disease, but in II. 21 τοιαύτη ἦν ἐπὶ πάντων τὴν ἰδέαν, should be translated, 'was such in its general phenomena.' Here *ἰδέα* calls up a picture, while *εἶδος* simply designates a class or kind of thing. So *πάσα ἰδέα—θανάτου* Thuc. III. 81 is not 'every kind of death,' but 'death in every form.'

§ 2. The word *εἶδος* occurs frequently in Plato in its ordinary sense. Thus in Theæt. p. 157. ἀνθρώπων τε τίθενται καὶ λίθων καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ζῶν τε καὶ εἶδος, the word is scarcely more abstract than in Herodotus I. 94. τὰ—τῶν παιγνιέων εἶδεα.

A more philosophical application of the same use occurs p. 181, where we have the δύο εἶδη κινήσεως.

§ 3. But it occurs also in a more abstract sense, which we may possibly be right in attributing to Socrates, as a distinctly logical term. *εἶδος* then means a class, or species, as that to which particular things are referred, which contains them, and marks them off from others, and which itself answers to their definition. See Theætetus, p. 148. ταύτας πολλὰς οὐσας ἐνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες. p. 205. εἰς ταῦτον ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ.

§ 4. It may be doubted whether in Plato the word *εἶδος* ever loses entirely the association of its earliest meaning (in which he frequently employs it) of outward appearance, form. (See Ast, Lex. sub voc.) But as it approaches to its technical use in his philosophy, it tends to regain metaphorically the association of visible shape, which in a literal sense it has cast off. The metaphor is not perfect, however, until the word has been changed to *ἰδέα*. Or if we choose to put it so, *εἶδος* expresses the general shape and contour of a thing; *ἰδέα* implies also the colour and the whole appearance. *εἶδος* is a colourless *ἰδέα*. See Theæt. p. 203. ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν

μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον. And there is a real difference underlying the figurative one. For a comparison of passages tends to prove that εἶδος is applied to the universal forms of existence as they are distinct from one another; ἰδέα rather as each of them has a unity in itself. Thus in Theæt. l. c. we have ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων^c. Again, p. 204. μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη. Ib. ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν. p. 205. μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη. 205. καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα. Cf. supr. p. 184. εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν—συντείνει.

It should be noticed, that in the above passages the use of both words is in a transition state, assuming rather the form of an adaptation of the ordinary use, than of technical phraseology. Plato may perhaps be teaching the doctrine of ideas by example; but he does not avowedly give to the words the 'second intention' with which they are used in many passages to express the eternal forms of Being. There is also an intermediate transition noticeable in the use of ἰδέα, from the abstract to the concrete, i. e. it passes, by a kind of *synecdoche*, from meaning the sum of the attributes to mean that to which they belong. So in Thuc. l. c. πᾶσα ἰδέα θανάτου = θάνατος πάσης ἰδέας. And in Theæt. l. c. μία ἰδέα is used synonymously with ἐν εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον. It is more to the purpose, however, to observe generally, that the word εἶδος tends to a use at once more logical (ἕτερον εἶδος, διττὰ εἶδη, κατ' εἶδη διῆστας, κατ' εἶδη τέμνειν) and more concrete: (the ἰδέα is spoken of as inherent in it): the word ἰδέα to one more metaphysical, (εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσπαρμένα, μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν πάντη διατεταμένην ἰκανῶς διαισθάνεται,) more abstract, and at the same time more figurative.

The word ἰδέα is a fair symbol of the union of reason and imagination in Plato.

^c Cf. Rep. p. 544. ἢ τινὰ ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἢ τις καὶ ἐν εἶδει διαφανεῖ τινι κείται.

APPENDIX D.

ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ μέλε.

These and the like phrases are apt to be slurred over in translating or interpreting Plato, from the frequency of their recurrence and the difficulty of appreciating their exact force in each connexion. They belong to that conversational sprightliness and play of fancy which it is impossible to bind to any rule.

Here, as elsewhere, Plato carries further an existing tendency of the Greek language. Such addresses as *δαιμόνιε*, *δαιμονίη*, *ἡθείε*, in Homer (Il. VI. 407, 486, 518, 521. cf. Plat. Rep. 344. ὦ δαιμόνιε *Θρασύμαχε*) vary in signification according to the mood of the speaker. The same may be said of ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ μέλε, in Aristophanes.

In Plato the variety of such addresses is much greater, and the variety of their meaning greater still. They can often be more perfectly rendered by a changed expression of the voice or countenance, than by any words. All that can be said of them generally is, that they give an increased intensity to the tone of the conversation at the moment, whether this be grave or humorous, respectful, ironical or familiar.

ὦ θαυμάσιε in its simplest use conveys a remonstrance, 'I wonder at you.' The most decided instance is in the Phædo, p. 117. Οἶον, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. 'What are you doing! I am amazed at you.' It may also sometimes convey admiration. But it is frequently used where the subject of wonder or surprise has nothing to do with the person addressed: e. g. Cratyl. 439, where it indicates Socrates' intense interest in the mystery of the Ideas. Compare the use of the form of congratulation ὦ μακάριε (see Aristoph. Nub. 167.) to express Socrates' own delight at some great discovery: e. g. Rep. 432, where Justice is discovered; Phæd. 69, where Socrates congratulates himself as well as Simmias on the superiority of the philosophic life.—So when Hamlet says, 'O good Horatio, I'll take the ghost's word for a thousand pound,' the address is prompted

not this time by Horatio's worth, but by the relief caused to his own mind by the discovery of the king's guilt. Thus in *Theæt.* p. 151. ὦ θαυμάσιε can hardly be rendered except by a note of admiration. 'Do you know that many have been ready to bite me!'

Nearly the same is true of ὦ δαιμόνιε, p. 180, though it here retains a slight tone of remonstrance. 'Disciples, my good sir!' 'Disciples, did you say?' While in p. 172 it wears quite a different expression, conveying really Socrates' admiration for the philosophic life, and is more difficult to render. 'Ah! my good friend, this is not the first time I have observed how natural it is that a philosopher should make a poor figure at the bar!'

The affectionate confidence and familiarity expressed in ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ φίλε, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, acquires, in ὦ μέλε, a degree of humorous or triumphant gaiety. *Theæt.* p. 178. Νῆ Δία, ὦ μέλε, 'My dear fellow! I should rather think he did.'

The use of quaint adjurations and addresses in Shakspeare affords an interesting illustration of this feature of Plato's style.

ERRATA.

Page xxiv. line 20. *for invocation read invention*

xxviii. line 5. *for θεσμὸν read δεσμὸν*

xxxvi. line 8. *for hard read had*

lxxxiii. line 25. *for experiences read experience*

152. c. St., add note on πάσσοφος] I. e. 'Wiser even than we esteemed him;' referring to σοφὸν ἄνδρα above.

In the note on p. 155. b. St., for ἐμοῦ τοῦ ὄγκου read τοῦ ὄγκου ἐμοῦ

208. line 18. ἐσκότω μένῳ read ἐσκοτωμένῳ

